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From Marxist-Leninism to Market-Liberalism?
The Varied Adaptation of Latin America’s Leftist Parties
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Supervisors: Kurt Weyland and Wendy Hunter
There has been tremendous variation in the development trajectories of Latin 
America’s leftist parties. Whereas some have successfully entrenched roots in society, 
built their party organization, and become relevant national parties, other leftist parties 
have languished organizationally, suffered debilitating internecine rivalries, and 
witnessed a mass defection of followers, at times despite substantial initial electoral 
success. For instance, Brazil’s Workers' Party (PT) abandoned socialism, moderated its 
program, and built itself up into one of Brazil’s two main parties. Venezuela’s Radical 
Cause (LCR) and Peru's United Left (IU), however, did not. While they had similar 
origins to the PT, both failed to adapt: LCR and IU fractured and became electorally 
irrelevant, having been unable to adapt to external challenges.
What accounts for this puzzling empirical variation in otherwise similar parties in 
relatively similar contexts? More broadly, this dissertation seeks to answer under what 
conditions do leftist parties in Latin American democracies transform from 
undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized parties into democratic, moderate, 
professional parties? Conversely, under what conditions do they fail to adapt, experience 
organizational stagnation, and succumb to irrelevance?
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It argues that the political context in which each of these leftist parties emerged 
had an indelible effect on the parties' later ability to adapt institutionally and ideologically 
to future endogenous and exogenous shocks. First, where authoritarian repression 
dismantled preexisting leftist parties, a political vacuum on the left emerged that created 
the incentive for the rise of a new type of leftist party that intrinsically valued democracy. 
Second, the implementation of legal requirements by outgoing authoritarian regimes 
during a party's formative years encouraged parties to institutionalize, ensuring the 
development of a disciplined, majoritarian party organization. Finally, obstinance on the 
part of the military's move to extricate itself from politics encouraged leftist parties to 
participate in democratization and, thus, widen their electoral appeals.
Those leftist parties that were formed under such regimes were induced to take 
certain actions and adopt certain institutions that made them adaptable in the long run. 
Those that formed afterwards or never experienced life under authoritarian rule had little 
incentive to change and, thus, proved unable to respond to external challenges down the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The convocation of democratic elections in the 1980s following the decline of 
many of Latin America’s authoritarian regimes was expected to bring about a clear and 
uniform political  shift  to  the  left  (O’Donnell  and  Schmitter  1986,  pp  57-64),  as  the 
region’s severe economic poverty and social inequality were regarded as ideal conditions 
for  the  success  of  left-wing  parties  in  post-democratic-transition  Latin  America  (cf. 
Cleary 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Yet left-wing parties were, by and large, not 
up to the challenge. Indeed, the right or center-right retained power until the late 1990s—
almost two decades after the initial wave of founding elections.
The  late  1990s  brought  about  the  so-called  “pink  tide,”  beginning  with 
Venezuela's  election  of  Hugo  Chávez  (1998-2013);  however,  this  phenomenon  was 
characterized mainly by the election of populist leaders and movements, not necessarily 
leftist parties. Nonetheless, the “pink tide” generated another wave of scholarly attention 
(cf. Castañeda and Navia 2007; Arnson and Perales 2007; Castañeda and Morales 2008; 
Baker and Greene 2011; Roberts forthcoming). From Guatemala down to Chile, leftist 
presidents came to power, prompting scholars and commentators alike to proclaim the 
new hegemony of leftist politics in the region (Cleary 2006; Economist 2006; Castañeda 
2006), despite the fact that Latin America’s so-called “left turn” was not accompanied by 
any discernible leftward shift in terms of citizens’ ideological self-placement (Seligson 
2007; Arnold and Samuels 2011).
It should be little surprise that leftists, like rightists, win elections, whether they 
be  anti-system  extremists  who  exercise  populist  anti-American  rhetoric  or  centrist 
moderates  who  espouse  sound  macroeconomic  measures  alongside  poverty-fighting 
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social programs (cf. Petkoff 2005; Madrid 2010); electoral results are not the best way of 
categorizing or  measuring sweeping change.1 Success  at  the  polls  is  arguably  just  as 
much a reflection of contingent, system-specific factors as it is of region-wide trends: the 
2000 election of Ricardo Lagos of Chile’s Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS), for 
instance, had more to do with coalition politics and the continued appeal of the anti-
Pinochet alliance than with any fundamental change in the Chilean electorate (Garretón 
2000).
Furthermore, those leftist leaders who rose to power at the expense of traditional 
parties—relying instead on top-down movements or personal electoral vehicles, such as 
Chávez—may  make  headlines  with  their  incendiary  rhetoric,  yet  their  inability  to 
institutionalize their political practices (through a political party, for instance) may well 
undermine any legacy they hope to have. While individual political leaders may hold 
outsized influence while  in  power,  their  legacies  fail  in  comparison to  the  long-term 
influence held by established political parties. In this way, a focus on electoral results and 
leftist  leaders  distracts  attention  away  from  the  broader—and  more  significant—
institutional changes occurring on the left.
This  author  argues  that  the  more  enduring  and  consequential  phenomenon 
occurring  on  the  left  side  of  Latin  America’s  political  spectrum2 has  not  been  this 
wavering  wave  of leftist  governments,  but  the  varied  rise  and  consolidation  of 
democratically loyal, professional, moderate leftist parties in some countries (cf. Levitsky 
and  Roberts  2011a).  This  project  focuses  on  the  rise  of  democratic,  professional, 
1 Indeed, leftist leader Rafael Correa won the second round of Ecuador’s 2006 presidential election after 
placing second in the first round with under 23 percent of the vote. Daniel Ortega of the leftist Sandin-
ista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) won Nicaragua’s 
2006 presidential election with little over 38 percent of the vote, having avoided a second round runoff 
by receiving more than a 5 percent margin victory over the second place finisher (Political Database of 
the Americas: PDBA). Both presidents have been in power since 2007.
2 This paper borrows its definition of the left from Levitsky and Roberts (2011b, p 5; 2011a): i.e., politi-
cal actors seeking to protect individuals from market failures, reduce socio-economic inequality, and 
strengthen underprivileged sectors.
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moderate parties in some countries, alongside the persistence of nondemocratic, weakly 
institutionalized,  radical  parties  in others.  Defined more in depth later  in the chapter, 
party  adaptation,  the  project's  dependent  variable,  entails  commitment  to  democracy, 
institutional  professionalization  (i.e.,  the  gradual  construction  of  a  flexible,  complex, 
autonomous, and coherent party apparatus), and ideological moderation (i.e., the gradual 
moderation of a party platform). 
Indeed, there has been significant empirical variation in the level of democratic 
commitment on the part of Latin America's leftist parties: whereas some have recognized 
the intrinsic value of democracy and agreed to the procedural rules of the democratic 
game, others have failed, having been unable to distance themselves from their earlier 
support of non-legal routes to political power and to accept democratic elections as the 
sole  means  of  ratifying  power  relations:  compare Uruguay's  successful  Broad  Front 
(Frente Amplio, FA) to Venezuela's Radical Cause (La Causa Radical, LCR), for instance 
(cf. Luna 2007; López Maya 1995). 
Similarly,  there  has  been  significant  empirical  variation  in  the institutional 
professionalization of  Latin  America’s  leftist  parties:  whereas  some have successfully 
entrenched roots in society, built their party organization, and become relevant national 
parties, other parties have languished organizationally, suffered debilitating internecine 
rivalries, and witnessed a mass defection of followers, at times despite substantial initial 
electoral  success:  compare  the  strong  organization  and  structure  of  Brazil's  Workers' 
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) to the ephemeral institution that was Peru's United 
Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), for example (cf. Tanaka 1998; Hunter 2010).
Finally, there has been significant empirical variation in the degree of ideological 
moderation of  such  formerly  radical  parties:  whereas  some  parties  have  successfully 
abandoned orthodox economic positions and opted to follow public opinion instead of try 
3
to  shape  it,  other  parties  have  languished  or  even  collapsed,  unable  to  adapt  to  the 
changing nature of the electorate: compare Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(Partido de la Revolución Democrática,  PRD) to Colombia's 19th of  April  Movement 
(Movimiento 19 de Abril, M-19), for example (c. Borjas Benavente 2003; Carrigan 2009).
This thesis  analyzes the empirical  variation among once broadly similar  Latin 
American leftist parties and offers a new theory to explain their varied ideological3 and 
institutional transformation over time. In doing so, it sheds light on the real sea change 
occurring  on  the  Latin  American  left:  the  rise  and  consolidation  of  professional, 
moderate, democratic leftist parties in certain countries, alongside the failure to moderate, 
professionalize,  and  accept  democracy  of  leftist  parties  in  others.  This  chapter  first 
presents the empirical puzzle to be explained. It then summarizes the theory explaining 
leftist party adaptation. Subsequently, it makes a case for the significance of this research 
question to the discipline and the importance of leftist party adaptation to the future of 
democracy in Latin America. Then, it comments on the theoretical implications of the 
theory.  Following  that,  it  has  two  small  sections  on  research  design  and  scope  and 
organization, followed by a brief conclusion.
THE PUZZLE: THE VARIED ADAPTATION OF LATIN AMERICA’S LEFTIST PARTIES
Given  the  fact  that  the  region’s  relative  economic  poverty  and  stark  social 
inequality  are  often  assumed  to  be  the  ideal  structural  basis  for  the  growth  and 
development of left-wing parties (cf. Debs and Helmke 2008; Cleary 2006; Castañeda 
1993), why do we not see a higher frequency of success of such parties throughout Latin 
America? What accounts for the empirical variation in the developmental trajectories of 
3 Ideological transformation is used to signify both strategic moderation (i.e., commitment to a demo-
cratic regime) as well as policy moderation (i.e., softening one's party platform to be more in line with 
the policy demands of society at large).
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parties with relatively similar origins and confronted by the same political and economic 
transitions?
Latin America's leftist parties have not had it easy. In the 1980's, democratization, 
the  collapse  of  communism,  the  rise  of  market  economics,  and  the  Latin  American 
political  spectrum’s  subsequent  spatial  shift  to  the  right  in  the  1990s4 reinforced 
democratic  preferences,  reshaped  societal  demands,  and  re-calibrated  leftist  partisan 
priorities (Baker 2003; Stallings 1992). Lest they risk irrelevance, Latin America’s leftist 
parties  were  induced to  reinterpret  democracy as  having more  than just  instrumental 
value,  revisit  the  belief  in  the  state  as  the  prime  lever  for  economic  change,  and 
reconsider the notion that power is obtained through the seizure (and destruction) of the 
state by the proletariat (Burgess and Levitsky 2003; Madrid 2010). 
In addition to these broad ideological changes, Latin America's leftist parties also 
witnessed  an  institutional  transformation  following  the  “subproletariat-ization”  of  the 
working class and the undermining of its political organization (Roberts 2002; Portes and 
Hoffman 2003); the professionalization of politics and a changing role for parties (Katz 
and Mair 1995); as well as the “media-ization” of political campaigns, such as the use of 
opinion  polling  (Tanaka  1998;  Levitsky  and  Cameron  2003;  Dalton  and  Wattenberg 
2000).  Its  leftist  parties  were likewise induced to reinterpret  their  role within society 
(particularly,  their  historical  reluctance  to  engage  the  broader  electorate),  rethink  the 
nature of party-organization linkages (i.e., relying less on routine mobilization through 
party-affiliated  social  organizations),  and  embrace  the  usage  of marqueteros (i.e., 
marketing  firms  and  pollsters)  and  increasingly  sophisticated  polling-based  strategies 
aimed at tapping into public opinion and capturing the median voter (Handlin and Collier 
2011; Coppedge 2001).
4 These so-called “external” explanations happened conjuncturally; many reinforced each other, but they 
are not the same, nor did they happen simultaneously.
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Given the changing political and economic landscape, one would expect leftist 
parties  to  adapt  to  this  new environment.  To  be  sure,  some  parties  abandoned  their 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary programs and orthodox economic determinism in favor of 
democracy and market capitalism, and professionalized their institutions in the process. 
Indeed, looking back at the past thirty years, José Eduardo Dutra, former president of 
Brazil’s PT, argued that “the PT changed because the world changed, and because Brazil 
changed,  too;  but we had  the  capacity  to  change  without  changing  sides”  (Folha de 
S.Paulo 2010;  emphasis  added)5.  However,  not  all  parties  adapted  ideologically  and 
institutionally (and, furthermore, not all parties were capable of effecting change without 
“changing sides”).
While  the  diffusion  of  ideas  about  economic  and  political  liberalization  was 
relatively  uniform throughout  Latin  America,  its  consequences  on  the  region's  leftist 
parties  were  decidedly  not. There  has  been  significant  empirical  variation  in  the 
development trajectories of Latin America’s leftist parties. Brazil's PT on the one hand, 
and Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR on the other—this project's three case studies—are 
paradigmatic cases of the two different paths taken by Latin American leftist parties. The 
PT and  IU  were  both  born  in  1980  as  radical,  weakly  institutionalized  parties  with 
ambivalent  views  toward  representative  democracy  (Azevedo  1995;  Tanaka  2008). 
Venezuela's LCR was born as a political organization in 19786 and shared broadly similar 
qualities  (López  Maya,  1995).  However,  shortly  thereafter,  these  parties'  trajectories 
diverged.
The  PT  adapted  institutionally  and  ideologically.  It  quickly  recognized  the 
intrinsic value of democracy, slowly consolidated its party organization and structure, and 
eventually moderated its policy stance. Today it has entrenched roots in society; is one of 
5 All translations in this dissertation were done by the author.
6 From roughly 1973-1978, LCR was a social movement, composed of loosely connected social groups.
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Brazil's  largest,  most  institutionalized  parties;  has  helped  consolidate  the  country's 
democracy; and has responsibly governed the country since 2003 (Hunter 2010; Ribeiro 
2008; Amaral 2003, 2010).7
However, while IU's and LCR's origins bore striking similarities to those of the 
PT, their developmental trajectory was markedly different.  LCR failed to adapt either 
institutionally  or  ideologically  (López  Maya  1995):  throughout  the  1990s,  a  sizable 
minority of its national directorate—including the party's secretary general—was actively 
seeking to overthrow the democratic regime (cf. Medina 1999). Similarly, IU, a coalition 
of small  leftist  parties,  was unwilling ever to accept democratic elections as the sole 
means  of  ratifying  power  relations,  broaden  and  deepen  its  political  appeals,  or 
professionalize its organization (Tanaka 1998; CVR 2003, III.2.4). Indeed, throughout the 
1980s Peru's IU continued to defend in its party statutes and through public statements 
violence as  a  revolutionary principle  and legitimate  means  of  struggle,  and its  ultra-
radical  wing openly sought (an ill-defined) socialist  revolution as late as 1989 (CVR 
2003;  Lynch  1999). Internecine  rivalries  and  ideological  inconsistencies  led  to 
debilitating schism and party collapse for both LCR and IU (Salamanca 2004; Tanaka 
2008).
What, then, accounts for this variation in the developmental trajectories of parties 
with relatively similar origins confronting the same external challenges? Why did once-
similar leftist  parties confronting broadly similar obstacles—namely, the transitions to 
democracy (where it was not already present) and market economics,8 and the “media-
ization” of politics—make such vastly disparate strategic choices? What effect did these 
7 Uruguay's FA followed much the same trajectory (Luna 2007). While not one of this project's case 
studies, the FA will be referenced throughout to provide further support to certain points.
8 To be sure, in Latin America, the “dual transition” occurred within the same world historical period, but 
not necessarily simultaneously: for the most part, the political transition occurred in the 1980s while 
the economic transition occurred in the 1990s. Furthermore, the two often entered into conflict with 
one another (see, for example, Stokes 2001).
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choices have on the parties’ subsequent electoral fortunes? More broadly, the dissertation 
answer  the  question: under  what  conditions  do  leftist  parties  in  Latin  American 
democracies transform from undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized parties into 
democratic, moderate, professional ones? Conversely, under what conditions do they fail 
to  adapt,  remaining  confined  to  their  ideological  ghettoes  and  stagnating 
organizationally?
Despite  the  weight  of  this  project's  research  questions,  however,  existing 
arguments do not adequately explain why leftist parties with similar origins have pursued 
dissimilar ideological and institutional trajectories. A new explanation is thus needed to 
address this lacuna. In the following section the author tackles this issue by showing how 
the political context of and external challenges faced during the formative years of a party 
help determine that party's ability to adapt institutionally and ideologically down the line.
Adaptation is not necessarily normatively preferable; however, for the purposes of 
this  thesis,  this  author  contends  that  such  ideational  and  institutional  changes  are 
necessary for sustained electoral and political relevance, as adaptation allows for long-
term party growth and development and thus positions parties for future electoral success 
(cf.  Kitschelt  1994).  Leftist  parties can and do experience  electoral  success  without 
adapting—elections are, after all,  unpredictable and democracy is inherently uncertain 
(cf. Przeworski 1991); however, lack of adaptation all but ensures that such success is 
fleeting. More importantly, it is adaptability that is key: parties that are either unable or 
unwilling to  adapt,  despite  the  strong  incentive  to  do  so,  will  face  arguably 
insurmountable obstacles to remain electorally relevant in the medium and long term.
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THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF: NO PAIN, NO GAIN
It is widely held that the particular circumstances under which a party develops 
has indelible effects upon that party’s growth and development (Panebianco 1988; Collier 
and Collier 1991; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Non-democratic regimes, it follows, create 
particular incentives and constraints upon the institutional and ideological developmental 
trajectory  of  leftist  parties.  This  author argues  that  both  the  nature  and  severity  of 
challenges faced by a leftist party at its very inception—as well as the institutional setting 
in  which  its  formative  moments  took  place—create  particular  incentives  for  and 
constraints upon that party's long-term ideological and institutional path. 
Parties  that  emerged  under  adverse  conditions  tended  to  accept  democracy, 
centralize  power,  and  broaden  and  deepen  their  political  appeals;  this  facilitated 
ideological moderation and institutional professionalization down the line. Alternatively, 
parties that came about in more permitting contexts had little incentive or need to change; 
since they were never forced to adopt certain mechanisms and policies in their  early 
years, such parties had difficulty adapting later on. In this way, the type of regime under 
which a party develops helps determine that party's future ability to adapt successfully to 
external  stimuli.  Thus,  the  early pain inflicted  upon  such  parties'  predecessors  by 
repressive regimes led to later gain, as parties were better prepared to respond quickly to 
external challenges—namely, the political and economic transitions, mentioned earlier—
and to engage in successful party adaptation than parties that were never confronted by 
challenges in their past. 
This dissertation argues that 1) the levels of repression suffered by the left under 
earlier  authoritarian  rule  (prior  to  party  formation),  2)  variations  in  the  design  and 
implementation of electoral and partisan rules used by outgoing authoritarian regimes, 
and 3) the timeframe with which the authoritarian regime agreed to a complete turnover 
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of  power,  help  determine  the  success  of  future  leftist  party  adaptation.  Those  leftist 
parties that arose under regimes that had repressed the left, sought to restrain nascent 
leftist parties, and prolonged their own extrication from power were induced to adopt 
certain policies and mechanisms that favored future adaptation.
It claims that, far from preventing change, a party's historical legacy—i.e.,  the 
“weight of the past”—can also, paradoxically, lead to the adoption of institutions that 
allow  for  sweeping change down  the  line.  Along  the  lines  of  revisionist  historical 
institutionalism,  which  understands  institutions  as  dynamic  entities  (cf.  Streeck  and 
Thelen  2005;  Mahoney  and  Thelen  2010)  this  dissertation's  theory  explicates  how 
institutional features initially adopted by leftist parties in the face of repression, legal 
challenges, and authoritarian obstinance have unintended, albeit positive, consequences: 
they pave the way for ideological and institutional transformations in the long run by 
making  parties  more  adaptable.  This  project  thus  engages  the  debate  between  the 
competing “critical juncture” à la Katznelson (2003) and “gradual change” à la Pierson 
(2004) frameworks for conceptualizing institutional change. Rather than understanding 
them as competing visions, however, it contends that, by integrating the two arguments, 
an “unorthodox” critical juncture argument can account for later, gradual change.
This project's argument also challenges the prevailing view that, when faced with 
repression,  parties will  necessarily radicalize.  Repression is  thought to keep a radical 
party out of step with the average voter: in response to repression, the old guard should 
“hunker down” and block the ideological moderation desired by younger militants who 
never suffered under the old regime (cf.  Greene 2007; Hellman 2011). However,  this 
theory  shows  that,  when  leftist  parties  develop  under  a  repressive  but impermanent 
authoritarian regime, they end up professionalizing and moderating their  strategy and 
policies in the medium and long run. The parties more likely to remain undemocratic, 
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radical,  and  weakly  institutionalized  are  those  that  develop  within non-repressive 
contexts, be they democracies or soft authoritarian regimes. The reason is that parties 
with  centralized  control  are  more  adaptable  than  those  with  a  less  developed  party 
structure and organization (Share 1999).9
THE SIGNIFICANCE: WHY LEFTIST PARTY ADAPTATION MATTERS
An answer to this project's research question is pertinent to the literature on the 
consolidation and quality of democracy, as well as to the nascent field of institutional 
change. Indeed, democracy without political parties is unthinkable (cf. Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995; Aldrich 1995; Schattschneider 1942; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Parties 
matter  for  democracy  because,  in  an  ideal  system,  they  aggregate  interests,  direct 
grievances  through  legitimate  channels,  and  facilitate  governability  (Ware  1996; 
Hagopian 1998). Cohesive parties address collective action and responsibility problems 
that arise in the campaigning and governing process, limit the self-interest of individual 
legislators  to  facilitate  the  delivery  of  national  policy  needs,  provide  structure  to 
democratic politics in the electoral arena and the legislature, and generate predictability 
in how political actors behave (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Mainwaring 
and Scully 2008).
My conceptualization of the causes of party adaptation has practical as well as 
scholarly implications. Explaining the variation in leftist parties’ adaptation is important 
for  our  understanding  of  the  efficacy  of  democratic  institutions  and  the  future  of 
democratic representation in the region (see Stokes 1999). This is particularly the case 
today, given Latin America’s all-too-recent history of military intervention to ward off the 
9 This meshes with Levitsky's  (2003) findings in his study on the origins of the adaptability of Ar-
gentina's Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista,  PJ): leadership renovation, leadership autonomy, and 
structural pliability enabled the Peronists to adapt to changing times. See also Burgess and Levitsky 
(2003).
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real or perceived threat of revolutionary leftist radicalism (cf. Stepan 1978a; Valenzuela 
1990).10
Moderated  leftist  parties  have  proven fundamental  in  helping democratize  the 
societies in which they operate: by conforming to and embracing established democratic 
institutions, such parties channel societal discontent from radical options into democratic 
norms, strategies, and goals. Leftist party adaptation institutionalizes these non-violent 
channels  with  which the  remaining radical  leftists  can then air  grievances  and effect 
change democratically, helping moderate the left over time. In turn, the de-radicalization 
of these sectors undermines the self-purported rationale behind the radical right’s claims 
that,  in  order  to  protect  democracy,  one  must  destroy  it:  the  objective  of  sustained 
military intervention in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s was to ward off the (real or 
perceived) threat of revolutionary leftist radicalism (cf. Stepan 1978a; Valenzuela 1990). 
Consequences of No Party Adaptation: Anti-System Outsiders
Leftist party adaptation is important not only for the leftist parties in question, but 
for the stability of the party system as a whole and the very legitimacy of the democratic 
regime. Thanks in large part to the undemocratic theoretical texts upon which they have 
based  their  ideology  (but  also  in  part  due  to  the  Latin  American  right's  historical 
disregard  for  the  intrinsic  value  of  democracy,  to  be  sure),  Latin  America's  leftists 
historically  valued  democracy  only  for  its  instrumental  value  (cf.  Castañeda  1993). 
Channeling  leftist  grievances,  sentiment,  and  political  participation  into  the  electoral 
arena and political institutions of representative democracy is, arguably, a prerequisite for 
the stability of democratic governance. It is no coincidence that in countries in which 
10 Indeed, comprehending the transformation of Uruguay’s FA from urban guerrilla group to semi-loyal 
opposition to governing party sheds light on how democracy becomes, in Linz and Stepan's (1996) 
words, the “only game in town.”
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leftist parties have not engaged in moderation and professionalization leftist sentiment 
has turned to anti-system, (arguably) non-democratic options. 
As the absence of a legal leftist option can harm a democratic regime's legitimacy 
and encourage the electorate to opt for anti-system candidates, an explanation for the 
variation in leftist party adaptation is important for analyzing the resilience of democratic 
regimes over time. For instance, understanding how and why IU failed to adapt and take 
advantage of the opportune political opening created by the decay of Peru's traditional 
parties helps explain why the left threw their support behind the anti-system, autocratic 
Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), who was elected president in 1990 (Lynch 2000). Much 
the same can be said for the failure of Venezuela's LCR to adapt: the subsequent political 
vacuum on Venezuela's  left  served the  populist  Hugo Chávez  well  in  the  late  1990s 
(Salamanca 2004). The next two sub-sections look at the immediate results of IU and 
LCR's failed party adaptations: the elections of Fujimori and Chávez and the subsequent 
declines of Peru's and Venezuela's lefts, respectively.
IU's Collapse Helps Fujimori Rise
The failure of IU to engage in successful party adaptation explains, in part, the 
1990 election of  Alberto  Fujimori,  an anti-system outsider  who trampled over  Peru's 
democratic institutions and set back the country's process of democratic consolidation. 
Despite the radical changes occurring throughout Latin America and the world, from the 
political and economic transitions, to the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), the IU 
remained radical,  seemingly unable to adapt to changes in the Peruvian electorate by 
engaging in moderation and modernization. According to Zapata (2009), Peru's
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lefts  did  not  understand  the  shift  in  common  sentiment.  The  people  stopped 
believing in the State as the solution, instead identifying it more with the root of 
the  problem.  Liberalism  was  triumphing  and  the  lefts  repeated  a  statist 
discourse...Lastly, we [leftists] remained associated with the State and the armed 
struggle.
By the late  1980s,  every single  Peruvian social  group favored a  democratic  political 
regime to a revolutionary socialist one (cf. McClintock 1989, pp 139-142), yet the IU was 
unable to adapt to changing political realities and thus quickly became radically out-of-
step with the mindset of the general populace. IU could have forestalled its voter exodus, 
if only its party structure did not prevent it from moderating ideologically (Seawright 
2012).
IU's lack of institutional professionalization hampered its ability to sideline the 
more  radical  individuals  and  component  parties  of  the  party-front,  which  had  never 
moderated  strategically  by  committing  to  democracy.  This  prevented  de-facto  party 
leader  Alfonso  Barrantes  and  his  allies  from  shifting  programmatic  agendas  and 
broadening  alliances,  which  would  have  helped  IU  cope  with  the  changing  political 
context (cf. Kitschelt 1994). Instead, the party's power configuration (every component-
party leader had veto power), which was not supportive of change, ensured that little 
ideological or institutional transformation would occur (Harmel and Tan 2003); indeed, 
IU's pragmatic faction was forced out of the party, not vice-versa.
IU had  almost  been  poised  to  take  power  in  the  1990 election,  but  given  its 
inability to adapt, it squandered its chance and opened up a political vacuum. In 1988, 
Barrantes  had been the  election's  favorite,  projected to  win a  landslide  victory in  an 
inevitable  second  round  run-off,  but  slipped  shortly  thereafter,  once  IU's  internecine 
fighting between pragmatists and ideologues began to intensify; nonetheless, he remained 
in second place until a mere two months before the election (Schmidt 1996, p 329; Taylor 
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1990).11 However, in large part thanks to IU's split, Barrantes finished a depressing fourth 
place, with less than seven percent of the vote, and IU's Henry Pease in fifth, with barely 
over four percent (Political Database of the Americas, PDBA). According to Pedráglio 
(2011), the collapse of IU was:
one of the principal reasons for the birth of Fujimorismo. In what social space was 
Fujimorismo born? In the space that had been the left's. [IU] was responsible not 
only for supporting Fujimori over the alternative, [Mario] Vargas Llosa, but also 
because it divided; the people were tired of all the [left's] infighting.
Fujimori, the little-known underdog who had placed second in the first round, ended up 
handily  defeating  Vargas  Llosa  in  the  second  round,  thanks  to  the  support  of  IU's 
politicians and sympathizers.  Indeed, while Fujimori governed from the right,  he was 
elected on a center-left platform; much of the Peruvian left threw their support behind 
him in the second round of the election (Conaghan 2005).
In  his  decade  in  power,  Fujimori  dismantled  Peru's  democratic  institutions, 
violated democratic rights and freedoms, and unconstitutionally consolidated power in 
the name of efficiency and necessity, culminating (but not ending) in a temporary “self-
coup” on April 5, 1992. He attacked constitutional checks and balances and paid mere lip 
service to civil rights and liberties.
Fujimori  intervened regularly in the judicial  branch and the attorney general’s 
office;  temporarily  deactivated the Constitutional  Court  (Tribunal  Constitucional)  and 
dismissed three of its seven members; packed the National Panel of Elections (Jurado 
Nacional  de  Elecciones,  JNE)  with  loyal Fujimoristas (i.e.,  followers  of  Fujimori); 
curbed the power of the National Council of the Magistrates (Consejo Nacional de la 
11 “In January of 1989 Alfonso Barrantes led the presidential election polls, but in December of 1990 all 
that was left of the legal left was ruins and ashes....total collapse” (León Moya 2012).
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Magistratura);  and limited the power of electoral bodies that dared to declare his re-
reelection  candidacy  illegal  (Tanaka  2005,  Degregori  2003).  Additionally,  under  his 
power, the Ministry of the Presidency (Ministerio de la Presidencia) usurped functions of 
the legislature and the courts  and concentrated power in the hands of  the Executive. 
Furthermore, Fujimori used public spending on social services and the mobilization of 
public employees to shore up support in key districts, while conversely withholding state 
goods and services in other regions to undermine the popularity of opposition politicians 
(Conaghan 2005).
In addition to undermining the separation of powers, Fujimori also violated the 
civil  rights and liberties of Peruvians. Opposition politicians were subjected to police 
surveillance, harassment, and often served with concocted tax fraud charges. Worse yet, 
numerous human rights abuses were committed by Fujimori’s government.12 The truth 
was hard to come by, however, because Vladimiro Montesinos, the de facto leader of 
Peru’s  National  Intelligence  Service  (Servicio  de  Inteligencia  Nacional,  SIN),  had 
established a vast web of pressure and corruption to intimidate the press and co-opt them 
into only reporting stories favorable to the government; opposition media moguls, such as 
Channel 2 (Canal 2) owner Baruch Ivcher, were harassed by the government.13
Fujimori used his “politics of antipolitics” to reverse much of the limited progress 
the  country  had  made  toward  democratic  consolidation  and  governance  (Degregori 
2003). He succeeded in taking on dictatorial powers, first overtly and later through less 
obvious ways, in what Catherine Conaghan (2005) termed a “labyrinthine construct” that 
12 In 2009, Fujimori was charged with crimes against humanity for 15 extrajudicial executions in Barrios 
Altos in 1991, as well as the kidnapping and later killing of ten people in 1992 by the paramilitary Col-
ina Group (Tanaka 2009; Amnesty International 2005).
13 Ivcher was the target of trumped up tax evasion charges. He wound up losing his adopted Peruvian citi-
zenship, as well as control of his station, and was forced to flee to the United States (Conaghan 2005).
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assured him unchecked powers and untold opportunities.14 In this way Fujimori adeptly 
took advantage of Peru’s power vacuum, critical situation, and implosion of the left to 
advance his personal interests, disregarding his country’s interests and the future of its 
democratic governance.
LCR's Loss is Chávez's Gain
Similarly, the electoral appeal and subsequent rise to power of Chávez can be 
explained, in part, on LCR's failure to capitalize on Venezuela's crisis of representation, 
the collapse of its traditional parties, and desire for change.15 In the mid-1990s,  LCR 
seemed poised to assume the presidency. The party had been growing exponentially since 
the late 1980s, it had made a name for itself as an advocate of good governance, and had 
a candidate capable of appealing to a broad swath of the Venezuelan electorate. Yet, given 
ideological incoherence and internal inconsistencies, LCR was unable to sell itself as the 
solution to its country's woes.16 LCR's failure to engage in party adaptation meant that it 
could not fill the vacuum on the left  side of the political spectrum, of which Chávez 
ultimately took advantage.
Chávez and other subversive military members had long set their eyes on gaining 
political power (explained in Chapter 5); however, the original plan (concocted in the 
early 1980s) had never been for direct military  rule.  Indeed,  the  Bolivarian Republic 
Movement 20017 (Movimiento Bolivariano Republicano 200, MBR-200) never conceived 
of its leaders—neither Chávez nor Francisco Arias Cárdenas—as politicians capable of 
14 According to Tanaka (2005), “Peru had a government with important political support, capable of win-
ning elections, but functioning as an authoritarian regime, given the lack of autonomous institutions 
and effective mechanisms of checks and balances” (p 277).
15 To be fair, LCR was a failed remedy, not the disease.
16 Had LCR in fact won in 1992, it most likely would not have been able to govern effectively: the party 
was, indeed, plagued by debilitating intra-party issues.
17 The group was founded in 1983, on the 200th anniversary of the birth of Simón Bolívar.
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winning democratic elections and governing outright (Sánchez Urribarri 2008). However, 
the failure of LCR opened up the possibility of the group governing directly: the failed 
adaptation of the legal left meant that there was a recently vacated space in which Chávez 
could emerge.
LCR's  breakaway group threw its  support  behind Chávez and helped get  him 
elected in 1998. In power, he drew support from numerous former causaerristas (i.e., 
LCR members) to fill high-level positions within his governing coalition: General Arias 
Cárdenas, Aristóbulo Istúriz, Alí Rodríguez, Ana Elisa Osorio, María Cristina Iglesias, 
Farruco  Sesto,  David  Paravisini,  Mario  Isea,  Eduardo  Manuitt,  and  Roger  Capella. 
Chávez  very  well  may have  run and won the  presidency without  the  support  of  the 
defeated  LCR  and  the  electoral  backing  of  former causaerristas members  and 
sympathizers; however, he would have had a much more difficult time winning—and 
governing—had the party not split in two.
Whether  or  not  Chávez  was  a  boon or  bane  for  democracy is  up  for  debate, 
depending on who one asks  and one's  definition of  democracy.  Those who focus  on 
political inclusion and redistributive policies (cf. Ellner 2011, Buxton 2003) have been 
kinder to Chávez, while those focusing on political rights and democratic institutions (cf. 
Corrales and Penfold 2011, McCoy 2000) have been harsher. Chávez himself claimed to 
have  been  reviving  Venezuela's  democracy  via  participatory  institutions  and  the 
incorporation of long-excluded sectors into society. He often argued that representative 
democracy  has  failed  in  Latin  America,  and  that  it  was  “necessary  to  promote…a 
democracy that ceases being representative, although it preserves levels of representation, 
but  is  one  that  promotes  participation,  and  that  moves  towards  [popular]  decision-
making” (quoted in Lander 2005, p 31).
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However,  Chávez  did  so  at  the  expense  of  democratic  institutions:  his  1999 
Constitution  heightened  presidential  power  at  the  expense  of  the  legislature,  reduced 
civilian control over the military, and ended subsidies to political parties (McCoy 2000, 
pp  68-69).  He  systematically  broke  down  institutional  channels  of  representative 
democracy, eroded horizontal and vertical accountability, and constructed participatory 
institutions  in  the  name  of  greater  citizen  involvement  but  with  the  end  result  of 
centralizing  power  in  his  own hands  (Corrales  and  Penfold  2011,  p  8).  Autonomous 
democratic institutions, that had previously served as democratic checks and balances, 
were  either  dismantled  or  colonized  by Chavistas (i.e.,  followers  of  Chávez),  while 
numerous direct democracy mechanisms were established between society and the state, 
surpassing previously established channels (McCoy 2004, 284-95).
What is most worrisome in terms of Venezuela's long-term stability in the post-
Chávez era, however, is the legacy of Chávez's politics of “rage, race, and revenge,” in 
the words of Moisés Naim (2004). True, Venezuela's former Punto Fijo regime collapsed 
because  economic  decline  reenergized  social  conflict,  given  its  inability  to  link  new 
political demands to the policy process (Ellner and Hellinger 2004); indeed, Chávez rode 
to power on a wave of popular discontent for a regime based on elite settlements and the 
political sidelining of the country's underbelly. However, far from working to overcome 
the country’s polarization, Chávez used it to his own benefit by stoking class resentments 
rather than developing cross-class alliances (McCoy 2004, p 294). His promotion of class 
antagonism, exacerbation of societal tensions, and nurturing of political polarization for 
his own personal benefit was a zero-sum game; the entire country has suffered (Petkoff 
2010).18 
18 Not to mention the country's economy; see Arenas (2010) and even Ellner (2010).
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THE BIGGER PICTURE: CRITICAL JUNCTURES VS. GRADUAL CHANGE
Besides its  substantive relevance, an answer to this project's  research question 
also speaks to the growing field of research on institutional change (cf. Greif and Laitin 
2004). As is, the historical institutionalism has proven particularly well suited to explain 
institutional continuity and stability—indeed, institutions are seen as constraining human 
beliefs,  values,  and  interests  (Katznelson  and  Weingast  2005)  and,  at  least,  partially 
resistant  to  change;  however,  the  paradigm  has  had  more  difficulties  in  explaining 
institutional change. In response, an emerging body of historical institutionalist literature 
(e.g.,  Streeck  and  Thelen  2005;  Mahoney  and  Thelen  2010)  has  been  revising  the 
discipline's  understanding  of  institutions  as  “frozen”  residues,  or  “crystallization”  of 
previous conflicts, characterized by considerable autonomy and the inertial strength to 
resist shifts in the broader socio-political environment (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
The project  conducted contributes  to  this  innovative,  revisionary paradigm by 
showing how incremental institutional change can nonetheless result in transformative 
consequences over time (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005). This author looks at moments of 
institutional change to demonstrate how broad, external forces made formerly dormant 
party institutions more salient with time, and how internal balance-of-power shifts put old 
partisan institutions to new use. 
More significantly, this author shows how a party's historical origins, which have 
usually  been  stressed  as  an  anchor  of  stability  and  a  cause  of  status-quo  bias  (cf. 
Hagopian 1990), can also paradoxically serve as the mechanism for sweeping change 
down the line; in this way, a “critical juncture” can also account for gradual change. This 
theory explicates how institutional features initially adopted by leftist parties in the face 
of  repression,  legal  challenges,  and  authoritarian  obstinance  have  unintended,  albeit 
positive,  consequences:  they  pave  the  way  for  later  ideological  and  organizational 
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transformations,  following  the  establishment  of  democracy  (i.e.,  the opposite of 
institutional  inertia).  Indeed,  a  lack  of  foresight  and  omniscience  on  the  part  of 
institutional engineers means that particular institutional designs can offer opportunities 
for unforeseen venues of political contestation and unpredicted political outcomes.
Political  challenges  during  a  party’s  formative  years  and  the  institutional 
responses they engendered help shape its long-term developmental trajectory down the 
line.  But  the “weight”  of  one’s  past  is  not  necessarily  burdensome,  as  traditional  HI 
would  have  one  believe;  it  can  also  be  grounding  and  positive.  The  past  does  not 
necessarily  make  one  resilient  to  change  (since  certain  party  structures  and  policies 
technically remained in place past their original purpose); rather, this author argues that 
institutional legacies, paradoxically, ensured that leftist parties became adaptable and thus 
were able to adapt successfully into democratic, professional, moderate parties. 
RESEARCH DESIGN
The primary analytical component of this comparative-historical research project 
is  a  structured  comparative  analysis.  To  address  the  problem  of  having  too  few 
comparable cases but too many variables, the project relies upon the multivariate Millian 
Method of Difference (cf. Lijphart 1971). Such a method compares instances in which a 
phenomenon did occur with instances, in most other respects comparable, in which it did 
not in order to determine which other variables caused the difference in the dependent 
variable. This minimizes the number of operative variables by “controlling for” common 
systemic characteristics, thus allowing the researcher to assess the causal impact of the 
remaining intersystemic differences, which are then viewed as the explanatory variables 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970; Gerring 2007). 
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However,  given  the  limitations  of  controlled  comparisons  for  making  causal 
inferences, the small-n comparative case design will be complemented by process tracing 
to elucidate the causal pathways connecting the variables19 (George and Bennett 2005; 
Bennett  2008).  The outcome to be explained is the success or failure to adapt into a 
democratic, moderate, professional leftist party.
The  project's  party  adaptation  variable  takes  on  three  ordinal  values:  low, 
medium,  and  high.  Its  maximum value  is  adaptation  from an  undemocratic,  radical, 
unprofessional party to a democratic, moderate, professional party. The variable entails 
three  distinct,  albeit  related,  aspects:  regime  commitment,  institutional 
professionalization, ideological moderation (see below). In operationalizing the concept 
this author uses Collier and Mahon's (1993) non-classical conceptual category of family 
resemblance.  While  commonalities  are  present,  there  is  no  single  attribute  that  all 
members  of  a  category  share;  rather,  the  level  of  party  adaptation  is  analytically 
constructed through the aggregation of eight, dichotomously valued categories.20
Regime commitment entails the strategic moderation of a party such that it adheres 
to  liberal  democratic  norms  and  accepts  the  general  principles  of  market-based 
economics. The former involves i.) the acceptance of pluralism and the alternation of 
power, and ii.) the renouncement political violence and denouncing attempts to overthrow 
the prevailing regime. The latter involves iii.) acceptance of the central tenets of the free 
market  (broadly  defined),  and  iv.)  the  renouncement  of  infringements  upon  private 
property.
Institutional professionalization entails the gradual construction of a v.) flexible, 
vi.) complex, vii.) autonomous, viii.) coherent party apparatus. Flexibility is the ability to 
19 To be sure, quantitative analysis alone cannot shed light on the specific causal mechanisms that explain 
outcomes (cf. Ragin 1987; Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997; Mahoney 2003).
20 Goertz's (2006) idea of family resemblance defines concepts based on sufficiency conditions (i.e., using 
the logical operator “OR”), or substitutable characteristics (see ch 2). 
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confront head-on and adjust, accordingly, to changes (the opposite being an overly rigid 
party). Complexity is the organizational capacity—professionalized staff, etc—to address 
new tasks as they may arise (the opposite being a personal electoral vehicle). Autonomy 
is  the freedom from outside control  (the opposite  being a party beholden to external 
agents).  Organizational  coherence  is  the  existence  of  few  ideological  discrepancies 
between the different party levels and leaders (the opposite being a party that does not act 
like a team).21
Ideological  moderation entails  the  gradual  moderation  of  the  party's  platform 
such that the party ix.) no longer embraces extremist policy choices, as defined by the 
local political context, and x.) seeks to follow public opinion, not guide it à la a vanguard 
party.
To ensure maximal variation, and thus guard against spurious conclusions and 
biased inferences that can arise when variation on the dependent variable is truncated (cf. 
Geddes  1990;  Achen and Snidal  1989;  King,  Keohane,  and Verba 1994),  this  author 
chose cases of parties that represent (virtually) complete versus no/limited adaptation: 
Brazil’s  PT versus Peru's  IU and Venezuela's  LCR, respectively.  The focus is  on the 
primary leftist party of comparable cases from the sub-region of South America—thus 
holding constant the relative influence of the United States22—to ensure homogeneity of 
causal relationships and avoid conceptual stretching; given broadly similar settings, one 
can safely assume that causal factors are likely to have the same type of effect across 
cases.
21 This  definition of  institutional  professionalization is  adapted from Huntington (1968)  and borrows 
heavily from Salamanca (2004).
22 The United States played an outsized role in the internal politics of Central American and Spanish Car-
ibbean  countries  during  the  Cold  War.  For  a  particularly  compelling  analysis  of  this  history,  see 
Grandin (2004).
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The universe of cases is limited to Latin America to control for contextual factors: 
the region’s numerous historical and structural commonalities make it easier to assess the 
causal impact of the remaining differences on the political processes and outcomes of this 
particular type of party (Lijphart 1971; but see Rustow 1968). Likewise, causal factors 
are likely to have the same type of effect in similar, comparable settings (Ragin 1987). 
The rationale behind particular case selection23 was thus to select parties from countries 
as  similar  as  possible,  with respect  to  as  many features  as  possible,  to  minimize the 
number of potential variables. In this way, the theoretically significant differences found 
among otherwise similar systems can help explain the variation in political outcomes. 
In terms of specific case selection, Brazil’s,  Venezuela’s,  and Peru's lefts were 
chosen  because  of  the  countries’ many  common  background  factors  and  objective 
similarities, be they social, cultural, historical, or political. The three countries are, in 
many ways, ideal cases for the most similar systems design: besides their broader Latin 
similarities—Iberian colonization, Catholic heritage, presidential systems—they are all 
relatively  large  countries,  have  strong  urban  labor  contingents,  are  characterized  by 
relatively little  U.S.  influence,  and possess no politically efficacious,  ethnically based 
latent cleavages.
Additionally, PT, IU, and LCR have quite similar roots: they are, by and large, 
externally mobilized parties (Shefter 1993) that arose in the late 1970s/early 1980s from 
social  movements—in  particular,  new  unionists  (nuevos  sindicalistas),  students,  and 
intellectuals disillusioned with the dogmatic and bureaucratic nature of traditional leftist 
parties—fighting for political representation in their respective countries’ formal political 
arena.  All  three  were  born  in  the  same  world  historical  moment  (1978-1980),  thus 
23 King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) argue that random selection is not appropriate for small-N research, 
so long as one’s selection represents the full range of values on the dependent variable. See also Brady 
and Collier (2004) and Mahoney and Goertz (2004).
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controlling for the foreign influence of the relative weight of international socialism and 
the  USSR.  The  PT  arose  in  1980,  in  the  waning  days  of  Brazil's  then  tottering 
authoritarian regime, which had repressed the country's left, sought to impede the PT's 
birth and growth, and remained obstinate in giving up its role in governing the country. 
IU was likewise born in 1980, shortly after Peru's soft authoritarian regime, which had 
coddled the left for much of its duration, turned power over to civilian leaders. LCR's 
birth as a political organization was in 1978, the heyday of Venezuela's Fourth Republic 
(1958-1998), a 40-year period of relative democratic stability.
In  addition  to  the  vastly  divergent  trajectories  and  developments  of  the  three 
parties, as seen in the values of their dependent variables, Brazil and Venezuela stand as 
proxies for the consequential outcomes of successful vs. failed leftist party adaptation: 
Brazil  currently  enjoys  economic stability  and a  stable  multi-party  political  system,24 
while Venezuela is characterized by gross economic mismanagement, the curtailment of 
pluralism, and, according to some pessimists, near regime-collapse (cf. Corrales 2006). 
Peru is somewhere in between: it has been characterized as a democracy without parties 
(Levitsky and Cameron 2003) in the past,  but,  nonetheless,  in the last  few years the 
country has been moving in the direction of democratic and macroeconomic stability—
albeit still without political parties. Most importantly, the failure of IU and LCR to adapt 
into modern, professional parties helped paved the way for the ascent of Fujimori and 
Chávez’s  personalistic,  anti-party  form  of  radical  populism  in  which  power  was 
concentrated in the hands of the president and civil rights and political liberties were 
curtailed.
24 Mainwaring and Scully (1995) argued, in the mid 1990s, that Brazil’s party system was inchoate. How-
ever, the past 17 years have seen remarkable political development: presidential politics has turned into 
a two-party affair between the PT and the centrist Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy (Partido da 
Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB). These two parties' coalitions have garnered anywhere from 70 
to 90 percent of the first round votes in the last five federal elections (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 
2010).
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The analysis draws primarily upon two types of data: over 100 semi-structured 
interviews  with  politicians  and  high-level  party  bureaucrats  and  archival  research  of 
historical  documents.  In  this  way,  the  findings  are  corroborated  with  more  than  one 
research method to account and control partially for the drawbacks inherent in any and all 
approaches. Reliance upon elite interviews as a source of information is crucial in Latin 
America,  given the  region's  deficiency in  historical  documentation and prevalence of 
informal decision processes, as well as the fact that many of these interlocutors are the 
very participants who had made the political decisions in question. However, given the 
fallibility  of  human  memory,  objectivity,  and  truthfulness,  whenever  possible,  facts 
gleaned from interviews were double-checked alongside historical documents.
SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION
The research’s scope is limited to the universe of major Latin American leftist 
parties  with  historical  antecedents  in  socialist  and  communist  political  parties  of  the 
1960s and 1970s. Such delineation deliberately excludes leftist leaders who rose to power 
without  the  institutional  backing  of  established  parties  (such  as  Chávez);  the  unit  of 
analysis is leftist party, not leftist leader. For the sake of feasibility, it focuses solely on 
the single most important leftist party in any country. Additionally, given the dynamics of 
multi-party politics and the zero-sum nature of the electoral spectrum (i.e., a vote for one 
party is a loss for all others), the theory proposed has limited consequences beyond more 
than one leftist party.
The rationale behind a focus on leftist over rightist parties lies in the surprising 
variation of the left’s electoral fortunes in the region, especially given that many scholars 
assume  that  the  relatively  uniform  poverty  and  inequality  have  supplied  a  political 
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environment  conducive  to  blanket  leftist  success  (cf.  Acemoglu  and  Robinson  2006; 
Cleary 2006; Castañeda 2006). The parties of interest are externally mobilized parties, 
parties that  are “established by leaders who do not occupy positions of power in the 
prevailing  regime  and  who  seek  to  bludgeon  their  way  into  the  political  system by 
mobilizing  and  organizing  a  mass  constituency”  (Shefter  1993,  p  5).  Given  Latin 
America’s recent history of rightist  military dictatorships, externally mobilized parties 
happen to be, more often than not, on the left side of the political spectrum. As such, the 
proposed research’s structure is designed along the multiple case-study “building block” 
procedures (cf. George and Bennett 2005, p 76), one component part of a broader theory 
on party growth, development, and change in Latin America. This is done through the 
lens of party organization, composition, development, and party politics.
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 both positions this project's argument 
within the broader literature on parties and party change in Latin America and elsewhere, 
and also presents in detail the theory of leftist party adaptation. Chapter 3 provides an 
analytical comparison of the PT, IU, and LCR to explain how authoritarian repression 
“chastened”  the  left  and  encouraged  a  more  pluralistic  approach  to  politics  and 
economics. Chapter 4 expands upon this comparison in detailing how early challenges 
encouraged  party  building  and  the  critical  adoption  of  majoritarian  decision-making. 
Chapter 5 concludes the comparison, explaining how the struggle for democratization 
served  to  prime  parties  for  their  role  in  the  political-institutional  realm  and  helped 
broaden and deepen leftist  parties'  political  appeals.  Finally,  Chapter  6  concludes the 
thesis, broadening the scope to the rest of Latin America's leftist parties and expanding 
upon the theoretical contribution of the argument to the nascent literature on institutional 
change.
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CONCLUSION: LEFTIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA
Understanding leftist parties is important for understanding the state of democracy 
in Latin America. This project's new explanation of the varied development trajectory and 
differential success of Latin America’s leftist parties speaks to debates on the quality of 
democracy  and  nature  of  democratic  representation.  It  ties  together  the  disparate 
literatures  on  the  consolidation  and  quality  of  democracy  by  connecting  the  actual 
moment  of  transition  with  the  ensuing  regime  type.  In  particular,  it  argues  that  the 
decisions  made  and  actions  taken  during  the  formative  years  of  these  parties  have 
important developmental consequences down the line.
Such parties have profound effects beyond their own actions and decisions; after 
adapting, they also helped alter the very rules of the game and may help reverse the 
region’s harrowing trend of decreasing trust in government institutions and officials (see 
Mainwaring 2006). The existence of leftist parties helps ensure that party systems garner 
popular  legitimacy and,  ideally,  are protected from collapse (Dietz and Myers 2007). 
Finally, inclusion of the left into the legally-represented ideological spectrum increases 
regime support and helps ensure that democracy remains the only game in town, even in 
the face of severe political and economic crises (Linz and Stepan 1996b). The democratic 
orientation of leftist parties also garners regime stability (cf. Roberts 1998), especially in 
a  region  with  a  recent  historical  legacy  of  non-democratic  leftist  movements  that 
engendered non-democratic rightist responses. The valorization of democracy by the left 
and its rejection of purely tactical and instrumentalist notions of democratic participation 
have  strengthened  Latin  America's  democratic  systems  in  many  countries,  in  stark 
contrast to those countries in which the left failed to adapt.
Additionally, the presence of consolidated leftist  parties seems to promote and 
ensure stable party systems as well. Party systems matter for democracy in two principal 
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ways:  they  are  the  chief  vehicles  for  representation  and  they  affect  governability, 
especially in the legislative arena (Coppedge 2001). Indeed, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay
—the three countries in South America that also happen to have democratic, professional, 
moderate leftist parties—are notable for their increasingly stable party systems (Levitsky 
and Roberts 2011a). Brazil’s last four presidential elections have been largely two-way 
contests between the same two parties: the leftist PT and the centrist PSDB. Likewise, 
Chile’s party system consists of a stable, two-way contest between the leftist Concert of 
Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia)—which governed 
from 1990 to 2010—and the (now-defunct) rightist Alliance for Chile (Alianza por Chile) 
(Roberts 1998, pp 82-85). Uruguay has a stable multiparty system; the centrist Colored 
Party  (Partido  Colorado)  and  the  rightist  National  Party  (Partido  Nacional)  both 
regularly contest elections with the leftist FA (Cason 2002).
The  same  cannot  be  said  for  Venezuela,  an  increasingly  authoritarian  state 
(Corrales 2006),  or Peru, a democracy without parties (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). 
Indeed, it is no surprise that the most radical expressions of the left in contemporary Latin 
America—the IU and then Shining Path  (Sendero Luminoso)  in  Peru  and Chávez in 
Venezuela—have emerged in countries in which the left was neither severely repressed 
by exclusionary authoritarian rule nor played a crucial role in democratization. While the 
PT, FA, and PS adapted as a result of participation in their struggle for democracy, the IU 
and LCR did not, having battled economically illiberal and anti-popular democracies and 
thus never gaining the incentive to adopt the mechanisms needed to be able to adapt 
ideologically and institutionally.
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Chapter 2: A Theory of Party Adaptation
While the transitions to democracy and market economics, as well as the “media-
ization” of politics, affected the entire region of Latin America, the consequences of these 
external stimuli upon leftist parties were varied. Indeed, to the extent that they focused on 
winning  elections,  the  logical  response  from  all  such  parties  would  be  ideological 
moderation and institutional professionalization in order to be better able to garner votes 
and to compete in the new electoral arena; yet while many parties did exactly that, others 
were unable to do so. The objective of this chapter is to explain why.
This  chapter  provides  the  overall  theoretical  framework for  the  thesis.  It  first 
shows  how  and  why  existing  theories  on  party  organization  and  adaptation  are  ill-
equipped to answer the research question at hand by analyzing the extant comparative 
literature  on  leftist  party  adaptation  on  a  global  scale.  Next,  it  details  in  depth  this 
project's theory of party adaptation, which explains under what conditions leftist parties 
transform from undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized parties into democratic, 
moderate, professional ones, and, conversely, under what conditions they fail to adapt, 
and become politically irrelevant.  Finally,  it  situates  the argument  within the broader 
paradigm of historical institutionalism, alongside a growing body of literature seeking to 
revise how the paradigm seeks to understand and explain the phenomenon of institutional 
dynamism.
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EXTANT APPROACHES TO PARTY ADAPTATION
The existing literature does not adequately explain why similar externally 
mobilized, ideologically rooted leftist parties have followed dissimilar trajectories. 
Moreover, there are no Latin America-specific theories that explain this empirical 
variation in both ideological moderation and institutional professionalization.25 However, 
general theories that explain the adaptation of parties do exist (or can be easily deduced, 
from the fundamentals that underpin a paradigmatic approach). They posit that party 
adaptation is due to socio-structural factors, strategic choices, or formal political 
institutions. However, when we extend the theories to the specific, Latin American leftist 
party context, the suppositions fail to hold.
Socio-Structural Theories
Theories focusing on system-level trends predict leftist party adaptation as the 
internal response to external structural pressures, such as an increase in suffrage or the 
mobilization and organization of the working class—allegedly the left's natural 
constituency (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Kitschelt 1994; Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Bartolini 2000). Such theories are informed by the 
structuralist paradigm, which argues that structures, not choices, produce political 
outcomes; they determine individual preferences, beliefs, and actions. Structuralists see 
structures as simultaneously constraining and empowering individuals; as such, they 
study the cage, not the prisoner (Lichbach 2003, pp 99-111). 
25 Most arguments are system-specific case-studies; a notable exception is Roberts (1998). Burgess and 
Levitsky (2003) look at ideological moderation but not institutional professionalization.
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Such arguments fail to explain the variation in adaptation seen among Latin 
America's leftist parties. For instance, Przeworski (1985) argues that the establishment of 
democratic political systems based on universal male suffrage led to the adaptation of 
radical, non-professional socialists in Europe. As direct confrontation on the streets was 
replaced with indirect confrontation through political institutions (with the goal of 
legislating society into socialism), leftist parties professionalized so that they could 
operate within the new political framework. Likewise, as electoral pressures demanded 
an abandonment of revolutionary goals in favor of incremental reform within the existing 
capitalist framework, leftist parties moderated so that they could win elections. Such an 
argument could plausibly explain the PT's efforts to widen its political appeals and pursue 
public office, and thus moderate and professionalize, from the late 1980s onward: Brazil 
extended  suffrage  to  illiterates  in  1985.  However,  Peru  also  extended  suffrage  to 
illiterates in 1979, yet IU did not engage in adaptation. Furthermore, universal suffrage 
was established in Venezuela in the Constitution of 1947, yet LCR emerged over 30 years 
later as an undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized party.
An alternative explanation could suggest that the pragmatic nature of labor 
leaders and unions, a significant segment of the PT's (initial) leadership, could explain the 
party's adaptation, as well as explain why the IU, a party composed of more leftist 
militants than union members, did not adapt. However, this argument no longer works 
when one looks at LCR. Both the PT and LCR had strong, organic party-union linkages 
and both benefited from new unionism, particularly in the states of São Paulo and 
Bolívar, respectively (Meneguello 1989; Yépez Salas 1993). Unlike the PT (cf. Keck 
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1992), however, LCR proved unable to take advantage of this naturally predisposed and 
increasingly electorally available constituency—it had difficulty expanding into 
unionized labor's ranks outside of its home state. The catch-all Democratic Action 
(Acción Democrática, AD) kept a virtual stranglehold over organized labor, thanks to its 
privileged position within the corporatist structure constructed by the Punto Fijo pact.
Even so, the percentage of labor leaders in the upper echelons of the PT's party 
structure declined precipitously in the 1980s (Singer 2001), before the party began to 
adapt wholeheartedly. While approximately 60 percent of the PT's founders were 
somehow tied to New Unionism, the relative clout of unionists began declining from the 
start. Meneguello (1989) argues that the National Executive Committee (Comissão 
Executiva Nacional, CEN) of 1981 already showed a profound shift in the party's 
balance-of-power from unionists to intellectuals, partisan leftists, parliamentarians, and 
those with backgrounds in social movements (p 70). According to Rodrigues (1991),
The PT effectively has a union base, but that is only one of three pillars sustaining 
the party. Were the party run basically by labor leaders and were its social base of 
support constituted in the majority by manual laborers and by the lower classes of 
Brazilian society, the PT would have already become social democratic...But the 
PT's social base is not [just] workers.  The PT is fundamentally a party of the 
medium and upper classes...If it was predominantly a party of manual laborers, 
for sure the [internal] discussions would be more concrete, and costly and long 
meetings reserved for debating theoretical questions would not take place.
And furthermore, IU was no stranger to labor: it enjoyed much success organizing the 
labor sectors that the previous, leftist authoritarian regime had mobilized but never 
organized: see, for example, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers 
(Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, CGTP), which became dominated by 
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the Communists (Samanez 1982, p 52). Yet, nonetheless, IU's median position shifted to 
the left as the 1980s progressed (CVR 2003, III.2.4) and its organization never 
professionalized into a modern party.
The problem with such an approach is that it generally under-predicts change over 
time; structural arguments are better at explaining commonalities within a population 
than they are at variation. Indeed, much of the literature on Latin America's “New Left” 
suffers from this pitfall: severe economic inequality is generally assumed to offer the left 
a natural support base that encompasses a vast majority of Latin American populations 
(cf. Cleary 2006),26 yet the left does not win uniformly in the region.27
Strategic Choice Theories
Theories of political learning, a subset of choice, focus instead on the strategic 
responses to specific endogenous or exogenous contingencies, such as a sudden change in 
party leadership or an important electoral defeat, in predicting leftist party adaptation (cf. 
Wilson 1994). Such theories are informed by the strategic paradigm: as rational actors, 
voters will opt for an optimal response to the incentives and constraints of their 
environment and the behavior of other actors in order to maximize their chances of 
achieving their instrumental goals: winning elections (Geddes 1995).
26 Debs and Helmke (2008) make a similar, albeit more nuanced, argument: inequality has a non-mono-
tonic effect on the likelihood of leftist electoral success. The left is most likely to win office if inequal-
ity is not too high (lest the rich have too much to lose and thwart the left) and not too low (lest the poor 
have relatively too little to gain in electing the left), and, since region-wide levels of inequality have 
converged toward the middle in the past decade, leftist leaders have swept into power (see also Ace-
moglu and Robinson 2005).
27 More generally, the literature on Latin America's “New Left” (cf. Baker and Greene 2011; Stokes 2008; 
Arnold and Samuels 2008; Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2009) deals with a different dependent 
variable: electoral success. As such, its usefulness to this project's research question is limited.
34
Such arguments have been used to explain the PT's party adaptation. For instance, 
David Samuels (2004) and Claudio Couto (1995) argue that an endogenous event—the 
piecemeal rise of pragmatists within the PT's rank-and-file—combined with the party's 
internally democratic institutions led to party moderation and, therefore, electoral 
success.28 This rise of pragmatists, according to Samuels, was a consequence of both the 
election of moderate petistas into the halls of city government, which strengthened the 
pragmatists' hand in intra-party debates, as well as the need of those elected officials to 
demonstrate results once in office.29 Similarly,  Wendy  Hunter  (2010)  argues  that  an 
exogenous  event—the  resounding  success  of  the  Real  Plan  (Plano Real) and the 
subsequent election of centrist Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the first round of the 1994 
presidential election (the PT's Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva suffered an unexpected and 
resounding defeat)—forced party leaders to engage in self-critical reassessment and 
moderate their radical views and goals. 
However, such strategic arguments would also falsely predict both IU and LCR 
adaptation. Alfonso Barrantes' much-lauded term as mayor of Lima (1983-1986), 
followed by his defeat in the 1985 presidential election, were comparable endogenous 
and exogenous events, respectively, that should have led to political learning in IU, but 
did not. Likewise, LCR had internally democratic structures and mechanisms, ample 
28 Clovis Bueno de Azevedo, chief of staff of the secretary of administration under the PT's São Paulo 
mayoral administrations of both Luiza Erundina (1989-1992) and Marta Suplicy (2001-2004), chal-
lenges the accuracy of Samuels' and Couto's argument for the case of the PT. According to Azevedo, 
little institutional learning—if any—took place within the PT in response to Erundina's term in office. 
Furthermore, Erundina, the cage-rattler from Brazil's distant Northeast region, was far more radical 
than the party, whose leadership had unsuccessfully thrown its support behind another petista in the in-
ternal primary for PT candidate: the centrist Plínio de Arruda Sampaio, who hailed from one of São 
Paulo's most important families. Author interviews with Azevedo (23 July 2010) and PT founder and 
three-term federal deputy Plínio de Arruda Sampaio (29 November 2010).
29 Juan Pablo Luna (2007) makes a similar argument in explaining the adaptation of Uruguay's FA, em-
phasizing the moderating effects of having governed Montevideo, the Uruguayan capital.
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municipal- and state-level administrative experience (cf. López Maya 2004), and 
narrowly lost the 1993 presidential election in a (possibly fraudulent) near four-way tie. 
But rather than moderating in response, important segments of the party radicalized 
during the early 1990s.
The problem with such an approach is that it generally over-predicts change; the 
strategic framework often presumes that actors are willing and able to respond quickly 
and effectively to changes to their environment in order to get ahead. However, many 
members of these parties in question are ideologically driven and do not necessarily unify 
behind a singular party goal of winning elections; indeed, such parties are oftentimes not 
unified at all (see Kitschelt 1994; Tsebelis 1990). Latin American politicians often rank 
economic goals higher than political ones (Weyland 2002); imputing purely instrumental 
political goals to the politicians within these parties is not straightforward and cannot just 
be taken as given (cf. Grindle 2000). Externally mobilized parties, such as the PT or the 
FA, cannot—nor do they necessarily want to—update strategies at a whim and adapt 
rapidly to voter shifts by changing policy platforms: they have other goals in mind 
besides winning elections (cf. Müller and Strøm 1999).
Indeed, the PT did not embrace market economic principles until 2002—in the 
form of the “Letter to the Brazilian people” (Carta ao Povo Brasileiro) from presidential 
candidate Lula. This was years after the electorate had warmed to the idea of market 
economics, and thus sought candidates with similar views; and even then, it was the 
result of market, not electoral, pressure, and was never really fully embraced by the party 
(cf. Hunter 2010). Likewise, despite the fact that, among those with an opinion on the 
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issue, a majority of Brazilians have supported free trade for a while now (cf. Baker 2003), 
the PT has remained notoriously wary of the issue. In fact, the party helped derail the 
Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks and any hope of 
passage of a Free Trade Area of the Americas by its obstinacy in the face of US and 
European Union (EU) demands.
Strategic, Formal Institutional Theories
Finally, theories focusing on formal political institutions would predict leftist 
party adaptation as a direct consequence of institutional reforms. Such theories are 
informed by the rational choice institutional framework: formal organizations and 
informal rules and procedures impose constrains on political behavior by changing the 
choices that actors chose from in order to maximize their self interest (cf. Shepsle 1989).
Such an approach has been used to argue that constitutional reforms instituting 
presidential run-offs encourage radical parties both to move to the ideological center and 
to professionalize their organization, since parties can only win by appealing to, and then 
reaching, a majority of voters. For instance, Cason (2000) claims that Uruguay's 1996 
constitutional reform,30 instituting a run-off for presidential elections in which no 
candidate achieved an absolute majority, forced EP-FA31 towards the center, since to win, 
it could no longer rely on its core supporters alone (p 92): in order to win, FA could not 
merely eke out a plurality, as Salvador Allende of Chile's PS had so memorably and 
consequentially done in 1970.
30 The rationale behind this referendum has been widely understood as an effort by the traditional Colored 
(Colorado) and White (Blanco) parties to head off a victory by the left in 1999 (cf. Cason 2000).
31 From 1994 to 2005, FA contested elections together with Progressive Encounter (Encuentro Progre-
sista, EP), a breakaway group from the two traditional parties, as well as the FA itself. The EP, along 
with New Majority (Nueva Mayoría), merged with the FA in 2005.
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While this could plausibly explain the PT's successful adaptation, since Brazil 
introduced two-round presidential elections in the 1988 Constitution, it cannot explain 
IU's  trajectory.  Peru  implemented  a  presidential  run-off  system  in  1979,  but,  as 
mentioned earlier, IU neither moved to the center nor professionalized (cf. CVR 2003, 
III.2.4). One could argue that the coalitional nature of IU prevented the party from 
responding to these incentives to moderate, as its more radical component-parties and the 
tenuous nature of coalitions could have derailed adaptation; however, FA was also a 
coalition of leftist component-parties, and it was nonetheless able to adapt. Furthermore, 
as explained in Chapter 4, IU's inability to unify is, in fact, a consequence, not a cause, of 
the phenomenon in question. 
Alternatively, another plausible formal institutional argument is that specific 
electoral laws encouraged the political unification of leftist parties with center-left and 
centrist parties such that they moderated and professionalized in the process of 
collaborating with more established, mainstream parties. Valenzuela and Scully (1997) 
argue that certain electoral laws,32 instated by the outgoing Pinochet regime to engineer 
the creation of a two-party system, allowed for the PS simultaneously to retain many of 
its leftist credentials in theory through official party policy while moderate and 
professionalize in practice through its alliance-of-necessity with the centrist Christian 
Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC). Given the system-specificity of 
this argument (i.e., it cannot travel to any other case), however, it does not allow for 
generalized inferences that could apply to the entire set of Latin America’s leftist parties
32 See Angell and Pollack (1990) for a discussion of Chile’s formal electoral laws and Engel and Navia 
(1996) for a discussion on the partisan consequences of these laws.
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While such rational choice institutional arguments shed substantial light upon the 
relevant variables at play—i.e., the overall political context, formal institutional 
arrangements, and the dynamics of electoral competition, they do not take us far enough 
in terms of understanding the variation seen in leftist party adaptation. Instead, as the 
dependent variable is institutional change over time, the historical institutionalism 
paradigm is far more suited to account for the variation in party adaptation across space 
and time. Historical institutionalism sees institutions as structuring political interactions 
and, thus, affecting political outcomes by shaping and constraining the political strategies 
and behaviors open to actors (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). A new, historical institutional 
theory is needed to explain adequately under what conditions leftist parties succeed or 
fail to adapt in Latin American democracies. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIME CONTEXT: A THEORY OF PARTY ADAPTATION
I argue that a party's ability to adapt institutionally and ideologically is determined 
in large part by the external challenges faced during its formative years. The specific 
difficulties  parties  experience  when  emerging  under  repressive,  but  transient, 
authoritarianism encourage them to adopt certain mechanisms and policies that facilitate 
adaptation down the line, if and when the external environment demands it (for example, 
following the transitions to democracy and the market in the 1980s and 1990s).  In a 
sense, the roots for adaptability are sunk early, allowing for future adaptation in the event 
that a party needs to update its ideology or institutions to compete better in changing 
environs. Where those challenges are not present, parties lack the incentives to institute 
these  mechanisms,  which  then  limit  their  adaptability  and  thus  complicate  efforts  at 
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institutional professionalization and ideological moderation if and when environmental 
conditions reward party adaptation. Put simply: no early pain, no later gain.
The  type  of  regime  under  which  a  party  develops—particularly  during  its 
formative years—has lasting effects upon that party’s developmental path (Panebianco 
1998; Collier and Collier 1991). Those that develop under repressive, non-democratic 
regimes, for instance, are subject to particular challenges that affect the long-term growth 
and development of externally mobilized parties. Conversely, those parties that were not 
confronted  by  authoritarian  challenges  during  their  formative  years  subsequently 
followed different developmental trajectories. This author argues that this latter set of 
parties—those that emerged either under democracy or soft authoritarianism—are less 
able to adapt ideologically and institutionally down the line for this very reason: those 
initial challenges suffered by their brethren parties elsewhere in the region brought about 
changes that  strengthened adaptability and thus facilitated adaptation in the long run. 
Instead of preventing much-needed adaptation, this author thus argues that the weight of 
the past ended up helping leftist parties adapt in the long-term. The early pain inflicted 
upon such parties by authoritarian regimes led to later gain, as they were better prepared 
to respond effectively to external challenges and engage in party adaptation.
More specifically, this theory contends that the 1) levels of repression suffered by 
the  left  under  earlier  authoritarian  rule,  2)  variations  in  the  arbitrariness  and 
unreasonableness  of  rules  and  regulations  employed  by  the  outgoing  authoritarian 
regime, and 3) the timeframe in which the authoritarian regime completed the turnover of 
power  (i.e.,  whether  the  left  was  compelled to  get  involved to  ensure  the  successful 
completion of the handover), determine the adaptability of leftist parties and, thus, the 
success of leftist party adaptation.
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In this way, a legacy of repression, being subjected to unfair rules and regulations, 
and  fighting  against  tottering  non-democratic  regimes  ultimately  led  to  leftist  party 
adaptation by creating the incentive and capacity to see democracy as more than just one 
of multiple paths to obtain power, develop a disciplined, majoritarian party structure, and 
broaden and deepen political appeals. Once democracy was reestablished, these factors 
eventually  allowed  for  party  adaptation:  a  commitment  to  democratic  politics,  the 
professionalization of the party organization, and the moderation of party ideology.
Figure 2.1: Causal Relationship
Those leftist parties that emerged under such regimes were induced to act, while 
those that formed afterwards or never experienced life under repressive authoritarianism 
had little incentive to do so. As such, they engaged in limited to no adaptation, given the 
high upfront costs of engaging in ideological and institutional change (Shefter 1993). In 
this  way,  the  interest  articulation,  interest  aggregation,  and political  socialization and 
recruitment  needed  for  leftist  parties  to  transform into  modern,  electoral-professional 
parties committed to democracy came about in large part due to the type of regime in 
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power  at  the  time  of  their  foundation.  The  political  context  in  which  they  emerged 
ensured that such parties developed organizational mechanisms and political strategies 
that increased adaptability and thus enabled ideologically and institutionally adaptation 
once the external environment demanded it. Table 2.1 demonstrates the consequences of 
this phenomenon on a regional scale: those parties that emerged under democracy or soft 















































33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Low
LCR, 
Venezuela 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Low
M-19, 
Colombia 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Low
MIR,34
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 Medium
ID,
Ecuador 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 6 Medium
FREPASO 
Argentina 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 Medium
FA,
Uruguay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 High
PS-PPD,
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 High
PT,
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 High
Table 2.1: Operationalization of Leftist Party Adaptation
33 All cases were scored by the author, based on primary and secondary research.
34 MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria). ID: Demo-
cratic Left (Izquierda Democrática). FREPASO: Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente por un País 
Solidario).
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The  next  three  sections  detail  the  main  independent  variables'  three  causal 
mechanisms: authoritarian repression, bureaucratic hurdles, and obstinacy leaving power. 
Authoritarian Repression Encourages the Acceptance of Democracy
One of the external challenges faced by some leftist parties during their formative 
years was authoritarian repression; this challenge ended up creating the incentive for 
leftist parties to accept democracy as the “only game in town.” This is consequential, as 
Latin America’s left had historically tended to ignore the intrinsic merits of democracy, 
supporting instead only its value in leading to political power (Castañeda 1993).
In many Latin American countries, authoritarian regimes had targeted the left in 
the name of the Cold War struggle against communism. State terror successfully 
destroyed preexisting leftist parties and organizations. Furthermore, the assassination of 
hard-liners, coupled with the ideological moderation that tended to occur among exiles, 
led to a fundamental challenge of the left's orthodox Marxist stance. This was later 
exacerbated by the influx of relatively non-ideological individuals, who filled the ranks 
of the new parties that were created in the post-dictatorship political vacuum. Because the 
political arena had been closed off, leftists who survived repression were temporarily 
forced into the social realm, where relatively apolitical social actors who valorized social 
concerns and basic political rights over ideological battles ended up diluting much of the 
left's remaining radicalism.
The result of this process was the growth of new leftist parties characterized by 
loose ties to the orthodox left,  diverse societal linkages, and a chastened view of the 
relationship between power and government: a party characterized and controlled more 
by pragmatists than ideologues (cf. Weffort 1984, p 76). Such a shift in a party's internal 
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balance-of-power ensured that it understood that there are limits to popular sovereignty: 
winning elections does not entail a “take-over” of the state, whereby one can then impose 
one's  utopian  goals  upon  society.  Rather,  political  change  comes  about  through  a 
pluralistic strategy of appealing to voters in order to win elections.
Over  time,  this  process  induced  the  leftist  antagonists  of  such  politically 
exclusionary regimes to adopt the mantle of protector of political rights and individual 
freedoms. Indeed, embracing and advocating pluralism was the only way in which the 
left would be able to rejoin the political arena; likewise, constitutionally protected rights 
were the only security against continued persecution at the hands of the state. In this way 
it  became in the self  interest  of  these new leftist  parties  to  democratize  the political 
system, so that they could participate in the political arena. Such parties thus adopted a 
newfound respect for liberal safeguards and an intrinsic valuation of democracy: 
H1: Leftist parties whose antecedents suffered from authoritarian repression are  
more likely to accept democracy's intrinsic value than those parties whose direct  
predecessors were not subject to state terror.
Once  the  tables  had  turned  and  leftist  parties  were  allowed  to  compete  for 
political power without fear of retribution, the lasting memory of repression ensured that 
they  would  not  resort  back  to  advocating  for  their  earlier,  utopian  ends  (i.e.,  socio-
economic equality),  which would require  undemocratic  means to  be achieved (i.e.,  a 
dictatorship of the proletariat). In the words of Francisco Weffort (1984), “those who had 
dedicated  themselves  yesterday  to  armed  actions  against  the  military  regime  today 
participate in the struggle for democracy” (p 80). The left was confronted with a strong 
incentive  to  refrain  from  excusing  any  suspension  of  democratic  practices  and  any 
violation of human rights, regardless of its ideological motivations. Indeed, the hypocrisy 
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of  advocating  one  (arguably)  non-democratic  political  goal—i.e.  socialism—whilst 
fighting against another, equally non-democratic one—i.e., military authoritarianism—is 
hard  to  defend  logically:  “Nothing  is  worse  for  someone  who  fought  against  a 
dictatorship for years than be accused of using procedures similar to their adversaries” 
(Weffort 1984, p 84). Of course, leftists with a radical attitudinal orientation still existed; 
however, given the horrors of repression, their numbers and intellectual clout diminished 
greatly. This helped give the upper hand to pragmatists, who would then more likely lead 
the party toward a logic of party competition (cf. Kitschelt 1989).
Furthermore,  having  assumed  publicly  the  responsibility  of  promoter-of-
democracy under military dictatorships, leftist parties were then hemmed into abiding by 
democratic  norms  and  procedures  down  the  line.  This  ensured  that  leftist  parties 
continued to play by democratic rules—a prerequisite for successful party adaptation—
once democracy had been re-established and the threat of repression had passed. It also 
helped stem internecine battles over possible political strategies and goals by rendering 
illegitimate the more radical leftist options, facilitating future moderation campaigns; this 
further played into the hands of party pragmatists,  who then used such arguments to 
sideline ideologues and gain power within the party. 
Repression thus led to a chastened view of power and political change, with this 
new left adopting a more pluralistic, conciliatory view of power as the long-term strategy 
of  constructing political  hegemony by appealing to  the electorate  (i.e.,  responding to 
public opinion shifts, instead of trying to guide public opinion), occupying positions of 
power, and effecting change legitimately through the levers of democratic institutions. In 
short, it paved the way for future ideological moderation and thus party adaptation.
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Bureaucratic Hurdles Encourage Party Building
Another one of the external challenges faced by some leftist parties during their 
formative years was bureaucratic hurdles. This challenge ended up creating the incentive 
to “party build.” Developing one's organizational capacity, bureaucratic structure, and 
disciplined decision-making mechanisms is an ultimately worthwhile, albeit politically 
and electorally costly, endeavor that nascent parties would not normally pursue unless 
forced to do so (Shefter 1993). Building institutions is time-consuming and costly; it is 
only natural for nascent parties to put off such actions unless they are absolutely 
necessary (Harmel and Janda 1994). However, the implementation of hurdles by 
authoritarian regimes changed the cost-benefit ratio of this process, and ended up 
encouraging institutionalization; institutionalization, in turn, increased party adaptability.
These arbitrary and unreasonable rules and regulations—from erecting onerous 
bureaucratic hurdles to party registration, to limiting public funds available to such 
parties—were put in place by outgoing authoritarian regimes in order to block the growth 
of the left. Such legal requirements were particularly efficacious because they were 
implemented during parties' formative years, when institutions are inchoate and thus 
highly malleable. However, the desired effect—i.e., hampering the left—was not 
necessarily accomplished; instead, parties went into defensive mode and sought to build 
up their organization and structure in order to ensure their continued existence. Much as 
Christian Democratic parties formed in Europe in spite of, not because of, the Church’s 
intentions and actions (cf. Kalyvas 1996), so too was the institutional development of 
some leftist parties unintended and unanticipated, not because of the intentions and 
actions of political elites. 
Such a focus on institutional survival ended up fundamentally altering the 
interests and strategies of these parties, creating strong, majoritarian parties: bureaucratic 
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hurdles inadvertently encouraged leftists to sink roots in society, institutionalize, and 
develop their organization and structure. These short-term considerations had long-term 
repercussions: parties forced upon this organization-building trajectory strengthened their 
adaptability. In this way they were more likely to adapt successfully down the line, once 
democracy was re-established, given the nature of the organizational structures and 
decision-making mechanisms adopted in response to the challenges:
H2:  Leftist  parties  that  had  to  cope  with  bureaucratic  hurdles  during  their  
formative years are more likely to develop a majoritarian structure and effective 
decision-making mechanisms than those that were not forced to fulfill  difficult  
bureaucratic requirements.
Furthermore, because they developed under duress, leftist parties were forced to 
establish  greater  organizational  coherence  and  focus  on  institutional  survival  over 
ideological positioning—the latter would have risked the unity (and thus strength) of the 
party at  siege.  The presence of an “external enemy” helped parties put aside internal 
squabbles for the sake of their collective wellbeing: not to do so would amount to suicide. 
For instance, Trotskyists and Maoists had to put aside their ideological differences and 
focus their efforts on protecting their shared party from dissolution. In this way, such 
challenges  forced  parties  to  adopt  a  more  majoritarian  structure,  and  streamline  the 
decision-making and decision-enforcing  mechanisms that  could  later  be  used  to  help 
effect top-down change should the need arise. These parties did not have the privilege of 
deliberative  democracy  that  those  leftist  parties  situated  within  the  relative  safety  of 
democratic contexts enjoyed; they were forced to adopt more majoritarian organizational 
mechanisms  to  survive  the  legal  challenges  imposed  upon  them  by  the  outgoing 
authoritarian  regimes.  Like  declaring  martial  law during  times  of  war,  leftist  parties 
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subject to threats to their legal existence abandoned a certain degree of organizational 
freedom in exchange for short-term survival.
This  organizational  coherence  and  streamlined  decision-making  enabled  leftist 
parties to avoid the factionalist gridlock and tendency to split that often plagues leftists 
parties,  in which leadership is compelled to consult grass roots allies on every single 
decision and seek a mandate for every single initiative (cf. Castañeda 1993, pp 360-362). 
While perhaps theoretically and ideologically desirable to leftists, unanimity behind party 
decisions  is  realistically  unworkable  as  diffuse  leadership  is  anathema to  adaptation. 
Indeed,  internal  democracy rarely,  if  ever,  leads  to  adaptation—radical  change is  the 
province of strong leadership and majoritarian decision-making, not diffused power and 
pluralism  (cf.  Ware  1987;  Burgess  and  Levitsky  2003;  Grzymala-Busse  2002).  For 
example,  Share  (1999)  shows  how  the  Spanish  Socialist  Workers'  Party  (Partido 
Socialista  Obrero  Español, PSOE)  emerged  more  centralized,  majoritarian,  and 
disciplined from the country’s democratic transition (in which it was subject to numerous 
challenges by the outgoing military regime), enabling it to moderate and adapt to the 
restored democratic regime. 
Democratization Encourages the Widening of Political Appeals
Finally, the third external challenge faced by leftist parties during their formative 
years was authoritarian obstinance in leaving power; this challenge ended up creating the 
incentive for leftist parties to widen their political appeals and, thus, strengthen their 
adaptability. All else equal, politicians are not inclined to give up power: like all political 
actors, they are interested in maximizing their own self interest.35 As such, outgoing 
35 For an important rebuttal, see Grindle (2000).
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repressive authoritarian regimes that were in the position to do so36 dragged their feet in 
extricating themselves from power and opted to prolong the transition as long as possible. 
In those countries in which it appeared that the regime was unnecessarily prolonging the 
transition process, leftist parties felt compelled to mobilize society into acting in order to 
ensure a timely end to authoritarian rule.
Participation in the struggle for democratization helped prepare parties for their 
newfound role within the formal political sphere. Spearheading plebiscites and organizing 
strikes helped parties hone their ability to mobilize supporters while also building up 
legions of activists. Party members with natural leadership tendencies, but perhaps 
lacking in philosophical and ideological clout, were needed—and subsequently rewarded
—for their mobilizational skills. In particular, a common enemy, coupled with the 
continued risk of legal harassment, created a sense of camaraderie amongst party cadres 
and early supporters that went above and beyond the support typical of a militant or voter 
for her political party. 
This phenomenon helped attract a committed base of well-trained members 
willing to dedicate their time and efforts to helping the party survive and grow. Such 
steadfast, almost-blind support is exactly what is needed to ensure that supporters do not 
abandon their party en masse if and when it opts to shift away from an emphasis on the 
pursuit of ideological goals (cf. Kitschelt 1994). Indeed, such a change often risks 
disillusioning activists, weakening organizational unity, and destroying one’s political 
reputation (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986, pp 57-73); a committed party base—one 
with battle scars and a shared history of struggle—minimizes the costs of adaptation. 
36 In certain situations, the outgoing regime, having been delegitimized for whatever reason, was in no 
position to dictate the terms and timetable of the transition. This was particularly true in Argentina, 
where the armed forces were smarting over their embarrassing rout by Great Britain.
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Participation encouraged parties to commit their efforts to the political-
institutional realm, helping wrest control out of the hands of social organizations and 
squarely into the party bureaucracy and hierarchy, as they were compelled to battle the 
regime through legal channels. Indeed, by this time, many democratic institutions had 
already been put in place, international rights organizations and newly liberated media 
outlets were watching. Also, there was a need for the parties to distinguish themselves 
from the undemocratic ancien régime against which they were battling.
Being obliged by a regime's intransigence to participate actively in the process of 
democratization ended up having important repercussions for these parties' long-term 
institutional and ideological development, too (cf. Przeworski 1985). With increased 
visibility from the democratization struggle—as well as the newfound responsibility to 
represent an expanding support base—came these parties' need, both during and after the 
eventual regime change, to submit to the political needs and wants of their ever-
increasing, heterogeneous segment of society. These developments led to a fundamental 
shift within such parties, encouraging them to listen more to their supporters and the 
electorate at large than was normal for leftist parties at the time. In this way it encouraged 
parties to broaden and deepen their political appeals, as they felt the need to retain their 
diverse pro-democratic ally base and transform it into an electoral support base: thus 
arose the need to expand one's political appeal beyond narrow and radical ideologically-
based prescriptions and begin following public opinion instead of trying to lead it:
H3:  Leftist  parties  that  fought  against  tottering  authoritarian  regimes  in  the  
historical struggle for democracy widen their political appeals more and faster  
than those leftist parties that developed under democratic regimes. 
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Those parties that participated in the struggle for democracy were also compelled 
to distance themselves from their earlier ideological and partisan dogmatism for the sake 
of the broader goal of regime change. This goal encouraged leftist parties to negotiate, 
compromise, and politick with diverse parties and organizations and, in particular, 
collaborate with other leftist and centrist parties—a feat oftentimes more difficult than 
working  with  the  right,  given  the  ever-present  tension  between  “revolutionary”  and 
“reformist”  lefts—and create  broad alliances in the name of  the greater  struggle:  my 
enemies' enemies are my friends. As such, leftist parties were encouraged to broaden their 
bases  and  engage  in  sustained  dialogue  and  cooperation  with  other  groups  (cf. 
Schönwälder 2002). This embrace of democratic accountability—as opposed to holding 
out for utopian goals—led to increased pragmatism, an emphasis on compromise over 
strident  ideology,  and  a  respect  for  the  will  of  the  electorate.  Again,  this  further 
strengthened the hand of party pragmatists vis-à-vis party ideologues.
Serving  as  protagonists  in  the  struggle  for  democratization  thus  led  to  the 
widening  of  appeals,  as  parties  remained  obliged  to  represent  their  newly  diverse 
electoral  base.  Such  a  broad-based  group,  with  likely  diverse  political  interests  and 
demands, necessitated that these parties renegotiate their strict adherence to ideological 
norms and focus more on ensuring that they represent their supporters: extremist views 
needed to be moderated so as not to estrange followers. In this way, these parties became 
more moderate in the aggregate, focused more on building political hegemony through 
winning and retaining supporters than on engineering top-down a utopian society. This 
served as the basis for future adaptation: such parties had already conducted “test runs” of 
the broad-scale ideological moderation that external events made electorally desirable in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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Participation channeled leftist party discontent into democratic norms, strategies, 
and goals. This theory suggests that Latin America’s leftist parties parallel the historical 
trajectory  of  social  democratic  parties  in  Western  Europe.  Witness  the  differential 
historical trajectories of leftist parties in Sweden and Germany—where social democratic 
parties were the principal participants in democratization—with that of the United States 
(Przeworski 1985). Serving as a protagonist in the process of democratization prepares 
parties  for  participating  democratically  in  the  ensuing  political  regime:  parties  help 
change—and, in the process, are changed by—politics.
“No Pain, No Gain”
Given  the  high  upfront  costs  of  embarking  upon  ideological  and  institutional 
change, party building and the broadening and deepening of political appeals should only 
happen if and when it is necessary (Shefter 1993, pp 32-33). Therefore paradoxically, the 
challenges of arising within the context of earlier repression, unfair rules and regulations, 
and  an  intransigent  regime  looking  to  lengthen  its  extrication  from power  ended up 
helping leftist parties in the long run. They helped parties see democracy's intrinsic value, 
develop a disciplined party structure,  and broaden and deepen their  political  appeals. 
Down the line, once democracy was reestablished, these factors facilitated institutional 
professionalization and ideological moderation.
Conversely, those parties that formed under regimes that had not repressed the 
left, did not discriminate legally against leftist parties, and returned to the barracks in a 
timely  fashion  (i.e.,  parties  that  developed  either  under  democracy  or  soft 
authoritarianism)  had  little  incentive  or  need  to  engage  in  those  actions  that  would 
strengthen adaptability and thus facilitate party adaptation down the line. Their birth and 
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formative years were “too easy,” in a sense: as there was no need to engage in these 
costly, albeit worthwhile, endeavors early on, they never did so. 
Where the left  was not constrained by authoritarian repression, and, therefore, 
there were no repercussions to retaining their radical ideologies, it remained ambivalent 
toward democracy: radical ideologues with veto power made it  difficult to accept the 
altered rules of the game down the line. Where leftist parties were not subject to legal 
requirements, there was no need to institutionalize and build up an organized, structured 
party with disciplined decision-making in the short-run:37 their unstructured nature made 
them immune to top-down change. Where leftist parties were not compelled to fight for 
the sake of ensuring regime change by developing a broad, pro-democratic base, they 
remained closed-off, factionalized entities with little incentive or pressure to pursue more 
pragmatic methods and policies:  lack of experience collaborating with diverse groups 
made it difficult for these parties to compromise their earlier positions down the line.
As such, they were not adaptable: these parties were not prepared to respond to 
broad exogenous changes and engage in ideological  and institutional adaptation.  This 
explains the varied success of leftist party adaptation in Latin America:
H4: Leftist parties that emerged under repressive authoritarian regimes are more 
adaptable and thus tend to adapt better to changes in their external environment  
than those leftist parties that developed under democratic or soft authoritarian  
rule.
Where  leftist  parties  were  unconstrained  by  serious  challenges  during  their  founding 
moments,  they  had  little  incentive  to  adopt  such  policies  and  strategies;  thus  they 
37 As parties diversify their strategies and pursue a broader electorate, they become impelled to institu-
tionalize (cf. Müller and Strøm 1999); however, the pace in which this happens varies substantially 
from party to party. Parties that did not confront external challenges during their formative years very 
well can (and most likely will) build up their organization and structure; however, given the large up-
front costs of the process, this author contends that they will put this off for as long as possible.
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struggled to adapt to external pressures demanding adaptation in the medium and long 
run. As there was no pressing need to build a strong party organization, none was built. 
Chapters  3,  4,  and  5  trace  the  process  whereby  the  presence  of  repressive 
authoritarianism induced parties,  such as Brazil's  PT (or Uruguay's  FA),  to adopt the 
necessary prerequisites for adaptation, while the absence of repressive authoritarianism 
meant that others, such as Venezuela's LCR and Peru's IU, had little reason to change, and 
thus, remained unable to adapt when the political context rewarded adaptation.
To be sure, however, not all leftist parties theorized to adapt ended up adapting. 
As mentioned earlier, necessity encourages change; however, it does not necessarily bring 
change  about  (cf.  Thelen  2003).  Especially  when  dealing  with  externally  mobilized 
parties  controlled  by  ideologically  driven  individuals,  responding  in  kind  to  external 
challenges should not be taken as a necessary given. In demonstrating the successful case 
of party adaptation for Brazil's PT, the next three chapters will systematically address the 
various cases of non-adaptation within the same context.
Historically, the strength of leftist parties has often originated in their founding 
struggles (cf. Huntington 1970, p 14). Analyzing the communist parties in Russia and 
China, Selznick (1952) develops the idea of party as organizational weapon,  durably 
built to survive their early years of full-blown class warfare and, therefore, also able to 
withstand powerful challenges in the future. Benjamin Smith (2005) builds upon this idea 
to argue that single-party rule is more durable in situations in which the party experienced 
serious organized opposition and fiscal scarcity during its early, formative years. In the 
Weberian words of Martin Shefter (1993), "the party organization leaders construct to 
meet  early  challenges  to  their  rule  will  be  on  hand  to  meet  the  problems  they 
subsequently confront in governing the regime they now control" (p 13). As such, it is 
helpful for such parties to experience difficulties during their early, formative years so 
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that they are prepared to respond to whatever external challenges they may face in the 
future. Inversely, no pain no gain: if parties do not experience such difficulties early on, 
they have little need to focus their time and efforts on party program and organization 
and, thus, will be less able to adapt successfully later on. Such parties stagnate because 
the seeds for adaptability were never sown to begin with.
In this way, leftist parties confronted by authoritarian repression adapted better 
than those which came about within the context of democracy, as the former were forced 
to withstand greater challenges and, by doing so, sowed the adaptability seeds for future 
party  growth  and  development.38 Such  a  proposition  is  counterintuitive:  growing  up 
under an authoritarian regime would seem to radicalize leftist parties and encourage them 
to take up armed struggle (cf. Greene 2007). The reason for this surprising result is that, 
in the rest of Latin America, repression took place in the shadow of democratization: it 
was widely acknowledged at the time by leftists that these tottering authoritarian regimes 
were on their way out. It was possession of this particular knowledge that encouraged 
moderation over repression: these leftist parties knew they would soon be participating in 
the electoral arena. 
THE BIGGER PICTURE: HI, THE WEIGHT OF THE PAST, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DYNAMISM
As mentioned earlier, historical institutionalism is the most adequate paradigm 
with which to approach the research question. Historical institutionalism, which holds 
that institutions  constrain  and shape human beliefs,  values,  interests,  and the  way in 
which these are deployed to shape outcomes (Katznelson and Weingast 2005), holds that 
38 The argument is thus both genetic and generational. The enduring organizational effects of a party’s 
founding moment matter, but so does the impact of specific historical experiences. In this way, the fact 
that the PT and FA was born under authoritarian rule matters, but so the fact that Chile's pre-existing PS 
was fundamentally transformed by their experiences under authoritarian rule.
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change can occur in one of two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive ways. The 
first  way is during critical junctures—unsettled moments of great transformation and 
institutional flux, in which change can take one of several “paths” made available by the 
specific institutional context (Katznelson and Weingast 2005). Once introduced, the 
course of action taken during these moments can be difficult to reverse,39 and institutional 
stasis returns. The other option is to conceptualize change as gradual and incremental, 
albeit tempered by change-averse institutions (cf. Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Such a 
conceptualization sees change as generational, hampered by the way things way.
For both schools of thought, the  founding  moments  and  formative  years  of 
institutions are causally important to the nature and direction of long-term growth and 
development. In this way, the context and circumstances under which regimes are born 
sharply influence their present and future character (cf. Moore 1966; Linz and Stepan 
1996a; Hagopian 1990); much the same is true for the moments in which parties are born 
(Duverger 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
However, classical historical institutionalism holds that the weight of a party’s 
past  impedes  its  ability  to  compete  in  a  (new)  different  system,  since  its  structure, 
policies, and esprit de corps were created during a different (earlier) era (cf. Greene 2007, 
ch 6; Hunter 2010, ch 2). Since institutions hold a status-quo bias, actors are hesitant to 
change, even if it is in their (imputed) best interest to do so. Change may happen, but it is 
mediated by tradition: for example, the PT was unable to accept legal donations from 
businessmen because of the obstinance of orthodox views of party extremists, forcing the 
party instead to seek illegal, under-the-table kickbacks as a source of funding to deal with 
previously unforeseen political challenges (Hunter 2007).
39 For a discussion on path dependency, see Pierson (2000).
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In  this  way,  institutions  gain  considerable  autonomy  and  inertial  strength  to 
withstand  shifts  in  the  broader  political  and  socio-economic  environment.  Structural 
constraints,  a  status-quo  bias,  and  continuity  thus  may  tend  to  predict  institutional 
resilience, not change. This is a problem for someone looking to explain the variation in 
party  adaptation.  However,  a  revisionist  strand  of historical institutionalism (e.g., 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010) has been addressing this very issue.
This dissertation's argument parallels Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) understanding 
of institutional dynamism in rejecting the classic assumption that the weight of the past 
necessarily “holds back” institutions; instead, institutions created in earlier times can also 
be “converted,” or adapted to serve new goals or fit the interests of new actors. Such a 
redirection is the result of changes within the contextual environment, such as regime 
change,  or through changes in power relations,  as actors not involved in the original 
design of an institution may take it over and turn it to new ends (p 26). This project 
shows  how structures  and  mechanisms  adopted  by  leftist  parties  under  authoritarian 
regimes had unintended consequences that prepared these parties for adaptation (i.e., the 
opposite of institutional resilience), following the re-establishment of democracy.
Authoritarian challenges prior to a party's birth and during its formative years, and 
the  institutional  responses  they  engendered,  helped  shape  that  party's  long-term 
developmental trajectory in the future. In this way, the weight of one’s past does not 
necessarily drag it down; it can also help lead to adaptation by liberating a party from its 
more rigid ideological and institutional origins. This theory thus argues that, rather than 
prevent  much-needed  change  (since  certain  party  structures  and  policies  technically 
remained in place past their original purpose), institutional resilience ensured that leftist 
parties transformed successfully into democratic, moderate, professional parties through 
the incremental but transformative process of institutional dynamism.
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When leftist parties were repressed by tottering authoritarian regimes during their 
formative years, subjected to bureaucratic hurdles, and forced to fight for democracy (the 
three combined to create a “regime change” critical juncture), they were encouraged to 
accept the intrinsic value of democracy, build up a strong organizational structure and 
disciplined  decision-making  mechanisms,  and  begin  representing  a  diverse  electoral 
constituency.  These  short  term  responses  were  later  converted  into  use  for  different 
purposes; the consequence of this incremental change was adaptability and, when society 
rewarded it, transformative party adaptation.
These leftist parties were forced to regroup and re-develop within the confines of 
democratic reformism: this ended up forcing them to accept democracy and offering them 
a legitimate excuse to sideline radical, non-democratic leftist elements from their ranks 
who would prevent future adaptation. These leftist parties were induced to build a solid 
party organization to confront the various bureaucratic hurdles placed in their way; this 
ended up creating an effective party apparatus and fostering disciplined decision-making 
mechanisms, allowing for top-down change to occur. These leftist parties were forced to 
compromise and collaborate with outside groups and parties; this ended up broadening 
and deepening the electoral  appeals  of  these parties,  making them less dogmatic and 
sectarian and more focused on building political hegemony democratically.
It was the weight of the past that liberated Latin America's leftist parties from 
their history of ideological radicalism and weakly institutionalization and enabled them to 
adapt successfully to the profound exogenous forces that shook the region in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The next three chapters—Chapters 3, 4, and 5—test this theory on 
three of Latin America's leftist parties, one that engaged in high adaptation and two that 
engaged in low adaptation; they systematically demonstrate the three causal mechanisms 
at play.
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Chapter 3: “Chastening” the Left: Curtailing the Spectrum of 
Legitimate Political Options
Authoritarian repression of the left paradoxically offered a propitious incentive 
for the formation of leftist parties capable of adapting, should the incentive to adapt arise. 
This became important following Latin America’s political shift to the right, a result of 
the “neoliberal” policy dictates put in place following the region's debt crisis,  and its 
related transformation to professionalism, a result of the “media-ization” of politics (cf. 
Mainwaring, and Zoco 2007). New leftist parties that emerged after the repression of a 
more  dogmatic,  radical  left,  such  as  Brazil’s  PT (and  Uruguay’s  FA40),  formed  and 
developed in a manner different from those that arose in the context of no repression—be 
it under soft authoritarianism or democracy, such as Peru’s IU and LCR, respectively. 
Those in the former group were induced to moderate strategically and accept the intrinsic 
value  of  democracy,  which  increased  their  adaptability  and  thus  allowed  for  later 
adaptation in the form of policy moderation. Those in the latter group were not and, thus, 
had difficulties adapting if and when the electorate rewarded party adaptation.
This chapter explains the causal mechanisms at play whereby prior authoritarian 
repression  of  the  left  led  to  the  emergence  of  new  leftist  parties  with  strategically 
moderated views on democracy and,  thus,  heightened adaptability capabilities.  It  first 
goes into more detail on the theory, introduced in Chapter 2, that explains how and why 
40 While the FA arose two years before the military seized power in Uruguay in 1973, by the year of its 
founding (1971) a state of emergency had been in effect for over three years, alongside brutal policing 
and interrogation techniques. 
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repression ultimately lays the groundwork for future party adaptation, despite the often 
held assumption that the opposite is true. Next, it demonstrates how this surprising twist 
played out for Brazil's PT, a paradigmatic example of leftist party adaptation. Then, it 
demonstrates how the absence of this key factor led the opposite to occur for both Peru's 
IU and Venezuela's LCR, this project's two cases of failed party adaptation. The chapter 
ends  with  a  brief  conclusion  on  the  importance  that  accepting  the  intrinsic  value  of 
democracy has on leftist party adaptation.
THE ROLE OF REPRESSION IN PARTY ADAPTATION
Historically,  Latin  America’s  left  tended  to  disregard  the  intrinsic  merits  of 
democracy (Castañeda 1993, p 328). Strongly influenced by Marxism-Leninism, albeit to 
varying degrees of orthodoxy, many Latin American leftist parties sought to overthrow or 
overhaul the region's admittedly imperfect democratic regimes and instill some radical 
form of direct democracy or socialism, be it through peaceful popular uprising, guerrilla 
warfare, or the election booth. This ideological radicalism was tempered for those leftists 
who were subject to repression under authoritarian rule; as victims of repression, they 
learned to value democracy and the basic protections it brings more than they ever had in 
the  past  (cf.  Wickham  2004).  Conversely,  those  lefts  that  never  witnessed  such  an 
experience continued to discount democracy, with all its imperfections. Repression was 
thus fundamental in forcing leftists to accept democracy not only for its instrumental 
purpose, but for its intrinsic value as well; this development, in turn, facilitated the future 
ideological moderation, and thus adaptation, of leftist parties.
Thanks in no small part to real Cold War tensions in the region and elsewhere, 
both Latin America's left and right extremes radicalized in the 1960's. Leftist extremists 
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organized  armed  militias  in  Brazil,  bombed  buildings  in  Uruguay,  and  waged  urban 
guerrilla  warfare  in  Argentina.  Rightist  extremists  labeled  anyone  holding  leftist 
sympathies traitors and engaged in brutal repression to silence the supposed specter of 
communism. In response to the alleged threat of communist subversion, the armed forces 
deposed democratic presidents and installed themselves in power in several  countries 
throughout the region. These authoritarian regimes then proceeded to repress the left in 
the  hopes  of  destroying  systematically  the  organizational  structure  and  mobilization 
capacity of the region's leftist parties and thus their ability to divulge their message and 
effect political change at the ballot box or elsewhere (Castañeda 2006, p 35).
For instance, during Argentina's “Dirty War” thousands of leftists were tortured at 
the hands of the state.  It  is estimated that up to 30,000 Argentines were subjected to 
forced disappearances (cf.  González 1980; Andersen 1993; Sabato 1984).41 Much  the 
same took place in neighboring Chile: the Valech Report cites over 40,000 direct victims 
of  state  terror  under  Chile's  military  dictatorship  (Comisión Valech 2011).  While  the 
number of disappearances in Uruguay was relatively low, the institutionalized repression 
was no less severe than that of its neighbors: the Uruguayan armed forces relied upon 
psychological and novel forms of physical repression to destroy the willpower and sanity 
of political  detainees (cf.  Piuma 1988).  In Brazil,  disappearances were also relatively 
low; however,  tens of thousands of cases of torture have been documented (see Arns 
1985).
The medium- and long-term result of such targeted repression was moderation at 
the individual and group leevl: radical leftists were killed off or chastened by their time in 
41 One particularly chilling form of terror was the process of abducting the newborns of pregnant political 
detainees and adopting them out to military families; it took decades for many of these children to find 
out their true familial origins. Jorge Rafael Videla, Argentina's authoritarian leader from 1976 to 1981, 
was condemned to 50 years of prison for his role in masterminding the systematic kidnapping of what 
the Grandmothers of the May Square (Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo) estimate was 500 children be-
tween 1976 and 1983 (Peregil 2012). 
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exile, creating a more moderate leftist group at the individual and group level. Also, that 
democracy was rolled back throughout the region as a result of increasing ideological 
polarization was not lost upon such parties;  in one sense they learned their historical 
lesson about the dangers of internal ideological radicalism and tactical bickering.42
In  short,  the  authoritarian  regimes  of  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Uruguay 
terrorized the left. In fact, they unleashed so much state terror that a new term was coined 
to define the alleged subversives whom the state apparatus abducted,  tortured,  killed, 
and/or  disposed  of,  so  that  the  state  could  deny  any  knowledge  of  the  victims' 
whereabouts and status: los desaparecidos,  or, “the disappeared” (cf. Arditti 1999). In 
fact, the military regimes of these countries went so far as to combine their efforts to 
ensure maximal effect of their political repression; this cross-country collaboration was 
termed Operation Condor (cf. Calloni 1999; McSherry 2005).
The result  of this brutal  repression was the decimation of leftist  militants and 
sympathizers,  as  well  as  the  destruction  of  preexisting  leftist  parties.  Targeted 
assassinations, the trauma of torture, and temporary exile thinned the ranks of the left; the 
ensuing political vacuum did not exist for long, however. While the political realm had 
been closed off, the social realm still offered the possibility for indirect forms of political 
contestation.  Regimes  left leeway  for  social  groups—student  groups,  neighborhood 
organizations, soup kitchens, workers' unions, Catholic base communities, and the like—
to  operate  and  flourish  (cf.  Eckstein  2001). It  was  here,  in  civil  society,  that  new, 
democratic leftists emerged.
The remaining old  leftists  joined forces  with  these  new leftist  groups,  but  on 
decidedly new leftist terms: being forced into nominally non-political endeavors ended 
42 Outside of Latin America, Wickham (2004) details this very process of ideological moderation—a re-
sult of democratic learning in the face of state repression—by Egypt’s Islamic Wasat party and its sub-
sequent shift from a Weberian politics of principle to a politics of responsibility.
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up  weakening  the  remaining  left's  undemocratic,  orthodox  Marxist  holdouts  in  two 
principal ways. First, confronting real bread-and-butter challenges and discovering the 
efficacy of utilizing democratic channels with which to air grievances and effect political 
change helped leftist militants see the benefits of small, incremental institutional-political 
change (i.e., reform over revolution). Second, once the political arena had reopened and 
leftist parties were able to reemerge, the voices of militants were diluted by the advent of 
less-ideological social actors who valorized basic political rights and social concerns over 
ideological, sectarian debates. 
It was through this process that leftist parties began to see the intrinsic benefits of 
democracy.  Long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall,  leftist  parties in those Latin 
American  countries  in  which  the  left  had  been  repressed  were  emerging  with 
fundamentally democratic credentials and beliefs. These new leftist parties were tethered 
no longer to orthodox Marxist ideology, but instead to the pragmatic pursuit of addressing 
everyday concerns over basic political rights and social issues. 
This experience also altered the political strategies and goals of leftist  parties. 
Leftist antagonists of repressive regimes were induced to drop their role as purveyor of 
inflexible  ideological  goals  and  adopt  the  role  of  protector  of  political  rights  and 
individual freedoms instead. As pluralism seemed the best way for the left to rejoin the 
political arena and constitutional rights seemed the best protection against continued state 
victimization, leftists were encouraged to embrace the democratic process; similarly, it 
became  increasingly  untenable  to  excuse  one  non-democratic  political  goal—i.e., 
socialism—whilst  simultaneously  denouncing  and  battling  another,  equally  non-
democratic,  one—i.e.,  authoritarianism.  Furthermore,  the  traumatic  memory  of  prior 
repression no doubt had scared and scarred the left into avoiding any policies or actions 
that would be seen as “too radical.” As such, leftist parties refrained from excusing any 
63
suspension  of  democratic  practices,  regardless  of  its  ideological  motivations  (for 
example, a dictatorship of the proletariat), and staked a claim in the emerging democratic 
regime. 
This acceptance of the electoral route to power and of liberal-democratic limits to 
unchecked  popular  sovereignty  curtailed  the  future  spectrum of  possible  routes  such 
parties  could  then  take;  it  committed  them  to  democratic  goals  and  strategies  and 
strengthened pragmatists at the expense of radicals. In a sense, the left had to suffer the 
consequences  of  living  under  non-democratic  rule  to  accept  democracy  as  the  least 
intolerable form of government; as terrible as it sounds, the data suggest that, the left 
moderated strategically only if it had been repressed.
The assumption that repression necessarily leads to radicalization (or, at the very 
least,  continued  dogmatism)  does  not  hold  true  for  Latin  America's  leftist  parties 
principally because most of the region's authoritarian regimes were seen as transient. 
Opposition parties that emerged within dominant party authoritarian regimes, such as the 
70-plus-year  “perfect  dictatorship”  (in  the  words  of  what  Mario  Vargas  Llosa)  of 
Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), 
may  have  been  initially  constrained  by  their  origins  as  fringe,  challenger  parties, 
rendering  them unable  to  transform from niche  to  catchall  parties  and  thus  draw in 
broader support once new opportunities for expansion arose down the line (cf. Greene 
2007). However, Latin America's military dictatorships were decidedly more provisional 
and thus widely perceived as more impermanent than Mexico's unusually stable and all-
powerful authoritarian regime.
Latin America's left knew that democracy was on the horizon and thus that they 
would have the opportunity to compete in the electoral arena in the future on relatively 
equal footing. Chile's 1980 Constitution, for example, was widely seen as transitional. 
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General Pinochet's project was decidedly transient: the military's continued control was 
put to the vote every eight years. For this reason, the process whereby Mexico's leftist 
PRD and rightist National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) remained out of 
step with the average voter in the face of repression (and resource disadvantages), argued 
in Greene (2007), does not hold universally. Furthermore, the extent to which the PRD 
itself even remained “out of step” is debatable: indeed, in 2006 it won approximately 30 
percent of the legislative vote, and lost the presidential election by a mere 0.5 percent of 
the national  vote.  The PRD—a party whose predecessors  were repressed,  which was 
confronted by legal restrictions, and which was forced to fight for democracy—is another 
case of successful leftist adaptation; the party will be taken up in Chapter 6. 
The rest of Latin America's left faced different incentives and constraints, as they 
were operating within different contexts from those faced by the PAN and, to a lesser 
extent, the PRD; whereas Mexico's PRI was a dominant party that institutionalized itself 
in  power,43 the  rest  of  the  region's  authoritarian  regimes  were  run  by  either  rotating 
military leaders or ad-hoc juntas of them. Most of Latin America's military dictatorships 
were seen as transient in nature (cf. Lamounier 1990). While they may have tried, these 
authoritarian  regimes  proved  unable  to  gain  support  for  a  more  long-term  political 
project; authoritarianism was never seen as more than an interlude, with the inevitable 
democratization never that far off. In the Americas, the armed forces were not able to 
gain enough legitimacy to establish anything approaching permanent,  institutionalized 
authoritarian rule (Linz 1976; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p 15). 
43 The PAN was founded in 1939, at the height of Mexico's “perfect dictatorship;” the PRD arose in 1988, 
after endogenous and exogenous forces had challenged the PRI's one-party dominance. In this way the 
PRD arose in a context of authoritarian repression that was far more transient (and thus similar to the 
rest of the Latin American context) and thus did not remain dogmatic and “out of step” of the average 
voter in the way the PAN had decades earlier.
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As such,  leftist  parties were initially forbidden from contesting elections,  and, 
following democratization, operated at less of an incumbency disadvantage than was the 
case for the rightist PAN (which had been going up against single-party dominance for 
much  of  its  existence).  However,  while  perceived  as  temporary,  these  authoritarian 
regimes  were  decidedly  not  competitive:44 there  existed  few  political  arenas  of 
contestation  through  which  opposition  forces  could  challenge  and  defeat  autocratic 
incumbents45 (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2001). As the left in these countries 
knew that obtaining power in the near future was not a pipe dream, and as they were 
never obliged to compete on hopelessly unequal terms, their desperation resulting from 
repression led not to radicalization, but moderation.
In  this  way,  leftist  parties  whose  predecessors  had  suffered  authoritarian 
repression during their formative years intrinsically valued democracy more than those 
that were not subject to state terror; they were thus better able to moderate ideologically 
should the need arise, given their prior distancing from radical Marxism (cf. Levitsky and 
Roberts, 2011b). The next section traces the process whereby prior repression of Brazil's 
left helped convince the PT of the intrinsic value of democracy.
THE PT: ACCEPTING DEMOCRACY AS THE “ONLY GAME IN TOWN”
In Brazil, where the left had been victimized by state repression, successor leftist 
parties  learned  to  value  democracy  intrinsically  and  embrace  the  basic  protections  it 
44 Levitsky and Way (2002) describe competitive authoritarian regimes as one type of post-Cold War hy-
brid regime that is not quite a democracy (it fails to meet the minimalist procedural definition) yet not 
quite an authoritarian regime (incumbents manipulate formal democratic rules but do not eliminate 
them outright).
45 Likewise, what strategies may have brought about liberalizing electoral outcomes in such contexts—
grand coalitions among all opposition parties and candidates, whose sole shared characteristic is a de-
sire for a change in leadership (cf. Howard and Roessler 2006)—would most likely not work in many 
of these countries. This was the case, however, for Chile, where General Augusto Pinochet submitted to 
a general plebiscite on whether to extend his rule to another 8-year term.
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entails. Such strategic moderation had important long-term consequences that ended up 
strengthening parties' ability to adapt, should the need arise. This section demonstrates 
how the trauma of terror ensured that Brazil's PT did not continue to discount democracy 
and, thus, would be well placed to adapt down the line, once external factors (namely, the 
transitions to the market economy and democratic rule) necessitated policy moderation. 
Indeed,  a  lack  of  consensus  around  democratic  goals  and  strategies  precludes  the 
possibility of adaptation, as the starting negotiation positions between party radicals and 
moderates are so far apart that any effort to moderate ideologically would inevitably lead 
to internecine fighting and party schism.
The Dismantling of the Left
In  1964,  Brazil's  armed forces  deposed President  João Goulart  (1961-1964),46 
installed an authoritarian regime, suppressed individual liberties and political rights, and 
sought  to  destroy  the  leftist  opposition  by  force.  To  this  end,  the  regime  began  a 
systematic campaign of state repression to neutralize the purported communist threat, the 
Cold War having colored fundamentally the region's political debates.47 Institutional Act 
No. 1 (Ato Institucional No1 AI-1) suspended constitutional guarantees, forced various 
political leaders into exile, created the nefarious National Information Service (Serviço 
Nacional  de  Informações,  SNI),  and “legitimized” the  regime's  systematic  assault  on 
labor leaders and the left (Gaspari 2002a, pp 153-174). 
46 “Jango,” as he was popularly known, held strong ties to the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Co-
munista Brasileiro, PCB) and was never well liked by the military. Furthermore, he was never elected 
as president, but rather, as Vice-President, assumed power after President Jãnio Quadros (1961-1961) 
renounced the presidency. In power, he pressed for agrarian reform, sought the legalization of the PCB, 
encouraged the arming and mobilization of peasant leagues (ligas camponesas) and workers, and sanc-
tioned the pardoning of sailors and marines who had mutinied.
47 The extent to which the left could be considered an actual threat is debatable. What is not debatable, 
however, is the radicalness of much of Brazil's left: at the time, leftists were looking not to Scandinavia 
for inspiration, but to (then totalitarian) Cuba and China. Author interview with former leftist intellec-
tual Bolívar Lamounier (11 August 2010).
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While the military remained in power for 21 years, until 1985, the vast majority of 
state  repression  was  conducted  during  the  “lead  years”  (anos  de  chumbo)  of  the 
authoritarian regime. This period began in 1968 with the decree of Institutional Act No. 5 
(Ato Institucional No5, AI-5)—which instituted, amongst other things, partial censorship 
of  the  arts,  the  suspension  of  habeas  corpus  for  politically  motivated  cases,  and  the 
revoking of the right to assembly (cf. Alves 1993, pp 169-174)—and ended with the rise 
to  power  of  General  Ernesto  Geisel  (1974-1979),  a  military  soft-liner  (Alves  1996). 
Overall, more than 17,000 cases of torture have been documented during the entire period 
(Arns 1985); the number of disappearances is in the mid 300s.48 Both numbers are likely 
to rise once the newly installed truth commission finishes its work in May 2014; signed 
into law on 18 November 2011 by Brazil's current President Dilma Rousseff (2011-), this 
commission  will  investigate  further  those  killed  and  disappeared  during  the  military 
regime.  A former  leftist  militant  with  the  Palmares  Armed  Revolutionary  Vanguard 
(Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares, VAR Palmares) who has since become a 
petista (i.e., a member of the PT), Rousseff herself was a victim of repression: she was 
tortured during her time in prison, between 1970 and 1972.49
Regardless  of  the  exact  numbers, repression  took  its  toll  on  the  left. The 
dictatorship's  repressive  tools  included  assassination,  disappearances,  and,  especially 
torture (Iasi 2004; Alves 1986). The latter involved beatings, electric shocks to the tongue 
and genitals, stranglings, and simulated drownings; female prisoners were additionally 
subjected to rape and all sorts of perverse and demeaning sexual violations.50
48 Torture Never More (Tortura Nunca Mais) lists 384 persons (Eloysa 1987), while the official Right to 
Memory and Truth (Direito à Memória e à Verdad), written by Brazil's Human Rights Secretariat (Sec-
retaria de Direitos Humanos), counts 339.
49 In May of 2012 she was compensated 20,000 Brazilian reais from the State of Rio de Janeiro as retri-
bution (Estado de S.Paulo, 2007).
50 Interview with guerrilla Ângelo Pezzutti, cited in Truskier (1969). See also Guerra et al (2012).
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Repression  led  to  a  definite,  albeit  short-lived  radicalization  among  Brazil's 
leftists: small groups of leftist militants took up arms and engaged in kidnappings, bank 
robberies,  and  guerrilla  warfare.  As  these  insurgent  activities  were  quickly  defeated, 
however,  the left  quickly realized that  armed struggle  would not  work:  the Brazilian 
military would not be defeated on the battlefield. Indeed, the most promising group was 
the result  of  a  Communist  Party of  Brazil-  (Partido Comunista do Brasil;  PC do B) 
backed  attempt  to  train a  guerrilla  army  along  the  Araguaia  river,  in  a  rural  area 
straddling the states of Goiás,  Maranhão, and Pará; the guerrillas sought to foment a 
popular uprising among the local peasants,  who would then eventually overthrow the 
authoritarian regime.51 Once the Brazilian military discovered its whereabouts, however, 
it massacred the group: over 60 of a total of 80 PC do B militants were killed in the raid, 
or disappeared shortly thereafter (Gaspari 2002b, pp 399-464). The failure of this effort 
generated much soul searching among Brazil's leftists as the insurgency was terribly ill-
prepared for warfare: it  was composed mainly of young students who had difficulties 
firing guns, let alone surviving in the Northern countryside (most were from the city of 
São Paulo, over 2,000 kilometers away and a world apart).52 
By  1973,  Brazil's  “radical  left  had  been  crushed,  its  principal  organizations 
eliminated,  and  the  majority  of  its  fighters  put  out  of  combat—dead,  imprisoned,  or 
exiled” (Sader  and Silverstein 1991,  p 14).  According to a  high-ranking PT militant, 
Valter Pomar,
The repression practiced by the  military  dictatorship  [in  Brazil]  destroyed the 
organizations of the leftist groups that had preceded the PT, which, to a certain 
51 For a definitive analysis of the Araguaia guerrilla group, see Studart (2006) and Pomar (1980).
52 Author interview with former member of the Central Committee of the PC do B Augusto Buonicore 
(12 May 2011). See also Coelho (2007, pp 24-25, 441).
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degree, made it so that, when the PT formed, it could attract a large number of 
leftist cadres lacking organizations (or with very weak organizations).53
Margaret Keck (1991) argues that, thanks to a variety of concerted efforts that rendered 
extinct former parties, the military regime in Brazil disorganized partisan loyalties far 
more so than elsewhere in Latin America (pp 49-50). Censorship and repression had bred 
distrust,  turning leftist  against  leftist  and ensuring that  there was never an organized, 
unified resistance to authoritarian rule.54 
With  so  many  leftists  assassinated,  tortured,  exiled,  or  otherwise  persecuted, 
Brazil's  leftist  parties  imploded.55 Indeed,  both  the PCB and PC do  B were  severely 
weakened by state repression and, as a consequence, suffered from numerous strategy- 
and ideology-based battles that led to debilitating schisms (Paraná 2006); the PCB was a 
“political cadaver” in the words of PT founder Valério Arcary.56 Much the same happened 
to the rest of Brazil's smaller leftist parties and organizations: “the left was liquidated, 
turned to dust.”57
In his treatise on Brazil's political parties and factions, Antonio Da Silva (1987) 
documents the extent to which the organizational and mobilizational capacity of leftist 
parties  was  devastated  by  the  repression  of  Brazil's  authoritarian  regime.58 National 
Liberation  Action  (Ação  Libertadora  Nacional,  ALN),  for  instance,  was  an  urban 
guerrilla group that emerged from the PCB: “the ALN disintegrated not because of its 
53  Author interview with (11 July 2010).
54 Author interview with PT intellectual Candido Mendes de Almeida (13 April 2011). See also Paraná 
2006 (pp 69-70).
55 Brazil's old leftist parties experienced setback after setback until eventually imploding. Hesitant to at-
tach themselves to these practically defunct parties, neither the former guerrillas nor the rising social 
actors (from new unionism, for example) wanted to associate with them; they bid their time waiting for 
a promising alternative. Author interview with Carlos Eduardo de Carvalho, coordinator of Lula's 1989 
Government Program (10 August 2010).
56 Author interview (20 August 2010).
57 Author interview with PC do B Secretary of International Relations Ricardo Abreu (26 May 2011).
58 Brazil's intelligence community conducted extensive research on the various active guerrilla groups. In-
telligence analysts adroitly infiltrated most of these groups (cf. Secretaria de Segurança Publica do Rio 
Grande do Sul 1968 and Departamento de Ordem Política e Social 1967).
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errors,  but principally because of the systematic and violent repression committed by 
[State] repressive organs” (p 106). The Maoist group Popular Action (Ação Popular, AP) 
suffered brutally at  the hands of  the state:  its  organization collapsed and was almost 
completely destroyed in late 1973 when most of its leaders were disappeared, the result 
of a former leader cracking under torture and denouncing his colleagues.59
Much  the  same  happened  to  the Revolutionary  Brazilian  Communist  Party 
(Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário, PCBR), another breakaway party of the 
PCB: “...a large part of the PCBR's Central Committee (Comitê Central, CC), all of its 
National Secretariat (Secretariado Nacional), and leader cadres from the Northeast and 
Southeast fell to the talons of repression.” Then, after just barely surviving this first bout 
of repression,
...the PCBR suffered a second rough blow from the forces of repression which 
almost completely dismantled the party. Nonetheless, it was able to reorganize a 
third CC, with three members. However, the repression continued: the three CC 
members,  along  with  other  leaders  and  militants,  were  then  exterminated  in 
torture chambers (p 108).60
On the micro-level, repression had terrible repercussions on individual leftists, as 
well. Radicals—such as Carlos Marighella, the author of the Mini Manual of the Urban 
Guerrilla (Minimanual do Guerrilheiro Urbano 1969), and Carlos Lamarca, a military 
captain who defected and went on to establish a guerrilla-training camp—were targeted 
for assassination (MR-8, undated); less radical subversives were more likely to survive 
and, thus, effect a de facto shift toward the center (Gaspari 2002b, pp 141-157). Torture 
59 Author interview with former Popular Action (Ação Popular, AP) guerrilla and PT founder Ricardo de 
Azevedo (3 February 2011).
60 For information on the downfall of the Revolutionary Movement – October 8 (Movimento Revolu-
cionário 8 de Outubro, MR-8) at the hands of repression, see pp 110-111. For information on the fate 
of Red Wing (Ala Vermelha), see p 133. For the National Liberation Command (Comando de Liber-
tação Nacional, COLINA), see p 114.
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left indelible marks on its victims that set them apart from their brethren: José Genoino, a 
PC do B guerrilla tortured by the regime (and survivor from the Araguaia guerrilla camp), 
became one of the PT's first and most adamant advocates for ideological moderation in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s (Coelho 2007; Paraná 2006).61 The vast majority of former 
guerrillas who returned to politics ended up joining the PT.62 Another paradigmatic case 
was José Dirceu, a radical leftist student leader imprisoned and tortured in the 1960s. 
Dirceu  went  on  to  help  found  the  PT,  where  he  became  an  influential  and  highly 
pragmatic  figure  who continually  pushed for  ideological  moderation  and institutional 
professionalization.63 The suffering of  such torture victims not  only helped them win 
sympathy among other leftists, but also helped them retain legitimacy in the face of their 
seeming “sell-out” of traditional leftist principles.
Bolívar Lamounier, a leftist intellectual who was forced into self-exile, returned to 
Brazil with decidedly moderate political beliefs. Such a political transformation was in no 
way  an  anomaly:  he  claims  that  many  fellow  exiled  leftists  returned  home  with  a 
newfound appreciation of the intrinsic value of democracy.64 Indeed, after a brief foray 
into armed struggle, which ended almost as soon as it had started (Gaspari 2002b), many 
leftists became cognizant of two facts: 1) armed struggle would not work against the 
Brazilian  state,65 and  2)  while  normatively  less  desirable  than  socialism,  democracy 
would at least guarantee protection against more repression (Azevedo 1995, pp 17-18). 
61 Author interview with PT founder and former party president José Genoino (2 February 2011) and in-
terview with José Genoino by Marcelo Ridenti (6 January 1986).
62 Author interview with Carlos de Carvalho, coordinator of Lula's 1989 Presidential Government Pro-
gram (10 August 2010). 80-90 percent of AP survivors flocked to PT; author interview with Ricardo 
Azevedo (3 February 2011). Those numbers were even higher for Dilma Rousseff's VAR-Palmares, 
which had likewise been completely destroyed by repression, although Dilma herself joined the Demo-
cratic Labor Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista, PDT); author interview with PT founder and for-
mer PT president Rui Falcão (17 February 2011).
63 Author interview with PT founder José Álvaro Moisés (17 August 2010).
64 Author interview (11 August 2010).
65 For an indelible first-hand account of the political learning taking place among Brazil's left in the face 
of defeat, see Gabeira (1979).
72
Democracy as a Means of Survival
In this way, Brazil's leftists began seeing rights-based struggles—democratically 
protected political and human rights—as the best method to safeguard their lives. Indeed, 
according to PT founder and former secretary-general  Francisco Weffort,  “democracy 
planted itself in Brazil because of the dictatorship.”66 Part  and parcel  of this  political 
learning was the fact that the political realm became effectively closed off to the radical 
opposition.67 Chastised by repression,  some of Brazil's  leftists moderated strategically 
and participated clandestinely in the government-sanctioned, centrist opposition party, the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement68 (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, MDB).69 Others, 
seeing the growing prominence and success of civil  society organizations, jumped on 
board and regrouped within the social realm. Various social movements—from student 
groups to workers' unions to the Catholic church—had mobilized to oppose indirectly the 
regime by fighting for improved living conditions (Alves 1993).
As labor  groups,  neighborhood associations,  and student  movements  were not 
subject  to  the  same  constraints  as  nominally  political  organizations,  they  flourished. 
66 Author interview (15 July 2010).
67 Institutional Act No 2 (Ato Institucional No 2, AI-2) had dissolved all political parties and replaced 
them with a pro-regime party, the National Renewal Alliance Party (Aliança Renovadora Nacional, 
ARENA), and a legal, albeit highly curtailed, opposition party. AI-2 was promulgated after the opposi-
tion swept state elections in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais.
68 Many of those leftists who went on to form the PT had chosen to boycott the MDB, arguing that partic-
ipation in the authoritarian regime's legal opposition party was tantamount to legitimizing the authori-
tarian regime. For them, whereas ARENA was considered the “party of yes,” the MDB was termed, 
tongue-in-cheekily, the “party of yes, sir” (“o partido do sim, senhor”). Author interview with former 
MDB state deputy, PT founder, and secretary-general Irma Passoni (21 February 2011). The PCB, how-
ever, opted to embrace the MDB during the 1970s and early 1980s: “We Communists believe that the 
strengthening of the MDB...and the fight for its unity is a basic presupposition of the electoral defeat of 
the [authoritarian] regime....every vote attributed to the MDB is a vote of opposition” (PCB 1978, pp 4-
5).
69 Later,  many  leftists  then  participated  in  the  Popular  Front  (Frente  Popular)  movement.  With  the 
reestablishment of democratic politics and the reemergence of parties out of clandestinity, not all left-
ists joined the PT; many joined the PDT and PC do B as well. Author interview with PMDB founder 
Almino Affonso (30 November 2010).
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Leftists  eventually  flocked to  such groups as  New Unionism labor  organizations,  the 
Movement  against  Famine  (Movimento  contra  a  Carestia),  and  the  Cost-of-Living 
Movement (Movimento do Custo de Vida), to name a few. Both phenomena served as 
chastening experiences. The former meant collaboration with centrist political groups, the 
latter  meant  working within  largely  non-political  groups  and learning to  valorize  the 
reformist struggle for more egalitarian social rights over the revolutionary struggle for 
equal  political  rights  (i.e.  socialism).  Down the  line,  the  presence  of  non-ideological 
leftists, such as factory workers, community organizers, clergymen,70 and social workers, 
within the newly founded PT diluted the party's ideological bent in favor of direct action 
with tangible results.71
An ideological sea change occurred within the Brazilian left between the 1960s 
and 1980s: Marxist approaches, which had come to have a hegemonic dominance over 
the  left  in  the  late  1960s,  were  replaced  by  more  pluralistic  visions  of  politics 
(Packenham 1986). Repression made Brazil's left accept democracy as the “only game in 
town:”  much  of  Brazil's  left  reformed  in  the  late  1970's  and  came  out  as  distinctly 
democratic players (cf. Weffort 1984b, pp 74-84).72 The PT's foundation in the late 1970's 
and early 1980's was marked by heated discussions over whether the party was socialist 
(Azevedo  1995).  Nonetheless,  the  party's  representative  democratic  credentials  were 
undebatable: the PT was not tied to the left's sacred, non-democratic texts (Singer 1980). 
Moreover,  at  the  party's  founding  meeting,  PT  leader  and  future  Brazilian 
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2003-2010) made clear that, “it's time to finish 
70 Base communities played a critical role in the formation and construction of the PT, particularly in the 
poorest neighborhoods, where formal labor had no presence. There was an overlap of personnel, ideas, 
and resources between Brazil's labor movement and its CEB network. The Church had supported work-
ers' strikes before public opinion had come around. Author interview with PT founder and CEB activist 
Geraldo Cruz (5 May 2011).
71 Author interviews with PT intellectual Candido Mendes de Almeida (13 April 2011) and PT founder 
and former president José Genoino (2 February 2011).
72 Author interview with PT founder and former high-ranking official Valério Arcary (20 August 2010).
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with ideological mustiness and self-indulgence of those who sit at home reading Marx 
and Lenin” (Sader and Silverstein 1991,  p 50).  The PT's  1979 Charter of  Principles 
(Carta de Princípios), published before the party was formally launched, reaffirmed the 
PT's  “commitment  with  full  democracy,  exercised  directly  by  the  masses;  indeed, 
socialism does not exist without democracy, and neither does democracy exist without 
socialism.” Socialism, however, was mentioned neither in the PT's Manifesto nor in its 
1982 party platform (although the nationalization of banks and large companies was). It 
was mentioned  in  the  party's  1981  National  Convention  (Convenção  Nacional). 
Nonetheless,  it  was  explicitly  conceived as  a  new form of  democratic  socialism,  not 
imported from Russia but constructed in Brazil from the bottom-up, based on the needs 
and wants of Brazil's working class (Gushiken 1990, p 23).
Repression may have briefly radicalized Brazil's left;73 but, in the medium- and 
long-run, it did the opposite.74 The reason is because Brazil's authoritarian regime, like 
those of its neighbors, was perceived as transient: according to former guerrilla and PT 
founder Markus Sokol, “in the late 1970s people could feel the fragility of the regime, 
and this  made them more pragmatic.”75 In  recognition of  this,  noted authoritarianism 
scholar  Juan  Linz  (1976)  characterizes  the  21  years  of  military  rule  in  Brazil  as  an 
“authoritarian situation,” not  an “authoritarian regime.” According to PT founder and 
former high-ranking official Valério Arcary, since the PT's very founding its members:
73 Following the government crackdown in 1968, armed struggle groups expanded tremendously: these 
organizations received so many new recruits that “we didn't know what to do with all the people who 
wanted  to  join  us  and begin  to  fight.”  Interview with  MR-8 guerrilla  Fernando Gabeira  (cited  in 
Truskier 1969). 
74 Weffort (1984b) downplays the radicalism of Brazil's left in the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, he of-
fers the same conclusions: the left emerged out of military rule more committed to democracy than it 
had been before. According to PT founder and leftist intellectual José Moisés, “repression is what mod-
erated the [Brazilian] left. Those most directly involved with the armed struggle understood more than 
most that the left had to reform.” Author interview (17 August 2010).
75 Author interview (12 August 2010).
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knew that the military regime was on its way out. It was widely understood that 
the Brazilian military was looking to follow the Spanish example [and extricate 
itself from politics as soon as possible]....It was common knowledge that [General 
João] Figueiredo [(1979-1985)] would be the last military president.76 
For the first two years, President Castelo Branco (1964-1967) insisted that the 
military's intervention in politics would be short lived, and planned to see the country 
through direct elections for a new, civilian president in 1966. Regime hard liners, who 
held  a  decidedly  more  long-term  strategic  vision  of  the  “Redemptive  Revolution” 
(Revolução Redentora) and sought to remain in power until the alleged communist threat 
was completely abated, gained the upper hand in 1966, with the ascension to power of 
General Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) and, later, General Emílio Médici (1969-
1974).  Nonetheless,  by 1974,  the armed forces  had begun their  protracted process  of 
extrication from politics, with incoming President General Ernesto Geisel’s declaration of 
distensão (the  slow,  safe,  and gradual  “relaxation” of  authoritarian rule),  followed in 
1979 by  President  João  Baptista  de  Oliveira  Figueiredo’s  (1979-1985)  declaration  of 
abertura (literally, “opening”) and general amnesty (Gaspari 2003; Gaspari 2004).
Hence, for the majority of the authoritarian regime's 21 years in power77—1964-
1967, then 1974-1985—the regime was actually on its way out, slowly but surely. “From 
1964  to  1967  President  Castelo  Branco  sought  to  exercise  a  temporary 
dictatorship....From 1974 to 1979...[the armed forces] began its exit” (Gaspari 2002a, p 
129). The regime was seen as transient by much of Brazilian society;78 however, it proved 
reluctant  to  leave  power.  Because  of  this, Brazil's leftist  opposition  did  not  think  it 
impossible  to  compete  on  a  level  playing  field  in  the  near  future;  much  of  it  thus 
embraced democracy as the best route to power—the armed forces just needed a little 
76 Author interview (20 August 2010).
77 Some even, questionably, claim that the dictatorship ended in 1979 (cf. Boix 2003).
78 Author interview with Davi Schmidt, advisor at the Secretariat for Political and Institutional Studies of 
the Presidency (17 September 2010).
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push to give up their last vestiges of power in the mid-1980s.79 By 1980, when the PT 
was founded, it  was “widely understood that  the authoritarian regime was seeking to 
leave power,” given the incremental convening of democratic elections that covered more 
and more government positions.80 External  events  created the incentive for  the PT to 
moderate strategically, and it did so; however, in order for this incentive to lead to action 
a party has to at least be amenable to change.
The PT was presented with a choice. It was faced with an external challenge and 
decided to institutionalize in order to best respond to the ensuing constraints. However, 
the need to do something does not necessarily mean that said something will get done. A 
precondition  for  such  action  is  a  malleable  ideological  outlook:  in  order  to  respond 
logically  to  incentives  and  constraints  a  party  has  to  be,  at  least,  amenable  to  the 
possibility of change.
Brazil's PC do B and PCB are examples of parties that did not respond readily to 
such incentives for action. The PC do B, which was composed primarily of ultra-radical 
students, remained obstinate in the face of severe repression and military defeat. Whereas 
most leftists agreed that PC do B's Araguaia guerrilla war of the early 1970s ended in 
total defeat, some pecedobistas (i.e., members of the PC do B) exalted the experience into 
the early 1980s, claiming that the guerrillas had just needed a bit more time to win over 
the populace and thus be able to transform the foco into a true people's war (Coelho 2007, 
pp 253-255). While those defending the war slowly lost support within the PC do B's CC 
to those who saw the guerrilla for what it really was (i.e., a terrible defeat),81 the damage 
was already done: the party remained sidelined and was not allowed to legalize under the 
new  partisan  rules  of  1979  (Buonicore  unpublished).  Similarly,  the  PCB  remained 
79 For the Brazilian left's role in ensuring that the military return to the barracks, see Chapter 5.
80 Author interview with PT founder and former high-ranking militant Valério Arcary (20 August 2010).
81 For more information on the competing visions of how to interpret the Araguaia guerrilla military “de-
feat,” see Arroyo (1979) and Pomar (1979).
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wracked by internal divisions over who should run the party and how the party should 
respond to global setbacks to Marxism (Pandolfi 1995).
Accepting democracy as the only game in town was a prerequisite for the PT's 
adaptation because, otherwise, the party would not limit its actions to the institutional-
political arena or seek to follow public opinion instead of lead it. Indeed, leftist parties 
that emerged in countries in which the left had been repressed by authoritarian regimes, 
such  as  Brazil's  PT (or  Uruguay's  FA),  quickly  engaged  in  strategic  moderation  and 
accepted democracy as more than just  a  mere instrument to power.  However,  not  all 
leftist parties in Brazil accepted the intrinsic value of democracy: just because the need is 
there,  it  does  not  deterministically  mean  that  the  party  respond  accordingly.  The 
precondition for the theory to work is that people respond to external challenges and 
constraints.
Sister parties in countries in which the left was not repressed—be it because the 
country's history was democratic or marked by soft authoritarian rule—took far longer to 
accept the intrinsic value of democracy than the PT. Because of this, such parties were 
then less able to adapt ideologically than those parties with antecedents in the repressed 
left. The next two sections demonstrate how this manifested itself in the cases of Peru's 
IU and Venezuela's LCR, respectively.
IU: THE PERSISTENCE OF DISLOYAL DEMOCRATS
Unlike  the  case  of  the  PT,  IU's  immediate  leftist  predecessors  were  barely 
repressed.82 Small, leftist guerrilla forces were swiftly defeated by Peru's armed forces in 
82 To be sure, in the 1960s Peru's two minor guerrilla groups—The Movement of the Revolutionary Left 
(Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR), and the Army of National Liberation (Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN)—were targeted and destroyed by the Peruvian state. There is a qualitative 
difference, however, between a state defending its national sovereignty from a violent insurgency—
what happened in Peru, and Venezuela—and one targeting leftists just for being leftists—as had hap-
pened in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, for example (bar a few exceptions, such as Araguaia).
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1965,  mere  months  after  they came about.  From 1968 to  1980,  Peru  was  led  by an 
authoritarian regime, but a soft authoritarian regime; again, this involved little repression. 
Indeed, Peru's “revolutionary leftist” regime sought to appease and harness the left, not 
suppress them. Because of this, IU, like Venezuela's LCR (which will be discussed later 
in the chapter), was never forced to reassess its aversion to democracy and, therefore, 
remained  largely  unadaptable.  This  lack  of  strategic  moderation  hampered  party 
adaptation and eventually led to the party's dissolution.
Authoritarianism with Low Repression
In 1968, Peru's armed forces began their top-down leftist revolution by deposing 
the democratically elected president, Fernando Belaúnde (1963-1968), and establishing 
an institutionalized military regime under General Juan Velasco (1968-1975).83 However, 
Peru's authoritarian regime was qualitatively different from the repressive dictatorships 
elsewhere in Latin America. While the national security doctrine of the Southern Cone 
had concluded that Marxist guerrillas and mobilized popular masses were the main threat 
to political stability, Peru’s national security doctrine, developed and disseminated by the 
Center  of  High  Military  Studies  (Centro  de  Altos  Estudios  Militares),  had  reasoned 
instead  that  subversion  would  come  about  from  internal  socioeconomic 
underdevelopment (Kruijt 1996; Villanueva 1969).84
The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (Gobierno Revolucionario 
de las Fuerzas Armadas) believed that stability was predicated upon the destruction of 
the  anti-liberal  economic  elites.  This  was  to  be  done  through  a  number  of  different 
83 The reasons for the military coup included revelations of political corruption, rising economic prob-
lems, and, in particular, President Belaúnde's mishandling of royalty negotiations with the International 
Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil) over subsoil ownership.
84 See Stepan (1973) for an in-depth comparison of the military regimes of Peru and Brazil.
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actions: the nationalization of oil holdings, the broadening of the political arena through 
the  participatory  inclusion  of  Peru's  indigenous  peasants  (campesinos)  and  urban 
underbelly (Villanueva 1972),85 and land expropriations of haciendas—the profundity of 
which rivaled Fidel Castro's revolutionary agrarian program in Cuba (Chernick 2007). 
Indeed,  prior  to  Velasco's  land  reform,  Peru  had  had  the  most  unequal  landholding 
structure within Latin America, a region infamous for its landowning inequality (cf. Reid 
1985,  p  37);  given  a  300,000-peasant-strong  uprising  in  the  1960s,  the  military  was 
particularly concerned that the unrest in the hinterlands would brew into subversion.
In this vein, the authoritarian regime sought to increase the role of the state in the 
economy, dismantle the oligarchy, modernize rural society, and integrate the marginalized 
masses into national society and the political arena through its so-called “revolutionary 
third way” (cf. Lowenthal 1975; McClintock and Lowenthal 1983). Subversion was thus 
to be combated preemptively through social development, not state terror: the structural 
causes of popular insurgency were targeted through inclusionary corporatist policies and 
redistributive reforms (Krujit 1989).
With such an ideological outlook, Peru's military regime saw no need to repress 
the left:86 given the  regime's  particular  understanding of  subversion,  leftists  were  not 
considered enemies of the state. Especially during the first seven years of the dictatorship, 
the  government  relied  not  on  repression  but  co-optation,  not  exclusion  but  rather 
inclusion.  Instead,  in  order  to  undermine  the  power  of  the  American  Popular 
Revolutionary  Alliance  (Alianza  Popular  Revolucionaria  Americana,  APRA),  the 
85 The Civil Code of 1977 reduced the voting age from 21 to 18; during the time of the dictatorship, 
Peru's electoral population increased from 2.3 million to just under 5 million (Bernales 1980, p 13).
86 Again, there had been a round of repression before: the state used military force to squash the country's 
two small guerrilla movements in 1965. For example, Hugo Blanco was given 25 years in prison (only 
to be amnestied by Velasco after eight), then deported on three separate occasions. Author interview 
(10 August 2011). That being said, the movements were small, far out in the countryside—and thus ex-
erting limited influence on leftists in Lima, and quickly destroyed.
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Peruvian  military's  archenemy,87 Velasco  worked  closely  with  the  Communist  Party 
(Partido Comunista Peruano, PCP) and assisted in its usurpation of the leadership within 
the labor movement through the CGTP (Sanborn 1991; Samanez 1982). While there was 
bitter disagreement within the armed forces over the appropriate stance to take with labor 
and the left in general, Velasco and his ruling partners had strategically decided that the 
wisest option would be to encourage popular mobilization and political participation, and 
then attempt  to  channel  it  into  pro-government  organizations  (cf.  Stokes  1995;  Dietz 
1980).
This official policy was challenged, but not scrapped, with the fall of Velasco and 
the internal coup of 1975 that brought the relatively more hardline General  Francisco 
Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) to power.88 Overnight, the regime's stance towards the 
popular sectors soured significantly; nonetheless, this did not trigger  the beginning of 
state terror against the Peruvian left.  Rather,  it  signified a cooling-off of the regime's 
support  of  popular  organization,  mobilization,  and  inclusion.  In  1976,  following  the 
unrest generated by economic turmoil, Morales Bermúdez declared a national state of 
emergency—the military regime's first since coming to power in 1968—and instituted 
various  nominally  repressive  policies,  such  as  the  prohibition  of  strikes  and 
demonstrations, closures of press outlets, and mass firings (see Pease 1979), which were 
aimed at  demobilizing the popular  sectors. Even when confronted by violent  popular 
unrest, though, Peru's military chose retreat, not repression.
87 Decades earlier, APRA militants and supporters had engaged in a rebellion that killed 60 soldiers in 
Trujillo, an APRA stronghold and APRA founder Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre's birthplace. In retalia-
tion, the armed forces killed over 1,000 rebels and sympathizers through heavy military repression, set-
ting the stage for decades of antagonistic APRA-military relations (cf. Cotler 1995, pp 327-328). Au-
thor interview with Carlos Indacochea, Peruvian military expert and son of General Carlos Indacochea 
Ballón (6 September 2011). 
88 Steep increases in the price of oil following the 1973 oil crisis, coupled with the parallel decline in the 
price of key commodities, led to a balance-of-payments crisis, spiraling inflation, and economic de-
cline.  This,  along  with  Velasco's  sudden  debilitating  illness,  led  to  a  dramatic  shift  in  the  bal-
ance-of-power within the armed forces between soft- and hard-liners (cf. Stepan 1973; McClintock and 
Lowenthal 1983).
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Whether or not it may have wanted to, the military regime of the “second phase” 
proved  unwilling  to  follow  the  path  of  neighboring  regimes  and  smash  popular 
organizations:  when  confronted  with  increasingly  violent  and  uncontrollable  popular 
unrest, it opted not to fight, but instead announced its extrication from power through the 
convocation of  constituent  assembly elections  (Huber  Stephens 1983,  p  58).  Morales 
Bermúdez was even lax about which groups were permitted to participate in this contest, 
to be held in 1978: any and all political groups, regardless of ideology, were permitted to 
participate, so long as they could collect at least 40,000 signatures of eligible voters and 
open at least 14 local party committees (Sanborn 1991, p 137; Bernales 1980). While 
there were individual cases of repression targeting them, for the most part, Peru's leftists 
were, on the whole, left alone.
Peru's military did not look to repress the left, as was being done elsewhere in the 
region  for  the  purposes  of  popular  demobilization  and  pacification. According  to 
Peruvian  intellectual  specialist  José  Luis  Rénique,  “the  [Peruvian]  left  was  not 
persecuted.  There  were  no  real  conditions  for  repression,  no  confrontation  head-on 
between the left and the government.”89 Peru's left was not diminished by the military, as 
had occurred in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Thus, save a scant few forced exiles and 
minor persecution under Morales Bermúdez—such as the firing of striking employees at 
the  state-owned  Pesca  Peru,  the  installation  of  curfews  in  Lima,  and  the  temporary 
detention  of  labor  leaders  (Bernales  1980,  p  23;  Roberts  1998,  p  224)90—Peru's 
traditional left was not destroyed by the military regime; in fact, it flourished.  
89 Author interview (1 September 2011). 
90 Author interview with Peruvian military specialist Carlos Indacochea (6 September 2011). 
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Radicalism, Unencumbered
With no external challenge creating the incentive for change, Peru's traditional, 
orthodox leftist  parties  were  able  to  survive  the  military  dictatorship  intact  as  small, 
sectarian,  dogmatic,  vanguard-style  parties.91 This  meant  that  the  next  generation  of 
leftists were inculcated in radical, leftist ideology. Given a lack of fear of being repressed 
by the government or being excluded from the political arena, Peru's leftists were able to 
continue to advocate ultra-radical, undemocratic, revolutionary positions; they had little 
incentive to moderate strategically. In this way, the “permissive” nature of Peru's  soft 
authoritarian  regime  offered  the  same  context  that  Venezuela's  democratic  regime 
(explained in the next section) would provide: a safe space in which leftist parties were 
able to remain only partially committed to democracy without fear of retribution. Such 
radical  stances  would have led (and did lead)  to  brutal  military  repression  in  Brazil. 
Without  a  pressing  need  among  Peru's  left  to  engage  in  strategic  moderation,  no 
moderation took place: the radical status-quo remained.
In this way there was no rise of a chastened left that respected and embraced 
democratic  institutions.  Peru's  two  minuscule  guerrilla  movements,  the  MIR and  the 
ELN, had been quickly destroyed in 196592 (cf. Letts 1981 pp 49-54; Samanez 1982), and 
the decision by the third New Left (Nueva Izquierda) group, Revolutionary Vanguard 
(Vanguardia Revolucionaria, VR),93 to “delay” the armed struggle in order to allow for 
the accumulation of forces, did not signify the rise of a democratically loyal left in its 
91 Author interview with former member of IU's CDN Santiago Pedráglio (13 July 2011). For a definitive 
analysis of Peru's many leftist parties, see Letts (1981).
92 Although some guerrillas survived and went on to pursue revolutionary change just the same. Hugo 
Blanco, for example, reemerged from the guerrilla movement unmoderated.
93 For a thorough analysis of VR, see Caro (1998). Many VR members went on to found the radical Mari-
ateguist Unified Party (Partido Unificado Mariateguista, PUM)—one of IU's component parties—with 
former members of the MIR and a breakaway group of the PCR, in 1983. A broader analysis of the in-
tellectual  heritage  of  the  New Left  and  biographies  of  its  key  members  can  be  found  in  Osmar 
González (1999).
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place  (cf.  Rubio  1982;  Pásara  1990).94 Peru's  leftist  military  regime  had  enabled  the 
country's leftist parties to remain radical without fear of violent repercussions: there was 
no incentive, in the form of state terror, to moderate their actions or ideologies.
In fact, the opposite held true: there was actually an incentive to radicalize (cf. 
Hinojosa 1998). Indeed, according to Enrique Bernales (1980), three-time IU senator and 
former  secretary-general  of  the  PSR,  “The  reformism  of  the  Velasco  government 
contributed to the “ideologicalization” of society, in effect accentuating the drivers of 
social mobilization that the government did not want to stimulate, but could not control” 
(p  71).  Given  the  fact  that  the  military  had  pursued  traditionally  leftist  goals  by 
implementing  a  reformist  strategy—e.g.,  land  reform,  nationalizations  of  industries, 
political  inclusion,  significant  portions of  the agenda for  which the Peruvian left  had 
historically advocated (Tanaka 2008)—it was only rational for leftist parties to find the 
need to differentiate themselves95 from the Velasquistas (i.e.,  followers of Velasco) by 
promoting a revolutionary strategy, instead. Combined with Velasco's encouragement of 
independent  popular  organizations,  this  facilitated  the  growth  of  more  radical  leftist 
political groups (Sanborn 1991, p 87). 
This  was  particularly  the  case  with  the  National  Support  System  for  Social 
Mobilization (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social, SINAMOS). While 
SINAMOS was designed to depoliticize popular organizations and bring them into the 
government's fold, leftist parties—and even many SINAMOS employees, who were often 
94 Murrugarra (2003) details the numerous historical failures of the Peruvian left to embrace democracy 
and condemn political violence; a prime example was in the aftermath of the defeat of the leftist guer-
rilla movements in the late 1960s.
95 Author interview with the principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation 
commission Ricardo Caro (4 July 2011). Most of Peru's leftist parties opposed the military regime, in 
particular, Velasco's corporatist methods of popular organization and his destruction, in the name of 
modernity, of peasant communities (comunidades campesinos) earned him the title of “fascist” (Lynch 
1990). Many of those individual leftists who had supported him went on to form the Revolutionary So-
cialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario, PSR); others opted to boycott IU because of the parti-
san left's continued anti-Velasquismo. Interview with former guerrilla and leftist intellectual Héctor Bé-
jar (25 July 2011).
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young leftists  advancing  ideas  far  more  radical  than  the  government  had  anticipated 
(McClintock  1989,  p  139)96—had succeeded  in  radicalizing  the  terms  of  the  debate. 
Through its control of public teachers' unions, the largest miners' organization, and the 
Peasant Confederation of Peru (Confederación Campesina del Perú, CCP), for instance, 
the  partisan  left  raised  the  political  stakes  by  legitimizing  radical  demands  for 
redistributive justice by Peru's previously marginalized social classes and ethnic groups.
When the time came to embrace democracy in the late 1970s, the Peruvian left 
was  not  up  to  the  task.97 While  leftist  parties  were  widely  credited  for  organizing  a 
general strike in 1977, the gran paro (discussed in depth in Chapter 5), and for pressuring 
the military to return to the barracks,98 pushing for a transition from military rule is not 
the same as pushing for a transition to democratic rule:99 the rallying cry of the protestors 
was  not  a  pro-democratic  chant,  but  rather,  “out  with  the  military”  (“fuera  los 
militares”)100 Peru's  left  was not advocating for democracy; it  was seeking a socialist 
revolution.  For  example,  Hugo  Blanco,  former  guerrilla  leader  and  1980  leftist 
presidential  candidate,  claims  that  he  was  seeking  a  form  of  radical,  participatory 
96 This radicalism also came from above: General Leonidas Rodríguez, the leader of SINAMOS, was 
widely regarded as being a pro-Castro Marxist. Author interview with Peruvian military expert Carlos 
Indacochea (6 September 2011).
97 To be fair, a major reason for the Peruvian left's reluctance to embrace democracy was the fact that they 
had taken from the  historical  experience  of  neighboring  Chile  that  the  conservative  establishment 
would not recognize an electoral win by a Marxist: the democratically elected president Salvador Al-
lende (1970-1973) had been overthrown a few years earlier. Author interview with former IU Senator 
and member of IU's National Directive Committee (Comité Directivo Nacional, CDN) Rolando Ames 
(14 July 2011).
98 Besides the gran paro, other reasons for the Peruvian military's quick extrication from power include: 
1) the economic crisis; isolation, discrediting, and unpopularity of the military regime; and the external 
pressure from U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) to reestablish democratic regimes in Latin 
America; 2) the incapacity of Morales Bermúdez to propose an alternative political project; and 3) the 
tensions and contradictions within the Peruvian armed forces, especially thanks to Morales Bermúdez's 
mass firings of Velasquistas (Bernales 1980, chapter 1).
99 Author interview with Peruvian leftist specialist Cynthia Sanborn (12 July 2011). It was the centrist 
APRA and Popular Action (Acción Popular, AP) that collaborated with the military in pushing for im-
mediate political change and the holding of democratic elections. Author interview with Ricardo Caro, 
principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (4 July 2011).
100 Author interviews with Aldo Panfichi, Press Secretary for Alfonso Barrantes' Mayoral Campaign Com-
mittee in 1983 (15 July 2011) and Henry Pease, former IU senator and high-ranking IU official (13 July 
2011).
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democracy, similar to that found in the rebel-controlled territory of the Zapatista Army of 
National  Liberation  (Ejército  Zapatista  de  Liberación  Nacional,  EZLN)  in  Chiapas, 
Mexico.101 From  the  beginning,  a  majority  of  the  Marxist  left  rejected  Morales 
Bermúdez's overture at extricating the military from politics via a democratically elected 
Constituent Assembly, only to participate in the end, but on decidedly non-democratic 
terms; they were hedging their bets on the prospects of a genuine revolution from below 
(Nieto 1983).102
Despite  wanting  the  military  out  of  power,  much  of  the  left  was  wary  of 
participating in the “bourgeois” 1978 elections. According to former VR militant Carmen 
Balbi, “all of the left at this point saw democracy as a mere instrument.” Furthermore, the 
Constituent  Assembly  was  seen  as  “anti-democratic;”  however,  it  nonetheless  was  a 
political arena in which the left could seek power.103 The Communist Party of Peru—Red 
Fatherland  (Partido  Comunista  del  Perú–Patria  Roja),  a  Maoist  splinter  of  the  PCP 
which would join  IU in  1980,  was convinced that  electoral  mobilization would only 
distract it from its principal task of mobilizing direct political action and, for this, opted 
to boycott the elections.104 While the “reformist” PCP and PSR participated earnestly, 
looking to win Assembly seats so as to institutionalize within the new constitution the 
Velasco-era reforms that were under threat both by Morales Bermúdez and the Marxist 
left, the Popular Democratic Unity (Unidad Democrático Popular, UDP) and the Worker, 
Peasant, Student, and Popular Front (Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular, 
FOCEP) had purely disruptive and revolutionary intentions in mind (Tuesta 1980).
101 Author interview (10 August 2011).
102 To be sure, the PCP and the pro-Velasco PSR, however, did support the elections from the beginning.
103 Author interview (13 July 2011).
104 The Communist Party of Peru—Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso), at the 
time an elusive and insignificant splinter party, also boycotted these, as we as all subsequent, elections. 
More will be said about Shining Path later in the chapter (as well as in Chapter 5). 
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However,  Peru's  left  had misread contemporary developments and,  because of 
that, held a skewed view of the political demands of Peruvian society. Blinded by Lenin's 
theory of revolution, many leftists had interpreted the enormous level of popular support 
for  the gran  paro as  evidence  that  the  country  was  undergoing  pre-revolutionary 
upheavals.105 The left was convinced that the old regime was on the verge of collapse via 
mass insurrection—especially given the sudden rise of the peasants in the countryside106
—and that they themselves were uniquely positioned to foment revolution and guide the 
people toward socialism, their end goal (cf. Nieto 1983).107
In reality,  however,  the popular  masses were not  looking to storm the Winter 
Palace. Instead, street demonstrations were based, in large part, on economic grievances 
and a desire for political accountability from leaders:108 urban residents were up in arms 
over the military's poor handling of the economic crisis, while campesinos were looking 
to recover their communal land that had been turned into cooperatives by the military 
government.109 Indeed,  the  regime's  response  to  the  protests—reversal  of  food  price 
increases, restored collective bargaining rights, the lifting of the state of emergency, and, 
as mentioned before, the announcement of open elections for a Constituent Assembly—
were largely successful at appeasing the populace: the left's attempt at a second national 
work  stoppage  failed  to  garner  the  same  degree  of  support.  Indeed,  even  the  left's 
105 Author interview with former IU Senator Rolando Ames (14 July 2011).
106 According to Ricardo Caro, principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Peru's peasants, while restive, were conservative, not revolutionary; they were looking to 
recuperate their lands from the modernizing efforts of Velasco's Revolutionary Government. Author in-
terview (4 July 2011).
107 Little political learning took place, however. Later self-criticism did not focus on trying to foment a 
revolution, but rather, on trying to foment a revolution too soon: “a revolution comes about when the 
majority of the people rise up; revolutionary leaders arise from the uprising itself.” Indeed, Peru's “rev-
olutionary leaders” did not come about from the people. Author interview with former guerrilla and 
high-ranking IU party militant Hugo Blanco (10 August 2011).
108 Author interview with former guerrilla and leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar (25 July 2011).
109 The CCP opted to participate in the gran paro, organized by the CGTP, to fight for its political, eco-
nomic, and social rights. Peasants employed their traditional form of protest, such as land occupations 
and the formation of look-out committees. Their participation thus was neither radical nor revolution-
ary, it was a time-worn tradition of defending their community's rights. Author interview with former 
IU senator and CCP President Andres Luna Vargas (19 July 2011).
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extraordinary showing in the 1978 election was not exactly the sweeping mandate that it 
had been interpreted as: one of the main reasons that the Marxist left did so well was 
because AP, the party which would go on to win the presidential election two years later, 
had boycotted the 1978 election. In 1980, AP ended up performing particularly well in 
the South, precisely in those regions where the left had shone in 1978 (Tuesta 2001).
Wolves in Sheep's Clothing
Despite  their  belief  in  an imminent  revolution,  the majority  of  Peru's  Marxist 
parties nonetheless opted to participate in the 1978 elections. Peru's undemocratic leftists 
participated in democratic elections in part because they wanted the free media time and 
subsequent  protected  institutional  space  to  denounce  the  military,  divulge  their  anti-
system  beliefs,  and  provide  national  political  expression  to  the  popular  movements 
(Sanborn  1991,  pp  145-146).  According  to  former  IU  senator  and  CDN  member 
Edmundo  Murrugarra,  the  left  used  these  elections  to  “criticize  the  government  and 
prepare for an assault on power.”110 Hugo Blanco, the unreformed Trotskyist and former 
guerrilla  leader,  for  instance,  used  his  television  spots  to  denounce  democracy  and 
advocate armed struggle (Tuesta 1980); he ended up receiving the third-highest number 
of votes nationwide.111 That is not the expected behavior of a loyal democrat.
110 Author interview (18 July 2011).
111 IU's predecessor parties did surprisingly well in the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections: the seven 
leftist parties received a total of 36.22 percent of the valid vote. (Bernales 1980, p 36).
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Marxist leftist party Percentage of Valid Votes
Non-Marxist leftist 
party
Percentage of Valid 
Votes
ARS112 0.57 Christian Democrat113 2.36
FOCEP 12.34 PSR 6.62
FNTC114 3.85 UDP 4.57
PCP 5.91
Total 22.67 + 13.55 = 36.22
Table 3.1: Vote Shares of leftist parties in Peru's 1978 Constituent Assembly Elections
Even after getting elected, many leftist parliamentarians used their position as a 
soapbox  from  which  to  criticize  the  government.115 Indeed,  many  of  them  did  not 
participate in the drafting of the constitution, but instead remained active engaging in 
popular mobilizational efforts on the streets of Lima. Ricardo Napurí, another unreformed 
Trotskyist and former guerrilla, was convinced that the constituent assembly, of which he 
was a member, was a “Soviet commune,” whose “sole purpose was to overthrow the 
prevailing regime.”116 Additionally, VR representatives introduced, unsuccessfully, a “red 
motion” (moción roja) in the Assembly's first session, which moved to vest all the powers 
112 Socialist Revolutionary Action (Acción Revolucionaria Socialista).
113 Demócrata Cristiano.
114 National Front of Workers and Peasants (Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos).
115 Author interview with former PUM leader Antonio Zapata (1 August 2011).
116 Author interview with Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler (25 July 2011).
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of the state onto the Constituent Assembly (Lynch 1999).117 According to former guerrilla 
and leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar, FOCEP constituent assemblyperson Genaro Ledesma 
wanted to “convert the Constituent Assembly into the Paris Commune” and that virtually 
all leftist assemblypersons “saw democracy as an instrument.”118
Participation in these elections thus should not be read as support for democratic 
politics. Rather, the left's reasoning was, if we can take power through the ballot box then 
why take up arms? Peru's leftists saw democracy as void of any intrinsic value and held 
ambivalent  positions  on  representative  democratic  institutions—at  best,  seeing 
democratic elections as an instrument for their ulterior radical goals (Nieto 1983). At 
worst, they were acting as democratically disloyal provocateurs, unabashedly advocating 
the  destruction  of  the  current  regime  and  promoting  socialist  revolution:  wolves  in 
sheep's clothing.
To be fair,  no matter  how undemocratic their  intentions were,  the very act  of 
participating in elections did effect strategic moderation, however insignificantly. Former 
IU senator Javier Díez Canseco, of IU's radical wing, claims that “participation [in the 
1978  elections]  forced  the  left  to  democratize.  It  forced  the  left  to  reevaluate  the 
importance of democratic space and the forms of democracy. As many leftists had been 
Maoists, and thus believed that power can be obtained through one of various different 
routes, the Constituent Assembly's elections changed how we think.”119 Regardless of his 
statement, however, Senator Díez Canseco remained committed to non-electoral routes of 
power well into the late 1980s, a decade later.
117 Author interview with academic specializing in Peruvian intellectuals José Luis Rénique (1 September 
2011). 
118 Author interview (25 July 2011).
119 Author interview (2 August 2011).
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Given  their  survival,  ultra-radical  parties  and  individuals  were  able  to  play  a 
fundamental role in IU's foundation;120 the de facto leader of Peru's left in 1980 was the 
unreformed former guerrilla,  Hugo Blanco.  All  five leftist  candidate-lists  in the 1980 
general election declared that they did not believe in representative democracy as a form 
of government (CIUP and Fundación Friedrich Ebert 1980). IU's immediate predecessor 
party,  the  Revolutionary  Alliance  of  the  Left  (Alianza  Revolucionaria  de  Izquierda, 
ARI121), could not decide whether democracy was merely an instrument to accumulate 
forces, or whether it had intrinsic value in and of itself. IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch 
argued  that  the  party's  failure  stemmed  from its  internal  contradictions:  it  had  been 
designed as an electoral front for the country's democratic elections, yet its stated goal 
was a  revolutionary assault  on the  government.122 IU  was  thus  born uncommitted  to 
democracy; it held ambivalent positions on representative democratic institutions and saw 
democracy as void of any non-instrumental value (Nieto 1983)
The  IU's  central  tenets  included  political,  economic,  and  administrative 
decentralization;  the  strengthening  of  local-level  government;  nationalization  and 
“genuine” land reform; and the establishment of mechanisms and institutions of popular 
participation, among others (UDP-IU 1983; IU 1985). Its stated objective was to “fight 
for  the  radical  transformation  of  the  economic  structure,  social  system,  and  political 
superstructure” of Peru, and establish a popular-democratic state that would “open the 
way for socialism” through the “mobilization, organization, and revolutionary struggle of 
120 At its height, IU was composed of seven parties and fronts: Socialist Political Action (Acción Política 
Socialista,  APS),  FOCEP,  PCP,  the  Revolutionary  Communist  Party  (Partido  Comunista  Revolu-
cionario, PCR), PSR, PUM, and the Revolutionary Left Union (Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria, 
UNIR) (IU 1988a, art 2).
121 “Ari” means “yes” in Quechua,  the main indigenous language of  Peru.  It  was composed of  UDP, 
UNIR, PCR, and the Trotskyist members of FOCEP; PCP, PSR, and non-Trotskyist FOCEP members 
banned together to form the Unity of the Left (Unidad de Izquierda, UI). ARI collapsed and five leftist 
candidates ended up running for president in 1980. As a result, the left's overall vote share collapsed, 
from 29.4 in 1978 to 14.4 in 1980; Blanco received a mere 3.9 percent of the vote in the 1980 presiden-
tial elections (Tanaka 1998).
122 Author interview with IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch (1 August 2011).
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the  masses”  (IU 1988a;  PUM 1988a).  Moreover,  the  IU explicitly  did not foreswear 
armed struggle. It referred to itself as a revolutionary, socialist front, which
does not renounce, on principle, any means of struggle or form of organization. It 
combines each and every [means and form],  be they legal  or  illegal,  overt  or 
covert, depending on the circumstance [.…] class struggle is complex, sharp, and, 
at times, violent (IU 1984).123
IU remained only partially loyal to democracy throughout the 1980s: its principal 
documents,  formulated  in  1983,  established  neither  democracy  as  the  “only  game in 
town” nor the electoral arena as the only legitimate form of obtaining power (IU 1984). It 
advocated  extra-legal  political  struggle,  refused  to  renounce  political  violence,  and 
dithered over categorically denouncing Shining Path, Peru's Maoist guerrilla group (cf. 
CVR 2003, section III.2.4). Indeed, a significant minority of the PUM, IU's largest and 
most radical wing/component party, was even convinced—in 1989—that the country was 
ripe for an end to the liberal-democratic order through armed struggle.124 Undemocratic, 
radical ideologues ended up complicating IU's overall process of policy moderation by 
ensuring that the party's pragmatists were denied control of the party, unlike the case of 
those leftist parties in countries where military repression had chastened the left. Their 
relative strength and influence within the party enabled them to defeat IU pragmatists and 
derail any future attempts at party adaptation: it was because of them that the party never 
fully embraced democratic politics, a necessary condition of party adaptation.
One of the major reasons why IU (and LCR, as will  be explained in the next 
section) was unable to adapt to the sweeping changes occurring in the late 1980s was 
123 “IU no renuncia por principio a ningún medio de lucha, ni forma de organización. Combina todas y  
cada una de ellas, sean legales o ilegales, abiertas o secretas, según las circunstancias.” This affirma-
tion was repeated often throughout the 1980's: see PUM 1988a and APS 1987, for example.
124 Author interview with IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch (1 August 2011).
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because it had been born without any external challenges that would have encouraged 
strategic moderation, which would then have limited the breadth of potential, legitimate 
ideological stances. Peru's left was challenged, however, but in the future. According to 
Peruvian  intellectual  Julio  Cotler,  “the  Peruvian  left  discovered  democracy  through 
[being targeted for repression by] Shining Path and Fujimori.”125 
Unlike in Brazil,  dogmatic  and sectarian parties  and individuals  had not  been 
destroyed and silenced by the military and thus played a fundamental role in the IU's 
formation.  Indeed,  parties  that  abide by a  unitary theoretical  matrix  and believe in  a 
single truth—as was the case with many of the IU's component parties—have difficulties 
compromising their beliefs. Given their presence from the party's foundation and onward, 
these  radicals  retarded  and  complicated  the  party's  overall  process  of  ideological 
moderation by ensuring that its initial median ideological position, from which it would 
later moderate, was far to the left of those leftist parties whose ultra-radical members had 
been chastened by military repression. Their relative strength and influence within the 
party,  gained  from the  commitment  of  their  beliefs  and  their  ideological  legitimacy, 
enabled them to defeat IU pragmatists and derail the party's adaptation years down the 
line. Much the same occurred in LCR.
LCR: VENEZUELA'S LEFT, UNENCUMBERED
As was the case in Peru, in Venezuela the left was minimally repressed, in relative 
terms.126 Unlike  the  vast  majority  of  its  neighbors,  Venezuela  was  democratically 
125 Author interview (25 July 2011).
126 Author interviews with MAS founders and former leaders Franklin Guzmán (14 February 2012) and 
Hector Rodriguez Bauza (16 February 2012). Again, in response to the guerrilla movements of the 
Leftist Revolutionary Movement's (Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario, MIR) and the Armed Forces 
of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, FALN), President Rómulo Betan-
court (1959-1964) used brutal force; complicit leftists were targeted and repressed (D'Paola 2011, pp 
47-52).
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governed for  much of  the  second half  of  the  twentieth  century.  Because  of  this,  the 
country's left was given more leeway to operate than elsewhere in Latin America, and 
radical,  anti-democratic  sentiment  was permitted to  continue,  unchecked.  As a  result, 
LCR  arose  in  1978127 with  ambiguous  views  toward  representative  democracy  that 
sought—first  secretly,  then  openly—to  obtain  power  via  violent,  non-democratic 
channels. This complicated the party's ability to adapt down the line: the party's split was 
principally  caused  by  the  debate  over  whether  or  not  to  support  a  civilian-military 
insurrection that sought to overthrow Venezuela's democratic regime.
Model Democracy
The Venezuelan left was allowed to participate in the political sphere because the 
country  had  had  an  uninterrupted  history  of  democratic  politics  since  1958.  This 
democratic “exceptionalism” was the result  of  a compromise to put  to an end to the 
intense polarization of society and politics in the 1940s, the participatory explosion of the 
trienio (“three-year period”) and its ensuing violence,128 and undemocratic military rule 
(Levine 1978). Fear of continued autocracy had convinced Venezuela's political elites to 
agree to limit the possibility of conflict by imposing limits and checks on the political 
system: antagonistic political  elites acknowledged and accepted the pressing need for 
consensus-building to guarantee stability (Myers 2004).  Political  elites thus agreed to 
restraint,  by  imposing  limits  and  checks  on  the  political  system  and  by  opting  for 
127 LCR was born in 1973 as a social movement, albeit with broadly political goals; it only became a polit-
ical  party  and  started  contesting  elections  in  1978.  LCR's  immediate  antecedent  organization, 
Venezuela 83, was born in 1971. Author interview with LCR founder Clemente Scotto (8 November 
2011).
128 During the trienio (1945-1948), Venezuela’s first attempt at democracy, Democratic Action (Acción 
Democrática, AD) governed unilaterally, having won a clear mandate. It introduced universal suffrage, 
extended social services to the poor, and wrote a new constitution. However, it also severely polarized 
society and alienated certain groups, such as the Catholic Church, private sectors, and the right, and 
suffered a military coup in 1948 (Kornblith and Levine 1995).
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compromise over destabilizing competition, in order to create an allied, pro-democratic 
front  against  the  vestigial  organs  of  authoritarianism  remaining  within  Venezuelan 
politics (Coppedge 1994, p 38; McCoy 2004).
In  this  way  Venezuela’s  two  main  political  parties,  AD  and  the  Independent 
Electoral Political Organization Committee (Comité de Organización Política Electoral 
Independiente, COPEI), struck a power-sharing agreement to distribute power between 
themselves under the Punto Fijo Pact. Under this pact, the main parties pledged to respect 
elections—whatever the outcome, maintain a political truce depersonalizing debate, and 
share political responsibility and patronage (McCoy 2004, pp 274-275; Kornblith and 
Levine 1995,  p 45). This  agreement  allowed the two parties  to  share upwards of  90 
percent of the vote among themselves; however, this came at the expense of the left.
The  leftist  Democratic  Republican  Union  (Unión  Republicana  Democrática, 
URD) participated in the Pact’s founding, although it was increasingly sidelined from 
power; largely because of this, many of its leaders and sympathizers threw their support 
behind armed, leftist factions in the 1960s (Myers 2004, pp 22-23). The Communist Party 
of Venezuela (Partido Comunista de Venezuela,  PCV) was never a party to the Pact. 
Nonetheless, save for a few incidents, leftists were not repressed as they were in the rest 
of Latin America. Opposition was defused and representation bought through the state's 
oil  earnings:  oil  revenues trickled down in the form of clientelism (Hellinger,  2004), 
fostering  stability  and  democratic  governability  so  long  as  the  “petrobonanza”  held 
(Myers 2004, p 26).
Punto  Fijo  was  quite  successful  in  ensuring  civilian  rule  in  the  face  of 
authoritarian and anti-democratic currents.129 COPEI consented to limited land reform in 
129 These being: the military, business community, and the Catholic church, all of whom feared AD “radi-
calism;” the influence of the Cuban Revolution, which had polarized politics throughout the region but 
also served as a warning to neighboring countries of the desperation of marginalized groups; and sup-
port for the former dictator, General Pérez Jiménez, remained strong among a vocal minority of the 
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the name of  diminishing potential  support  for  communist  insurgents,  AD dropped its 
secular  education agenda,  and both agreed to share power...and wealth.  Oil  windfalls 
were  distributed  liberally  throughout  society  as  a  way  of  minimizing  class  conflict, 
quieting dissent, and purchasing support (Myers 2004). However, as income levels rose, 
societal  demands and expectations grew, and distributive policy proved inadequate in 
buying  off  the  new  sectors  that  emerged  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  (Hellinger  2004). 
Furthermore,  political  stability  came at  the expense of  representativeness,  as  AD and 
COPEI became increasingly  catch-all130 and  informally  boxed  out  other  parties  from 
power,  starting with the PCV, then extending to the URD, fringe factions,  and leftist 
social groups.
Punto Fijo had created a “partidocracia,” or, the stranglehold of the democratic 
system by even more ossified political parties and their leaders (Coppedge 1994). AD and 
COPEI were highly centralized, limited citizens’ electoral choices through closed-party 
lists, and forced legislators to vote as a party bloc. While no major media outlets were 
owned by political parties after 1969, they were nonetheless highly politicized and often 
ran one-party lines. Political options were highly limited (and became worse over time as 
parties ossified and hermetized to ensure continued success): “The system was so strong 
and self-contained that its key institutions left little room for emerging social forces to 
find expression; it was too rigid to respond to crisis with anything other than tools that no 
longer fit the job” (Crisp and Levine 1998, p 28). Nonetheless, because of this elite pact, 
democracy prevailed and the government had no need to repress the left.
population, especially in the poorer areas of Caracas (Coppedge 1994, p 154).
130 Party leaders fell more or less along two overlapping bell curves: AD’s curve was slightly left-of-cen-
ter, while COPEI’s was slightly right-of-center. However, to be sure, many AD leaders fell to the right 
of those of COPEI, and vice versa, as political power trumped ideology. The lack of difference in their 
electoral programs fostered disillusionment with politics as sectors of society could not find their opin-
ions represented by either party (Coppedge 1999).
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Venezuela's left was thus sidelined, but not repressed. Indeed, there were always 
close personal connections between PCV leaders and the government, and the political 
establishment encouraged the left to become reintegrated into political and social life. 
Indeed, the leftist Movement for Socialism's (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) founding 
and process of legalization was so simple because AD and COPEI thought it would help 
shore up their  own legitimacy.131 In  part  because  of  this  lack  of  a  common external 
enemy, the PCV became wracked by internal conflicts. Similar to what later happened to 
the LCR (as will be explained shortly), the PCV never felt pressured to reform its internal 
structure and remained a traditional, cadre party, despite growing demands from rising 
leaders for change (D'Paola 2011). Triggered by the fact that its executive committee was 
grossly out of touch with political realities and regularly disregarded the will of the party 
at large, the PCV experienced a mass exodus of militants and followers in late 1970.132
PCV's internal division133 was the result of increasingly bitter disagreements over 
how to interpret: the defeat of Venezuela's internal armed struggle, the understanding that 
armed conflict was not a legitimate route to power, the rise of the New Left in Europe, 
and pushes for increased freedom of expression and pluralism within the party—such as 
Teodoro Petkoff's published criticisms of the USSR and orthodox communism (Ochoa 
Antich 1997, pp 45-91; Ellner 1986).134 Dissidents left the PCV to found the MAS and 
131 Author interviews with MAS founders and former national leaders Rafael Guerra Ramos (27 February 
2012) and Pedro Mujica (24 February 2012). 
132 In particular, those associated with the PCV's highly organized, semi-autonomous Communist Youth of 
Venezuela  (Juventud  Comunista  de  Venezuela,  JCV)  left  en  masse.  Author  interviews  with  MAS 
founders Teodoro Petkoff (17 October 2011) and Pompeio Márquez (31 January 2012).
133 In broad strokes, the PCV was divided into three groups: the “rightist” pro-Stalin, pro-USSR, orthodox 
group (which was headed by the García Ponce brothers); the “leftist” reformers (headed by Teodoro 
Petkoff,  along with  Freddy Muñoz and LCR founder  Alfredo Maneiro),  and;  the  “centrist”  group 
(headed by Pompeyo Márquez, along with Rafael Guerra Ramos and Héctor Rodríguez Bauza), which 
criticized the USSR up to a certain point, but initially believed in reforming the PCV rather than aban-
doning it  (Díaz Rangel  1971,  pp 45-99). Author  interviews with MAS founders  Felipe Mujica (9 
March, 2012), Victor Hugo D'Paola (5 March 2012), and Rafael Guerra Ramos (27 February, 2012).
134 Author  interview with MAS founders  Rafael  Guerra  Ramos (27 February 2012)  and Victor  Hugo 
D'Paola (5 March 2012).
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LCR  because  it  was  excessively  bureaucratic,  it  did  not  embrace  pluralism,  and  its 
leaders  regularly  made  decisions  that  disregarded  the  will  of  the  majority  of  party 
members (Bayardo Sardi 2001; D'Paola 2011).135
 Unchallenged Left
It  was  in  this  context  of  PCV's  collapse  that LCR arose.  While  most  former 
communists  went  on  to  form  the  MAS  a  month  later,  in  1971,  veteran  guerrilla 
commander and mid-level PCV leader Alfredo Maneiro broke from the group and, with a 
few other ideological dissidents, formed the heterodox Marxist Venezuela 83, which later 
became LCR (Rangel 1983).136 LCR was created as a “party in permanent formation” 
(Maneiro 1986, p 181) because its founders, and Maneiro in particular, wanted to develop 
a party as far removed from the PCV, AD, and COPEI as possible (D'Paola 2011, pp 59-
61). With this in mind, it is no wonder that LCR ended up remaining a “non-party” party, 
even as it later grew into the country's third-largest party and stood poised to take the 
presidency.
LCR had been constructed as a new type of party—a “movement party” without 
written laws, established party roles, or a structured bureaucracy. As such, it would not be 
beset by the same problems that plagued both its predecessor, the bureaucratic PCV, and 
135 PCV's Central Committee members had been selected in a PCV Congress in 1958 and, since the selec-
tion of new leaders had been delayed, most of the party's leaders were orthodox leftists with outdated 
ideologies. Author interview with former PCV General-Secretary and MAS founder Pompeyo Márquez 
(31 January 2012).
136 Maneiro left the MAS during its very constituent congress because he was disturbed that MAS, which 
had  allowed Pompeyo Márquez  and  other  “USSR-apologists”  to  participate  in  the  new party  (cf. 
Márquez, 1981), would end up being bogged down by internal infighting over ideological positioning 
and struggles over bureaucratic positions, thus repeating the same mistakes of the PCV. According to 
MAS founder and former national leader Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, the MAS suffered from a “very 
large organizational incapacity: the party just fought and fought,” and that there was “contempt for 
practical work” such that everybody within the party just “theorized and theorized.” Author interview 
(16 February 2012). Reflecting back, with the benefit of hindsight, Petkoff admitted freely that perhaps 
it would have been better to break cleanly with the Communists like Maneiro and LCR: MAS ended up 
inheriting much of the bitter ideological debates and internecine fights from the PCV. Author interview 
with MAS founder and former MAS president Teodoro Petkoff (17 October 2011).
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the two elitist, catch-all parties that dominated Venezuela's increasingly closed-off party 
system, AD and COPEI.137 According to Andrés Velásquez, three-time LCR presidential 
candidate, “LCR does not affiliate militants...it does not provide ID cards, does not have a 
payroll record of militants;” all it does is unite like-minded people to “share ideas and 
responsibilities” (quoted in Sesto 1992b, pp 228-229). To the Venezuelan electorate, this 
innovative,  malleable,  non-bureaucratic  party was a  promising alternative not  only to 
traditional leftist parties,138 but also to the two moribund parties that had run Venezuela's 
increasingly ossified democracy since 1958. LCR was expected to sap support away from 
the two “undemocratic” parties, dismantle the closed political system, and, in this way, 
revive Venezuela's multi-party democracy (Coppedge 2001). 
LCR was novel and noteworthy for the fact that it was an externally mobilized 
party, one generated from civil society (Crisp and Levine 1998), in a country whose party 
system was, in effect, closed off to outsiders and whose two main parties were elitist and 
overly  rigid  (cf.  Coppedge  1994;  Kornblith  and  Levine  1995). The  party  targeted: 
students,  particularly at  the Central  University of  Venezuela (Universidad Central  de 
Venezuela,  UCV),  in  Caracas,  and the University  of  the  Andes  (Universidad  de  los 
Andes), in Mérida; the urban poor, particularly within the Catia neighborhood of Caracas; 
intellectuals,  through  its La  Casa  del  Agua  Mansa organization;  and  iron  and  steel 
137 Venezuela's political regime was democratic.  However, causaerristas (i.e.,  members of LCR), who 
were not party to the Punto Fijo pact, thought otherwise: they saw themselves as radical democrats 
looking to break into and topple the “mafia and dictatorship of AD and COPEI” (Lagonell 1987, p 35).
138 Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many leftist parties in Latin America began to emulate the 
Gramscian, Eurocommunist movement and question their own uncritical importation of the USSR's or-
thodox  communist  interpretations  and  dictatorial  tutelage.  This  political  watershed  was  generated 
mostly by a growing impatience on the part of both rank-and-file leftists and leftist leaders with the 
centralized, bureaucratic, and authoritarian nature of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Petkoff 
1976). The primary catalysts for the shift, however, were the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, which caused widespread disillusionment among many once-reverential Latin American leftists 
(Petkoff 1969) and the military defeat of Latin America's guerrilla uprisings (Blanco Muñoz 1980). For 
an analysis of Eurocommunism, see the writings of and on Enrico Berlinguer in Italy, Santiago Carrillo 
in Spain, and Georges Marchais in France.
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workers in the greater Guayana region, particularly at the Siderúrgica del Orinoco (Sidor) 
factory.139
Power by Any Means
However,  this  participatory,  radically  democratic  party  also  had a clandestine, 
military segment alongside those of workers, students, the urban poor, and intellectuals. 
This “fifth leg” dated back to 1973, when LCR was still  just a social movement (cf. 
Medina  1999,  pp  90-132).140 LCR  founder  and  mastermind  Alfredo  Maneiro  did 
recognize  the  intrinsic  value  of  democracy—“For  us  [causaerristas],  the  problem is 
democracy  and  the  solution  is  democracy”  (quoted  in  Rangel  1983)—and  often 
proclaimed publicly his organization's (ill-defined) goal of “deepening democracy”141 (cf. 
Yepez Salas 1993, pp 119-122); however, confusingly enough, he also had distinctly anti-
democratic tendencies, and saw elections as just one of many possible routes to power.142 
Indeed, his definition of democracy was decidedly radical: “I believe in democracy in the 
sense that Marx gave it when he said, when the revolutionary movement conquers power, 
it conquers democracy” (Maneiro 1986, p 221).
139 Edgar Yajure ran the student segment, the Moura brothers ran the popular segment, Farruco Sesto the 
intellectual segment, and Velásquez the worker segment. The military segment (to be discussed in the 
next section) was run by Maneiro, then Pablo Medina.
140 Author interviews with Federal Deputy Amérigo de Grazia (7 March 2012), LCR founder and leader 
Lucas Matheus (5 December 2011), and LCR founder and former national leader José Albornoz (9 No-
vember 2011 and 8 March 2012).
141 LCR president Velásquez himself had difficulty explaining it, both in an author interview (24 Novem-
ber 2011) and in an earlier interview (Sesto 1987, p 65). It means, roughly, making democracy more 
participatory, eliminating the distinction between leaders and subjects, and substantive socio-economic 
change. One of his presidential campaign selling-points was to “consult with the people on all impor-
tant decisions” (Velásquez 1993b). As governor (1989-1995), Velásquez made a point of crisscrossing 
the entire state of Bolívar twice a year, along with all of his ministers, in order to talk with his con-
stituents. Author interview with Ana Elisa Osorio, health minister for Bolívar under Velásquez (24 Feb-
ruary 2012).
142 Author  interviews  with  LCR  founder  and  three-time  mayor  of  Caroní  (1989-1995,  2004-2008) 
Clemente Scotto (8 November 2011) and LCR founder and former leader Edgar Yajure (26 October 
2011). According to Venezuelan labor specialist and former LCR intellectual Luis Salamanca, Maneiro 
“was a traditional [Venezuelan] leftist; he didn't believe in elections.” Author interview (29 September 
2011).
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He was looking not to “bring social content to the democratic form, but rather, 
[to] reformulate the very democratic form itself” (Maneiro 2007, p 36). Furthermore, he 
was cognizant of the fact that, in order for LCR to be able to take power following an 
electoral victory, it would need the support of significant swaths of the armed forces, lest 
the elections go unrecognized or get stolen through fraud.143 To this end, LCR infiltrated 
Venezuela's military,144 conducted intelligence on potentially subversive servicemen who 
were unhappy with the country's political system, and recruited them for the party's long-
term plan for an insurrectional uprising.145
LCR's civilian-military connection had been the idea of Maneiro,146 who had met 
with Hugo Chávez and other subversive members of the military several times, beginning 
in the late 1970s.147 Maneiro's political vision was for a civilian movement, spearheaded 
by LCR and with the support of progressive members of the military, to sweep away the 
prevailing regime via elections or, more likely, a broad-based national strike (similar to 
Rosa Luxemburg's vision of a truly democratic triumph).148 Maneiro  regularly  denied 
having an ulterior motive in mind; in response to a candid question asking about the 
143 Author interviews with LCR Federal Deputy Amérigo de Grazia (31 January 2012) and former LCR 
leader Rafael Uzcátegui (9 and 10 October 2011). 
144 On this note, LCR did much the same within social movements as well. In the early 1970s Maneiro had 
sent Pablo Medina to work undercover and infiltrate the labor unions of Ciudad Guayana; it was in this 
way that the party discovered Andrés Velásquez, whom they recruited and nurtured into a national 
leader (López Maya 1994). Medina, who has used various noms de guerre over the years—Mario, Al-
fredo, Natalio—had taken on the identity of an uneducated ironworker named Alonso when he went to 
work at Sidor (Medina 1999, pp 11-28). Similarly, José Albornoz was sent to infiltrate the student 
movement in UCV (Rosas 2009b, pp 62-65).
145 Author interview with former LCR leader Rafael Uzcátegui (9 and 10 October 2011). According to 
LCR founder and national leader Lucas Matheus, the party either had “to neutralize [the military], or to 
include them. We chose the latter.” Author interview (5 December 2011).
146 Technically, the idea predated Maneiro. Francisco Arias Cárdenas, who led the battalion that took over 
Maracaibo during 4F and who later was elected LCR Governor of Zulia, argues that the idea of a civil-
ian-military “Bolivarian Revolution” dates back to 1957 and comes from Douglas Bravo, a veteran 
guerrilla and PCV leader (Garrido 2005, p 23).
147 Author interviews with LCR founder and leader José Lira (5 December 2011) and LCR founder and 
former leader Edgar Yajure (26 October 2011).  For more on Maneiro's meetings with Chávez, see 
Rosas (2009b, pp 20-24) and Garrido (2000b, pp 19-20).
148 Author interviews with LCR founder and former leader Edgar Yajure (26 October 2011), former LCR 
leader Gustavo Hernandez (26 October 2011), and LCR leader César Ramírez (22 November 2011). 
101
ultimate, “hidden” motivation behind LCR's quest for power, he claimed that it is merely 
to “broaden and deepen democracy” (quoted in Rangel 1983). However, according to 
many party members, the goal was, indeed, to instill in Venezuela a more just, direct, 
participatory  democratic  regime  similar  to  that  advocated  by  traditional  Marxists. 
According to Pablo Medina, LCR had “an insurrectional design” from the very beginning 
(1999, p 90). General Müller Rojas (1991) claimed that LCR's birth was the continuation, 
via the political route, of “the revolution that had been pushed forth since the 1960s via 
the path of guerrilla warfare” (p 68), and that “as a revolutionary party, it did not abandon 
the idea of violent action through the mobilization of the masses as an instrument for 
achieving political control” (p 72). 
LCR looked, in many ways, like a moderate, reformist party. Indeed, for the first 
five years of its existence (as a social movement) it was solely occupied with improving 
the  social  and  economic  rights  of  factory  workers.  This  concern  for  fighting  the 
corruption of the traditional syndicalism, promoting democratic participation in unions, 
and advocating workplace health and security among metalworkers was best embodied in 
Andrés Velásquez, LCR's most successful and well-known leader.149 While this depiction 
of the party is not inaccurate, it only tells half of the story: LCR was founded as a radical, 
leftist  party with the long-term objective of toppling capitalism through class warfare 
(Salamanca 1998, p 240). While the party purported to “deepen democracy,” many of its 
members were not very committed to the democratic regime already in place. In response 
to the question, “is this democracy a fraud?” LCR secretary-general Medina responded 
(in 1988):
149 In November of 1979, shortly after establishing itself as a political power, LCR's Matanceros fielded 
candidates in the elections for SUTIS, the Single Union of the Iron and Steel Works of Orinoco (Sindi-
cato Único de la Siderúrgica del Orinoco). The Matancero slate garnered 2,932 votes, four-times as 
much as AD; they won seven of eleven seats on the board (Sesto 1987, p 63). “Matanceros,” the pre-
cursor to LCR's worker wing, was the name given to the group of new unionism workers at Sidor. The 
term comes from the periodical, Matancero, created by Pablo Medina and others from the nascent LCR 
to create a worker's movement (Salamanca 1998, p 235).
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Of course, it's a fraud. The forces that drive it are not democratic. If you come to 
convert  yourself  into  a  threat  to  them...they  will  immediately  reveal  their 
antidemocratic  nature.  And if  you  think  you  can  approach  the  State  to  effect 
profound changes, they are capable of making the State engage in a coup-d'etat 
upon itself (quoted in Sesto 1992a, p 37).
This  seemingly  contradictory  embrace  and  rejection  of  democracy  can  be 
explained  by  the  greater  Venezuelan  left's  unmoderated  disdain  for  representative 
democracy.  According  to  Venezuelan  left  specialist  Margarita  López  Maya,  LCR's 
founders were “never sincere about their democratic discourse.” In general, Venezuela's 
left has demonstrated a “profound lack of confidence in democratic rules and norms.” 
This illiberal attitude, she argues, can be explained in part because the country did not 
suffer through a dictatorship in the recent past.150 
While Venezuela's radical left suffered defeat in their attempted armed struggle in 
the 1960s, the overall lack of repression meant that only limited ideological renovation 
occurred.151 Some of the earliest and most outspoken leftist critics of armed struggle in 
Latin America hailed from Venezuela—such as Teodoro Petkoff and Pompeyo Márquez; 
particular, Petkoff argued that a principal realization was that “Venezuela in the 1960s 
was  not  Cuba  in  the  1950s...the  country  was  already  democratic.”152 However,  this 
political learning was not universal among the Venezuelan left. Bravo, in particular, had 
interpreted the decisive defeat  of  Venezuela's  minor guerrilla  insurgencies as a minor 
setback, not a call for a tactical retreat (as had most PCV militants); rather, he called for a 
“prolonged people's war” (quoted in Ellner 1986, p 83).
150 Author interview (11 October 2011).
151 As punishment for their role in the guerrilla insurgency, PCV was temporary pushed underground in 
the 1960s (cf. Álvarez 2006).
152 Author interviews with MAS founder and former guerrilla leader Teodoro Petkoff (17 October 2011) 
and MAS founder Pompeyo Márquez (31 January 2012). See also Márquez (1968) and Petkoff (1976). 
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Many LCR militants were staunchly democratic individuals who saw the electoral 
pursuit of power as the best way to be able to improve the lives of Venezuela's lower 
classes; however, many LCR militants were also disloyal democrats, looking to obtain 
power by any means necessary in order to implement their non-democratic political goals 
by force, if need be. The tension between these two groups, discussed in detail in Chapter 
5, prevented the party from adapting to external challenges and resulted in its division—
and subsequent irrelevance—in 1997: LCR's radical members left en masse to form 
Fatherland for All (Patria Para Todos, PPT), diluting LCR's political cache and electoral 
power.
CONCLUSION
Suffering at the hands of repression forced the left to accept democracy's intrinsic 
value and see it as more than just one of multiple paths to obtaining power. In contexts in 
which leftist parties' predecessors had experienced firsthand the horrors that take place if 
and  when  political  rights  and  liberties  are  not  guaranteed,  the  left  then  embraced 
democracy. This strategic moderation was partially the result of desperation—in order not 
only to participate in the political arena, but also to survive potential further repression, 
leftists had to embrace democracy as the best form of protection against state terror.
Conversely, in countries where the left had not been subject to repression, leftist 
parties remained only partially committed to democracy; they continued to see it more as 
an instrument than anything laden with intrinsic value. Where this was the case, leftist 
parties had difficulties adapting when the electorate rewarded moderation both because 
their  ranks  remained  occupied  by  revolutionary  agents  intent  on  radicalizing,  not 
moderating, their parties' policies, and because the median ideological stance of the party 
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was  so  far  to  the  left  that  reform-minded  pragmatists  were  unable  to  bring  the 
revolutionary ideologues around to the tangible benefits to ideological adaptation.
In this way, the strategic moderation of leftist  parties is not only important in 
ensuring that all relevant political actors see democracy as the “only game in town;” it 
also  has  important  effects  upon  leftist  parties'  future  growth  and  developmental 
trajectories. Strategic moderation is a necessary but insufficient requisite for ideological 
moderation: accepting the rules of the game shortens the ideological distance within a 
leftist party by sidelining radicals and replacing “socialism” and other idealistic socio-
economic goals with “democracy” and tangible, incremental social and political rights.
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Chapter 4: Bureaucratic Obstacles: Party Building as Institutional 
Survival
That  parties  will  necessarily  engage  in  institutionalization  is  a  common 
assumption. But, “[o]rganization building does not come naturally or automatically to 
political  actors.  It  is  a  difficult,  time-consuming,  costly,  and  often  risky  enterprise” 
(Kalyvas 1996, p 41). All else being equal, if parties do not need to extend their limited 
time and resources, chances are that they will not. Conversely, if parties feel compelled to 
sink roots into society, construct a party apparatus, and work more as a unified team for 
their own survival, then they are more likely to engage in party building.153 The hurdles to 
party  legalization  and  electoral  participation  implemented  by  outgoing  military 
dictatorships to thwart the nascent political left unintentionally created the incentive to do 
exactly  this:  early  bureaucratic  challenges  encouraged  nascent  leftist  parties,  such  as 
Brazil's  PT (and Uruguay's  FA),  to  construct  their  organizations  and streamline  their 
ability  to  make  and  enforce  decisions.  This  strengthened  these  parties'  adaptability, 
increasing their ability to adapt to changing external challenges.
Once repression had been (mostly) forsworn—be it for the sake of appearances or 
because changing power dynamics meant that state terror was no longer a policy option
—military  dictatorships  in  Latin  America  began  instead  to  employ  arbitrary  and 
unreasonable  rules  and  regulations  to  make  success  difficult  for  leftist  parties. 
Paradoxically, this encouraged, amongst other things, the development of an effective and 
153 Whether or not this “need” translates into action is another story, as necessity does not always bring 
about change; this author merely contends that this need makes it more likely that party building will 
occur. See, for example, the recent literature on the dysfunctionality of institutions within the historical 
institutionalism literature (i.e. Thelen 2003)
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disciplined party structure and a reliance upon democratic centralism over consensus as 
the basis behind decision-making mechanisms so that the party could react and respond 
quickly  to  external  threats.  Later  on,  such  majoritarian  decision-making  mechanisms 
helped  parties  moderate,  as  dramatic  institutional  change  often  occurs  thanks  to 
disciplined  leadership  and  effective  decision-making  (Grzymala-Busse  2002).  Leftist 
parties that were not subjected to such challenges from authoritarian regimes, such as 
Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR, had little need to institutionalize and, thus, did so to a far 
lesser extent, if at all (and, at a far slower rate). The result was an inability to engage in 
party  adaptation.  In  this  way,  party  structure  and  organization  have  important 
consequences for a party's ideological and institutional change (cf. Seawright 2012, ch 7; 
Kitschelt 1989).
 This  chapter  explains  the  causal  mechanisms  at  play  whereby  bureaucratic 
requirements imposed by outgoing authoritarian regimes encouraged new leftist parties to 
institutionalize,  leading  to  party  professionalization  and  thus  facilitating  later  party 
adaptation. It first explicates in depth the theory, introduced in Chapter 2, explaining how 
and why such early challenges make party building a question of survival, instead of a 
seemingly unnecessary activity not worth its initial costs. Next, it explains the hurdles 
implemented  by  the  Brazilian  authoritarian  regime  and  demonstrates  how  they 
encouraged the PT to institutionalize. Following that, it then shows how the lack of such 
challenges played out for IU and then LCR, neither of which engaged in party building; 
the  ensuing  lack  of  a  professional  party  apparatus  thwarted  both  parties'  attempts  at 
adaptation in the future. The chapter concludes with a few words on the importance of 
these birth pains on leftist parties' futures.
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BUREAUCRATIC REQUIREMENTS
As parties  diversify  strategies  and  pursue  a  broader  electorate,  they  become 
impelled to build, amongst other things, a routinized organizational machine, establish a 
hierarchy of offices, and train cadres (cf. Müller and Strøm 1999). Indeed, they cannot 
hope to remain viable in the long term without the support of a professionalized party 
apparatus.  Organizational  capacity,  a  bureaucratic  structure,  centralized  chains  of 
command, and disciplined decision-making and -enforcing mechanisms are needed to 
address  head-on the internal  and external  challenges that  parties  will  inevitably face; 
weakly institutionalized parties are simply not up to the task (Kitschelt 1989). Indeed, 
only those parties that had professionalized were adaptable enough to be able to respond 
successfully to the transitions to democracy and market economics. Since radical change, 
such  as  that  needed  to  effect  party  adaptation,  is  generally  the  province  of  strong, 
centralized leadership and not diffuse power (cf. Share 1999), leftist parties must engage 
in party-building if they are to adapt successfully when the electorate rewarded it. 
The problem, however, is that this worthwhile process is excessively costly—both 
economically and electorally—in the short run. Members and activists must be located, 
recruited, and trained. Local, regional, and national offices and branches must be built, 
furnished, and staffed. Resources to pay salaries and logistics must be sought, secured, 
and  routinized.  Rules  and  procedures  governing  lines  of  responsibility  and  decision-
making must be developed, agreed upon, and formalized. This is much to ask, especially 
for an externally mobilized party, a party with limited—if any—access to state spoils and 
characterized by limited resources and short terms horizons (cf. Shefter 1993). As such, it 
is only natural for parties to put off such actions until they are absolutely necessary, or at 
least until the party has begun winning administrative government positions (Harmel and 
Janda 1994).
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Complicating such efforts is a collective action problem that must be overcome: 
all else equal, individual politicians prefer not to have to compromise or share power 
either with other politicians or with their  own political  party.  Party building involves 
institutionalizing  decision-making  and  decision-enforcement  procedures  and 
mechanisms, at the expense of politicians' whims and personal freedom. This process of 
centralization  and  institutionalization  is  far  more  likely  to  occur  when  parties  are 
subjected to strong external challenges, particularly early on in their institutional life. 
Along this line, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that “bonds of solidarity forged 
out of periods of violent struggle are perhaps the most robust source of [party] cohesion” 
(p  65).  Similarly,  Allison  (2012)  shows  that  warring  factions  and  component 
organizations within the FSLN, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN), and the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG) put their 
internal differences over membership, preferred strategies and tactics, and analyses of 
social conditions aside when confronted by external challenges. Authoritarian repression 
in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, respectively, generated strong pressures for 
these groups to unify into well organized, centralized political parties able to withstand 
future challenges (p 13).154
In a  similar  vein,  authoritarian regimes in Latin America inadvertently helped 
solve this problem by increasing the benefits of institutionalization so much with their 
bureaucratic meddling that the process's short-term costs were no longer that onerous in 
comparison to the costs of not acting (i.e., the inability to legalize, the disbanding of the 
party). On their way out, many of Latin America's authoritarian regimes created legal 
154 However, Allison also notes that an end to the pressing challenges—i.e., negotiated settlements in the 
cases of the FMLN and URNG, and electoral defeat in the case of the FSLN—led to a partial fracturing 
of these party coalitions. Nonetheless, without that early pain, those parties would not have ever been 
unified in the first place.
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obstacles  to  deter  upstart  leftist  parties  as  a  last-ditch  effort  to  support  authoritarian 
successor parties of the right and stave off their own political irrelevance (and potential 
persecution for human rights violations). To ensure success, parties on the right were, in a 
sense, “helped” by the outgoing regime in order that the parties on the left would not win 
“by an overwhelming majority” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p 62).
These rules and regulations—from excluding the left from transitional pacts to 
erecting onerous bureaucratic hurdles for party registration to limiting the availability of 
public funds—ended up having profound effects because they occurred during these new 
parties'  formative years, when the newly formed parties were inchoate and malleable. 
Such challenges threatened the very survival of these parties and ended up having an 
indelible influence on their developmental trajectory. In this way, institutional survival 
trumped ideological positioning; failure to do so would have risked the unity (and thus 
strength)  of  the  “party  at  siege.”155 For  instance,  Chile's  PS  gradually  abandoned 
deliberation and pluralism156 in favor of “Leninist norms of democratic centralism in its 
organizational  life”  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s;  such  a  mechanism ended  up 
helping years later with the party's top-down ideological transformation and institutional 
maturation (Roberts 1998, p 102).
With democracy approaching, leftist parties felt that they could eventually win, in 
spite of the still-tilted “playing field,” and thus were willing to accept the unfair existing 
rules of the game in order to compete. To this end, parties responded to these challenges 
by  sinking  roots  into  society  and  strengthening  their  capacity  to  mobilize  voters; 
developing a bureaucratic structure that provided stable, valued, and recurring patterns of 
behavior (cf.  Huntington 1968, p 12); creating a professional corps of full-time party 
155 Without legal recognition, parties do not have access to state resources budgeted to political parties. 
They also are unable to field candidates for public office, limiting access to indirect state rents via polit-
ical appointments. Lacking such resources can easily spell the demise of a fledgling party.
156 During its transformative years under the authoritarian dictatorship, not its formative years, to be sure.
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workers  to  allow them to  engage  simultaneously  in  a  variety  of  different  tasks; and 
establishing greater organizational coherence by delineating clear lines of horizontal and 
vertical accountability. This led to the gradual construction of a disciplined leadership 
structure  that  streamlined  decision-making  mechanisms  and  strengthened  decision-
enforcement mechanisms so that the party could adapt quickly to future threats.
The  short-term  consideration  of  institutional  survival  had  long-term 
repercussions: parties forced upon this party-building trajectory were more likely to adapt 
successfully when the need arose, thanks to the organizational structures and decision-
making mechanisms they had adopted earlier. The combination of centralized leadership 
with majoritarian decision-making and effective enforcement mechanisms strengthened 
adaptability,  enabling  these  parties  to  avoid  the  factionalist  gridlock  and  schismatic 
tendency that often plague leftist parties as they try to engage in adaptation: hierarchical 
rigidity ensures that ideologues cannot just do as they please (cf. Kitschelt 1989).
Conversely,  those  parties  that  faced  no  pressing  need  to  build  an  organized, 
bureaucratized,  centralized  party  apparatus  never  built  one.  Parties  that  came  about 
within the relative safety of democratic or soft authoritarian contexts had the “privilege” 
to be able to put off party-building and engage in the more normatively-valued (by the 
left) process of deliberative democracy, instead of adopt more disciplined, majoritarian-
based mechanisms of decision-making. Some such parties—such as Venezuela's LCR and 
Peru's IU—went so far as to embrace consensus-based decision-making norms and rules; 
given the difficulties in reaching consensus, such mechanisms are anathema to adaptation 
since those who benefit from the status quo have every incentive to block reforms that 
would affect their privileged position as veto players.
In  this  way,  leftist  parties  that  were  subjected  to  legal  hurdles  during  their 
formative years developed a more disciplined party structure than those that  did not; 
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given their earlier institutionalization and centralization efforts, they were thus more able 
to professionalize and engage in party adaptation if and when needed. The next section 
traces this process, whereby bureaucratic hurdles helped force the PT to institutionalize 
early in its history.
THE PT: LEGALIZATION OBSTACLES ENCOURAGE PARTY BUILDING
On its way out, Brazil's authoritarian regime worked to ensure that re-emerging 
left  parties  would  participate  at  a  disadvantage  vis-à-vis  authoritarian  successor  and 
centrist-establishment parties in the re-opened democratic political arena. In particular, 
high barriers to entry for new parties sought to discourage leftist parties from forming and 
complicate their efforts at  vying for public office. As a new leftist  party,  the PT was 
negatively  affected  by  this  rule:  at  the  very  onset  of  its  existence,  the  inchoate 
organization was forced to accomplish a series of onerous bureaucratic tasks within a 
short period of time if it were to become a legal party. Participating in this very process, 
however, ended up forcing the PT along an institutionalization trajectory that culminated 
in  its  transformation  into  a  well-organized,  centralized,  majoritarian  party  (cf.  Keck 
1991). This positioned the PT to be able to engage in party adaptation in the 1990s, when 
external conditions (i.e., the “Americanization” of Latin American elections) rewarded 
parties  that  professionalized their  organizations.  The next  three subsections detail  the 
specific barriers to entry, the ensuing process of party building, and the culminating party 
professionalization of the PT, respectively.
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Barriers to Entry
On  22  November  1979,  Brazil's  outgoing  authoritarian  regime  promulgated 
legislation that disbanded the two officially sanctioned parties, ARENA and the MDB157 
and  established  onerous  criteria  for  registering  new  parties,  thus  reestablishing  the 
country's  multiparty  system.158 Legalization  consisted,  in  part,  of  completion  of  the 
following requirements of the Organic Law of Political Parties (Lei Orgânica de Partidos  
Políticos, Rule 6,767 of 20 December 1979):
a) Creation of a manifesto, program, and party statute, as well as the election of a 
seven-to-eleven -member Provisional National Executive Committee (Comissão 
Diretora Nacional Provisória, CDNP), by at least 101 founders. 
b) Designation by the CDNP of seven-to-eleven -member Provisional Regional 
Executive Committees (Comissões Diretoras Regionais Provisórias, CDRP) in at 
least nine states. Designation by the CDRPs (with the authorization of the CDNP) 
of  three-to-eleven  -member  Provisional  Municipal  Executive  Committees 
(Comissões Diretoras Municipais Provisórias, CDMP) in at least one-fifth of the 
municipalities in their respective states.
c)  Completion  of  numerous  bureaucratic  requirements  to  obtain  provisional 
registration.
- Within twelve months of obtaining provisional registration, the party must:
d) Hold municipal conventions in at least one-fifth of the municipalities of at least 
nine  states  in  order  to  choose  municipal  directorates  and  elect  delegates  to 
regional conventions.
e) Hold regional conventions in at least nine states to choose regional directorates 
and elect delegates to the national convention.
f) Hold a national convention to choose the national directorate.
g) Approve the party statute and program at all conventions; there are specific 
rules governing how these conventions should function, too.159
157 For information on Brazil's top-down-mandated bipartisan years, see Alves (1984) and Reis (1978).
158 AI-2 had disbanded all of Brazil's preexisting parties and mandated the creation of two parties, one pro-
regime and one opposition. See Alves (1984).
159 Skromov (1980) and Farias (1980). In reality, the PT had to take into account numerous laws governing 
party legalization, including: the Reorganization of Political Parties Law (Lei de Reorganização dos 
Partidos Políticos), the unrevoked articles from the former Organic Law of Political Parties, as well as 
resolutions and regulations from both the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE) 
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Formal  registration  is  so  important  not  only  because  it  enables  a  party  to  contest 
elections; it also provides it with all the official rights and public resources guaranteed a 
party.160
This rule did not explicitly target leftist parties, per se; however, it did only affect 
externally mobilized parties, i.e., parties that formed outside of the halls of the legislature, 
usually by individuals or groups excluded from power.161 If an organization counted at 
least ten percent of Brazil's Congress among its own, then it automatically could legalize 
as a party without having to go through any of the bureaucratic hurdles (Skromov, 1980). 
Given the fact that the outgoing authoritarian regime had outlawed leftist political parties 
and only permitted a centrist opposition party (the MDB) to participate politically, this 
law did end up specifically targeting the Brazilian left. Indeed, after having to disband, 
the  regime's  ARENA party  automatically  set  up  an  authoritarian  successor  party,  the 
Social  Democratic  Party  (Partido  Democrático  Social,  PDS);  likewise,  the  MDB 
merely162 added  the  word  “Party”  to  its  name,  became  the Partido  do  Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), and legalized easily.163
and regional electoral courts (Tribunais Regionais Eleitorais) (cf. PT 1980).
160 Public funds are important for the growth and survival of political parties. Relatedly, Kathleen Bruhn 
(2012) argues that public financing of parties encourages organizational development in the largest par-
ties (which subsequently stabilizes the party system).
161 Martin Shefter defines externally mobilized parties as those that are “established by leaders who do not 
occupy positions of power in the prevailing regime and who seek to bludgeon their way into the politi-
cal system by mobilizing and organizing a mass constituency” (1994, p 5).
162 While the process was relatively easy, most MDB members were vehemently against the dissipation of 
their party (cf. Jornal do Brasil 1979). 
163 The Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), a centrist party composed of dissident ARENA and MDB 
politicians, also automatically formed in the early months on 1980. The party opted to incorporate itself 
into the PMDB less than two years later because of another bureaucratic obstacle erected by the outgo-
ing military dictatorship: in the package of electoral reforms imposed by the regime in the run-up to the 
1982 elections, a clause was included that prohibited party coalitions (“coligações”) and mandated the 
“tied vote” (“voto vinculado”), meaning that electors could not split their vote. Rather than see the op-
position vote diluted—undoubtedly the regime's intention—the PP opted to subsume itself into the 
PMDB. Author interview with PT founder and former mayor of Porto Alegre (1997-2000) Raul Pont 
(24 March 2011).
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The process of legalization was more complicated for the left. Preexisting leftist 
parties had a more difficult time registering themselves. The military regime meddled in 
the internal power struggle over who would control the soon-to-be re-founded Brazilian 
Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB), the party of former president Getúlio 
Vargas  (1930-1945,  1951-1954).  Looking  to  weaken  the  once-popular  party,  General 
Golbery do Couto e Silva threw the regime's support behind Ivete Vargas, Getúlio's niece, 
instead of the far-more popular Leonel Brizola; the TSE sided with Ivete, forcing Brizola 
to found a new leftist party, the PDT, and thus dividing the once-powerful party name 
from a potential leftist threat.164 Given the historical strength of the PTB, however, both 
parties were able to legalize rather easily: preexisting leftist structures and organizations 
had been targeted by state repression, but never entirely destroyed.165
Such  restrictions  constituted  an  enormous  obstacle  to  the  nascent  PT.166 In 
addition to having to contend with the troubles of constructing a party from scratch, the 
party also had to focus on institutionalizing itself right away, from its founding moments. 
The “fight for legalization” became the “central task” of the PT's construction, taking 
precedence over all else, including ideological debates (da Conceição 1980, p 3). For the 
PT, fulfilling these requirements became a question of “institutional survival” (Falcão 
164 Brizola, the informal leader of the then-underground PTB in the late 1970s, was a paradigmatic case of 
a repressed leftist who experienced ideological renovation in exile and helped steer his party toward the 
ideological center. He initially tried to organize an armed uprising in Brazil during his early years of 
exile, in neighboring Uruguay, only later to embrace democracy and the pro-democratic ideas of Euro-
communism (Ribeiro nd).
165 Brizola and his PDT were the PT's major leftist competitor throughout the 1980s. However, Lula grad-
ually outshone Brizola—culminating in his edging out of the veteran candidate in the 1989 presidential 
election—in large part because of Brizola's hesitance to embrace the new unionists. The PDT became 
viewed less and less favorably by organized labor and social movements and resembled more and more 
a populist electoral vehicle for Brizola. Author interview with former mayor of Porto Alegre and for-
mer governor of Rio Grande do Sul Olívio Dutra (24 March 2011). In contrast, the centrist PMDB 
readily embraced the new unionists and often spoke out on their behalf (cf. Guimarães 1980).
166 The PCB and the PC do B were only able to legalize in 1985. The PCB was wracked by internal in-
fighting between a growing group of Eurocommunism followers and Luiz Carlos Prestes, as well as by 
continued harassment by the military regime (Prestes 1980, Folha de S.Paulo 1980, Pandolfi 1995). 
The government's Diário Oficial refused to publish its statute—one of the Organic Law's prerequisites
—over  concern that  the party  was still  linked to  external  governments  (Correio Braziliense 1984, 
Folha de S.Paulo 1984).
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1984) since it could not rely upon earlier partisan organizations and structures: “the PT 
only survived because it was capable of resisting the impediments created by the regime” 
(Weffort 1984a).
Institutionalization by Force
The  PT  opted  to  work  tirelessly  to  affiliate  members  and  fulfill  these  time-
sensitive requirements, on risk of its future existence: “Neither internal debates nor the 
campaign for the organization of the workers can serve to distract attention from the task 
of obtaining the party registry in the electoral courts” (CDNP 1980). To this end, the 
party  published  a  small  booklet, Legalize  the  PT,  now (Farias  1980),  explaining the 
importance of legalization and a play-by-play of how the party could accomplish the 
regime's dictates in the least amount of time possible. It also published a 27-page manual 
with 45 steps and 18 annexes detailing how precisely to construct a party directorate, the 
regime's mandated partisan structure (PT 1980; see Appendix B).
In this way, the PT was forced to quickly write up a concise party platform and 
statutes,  despite  the difficulty in  ever  reaching consensus over  the party's  ideological 
nature. According to Clovis Bueno de Azevedo (1995), the PT's political proposals are an 
“inconsistent mix, a contradictory combination of leninist and social-democratic theses” 
(p 147): the party never spent its limited resources and capital on hashing out formal 
responses to the ideological questions that plague most leftist parties. Indeed, the fact that 
the PT never adopted a unitary theoretical matrix may help explain the party's ability to 
engage in ideological moderation down the line: the party's ideology had always been 
flexible. Likewise, the PT was forced to open up party headquarters all over the country 
and develop a national scope, despite the party's regional nature: the bulk of the PT's 
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support came from within Metropolitan São Paulo.167 Equally important was affiliating 
members into the party, an arduous campaign given the party's lack of resources, but one 
that, according to PT founder and later party president Ricardo Berzoini, “really helped 
party members become activists; it  helped create the party brand.”168 These  processes 
beget a virtuous cycle of party growth that continues to this day.
To  legalize,  the  PT engaged  in  party  building  efforts  throughout  the  country, 
although it grew the fastest in the states of Acre, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, 
Goiás, Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande 
do Norte,  Rio Grande do Sul,  Santa Catarina, and, of course, São Paulo; the PT had 
established CDRPs in all  of these states by December 1980 (Meneguello 1989 p 74; 
Weffort 1983b). The next stage (d) proved exceedingly difficult, due to the large number 
of municipalities in Brazil's larger states: in São Paulo, for instance, the PT had to hold 
municipal  conventions  in  least  114  directorates.  However,  the  party  did  end  up 
establishing 203 by the 1982 election and, “without a doubt, this partisan infrastructure, 
concentrated mostly in the capital [city of São Paulo], guaranteed a certain contingent of 
militancy available for the electoral campaign of 1982” (Meneguello 1989 p 75).
While, initially, it was just adhering to the rules to be granted the right to register, 
these bureaucratic requirements ended up taking a life of their own and changing the 
party's goals and strategies (Skromov et al. 1983). These bureaucratic obstacles not only 
forced the PT to institutionalize when, under less challenging circumstances, it would 
have put off until later such tasks; they also ended up molding the PT into a distinctly 
167 In the 1982 elections, the first elections that the PT participated in, the party won 9.9 percent of the 
vote in São Paulo State, with almost 18 percent of those votes (203,533) coming from São Paulo's 
“ABCD” region: Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, and Diadema (PT 1982). 
Nationally, it only won 1.67 percent of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies, translating into a mere 
eight seats, six of which were from the state of São Paulo: Airton Soares, Bete Mendes, Djalma Bom, 
Eduardo Suplicy, Irma Passoni, and José Genoino.
168 Author interview (8 November 2010).
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bureaucratic, centrally organized, majoritarian party. Such a model was far from what the 
PT's founders had envisioned when they set about to create a party in the late 1970s.
In  particular, petistas had  initially  envisioned  a  horizontally-organized  party 
characterized by a bottom-up leadership structure (Keck 1991; Meneguello 1989 pp 91-
99). This took the form of party “base nuclei” (núcleos de base), local party headquarters 
that were a “combination of a primary cell for internal party deliberation with a window 
to connect  to  the masses”;  nuclei  were informal  groups of  militants  that  1)  dialogue 
regularly  with  social  movements,  debate  issues,  and contribute  directly  to  the  party's 
guidelines,  and  then,  2)  discuss  and  apply  these  guidelines  within  the  social  realm 
(Gushiken 1990). According to the PT's Statutes (articles 35-37), a nucleus is a small 
group of party affiliates organized by neighborhood, place of work, social movement, 
professional  category,  and  place  of  study,  among  others;  it  is  considered  a  place  of 
partisan democratic organization and political education. In other words, nuclei would 
dialogue with social groups to generate ideas, which were then sent up to state- and then 
national-level offices to be aggregated into official party policy; nuclei would thus serve 
as the conduit between party and society to divulge and promote the party policies at the 
local level.
Nuclei were really the essence of what would make the PT so different from other 
Brazilian parties (and most Latin American parties, for that matter): policy was to be 
decided from the bottom up. According to long-time national PT leader Luiz Gushiken 
(1990), the PT was to be a
party  of  the  poor;  a  bit  informal—somewhere  in  between  movement  and 
institution,  with  a  hint  of  anarchy  in  the  dominance  of  the  nuclei  over  the 
leadership; a party of the street, of the square, of the factory, of the schoolyard, of 
the fight, of the protest, and of the struggle.
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Nuclei were responsible for collaborating with preexisting social movements and groups 
to formulate the PT national program beginning from the party's base (Passoni 1981). It 
was  nuclei  that  would  enable  the  PT to  grow  and  function  as  a  horizontal,  diffuse 
organization. 
However, the partisan legislation dictated the establishment of party directorates 
(diretórios). The administrative organ of all political parties in Brazil, directorates are 
vertically-organized  organizations  defined  by  top-down  power  relations  (Meneguello 
1989). Such organs are designed to hierarchicalize diffuse groups and replicate national, 
bureaucratic  party  structures  at  the  local  and  state  level;  given  their  vertical  nature, 
directorates are also adept at streamlining decision-making as decisions mandated from 
above can be efficiently sent  down a clearly delineated chain of  command.  An early 
example of how the PT initially ran itself was with the administration of Fortaleza mayor 
Maria Luiza Fontenele (1986-1989). Considered by virtually the entire party (as well as 
much of Brazil) as a failure, Fontenele's administration was characterized by chaos and 
gridlock. According to PT founder and mayor of Belo Horizonte (2002-2008) Fernando 
Pimentel, she ran her city “like a Paris commune: in order to make any decision she first 
convened an assembly of the entire party's [Fortaleza] delegates.”169 Fontinele was an 
ultra  radical,  Maoist petista;  according  to  Antônio  Lassance,  special  advisor  in  the 
personal cabinet of President Lula, the “traumatic experience” of having her represent the 
party convinced the PT's pragmatic wing of the importance of sidelining radical factions 
and ensuring that party moderates are supported in internal primaries.170 
Unwilling to break with its idealistic nature, yet unable to ignore the bureaucratic 
dictates of the authoritarian regime, the PT opted to try to construct and maintain both 
169 Author interview (5 November 2010).
170 Author interview (5 October 2010).
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simultaneously.  However,  it  merely sought  to  fulfill  the bureaucratic  requirements  on 
paper, leaving the true power diffuse, in the hands of local party militants. PT national 
leader Luiz Gushiken (1990) also argued that, in spite of the dictatorship's pressure to 
create  parties  in  the  “classical  mold  of  parties  with  institutional  and  parliamentary 
cadres,” the PT nonetheless stayed true to its origins. It continued to open and rely upon 
nuclei,  keep internal  party  conflicts  within  the  party  (as  opposed to  appealing to  the 
relevant “bourgeois” institutions established to resolve such conflicts, such as electoral 
tribunals), and substitute the dictatorship's style of decision-making mechanisms with the 
PT's  own  “alive,  vigorous,  broad—and  sometimes  tedious,  time-consuming,  and 
tumultuous—processes,  which were more able to ensure a minimum form of internal 
democracy” (p 10). However, such an analysis was either wishful thinking or excessively 
optimistic:  it  is  unclear  for  how long this  compromise lasted,  or  if  it  did at  all.  The 
problem was that, unlike the directorates, nuclei were not seen as legitimate in the eyes of 
the state and were thus never legally recognized as official party organs (Skromov 1980, 
p 2).
The  regime's  dictates  took  a  life  of  their  own  as  the  party  ended  up  almost 
ignoring the nuclei and developing into a majoritarian party based primarily around the 
directorates.  According  to  PT founder  and  former  high-ranking  member  Ricardo  de 
Azevedo,  “The  [party]  legislation  of  the  regime  assisted  with  this  defeat  of  internal 
democracy.”171 Furthermore, according to PT founder Markus Sokol, “This legalization 
process was beneficial in that it helped nationalize the party; however, it also made it very 
bureaucratic and heavy...it forged the internal mechanisms of the party.”172 Due arguably 
in  large  part  to  the  fact  that  their  external  legality  empowered  them  with  internal 
legitimacy, directorates slowly but surely supplanted the role of nuclei. Militants from the 
171 Author interview (3 February 2011).  
172 Author interview (12 August 2010).
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PT publication Worker's Cause (Jornal Causa Operária) lamented this development and 
sought, in vain, for ways to “overcome the antidemocratic structure imposed [upon the 
PT] by the partisan legislation of the military regime” (Jornal Causa Operária 1981).
The  nature  of  the  regime's  rules  favored  the  creation  of  a  centralized,  highly 
majoritarian party, which is exactly what ended up becoming of the PT, despite its initial 
plans to the contrary.173 Another factor contributing to the PT's bureaucratization was the 
party's decision to phase out national meetings (“encontros”) and rely more on congresses 
(“congressos”);  the  latter  started to  resolve those issues  whose responsibility  initially 
resided with nuclei.174 Slowly but surely, the party developed into what the Brazilian 
news  magazine Época called  a  “company”  in  its  in-depth  article,  “Uma  Empresa 
Chamada PT” (Mendonça and Nunes 2004). By 2004, the party had 5,352 directorates, 
over four times the number of McDonalds franchises in Brazil; but the directorates only 
tell  part  of  the story of  the party's  professionalization.  A party that  once relied upon 
volunteer  labor  transformed  into  a  highly  structured  organization  with  a  highly 
specialized,  full-time  staff  and  boasting  its  own center  for  conducting  opinion  polls, 
interest groups, and in-depth voter surveys. The PT's Nucleus of Public Opinion (Núcleo 
de Opinião Pública, NOP) was established in 1997 to better understand public opinion. 
In  preparation  for  the  2002  presidential  campaign,  NOP  director  Gustavo  Venturi 
conducted 20 focus groups in state capitals to understand what voters thought of Lula and 
what he should do to become more electable; the result was “Lula lite” (a beardless, less-
menacing-looking politician with softer corners and a less radical rhetoric).175
Furthermore,  the  party  has  developed  its  own  exclusive  system  of  data 
transmission to keep its directorates connected, similar to those used by large banks. It 
173 Author interviews with PT founder and former high-ranking member Valério Arcary (20 August 2010) 
and PT founder José Moisés (17 August 2010).
174 Author interview with PT founder and former federal deputy Clovis da Silva (22 March 2011).
175 Author interview with PT pollster and campaign consultant Gustavo Venturi (13 August 2010).
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has a 0800 number to solicit campaign materials, make up to 20,000 robocalls per day, 
and  engage  in  voter  intention  surveys  for  the  PT's  30  most  important  campaigns. 
Furthermore, the PT allegedly has the name, address, and telephone number of each and 
every one of its over 650,000 party affiliates (Mendonça and Nunes 2004).
Party Professionalization, Party Adaptation
This costly party-building process had a huge pay-off: party institutionalization 
helped lead to party growth. According to Athos Pereira, PT founder and chief of staff of 
the PT Leadership in the Chamber of Deputies, it also helped “decide once and for all the 
debate  between whether  the  PT should be a  cadre-based party  or  a  mass  party” and 
grounded  the  party:  during  their  affiliation  drives  and  efforts  to  establish  party 
headquarters,  activists  were surprised at  how little the general  public cared about the 
activists' exiles or formal political ideologies.176 Arlete Sampaio, former vice-governor of 
the Brasília, claims that the task of canvassing neighborhoods to affiliate members also 
led  to  personal  transformation.  Speaking  of  her  own experience,  she  argues  that  the 
process of building the party resulted in “doctrine coming into conflict  with reality:” 
listening to the needs of the people made her rethink her former policy prescriptions.177 
The PT grew from 29,000 affiliates in May 1980 to 300,000 in September 1981, 
an  increase  of  1,000  percent  (PT  Secretaria  Nacional  de  Organização  1985)  and 
eventually  became  Brazil's  most  structured  party,  boasting  an  enormous  party 
bureaucracy, resource base, and professionalized staff.178 Three years after its founding, 
the party enjoyed the support of ten percent of the electorate, according to a Gallup poll, 
176 Author interview (20 September 2010).
177 Author interview (18 October 2010).
178 According to PT founder and former secretary-general Francisco Weffort, the legalization campaign 
was directly responsible for the party's ability to train a corps of militants, create grassroots organiza-
tions, and engage in a strong “ground game.” Author interview (15 July 2010).
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making the PT Brazil's third largest party in terms of national preferences (Jornal do 
Brasil 1983).  More importantly,  though, party building helped professionalize the PT, 
thus enabling it to engage in party adaptation down the line.
Bureaucratic  obstacles  put  in  place  by the  authoritarian  regime fundamentally 
altered  the  PT;179 they  forced  an  otherwise  weakly  institutionalized  party  into 
institutionalizing  and  constructing  a  distinctly  professional  party.180 The  PT  always 
remained an internally democratic party. However, its majoritarian nature, coupled with 
its  disciplined,  centralized  leadership  structure,  has  made  it  a  surprisingly  top-down 
party: once you win the party leadership, the PT is yours to mold. PT founder Mariucha 
Fontana,  who  was  expelled  from  the  party  along  with  the  rest  of  the  Socialist 
Convergence (Convergência Socialista, CS) in 1992, claims that, since the early 1990s, 
the PT does not have any internal democracy....Lula does what he wants. He has 
much more weight than the [institution that is] the PT. The 'base' does not order 
anything. Who runs the show is the party leadership. The PT changed its internal 
structure so that the leadership holds absolute control of the party. There are no 
nuclei nor debates at the base.181
Internal decision-making rests squarely at the top of the party.182 Indeed, these 
strict majoritarian rules allowed for substantial change: by winning (often with little more 
than  a  simple  majority  of  the  vote183)  and  holding  onto  the  party’s  leadership,  ex-
179 While trying to legalize, the party simultaneously had to deal with the campaign to reverse the condem-
nation of eleven labor leaders (including Lula), charges allegedly pursued with the intention of under-
mining the nascent PT. Author interview with former guerrilla and PT founder Markus Sokol (12 Au-
gust 2010).
180 Author interviews with Brazilian intellectual and former mid-ranking PT official Cláudio Gonçalves 
Couto (30 May 2011) and PT founder and high-ranking party cadre Adeli Sell (22 March 2011).
181 Author interview (10 May 2011).
182 The PT's pragmatic majority accomplished this not only by expelling unruly tendencies, but also by 
outlawing the existence of independent bases and journals amongst the party's factions, a policy that 
was used more and more in the 1990s. Author interview with PT federal deputy Luciana Genro, who 
was expelled (along with Babá and Heloísa Helena) from the party in 2003 (24 March 2011).
183 The PT tendency Popular Power and Socialism (Poder Popular e Socialismo, PPS; this later becomes 
Socialist Side, Vertente Socialista, VS) put forth the motion in the early 1990s that party leadership 
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President Lula's pragmatist Articulação faction was able to steer  the party,  top-down, 
through  profound  transformations  to  conform  better  to  the  changing  nature  of  the 
Brazilian electorate in the 1990's and 2000's.  According to party intellectual  Candido 
Mendes, Lula's position as de facto party leader was never seriously challenged (minor 
challengers included Plínio de Arruda Sampaio in the 1990s, Tarso Genro in the wake of 
the  Mensalão  scandal,  and  Eduardo  Suplicy  in  2002)  because,  given  the  party's 
background (as well as Brazil's geographic distribution of power), a new leader would 
have to come from São Paulo and be a unionist. Given the corporatist nature of Brazil's 
unions, no potential opposition could arise. Additionally, given his personality, Lula has 
always been adept at turning potential competitors into his own managers.184
The most visible manifestation of this change was in 2001, with the so-called 
Process of Direct Elections (Processo de Eleições Diretas, PED) reform, which altered 
the PT's statute and instituted direct membership elections for party president and leaders 
of  national,  state,  and  municipal  directorates  (prior  to  this,  the  party  president  and 
national directorate were chosen by delegates from the national conventions). While sold 
as a way to increase internal democracy,185 the move was widely regarded as a way to 
further  enable  the  party  leadership,  controlled  by  a  core  of  pragmatic  moderates  for 
should be based on proportional representation, not majoritarianism. This, according to PPS founder 
and several term PT federal deputy Eduardo Jorge, was just one of many failed attempts to “get the PT 
out of its Stalinist mindset.” Author interview (23 August 2010).
184 Author interview (13 April  2011).  The one close call  was in 1994, when the PT's leftists revolted 
against the Articulação, banded together, and gained a majority of votes for party president. Rui Falcão, 
the leader of the leftist tendency, Time of Truth (Hora de Verdade), served as interim party president 
and was elected Lula's campaign manager for the 1994 presidential election, in which the PT's cam-
paign and rhetoric were considered exceptionally radical. For instance, in March of 1994, Rui Falcão 
wrote an op-ed for the Folha de S.Paulo newspaper provocatively entitled “Cats with Gloves do not 
Catch Rats” (“Gatos con luvas não caçam ratos”), in which he defends the PT's embrace of land reform 
and the suspension of external debt payments and argues that “for every bit of support that the PT loses 
among the powerful [by adhering to radical policies and goals], it gains thousands of followers from 
workers, small business owners...and, principally, those who are excluded.” Falcão still posits that the 
1994 campaign was a failure not because it was too radical, but, rather, that it was too moderate. Au-
thor interview (17 February 2011). 
185 Senator Cristovam Buarque, the main sponsor of this proposal (along with Eduardo Suplicy), asserts 
that its primary purpose was to increase dismantle the party's bureaucratic machine and increase inter-
nal democracy. Author interview (9 November 2010).
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virtually the party's entire existence, to impose its will by circumventing party militants 
and organized factions—especially those averse to party adaptation—within the party by 
appealing directly to the PT's rank and file (Hunter 2010, pp 39-40). According to former 
PT president (2005-2006, 2007-2010) Ricardo Berzoini,  this move sharpened lines of 
authority  and  further  centralized  the  party's  leadership,  allowing  it  to  operate  less 
constrained  by  the  more  radical  holdout—found  mostly  in  the  party's  middle—that 
sought ideological purity and rejected any form of institutional change; the result was the 
top-down change desired by the party's top (the CEN) and bottom (mass membership).186 
This move helped sideline even the directorates; according to PT founder and former 
party intellectual Francisco de Oliveira, the party's power now lies squarely in the CEN at 
the expense of party militants (thanks to the party's majoritarian structure).187
Even  so,  strict  majoritarianism and  party  centralization  had  begun  far  earlier. 
Citing  the  rationale  behind  the  PT's  early  adoption  of  majoritarianism,  PT founder, 
former  party  president,  and  six-tem federal  deputy  José  Genoino  claims,  “When  the 
collective decides democratically upon a position you can demonstrate against it, make 
criticisms, but you have to vote together. You can rebel against it, but the vote is the bond 
of the pact” (quoted in Coelho 2007, p 402). From the beginning, the nuclei-directorate 
debate had created tension between the party's core leadership, centered in São Paulo, and 
other groups, over the proper venue of intra-party contestation. One side effect of this 
debate was the founding of the Articulation of the 113 faction (Articulação dos 113), a 
group of approximately 113 party members, all from São Paulo, who sought to create a 
unified leadership that could rise above the problems arising from having the heterodox 
group of individuals that is the PT simultaneously filling two parallel party structures: 
nuclei and directorates (de Souza et al 1983). As the members were mostly from the 
186 Author interview (8 November 2010).
187 Author interview (3 March 2011).
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leadership ranks of unions and base ecclesiastic communities, the faction's outlook was 
quite pragmatic. Ultimately victorious and serving as the archetype for the PT's future 
governing, hegemonic, centrist faction, the Articulação,188 the Articulação dos 113 was 
the first pass toward sidelining party militants and centralizing power in the hands of the 
party's leadership (cf. Dirceu 1985).
Relatedly,  the party's  centralized nature allowed it  to  exert  tight  controls  over 
party  membership.  Those  who  refused  to  sign  off  on  the  leadership's  desired  policy 
moderation  were  expelled,  a  particularly  effective  way  of  dealing  with  internal 
contradictions and ensuring adaptation. In 1990, the PT expelled the Trotskyist faction 
Worker's Cause (Causa Operária, CO) over its rejection of the PT's decision to engage in 
cross-party alliances; the group went on to form the Worker's Cause Party (Partido da 
Causa Operária, PCO).189 Two years later, the PT expelled the CS for opposing the PT's 
moderate stance vis-a-vis Brazil's impeached center-right president, Fernando Collor de 
Mello; the group went on to form the United Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista 
dos Trabalhadores Unificado, PSTU).190 In 2005, the PT expelled the Socialist Popular 
Action tendency (Ação Popular Socialista,  APS) for refusing to sign off  on the PT's 
“neoliberal”  reforms,  particularly  the  2003  Social  Security  Reform  (Reforma  da 
Previdência);  the  group went  on  to  form the  Socialism and Freedom Party  (Partido 
Socialismo  e  Liberdade,  PSOL).191 This  process  began  shortly  after  the  party's 
foundation: “State deputies and leaders of the PT convinced themselves that its necessary 
188 The Articulação has changed its name over the years; it has been called United in the Fight (Unidade 
na Luta), Majoritarian Camp (Campo Majoritário), and Constructing a New Brazil (Construindo um 
novo Brasil).
189 Author interview with former CO leader, current PCO president, and two-time PCO presidential candi-
date Rui Costa Pimenta (26 August 2010).
190 Author interviews with former CS leaders and current PSTU leaders Valério Arcary (20 August 2010) 
and Mariucha Fontana (10 May 2011).
191 Author interview with former APS leader and 2006 PSOL presidential candidate Heloísa Helena (12 
January 2011). Leaders of each of these three groups all agreed that the real reason they were expelled 
from the PT was because they were “holding back” the party from moderating and professionalizing. 
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to  isolate  sectarian  groups  and the  small  leftist  organizations  camouflaged inside  the 
party” (Folha de S.Paulo 1983).
Control over who can remain in the party is crucial for maintaining control of the 
party's direction and future trajectory. The PT's centralized leadership preempted many 
potential  internal  fights  over  its  top-down  program  of  party  adaptation  by  simply 
expelling  those  who  opposed  change:  preemptive  damage  control.  Especially  for 
ideologically-driven  parties,  changes  to  party  orthodoxy—be  it  a  promise  that  a  PT 
administration  honor  all  signed  agreements  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF),192 or one to override the veto power of party militants—often generate internecine 
struggles that can rent a party in two, exactly what happened to Peru's IU and Venezuela's 
LCR.
The  PT's  colleagues,  the  PC  do  B  and  the  PCB,  did  not  follow  the  same 
institutionalization  path.  Neither  the  former,  which  was  heavily  influenced  by  the 
Albanian line of communism, nor the latter, which was being torn apart by an internal 
struggle between the party's ultra radicals (who had close ties with foreign nationals) and 
more moderate radicals (cf. Prestes 1980, Dias 1985) was able to legalize—both the PCB 
and the PC do B were outlawed until 1985 (Buonicore unpublished). In this way, legal 
obstacles did not create the incentive for institutionalization, they prevented any from 
happening whatsoever. Once the parties were finally allowed to legalize, the onerous but 
surmountable requirements for legalization had been relaxed. Having “missed out” on the 
need to institutionalize as a means of self defense, the PCB and the PC do B never felt the 
need  to  develop  their  organizations  or  professionalize  their  internal  norms  and 
mechanisms. Furthermore, both parties had participated clandestinely in elections in the 
192 Shortly before the 2002 presidential election, Lula wrote his famous “Letter to the Brazilian People.” 
directed at the investment community, that promised to respect the center-right macro-economic poli-
cies of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), pay off the public debt, and balance the 
budget (Silva 2002).
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1970s under the MDB umbrella; this also helped preclude the need for the PCB and PC 
do B to engage in their own party building.
The institutionalization process, triggered by Brazil's authoritarian regime's efforts 
to  undermine  the  resurgence  of  the  left,  ended up professionalizing the  PT and thus 
preparing it for the party adaptation that proved to be necessary down the line. The PT's 
centralized leadership,  top-down decision-making mechanisms, and internal coherence 
strengthened the party's adaptability, making possible the otherwise difficult process of 
engaging in party adaptation. If and where external challenges had not forced the party to 
develop its organization, this process of institutional and ideological change would have 
been far more difficult to achieve. Indeed, both Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR failed in 
their party adaptation efforts. The next two sections will demonstrate that these parties 
were unable to adapt because they had never engaged in the relevant party building that 
would then make possible party adaptation that would be rewarded in the late 1980s and 
1990s.
IU: LEFTIST ENCOURAGEMENT PRECLUDES THE NEED TO INSTITUTIONALIZE
Where  leftist  parties  did  not  face  early  challenges  there  was  no  incentive  to 
institutionalize. Since a lack of party building limits a party's adaptability, the absence of 
early challenges for a party complicated its future attempts at adaptation. In Peru, for 
example,  the  “revolutionary  leftist”  authoritarian  regime  did  not  look  to  harass  or 
discourage the growth of leftist parties. Unlike in the rest of the region, Peru's leftist 
parties emerged from authoritarian rule not only intact, but stronger than they had been 
before. Furthermore, no restrictions were enacted to limit the political participation of 
radical, non-democratic actors (Sanborn 1991, p 137). Such a context did not bode well 
128
for  party  institutionalization:  IU  had  it  so  “easy”  that  it  never  felt  compelled  to 
institutionalize and so, given party-building's high upfront costs, never did. This lack of 
professionalization thwarted the party's efforts at adaptation in the late 1980s and early 
1990s,  complicating  the  various  attempts  at  top-down  change  by  the  party's  more 
pragmatic wing.193 The next three subsections detail the Peruvian left's growth during the 
military dictatorship, the lack of restrictions upon participation, and the failed efforts at 
professionalization (as well as their consequences on the party), respectively.
The Left Flourishes
Unlike in the rest of Latin America, the left in Peru emerged stronger from the 
period of authoritarian rule in terms of organizational structure, mobilizational capacity, 
and electoral  strength  (cf.  Huber  Stephens  1983;  Stokes  1995). Peru's  popular  sector 
mobilization flourished under the dictatorship of the armed forces, especially during the 
first phase of the “revolution” (1968 to 1975), but also from 1975-1980.194 Velasquismo 
actively promoted social mobilization and tolerated organizing among the partisan left 
(Roberts 1996); policies implemented by Peru's Revolutionary Government of the Armed 
Forces strengthened the left in a number of different way.
First, the regime harassed and worked to dismantle the left's traditional enemies. 
In  particular,  the  armed  forces  sought  to  weaken  the  centrist  APRA's195 hold  over 
organized labor, critically curtailing the mobilizational and organizational efficacy of the 
left's principal electoral competition (Sanborn 1991, p 86). 
193 This process of early-challenges-leading-to-party-building is exactly what happened with Peru's cen-
trist APRA, a constant target of the military regime that went on to become the country's most robust 
and institutionalized party throughout the 20th century (cf. Cotler 1995).
194 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the military ruled Peru from 1968 to 1980. General Juan Velasco governed 
from 1968 until 1975, when he was deposed by an internal coup and replaced with the more hardline 
General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (McClintock and Lowenthal 1983).
195 The APRA was the Peruvian military's archenemy (cf. Cotler 1995).
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Second, the regime's sweeping land reform of 1969 dismantled large agricultural 
estates  and  transformed  them into  cooperatives  (Chernick  2007).  This  destroyed  the 
power  base  of  Peru's  two traditionally  reactionary  forces,  the  agro-oligarchy and the 
highlands  landowners.  Coupled  with  the  industrial  reform of  1970,  which  mandated 
worker  representation  on  companies'  boards  of  directors,  the  regime encouraged 
alternative forms of popular organization and fostered the growth and development of 
militant trade unionism, providing the left with a newly empowered support base in the 
countryside and in the cities (Sanborn 1991, pp 84-85). According to former guerrilla and 
high-ranking IU party member Hugo Blanco,
In my opinion, the Velasco government was the most progressive government that 
Peru  has  ever  had:  he  liquidated  the  semi-feudal latifundios;  nationalized  the 
mines, oil, fisheries, banks, etc; things that even today none of the 'progressive 
governments' of South America have done....He freed political prisoners.196
The number of recognized unions, a useful proxy for judging the extent of popular 
sector organization, doubled under Velasco, and continued to grow even after the more 
exclusionary Morales Bermúdez assumed power; likewise, the number of neighborhood 
associations surged. At the same time, strike-activity—a good proxy for popular sector 
mobilization—skyrocketed,  as  indicated  both  by  the  number  of  strikes  and  workers 
involved (see Huber Stephens 1983, pp 61-62). With the help of leftist organizations, 
labor unions and other popular organizations successfully staged the gran paro in 1977, 
which  brought  the  entire  country  to  a  standstill  (McClintock  1999).  This  protest 
compelled Morales Bermúdez to accelerate the timetable for the military's return to the 
barracks:  a  mere  nine  days  later  the  regime announced the  convening of  constituent 
assembly elections for the following year (cf. Lynch 1992, pp 125-147).
196 Author interview (10 August 2011).
130
Third, in 1971 the regime set up SINAMOS to organize the popular sectors so 
that  they  would  be  better  able  to  contribute  to  and  take  advantage  of  the  country's 
economic  and  social  development.197 Through  SINAMOS,  the  government  organized 
agrarian  cooperatives,  industrial  communities,  neighborhood  organizations,  and  new 
unions,  while  simultaneously  linking  base-level  organizations  to  the  government  via 
intermediate  structures  (McClintock  1983;  Woy-Hazelton  1979).  However,  while  the 
regime mobilized the left  and popular  sectors  through SINAMOS, it never  formed a 
political party with which to channel these forces, leaving the ultra-radical leftist parties 
to  reap  the  resulting  benefits  (Stepan  1978b;  McClintock  and  Lowenthal  1983). 
SINAMOS did nothing to fill the political vacuum it helped build on the left: by declining 
to form a political party, SINAMOS was unable to create and retain a social basis of 
support for the regime.198 
In this way, while the process of mobilizing and organizing the population was a 
conscious effort by the Velasco regime to bypass the traditional party system and render 
political parties obsolete (one of the reasons why the military never sought to create a 
political party itself), by the end of the Velasco period, leftist parties were in a much 
stronger position than they had been twelve years prior  (cf.  Roberts  1998). Velasco's 
toleration of the left, coupled with his embracing of its traditional bases of support, had 
the unintended consequence of strengthening them. More than just strengthen the left, the 
“revolutionary leftist” dictatorship arguably also ended up radicalizing the partisan left, 
since it needed to differentiate itself from Velasquismo: Bernales (1980) argues that many 
leftists  adopted  revolutionary  leftist  ideas  and  strategies  principally  to  differentiate 
197 For information on SINAMOS, see Henry Dietz (1980, part III).
198 As a former Aprista, SINAMOS's founder, Carlos Delgado Olivera, was distrustful of political parties 
and the process whereby they bureaucratize and become hierarchical. As such, he convinced Velasco to 
eschew any efforts at institutionalizing SINAMOS as a political party. Author interview with Peruvian 
military expert Carlos Indacochea (6 September 2011).
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themselves from the dictatorship's reformist leftist platform (pp 71-2). Leftists did their 
part, too: they capitalized on and took advantage of the situation presented to them. Their 
success can be seen at the ballot box: in 1978, seven small Marxist left and center-left 
parties won over a third of the seats in the Constituent Assembly (see Table 3.1).
No Restrictions to Participation
Unlike in Latin American countries governed by repressive authoritarianism (cf. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), no leftist party, no matter how radical,  was excluded 
from participating in Peru's electoral arena (Sanborn 1991, p 137). A lack of obstacles to 
party legalization and participation meant that there was no pressure for leftist parties to 
engage in party building; in particular, there was no incentive to centralize power and 
streamline decision-making responsibilities. Because of this, IU never coalesced into a 
modern, professional party, but rather, remained inchoate and its leaders unwilling to put 
the collective interest over personal interest; as such, IU was unable to effect the top-
down party adaptation demanded of it in the late 1980s.
In the late 1970s, Peru's military regime was eager to extricate itself from power. 
Since the regime had embraced a leftist agenda and much of the partisan left, it had little 
reason to hold the left back, as Brazil's top military brass had done. Thus, when drafting 
party legislation, it made the process of legalization straightforward and easy to achieve. 
D.L 21994, the decree law of 15 November 1977 that modified the Civil Code of 1936, 
merely  required  that  a  political  organization  gather  40,000  signatures  in  order  to  be 
inscribed in the JNE. Such a demand was not particularly onerous; indeed, all of seven 
leftist parties199 quickly formalized and made it onto the 1978 ballot (Bernales 1980).
199 ARS, Christian Democrats, FOCEP, FNTC, PCP, PSR, and UDP.
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In fact, the opposite was the case: the outgoing military regime was relatively 
lenient upon the left, so much so that it imposed few, if any, bureaucratic hurdles in the 
path of extremist groups. Some leftist groups, such as Shining Path and Red Fatherland, 
were  so  radical  that  they  opted  for  self-exclusion  and  boycotted  the  1980  elections 
(Bernales 1980, pp 35-36, 53-54). Shining Path was a political organization which, in 
1980,  burned  the  ballot  boxes  in  the  Department  of  Ayacucho  and  began  a  bloody 
guerrilla war (cf. Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton 1990) and launched a Maoist-based armed 
insurrection aimed at  overthrowing the Peruvian state,  initiating a  dictatorship of  the 
proletariat, and guiding Peru—and the world—toward genuine communism (McClintock 
1984).200 Democratic  regimes  often  exercise  their  right  to  exclude  non-democratic 
political  elements from competing in national  elections;  surely it  should not  have let 
Shining Path be able to choose whether or not it wanted to participate in the country's 
democratic elections.
The military  government  and,  later,  the  subsequent  democratic  government  of 
Fernando  Belaúnde  (1980-1985),  imposed  few,  if  any,  unfair  rules  upon  the  left  to 
discourage their growth. In this permissive environment, radical discourse, ideology, and 
actions flourished: witness the rise of Shining Path. The democratic government was slow 
to respond to the Maoists, at first trying to reimpose order by sending in ill-prepared, 
untrained,  and resource-poor police to fight  a  violent  insurgency (Basombrío 2003,  p 
158).201
200 For a definitive analysis of Shining Path's historical origins and development, see Steve Stern (1998), 
Gustavo Gorriti  (2008), and the final report of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (CVR 
2003, II.1.1).
201 Belaúnde was rightly wary of relying upon the armed forces, who had just returned to their barracks. 
When the government finally did respond in a manner fitting to the seriousness and scope of the threat, 
two years later, it tried to overcompensate to make up for the lost time. It sanctioned the armed forces' 
use of draconian counterinsurgency tactics that ended up discrediting the state in the eyes of the peas-
ants, undermining their ability to end the armed insurgency in a timely manner by wresting their sup-
port away from the peasantry (Chernick 2007; CVR 2003, II.1.3; del Pino 1998).
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Also, having won almost thirty percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, 
the Marxist left saw little need to collaborate amongst themselves; they had done just fine 
divided. This belief was evident in the failure of the left to coordinate their efforts for the 
1980 presidential election. A year before, four leftist parties had succeeded in banding 
together  to  form  the  ARI;202 however,  the  brokered  pact  broke  down  amid  bitter 
internecine  quarrels  before  a  single  candidate  could  be  chosen  (Tanaka  1998).  To 
complicate  matters  more,  the  reformist  PCP  and  PSR  had  also  created  their  own 
competing pact, Left Unity (Unidad Izquierda, UI).203
Leftist leaders were incapable of getting past their own sectarianism because there 
was no pressing need to overcome their differences and work together. In interviews with 
party leaders, this author struggled to keep straight details of the infighting among the 
various  leftist  tendencies  that  comprised  IU.  Hugo  Blanco  was  convinced  that  ARI 
collapsed because the Maoists could not handle the thought of a Trotskyist like himself 
leading the Peruvian left. Javier Díez Canseco blamed the breakdown on the personal 
grudge between Alfonso Barrantes and Blanco. Many claimed that it was all Blanco's 
fault, as the Fourth International had convinced him to “go it alone” (he was, remember, 
the third largest vote-getter two years prior) instead of participate in a moderate electoral 
front with non-Marxists, such as the UDP (cf. Taylor 1990). Finally, nobody wanted to 
work with the PSR because it had collaborated with the “Nazi” Velasco.204
Because IU was not subject to unfair regulations like those imposed in Brazil, 
institutional development stagnated as the political costs for party building were just too 
high. Most parties—especially Latin American leftist parties—suffer from populism and 
202 ARI was composed of PCR, UDP, UNIR, and parts of FOCEP.
203 ARI and UI went on to form IU.
204 Anecdotes from this paragraph come from author interviews with ex-guerrilla and former presidential 
candidate Hugo Blanco (10 August 2011) and former PUM leader and current congressman Javier Díez 
Canseco (2 August 2011).
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personalism; however, in other countries, the presence of a common enemy in the form of 
legal harassment by the prevailing regime created the incentive for such parties to band 
together, build up their organization, and streamline their decision-making and -enforcing 
mechanisms. With one's very institutional survival on the line, theoretical disagreements 
on tactics and ideologies gradually became secondary to practical discussions on how to 
comply with a regime's ever-changing rules and regulations, often designed specifically 
to discriminate against the left.
Professionalization, Aborted
Without early challenges in the form of bureaucratic hurdles to confront, IU had 
no incentive to band together and professionalize; in fact, IU could barely work together 
at all. Whereas other Latin American leftist parties were building their party apparatus at 
similar points in their institutional history, the IU could not even unify, much less begin 
the institutionalization process. Throughout its fifteen years of existence, IU was plagued 
by problems of coordination such that it took years even to agree to a formal set of party 
principles:  IU remained a loosely bound coalition of  parties  that  were often in bitter 
disagreement  with  one  another.  Preexisting  component-parties  would  run  candidates 
together under the IU logo, but each would maintain its own partisan structure and leader. 
According to leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar, each of IU's component parties retained 
their own party infrastructure, from the national level down to the base level, regardless 
of the actual level of support it held. This meant that, given the hypothetical scenario in 
which a particular district had only one single FOCEP supporter, that supporter could 
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then become the party's local party president. Such bureaucratic rules had the effect of 
strengthening the clout of radical party ideologues.205
Spearheaded by relatively moderate206 leader Alfonso Barrantes, an effort to better 
unify  IU was  stifled  by  the  reticence  of  party  radicals  who  retained  unaccountable 
positions of leadership (UDP-IU 1983).207 Barrantes, along with his moderate allies (in 
particular, the PSR, independent politicians, and Henry Pease), advocated a number of 
reforms  aimed  primarily  at  strengthening  the  party  organization  and  introducing 
internally democratic measures, but that would also have had the effect of weakening the 
control of the component parties. He lobbied for a system of party identification cards 
(carnetización) to allow Peruvians not aligned with any of the component parties to be 
able to join the IU, a move that would recalibrate the base of support from individual 
parties to the IU itself. Overall, the IU counted on far more non-aligned support than it 
did on partisan support from its component parties. Likewise, while the IU itself had 
virtually  no presence at  the  base  level,  it  garnered more  support  than its  component 
parties ever could, since the latter were, by and large, elite-based parties.  The parties 
were, according to former IU senator, vice-mayor of Lima, and high ranking IU official 
Henry Pease, “many 'little captains' ('capitancitos') lacking soldiers to order around.”208
205 Author interview (25 July 2011).
206 Barrantes was seen as the de facto leader of IU's moderate factions; however, his moderation was rela-
tive. Indeed, his home office was described to this author as a “Pantheon to Totalitarianism,” with large 
photos not of François Mitterrand or Felipe González, but rather Fidel Castro and Joseph Stalin. Author 
interview with Peruvian intellectual Alberto Vergara (16 November 2012).
207 For example, FOCEP, IU's smallest party, with virtually no grassroots support, was wary of losing its 
cushy position of being treated as equal to the larger parties: despite being tiny, FOCEP held 1/8th of 
the power in the National Directive Committee (Comité Directivo Nacional, CDN), just as much as the 
far-larger PUM, that counted strong support from peasants and intellectuals. However, the PUM itself 
was generally opposed to the idea of a more unified party. While its leaders would have benefited from 
a more equitable distribution of power based on base-level support, they were averse to any changes in 
the  status  quo  which  could  alter  the  power  dynamics  that  had  been  successful  at  keeping  the 
“reformist” wing of Barrantes at bay. Author interview with IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch (1 August 
2011).
208  Author interview (13 July 2011).
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According to former IU Senator and CDN member Rolando Ames, Barrantes also 
pushed,  unsuccessfully,  to  overhaul  the  CDN's  undemocratic  selection  process, 
advocating  instead  internally  democratic  elections  based  on  a  one-militant-one-vote 
principle.209 Nevertheless, efforts to introduce a small semblance of internal democracy210 
into the IU encountered much opposition,211 which was little surprise since the party itself 
had never been an advocate for external democracy. In the end, IU's leaders only ever 
agreed to a lax coalition that permitted the continued existence of the front's component 
parts.
Majoritarian-based decision-making mechanisms would have enabled Barrantes 
to override the ideologues within the radical PUM212 and Red Fatherland: one-militant-
one-vote  elections would have produced a  CDN far  more amenable to  his  long-term 
goals, given the party's moderate base. Indeed, before giving up on the party in 1989, the 
moderates attempted a last-minute push, spearheaded by Senator Edmundo Murrugarra, 
to expel these two radical groups from the party. Unlike Lula's moderate wing of Brazil's 
PT,  which  on  three  separate  occasions  successfully  expelled  those  groups  that  were 
209 Author interview (14 July 2011). See also MAS-IU (1989).
210 Internal democracy is a flexible concept, similar in certain regards to the original, idealistic version of 
democratic centralism, in terms of its embrace of horizontal accountability and open elections to fill 
party leadership positions and select candidates for public office (cf. Lenin 1902), but with a far greater 
emphasis on substantive participation, deliberation, and the rights of the minority. If one were to sim-
plify the decision-making mechanisms of a democratic centralist party as majoritarian, then those of an 
internally democratic party would be considered consensus-based. More broadly, the concept of inter-
nal  democracy  encompasses:  deliberative  and  participatory  mechanisms;  non-hierarchical  deci-
sion-making; the consensual method; a critique of representative democracy and the delegation of pow-
ers to elected officials as undemocratic, and; the notion that citizen participation in choosing public rep-
resentatives contributes to good governance (Della Porta 2009).
211 In the end, the radical PUM also ended up supporting this measure. Indeed, internally democratic rules 
would have benefited the party, given its relative size vis-à-vis IU's other parties. The editorial staff of 
El Zorro de Abajo magazine, run by the PUM's moderate “zorros,” pushed, unsuccessfully, for more in-
ternal democracy within the party. They envisioned a reformed, democratically elected CDN to replace 
the existing one, which was virtually “unmovable,” and characterized by an “almost-permanent catato-
nia” (El Zorro de Abajo 1985; p 4). The radical Red Fatherland and the sometimes-radical PCP vehe-
mently opposed such internal reforms, however.
212 While at  the macro level,  the PUM was IU's  most  radical  party,  at  the micro level  it  nonetheless 
counted among its supporters quite moderate militants; this Trotskyist/Castrist party counted among its 
members peasants, university professors, and urban professionals. Like IU itself, the PUM was torn be-
tween moderate and radical tendencies, termed the “foxes” (“zorros”) and the “Libyans,” respectively 
(“Libios”). For a detailed analysis of the Zorros, see Osmar González (1999).
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preventing institutional and ideological change, the diffuse leadership structure and weak 
party infrastructure of IU prevented Barrantes's moderate wing from doing the same. A 
few of these internal reforms were passed, albeit in water-downed version, in IU's first 
National  Congress,  of  1989;  however,  the  sense  of  Barrantes  et  al.  was  that  these 
measures were “too little, too late.”213 
IU's  CDN  was  composed  of  the  seven  unelected  leaders  of  IU's  various 
component  parties  and  fronts,  plus  Barrantes  as  IU  president  (UDP-IU  1983).  IU's 
Statutes, Regulations and Electoral Norms (IU 1988a) stipulates that “The representation 
of the political organizations on the CDN will be as follows: one titular member per party 
and two per front[-party]” (art 26). These non-democratically elected party leaders were 
averse to building up IU's institutions because such a process would necessarily come at 
the expense of their own component parties, thus challenging their privileged roles as 
their parties' democratically unaccountable leaders. Unlike in Brazil (see Chapter 3), for 
instance, Peru's small leftist parties had not been destroyed by repression. IU developed 
on the foundation of strong, highly structured, sectarian parties, such as Red Fatherland 
and  the  PCP:  these  parties  were  “very  organized  and  averse  to  giving  up  power,” 
according to former member of IU's CDN, Santiago Pedráglio.214
This was a serious problem because fundamental differences between the leaders' 
positions, among other things, complicated the party's ability to get much done, much 
less remain united.215 Had IU been subject to bureaucratic hurdles, such as those that 
were  implemented  in  Brazil,  one  would  expect  the  party  to  have  responded  to  such 
constraints  by  uniting  further,  streamlining decision-making,  and presenting  a  unified 
213 Author interview with former IU Senator Rolando Ames (14 July 2011).
214 Author interview (13 July 2011).
215 For self-criticism of the CDN, see PUM (1988a).
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front in the face of external challenges. It also would have likely institutionalized ways to 
sideline party members that prevented much-needed change from occurring.
A long time in the making, IU's demise was predicated upon the inability of two 
contradictory  strategies  for  dealing with  Peru's  economic and political  crises  to  exist 
simultaneously, side by side. Barrantes—along with the more moderate PCR, former PSR 
(which  became  Socialist  Convergence, Convergencia  Socialista,  COSO),  and  some 
independents—was concerned primarily  by the fact  that  Peru's  precarious  democratic 
regime  was  at  risk  of  collapse  from  either  a  rightist  military  coup  or  the  Maoist 
insurrection in the countryside (PUM 1989; PUM 1988b). He concluded that a national 
accord with the governing APRA was needed to protect Peru's fragile democracy, and that 
general strikes should be discouraged lest they further destabilize the tottering democratic 
regime.
IU's  more  ideologically  driven  (and numerically  larger216)  wing,  composed of 
PUM,  UNIR,  and  FOCEP,  was  less  concerned  with  propping  up  the  existing 
representative-democratic regime, since, in their view, that was what was preventing their 
revolutionary political  goals from being achieved (Taylor 1990).  Indeed, IU's radicals 
saw the only possible solution to the crisis afflicting Peru throughout the 1980s was a 
“vanguard-led revolution” (CNM 1989, p 8).  More broadly, the leadership's moderate 
minority (who were in line with the overall party's majority) saw politics and the pursuit 
of power in more pluralistic, democratic terms, while its radical majority saw politics 
more as a struggle—oftentimes violent—to obtain power. Criticizing the radical wing, 
216 Radicals dominated the party's leadership and held the most elected official positions, while moderates 
dominated the party's bureaucracy and followers. In 1985, UNIR elected 16 deputies and two senators, 
PUM elected 13 deputies and 4 senators, and FOCEP one deputy and one senator; on the moderate 
side, PSR elected five deputies and two senators, PCR elected two deputies and zero senators, and IU-
affiliated independents elected five deputies and one senator. The PUM's analysis of these elections was 
that IU fared so poorly (in relative terms) because the party was “moving too far from the social move-
ments in struggle” and was becoming too “bureaucratic and prioritizing the legal scene [over extra-le-
gal ones]” (PUM 1985).
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Albavera (1989) of the moderate wing wrote: “It should be noted that those of us who are 
in favor of the democratic game acknowledge that one cannot govern a country with a 
quarter or a third of the votes. For this we seek consensus and political matches, without 
surrendering our principles.” 
Unable to sway those groups and individuals on the fence to his side, and unable 
to sideline or expel the radical sectors from IU, Barrantes and his moderate followers 
gave up. In resignation, they left the party in August of 1989 to form the Socialist Accord 
(Acuerdo  Socialista,  AS,  which  later  became the  Socialist  Left,  Izquierda  Socialista, 
IS).217 Barrantes had been defeated in his efforts to sideline IU's radical minority leaders, 
the main thing keeping the party from engaging in adaptation. Another, related reason 
why Barrantes chose to leave the party, according to former PUM leader Antonio Zapata, 
was because he did not believe that  the armed forces and conservative establishment 
would allow him to take power upon winning the presidential election were he to remain 
in such a radical party.218
In  1990,  the  Peruvian  left  ended  up  fielding  two  competing  presidential 
candidates,  Barrantes  and  Henry  Pease.  Combined,  the  two  former  friends  and 
ideologically similar colleagues219 received a meager 12 percent of the vote. Largely as a 
result, IU died a slow death, losing its registration five years later for failing to obtain the 
mandated five percent of the vote: it won a minuscule 0.58 percent of the presidential 
217 The PCP was generally seen as IU's center, siding with the reformists on certain occasions and with the 
revolutionaries on others. While PCP was generally seen as relatively moderate, it did not follow Bar-
rantes out of the party in 1989.
218 Author interview (1 August 2011). An interview with Barrantes prior to the 1985 presidential election 
demonstrates another pressing fear about the heterodox IU coalition. Were Barrantes to win, either the 
radical PUM faction or the “chino” faction (i.e., IU's Maoist groups) could split off, undermining his 
ability to govern and leading to political and economic instability, as had the departure of Jaime Paz 
Zamora done in 1982 to neighboring Bolivia (CIUP and Fundación Friedrich Ebert 1985, p 54).
219 While Pease and the Christian Democrats were initially considered moderate, they did radicalize to a 
certain degree towards the end of the decade.
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vote and 1.67 of the congressional vote in 1995 (Tanaka 2008, p 205). IS fared even 
worse.
IU remained an inchoate party without a modern, professional structure; it could 
never  develop  beyond  a  loose  coalition  of  parties  lacking  an  effective,  centralized 
leadership. Five years after its founding, the party self-critically characterized itself by a 
“lack of political leadership” and “organizational paralysis” (PUM 1988a). Its caciques 
governed not by majority rule, but by consensus. IU's founding documents state that, 
“The CDN adopts its accords on questions that the organization considers fundamental by 
consensus” (IU 1988a,  art  26;  cf.  UPD-IU 1983).  And,  since getting eight  dogmatic, 
sectarian, leftist caudillos to agree on anything is considerably difficult, little could be 
agreed upon. Former PCP Representative to IU Carlos Esteves Ostolaza described such 
meetings as “interminable sessions,” which were often held up by disagreements over the 
wording of  a  “single line of  text.”220 Consensus-based decision-making stifled much-
needed reforms and critical measures got derailed by ideological disagreements, tactical 
differences,  and even personal  vendettas.221 The only  accords  that  were  able  to  pass, 
according to former PUM leader Antonio Zapata, were “watered-down versions of the 
original  resolutions that  pleased nobody and resolved nothing.”222 The  result  was  the 
persistence  of  an  ineffective  and  undisciplined  leadership  structure  that  stifled  future 
adaptation efforts from ever coming to fruition.
Such a context does not bode well for would-be reformers interested in pushing 
through  ideological  moderation  and  institutional  modernization.  Barrantes  and  his 
220 Author interview (25 July 2011).
221 Also hampering compromise was the romanticized conviction among leaders, especially from the dog-
matic parties and fronts, that they were messiahs and thus could not compromise their position. This 
view also contributed to the continued support for armed struggle in the not-too-distant future: these 
leaders wanted to die fighting for the cause. Author interview with VR founder and former IU Senator 
Edmundo Murrugarra (18 July 2011).
222 Author interview (1 August 2011).
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reformist allies enjoyed the backing of a majority of IU's base support—as the electorate 
was  more  moderate  than  IU's  median  position  and  moderate  IU  politicians  were 
increasingly  demonstrating  their  competency  as  pragmatic  managers  in  local-level 
government; what he lacked, however, was the ability to use this majority support for his 
moderating  project  to  create  a  unified  IU  coalition  capable  of  winning  power  and 
governing.  According  to  IU  intellectual  Nicolás  Lynch,  “Barrantes  always  sought 
consensus; it was his greatest strength, but also his greatest weakness.”223
Later on, when exogenous changes had fundamentally altered Peruvian society 
and  a  majority  of  the  party's  supporters  sought  a  readjustment  to  IU's  ideology  and 
tactical approach to politics, the moderate wing was unable to effect top-down change. 
Kenneth  Roberts  (1996)  argues  that,  “the  insistent  support  of  IU  radicals  for  a 
revolutionary alternative prevented Barrantes from making the compromises and building 
the coalitions needed” to moderate the party and stand a chance at winning the presidency 
(p  87).  The  party  became  increasingly  polarized  between  moderate  democrats  and 
radicals  looking to overthrow the liberal  democratic  order  and install  a  revolutionary 
order  based  on  grass-roots  forms  of  popular  power  (Roberts  1998,  p  202),  yet  the 
pragmatic majority had no way of imposing order or forcing allegiance within the party. 
Adaptation was thwarted because undemocratically elected veto-players could derail the 
institutional and ideological change required by external changes. Instead of expelling the 
ultra-radical  dinosaurs,  it  was  the  moderate  faction  that  was  forced  to  leave:  party 
adaptation was thwarted.
223 Author interview (1 August 2011).
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LCR: NO EARLY CHALLENGES MEAN NO PARTY BUILDING
Similar to the case of IU, Venezuela's LCR faced no early challenges in the form 
of bureaucratic hurdles to party legalization and electoral participation. LCR emerged 
within the context of democracy; it thus did not suffer any birth pains, as the PT had. As 
such, there was no incentive for LCR to institutionalize,  in particular,  because it  was 
lucky enough to experience a “meteoric rise” without having to do much in the way of 
institutionalization; causaerristas thus had difficulty justifying to themselves the need to 
engage  in  the  costly  process  of  party  building.  Because  of  this,  when  the  external 
environment necessitated profound institutional and ideological changes in the late 1980s 
and  early  1990s,  the  still  weakly  organized  LCR  was  ill  prepared  to  adapt:  a 
democratic/moderate – undemocratic/radical division deepened and ended up renting the 
party in two. The next three subsections detail LCR's relatively tranquil early years, its 
meteoric  rise,  and  failed  efforts  at  professionalization  and,  thus,  party  adaptation, 
respectively. 
No Challenges
Venezuela's  LCR  did  not  experience  any  early  challenges  in  the  form  of 
bureaucratic  obstacles.  As  mentioned  in  Chapter  3,  the  country  was  democratically 
governed  for  almost  the  entire  second  half  of  the  20th century.  Furthermore,  the 
democratic regime did not impose any unfair legal restrictions upon leftist parties to deter 
their rise. As there was no external threat to the party's continued existence, there was no 
incentive to institutionalize. LCR thus remained a weakly institutionalized party with an 
inchoate  organizational  structure  and  ill-defined  decision-making  mechanisms—i.e.,  a 
party with low adaptability.
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LCR  was  simultaneously  fashioned  as  a  “movement  of  movements”  in 
“permanent  construction,”  but  with  a  small,  central  vanguard  leadership  guiding  the 
various movements from above. It was to be a new type of left-wing party, one whose 
political  stance,  strategy,  and composition  were  to  be  determined not  by  unchanging 
orthodox ideologies and inertial party bureaucracies, but rather continually defined and 
refined by popular movements (Salamanca 2004, p 239). It was designed to be fluid in 
form and content, horizontally structured, and guided by the internally democratic notion 
that decisions should be made unanimously; it  also rejected formalized rules,  did not 
regulate party membership, adopted a fluid organizational structure, and embraced diffuse 
leadership.224 
Given  the  belief  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  democracy  as  the  most  desirable 
organizing principle  of  political  groups,  and the  belief  that  political  decisions  should 
reflect  as  closely  as  possible  the  will  of  the  people  (interpreted  by  their  elected 
representatives),  consensus-based  democracy  should  trump  majoritarian  notions  of 
democracy. While many leftist  parties adopted internally democratic policies,  political 
realities—in particular, bureaucratic hurdles imposed to complicate the revival of the left
—got in the way of most leftist parties' efforts at implementing truly consensus-based 
democracy. As demonstrated earlier with the case of Brazil's PT, such idealism was often 
tempered  by  the  need  to  centralize  authority  and  streamline  decision-making 
mechanisms.
Largely given their unique lack of external threats, LCR went above and beyond 
what most leftist parties would ever consider when thinking about embracing internal 
224 During the same period in world time, Latin American trade unions underwent a similar phenomenon: 
New Unionism was challenging the formal, bureaucratic, corporatist, hierarchical organizational form 
and nature of the region's traditional trade unions. As unions were important sources of leftist support 
(and leaders), unionists and party members were well aware of, and learned, from the actions of one 
another.
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democracy. While  most  of  Latin  America's  leftist  parties  were limited to  interpreting 
internal democracy as the process of implementing internal elections for party leadership 
positions  and  primaries  to  decide  upon  official  candidates—overall  positive 
developments in terms of party renewal, legitimacy, and appeal—LCR was able to put 
into  practice  and retain indefinitely the ideal  by  spreading  out  leadership  positions 
horizontally amongst party members and making decisions based on consensus (instead 
of by majority). Such measures worked well when LCR was a small, tight-knit group of 
like-minded  social  activists  in  Venezuela's  Guayana  region;225 however,  it  proved 
inadequate  for  a  national  party  administering  municipal  and  state  governments  and 
presiding over fundamental economic and political transformations.
 
Meteoric Rise Made Easy
Despite doing little in terms of institutionalizing itself, LCR was able to grow 
electorally. Indeed, once the decentralizing reforms of the Presidential Commission for 
the Reform of the State (Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado, COPRE)226 
instituted direct elections for municipal and state positions of power, LCR candidates 
began  winning  public  office  (López  Maya  1994).227 Furthermore,  local  office  often 
served as a springboard for national office. In this way, LCR's “meteoric” electoral rise 
(Crisp and Levine 1998, p 39) to national prominence in the late 1980's and early 1990's 
225 LCR leader César Ramírez recalled nostalgically earlier party debates in which impromptu meetings of 
30 members would be hastily arranged, via a few phone calls, in order to debate a pressing issue at 
hand. If and when consensus could not be reached, militants would agree to mull over the issue and 
agree to meet again a month later to readdress the problem. Author interview (22 November 2011).
226 Created by President Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989), COPRE was a move to reform Venezuela's political 
system in order to breath life into an increasingly moribund regime (cf Ellner 1993).
227 Venezuela's closed-list voting system, which had enabled parties to control who got elected, was re-
placed with an open-list arrangement. This served to democratize party organization, allowing voters to 
know who they were voting for and thus exert more influence in the electoral process. Furthermore, 
elections for governors and mayors were changed to direct and secret vote under a system of simple 
plurality (cf. Kornblith and Levine 1995, pp 63-7).
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said less about the party, per se, than about the overall political situation in Venezuela at 
the time: a crisis of representation and the slow erosion of the country's party system.
The party was, in a sense, in the right place at the right time: the two traditional 
parties were stagnating, and, with the recent constitutional changes allowing for direct 
elections  of  governors  and mayors,  LCR was one of  few viable  options  available  to 
voters.228 The party's internal democracy and highly participatory nature were a breath of 
fresh  air  in  Venezuela's  otherwise  ossified  democracy;  LCR's  “otherness”  helped  it 
capitalize on the worsening crisis of representation, as seen in the slow collapse of the 
country's traditional AD and COPEI parties. Furthermore, the four orienting principles of 
Andrés  Velásquez's  1989  gubernatorial  campaign  were:  the  exercise  not  only  of 
democracy as elections, but democracy as governance; an end to political corruption; 
efficiency and transparency of government services (particularly,  in health,  education, 
and personal security), and; sustainable development of the Guayana region (López Maya 
1995). As governor, Velásquez went on to win the praise and support of much of the 
middle  class  and  businessmen  for  abolishing  a  semi-legal  kickback  scheme  and 
identifying “phantom” workers on the public payroll (Hellinger 1996, p 124). 
Thanks to  this  political  context,  LCR went  from a minor,  regional  party  to  a 
national political force: in 1989 it won three seats in Venezuela’s National Chamber of 
Deputies and the governorship of Bolívar State, thanks to the strong support of organized 
labor in numerous industries. Three years later, LCR won the mayoralty of Caracas, with 
support  stemming  both  from  the  urban  slums  and  from  the  upscale Country  Club 
neighborhood, and, in 1993 the party garnered over a fifth of both the presidential and the 
parliamentary votes, spread out across the country. Despite only having 700,000 bolivares 
228 Note that it is not a coincidence that in Bolívar, the state where LCR had its most electoral success, AD 
had suffered a large internal crisis: the country's growing steel and aluminum industries had created a 
new class of workers that was wary of AD domination. Additionally, the state also had very high rates 
of abstention (cf. López Maya 1995)
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of campaign funds to  AD's  80,000,000 (Sesto 1992b,  p  229),  Andrés  Velásquez won 
almost twenty two percent of the presidential vote, coming fourth in a four-way-split that 
many Venezuelans believed to be the result of systematic fraud.
There is a widespread belief among current and former members of LCR that the 
1993 presidential election was marred by systematic fraud: “...in December 1993, Andrés 
Velásquez won the elections but recognized the triumph of Rafael Caldera”  (Medina 
1999,  p  45).  Velásquez  himself  claims  that  he  “won  the  electoral  process  and  'they 
cheated me'” (“me hicieron trampa”) (quoted in Giusti 1997); Velásquez had opted not to 
contest the results for lack of “smoking gun” evidence. Such a conspiracy theory is not 
that far fetched, though: LCR was widely seen as the victim of electoral fraud in the 1989 
mayoral and gubernatorial elections. In response, party sympathizers had taken to the 
street  throughout  Bolívar  in  protest,  and  succeeding  in  enabling  the  winning  LCR 
candidates  (Clemente  Scotto  as  mayor  of  Caroní  and  Velásquz  as  governor)  to  take 
office.229
Regardless of the results of the presidential election, in 1993 LCR won strong 
legislative  representation—40 deputies  and nine  senators  were  elected,  making it  the 
country's third largest party. Furthermore, the positive management by its elected officials 
of municipal and state governments showcased the party as a force for decentralization, 
good governance,  and  the  development  of  a  participatory  culture—achievements  that 
bore a striking resemblance to those of the PT.230 LCR transformed from a tiny, radical 
group into a reputable organization with a proven record of honesty, transparency, and 
229 Author interviews with LCR founder and former leader José Albornoz (9 November 2011 and 8 March 
2012), LCR founder and leader Lucas Matheus (5 December 2011), and Andrés Velásquez (24 Novem-
ber 2011).
230 Andrés Velásquez governed Bolívar State from 1989-1995, Clemente Scotto was mayor of Caroní Mu-
nicipality (Ciudad Guayana) from 1989-1995 and 2004-2008, Pastora Medina was mayor of Caroní 
from 1995-2000, and Aristóbulo Istúriz was mayor of the Libertador Municipality of Caracas from 
1992-1995.
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good governance in its handling of regional and municipal governments (López Maya 
1999); however, unlike the PT, LCR did not grow institutionally alongside its electoral 
growth. 
LCR's  “meteoric”  electoral  rise  was  not  the  fruit  of  earlier  party  building; 
furthermore,  given  its  quick  electoral  success,  there  was  nothing  to  encourage  party 
building. In spite of its inchoate nature, LCR grew into a presidential contender because it 
had it so easy, both in terms of never experiencing early challenges—be they in the form 
of repression or bureaucratic hurdles—and also in terms of capitalizing on the collapse of 
the two traditional Venezuelan parties. Because LCR never professionalized, it was ill-
prepared  to  confront  headlong  the  problems that  arose  when it  tried  to  adapt  to  the 
changing environment around it; the party was unadaptable. The next subsection details 
how and why LCR failed to adapt and ended up splitting into two, in 1997.
 
No Professionalization, No Party Adaptation
LCR's origins directly influenced its refusal to professionalize; unlike other leftist 
parties with similar origins, LCR never experienced any growing pains encouraging it to 
bureaucratize and centralize power during its formative years. The lack of an external 
enemy meant that LCR was able to remain a party in “permanent formation,” even after it 
expanded geographically and electorally and became responsible for administering state- 
and  local-level  office,  including  the  mayoralty  of  Caracas.  LCR failed  to  engage  in 
successful party adaptation precisely because of the persistence of a variety of weakly 
institutionalized party characteristics and mechanisms that were never discarded because 
the party never institutionalized.
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First,  LCR did  not  have  any  founding  documents,  such  as  a  constitutive  act, 
binding rules, or statutes. LCR members were required to write up a formal statute for the 
Supreme Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral, CSE) in order to register as an 
official  party,  which they got  around to doing in 1978.  However,  this  document  was 
widely  considered  a  meaningless  formality  that  most  members  did  not  even  know 
existed. As such, there was little correspondence between these norms and the actual 
party; LCR operated based on the needs and wants of its members. Informal and flexible 
party rules were changed as needed. José Lira, LCR founder and de facto political head 
of the party, assured this author in two separate interviews that the statutes had little, if 
any, effect on the party's makeup and running, and were written solely to appease the 
CSE.231 In interview after interview, this author asked causaerristas about the content of 
the CSE Statute, only to be met with unknowing stares—its importance did not extend 
beyond compliance with official CSE dictates. Given this reality, most scholarly texts on 
LCR erroneously claim that no such statutes even exist (cf. López Maya, 2004, p 283).
Norms, procedures, and patterns of behavior are important for the institutional 
survival of parties, as they foster stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behavior and 
provide for agreed-upon ways to handle conflicts and issues as they arise (Huntington 
1968, p 12). The fact that LCR had no founding documents or organic rules hampered 
party adaptation because it meant that there was no established way to effect institutional 
change within the party. In its early years, LCR dealt with whatever internal issues that 
arose on an informal, ad-hoc basis. This worked well enough when the party was a small, 
homogenous group of individuals living in the same city;  however,  such an informal 
approach outlived its  usefulness  and remained in  place long after  the party  began to 
expand geographically. 
231 Author interviews (5 December 2011 and 27 February 2012).
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This ended up hampering party adaptation by not providing established channels 
through which the party could address problems. Decisions were made on the basis of 
consensus (explained below); however, if and when consensus could not be achieved, the 
status  quo remained in  effect,  no matter  how counterproductive that  may have been. 
There were no formal guidelines to establish the official protocol for such situations. And, 
since there were no authoritative ways to effect change, any proposed reform to the way 
the party functioned was sure to be denounced as illegitimate by those who benefited 
from  retaining  the  status-quo.  For  instance,  LCR's  1996  national  assembly—whose 
objective  it  was  to  analyze  the  party's  1995  electoral  setback,  plan  a  new  political 
direction, and choose a new secretary-general—ended with internecine fighting and few 
resolutions (López Maya 1998, p 86).
Lucas Matheus and other members of the “Bolívar group” had realized the need 
to separate the party from its component movements and tried both to formalize rules and 
register  affiliates,  only to  fall  flat  in  their  efforts:  given the  clout  and veto-power  of 
minority radical groups, the moderate majority had little chance of achieving consensus 
(Ellner 1996). Contrast this with Brazil's PT, which formalized its rules and regulations 
during its founding moments and which had established, straightforward ways to engage 
in institutional reform; the PT engaged in an extraordinary amount of institutional and 
ideological  adaptation over  roughly the same period (cf.  Hunter  2010;  Ribeiro 2008; 
Amaral 2003).
Second,  LCR  had  neither  formal  requirements  for  party  membership,  nor 
mechanisms with which to expel  party members.  In general,  such lax rules  on party 
membership all  but ensure the growth of a heterodox party,  potentially creating deep 
internal cleavages that could effect unruliness and hamper party efficacy. This turned out 
to be the case for LCR, which neither created a party registry nor attempted to identify 
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(and thus be able to target) its followers (López Maya 2004, p 299). LCR was never 
preoccupied with defining its  official  ideology (Salamanca 1998,  p  240;  Yépez Salas 
1993, pp 92-97) because it  did not want to be tied down by ideological purity in its 
struggle for the social rights of Guayana's workers. According to those who left LCR for 
the PPT, one of the principal reasons for the internal rupture was the fact that Andrés 
Velásquez had allegedly shifted his political stance to the right and was looking to do the 
same for the party's ideological orientation.
Furthermore,  while  party  leadership  had  initially  been  restricted  to  social 
movements leaders, this requirement gradually gave way; from the beginning, anybody 
could join the party regardless of their ideology. Ana Elisa Osorio, a high-leveled public 
functionary  who  worked  under  both  Caroní  Mayor  Clemente  Scotto  and  Bolívar 
Governor Andrés Velásquez, explained that she never joined the party because, frankly, 
“there was no real way of joining.”232 LCR administrations were known to hire far more 
non-party members than party members and so-called party meetings were not limited to 
party  members  (union  leaders  of  various  political  tendencies  regularly  attended).233 
Another example of this ideological flexibility was Jorge Olavarría, the center-right editor 
of Revista Resumen who was chosen as LCR's first ever presidential candidate (in 1983); 
his presence in the party, however brief, generated much internal strife. The seemingly 
sole point of agreement between the “oligarchic” Olavarría and LCR militants was their 
mutual disregard for corruption, political and otherwise (cf. Maneiro 1982). Olavarría's 
LCR  candidacy  was  curtailed  following  the  death  of  Maneiro,  who  was  Olavarría's 
principal defender within the party.
232 Author interview (24 February 2012).
233 Author interviews with Yajaira Briceño, a high-level, apolitical civil servant who worked in numerous 
LCR administrations (8 November, 2011) and Alirio Martínez, general director of the Caracas May-
oralty under Aristobulo Istúriz (1 November 2011).
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This lack of control over party membership ended up hampering party adaptation 
because it did not establish any formal way of expelling party members who disregarded 
party interests. According to LCR founder and current national leader José Lira, the party 
never felt the need to establish a disciplinary tribunal or other provisions for keeping 
internal  cohesion.234 What  this  meant  was  that  the  party,  which  was  becoming  more 
heterodox with time, found it increasingly difficult to find common ground amongst its 
members on important political issues, a tragic flaw for a political party responsible for 
administering more and more political offices. To be effective, parties need to be able to 
control who is allowed to join and, more importantly, to expel members who threaten the 
party's  institutional  coherence,  success,  or  survival.  For  example,  even  after  Pablo 
Medina  went  against  the  rulings  of  LCR's  Executive  Committee  (Comité  Ejecutivo 
Nacional, CEN), he was not expelled from the party and thus able to undermine it from 
within (see Medina 1999).235
Third,  LCR  established  no  specialized  roles,  professionalized  staff,  or 
organizational apparatus; there was never a party bureaucracy to speak of. There was no 
full-time staff, no party headquarters, and no regular financial contributions. A lack of a 
national  party  apparatus  meant  that  the  party  could  not  control  its  component 
organizations  and  movements,  all  of  which  predated  the  party  and  had  their  own 
organizational structures. The case of “PRAG” (which is not an acronym but rather a 
short,  catchy word),  LCR's student movement at  the UCV, demonstrates the tenuous, 
personal  ties that  connected the different  organizations to the party.  For instance,  the 
departure of Edgar Yajure, PRAG's founder and the mastermind behind LCR's idea of 
autonomous party segments, spelled the end of the student organization. A debilitated 
234 Author interviews (5 December 2011 and 21 February 2012).
235 Author interview with LCR founder and leader Adón Soto (23 November 2011). This incident is de-
tailed in Chapter 5.
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PRAG did remain a part of the party, only to disband for good following the death of 
Maneiro,  who,  according  to  Yajure,  was  the  only  real  connection  between  the 
organization and the party.236 Pro-Catia, LCR's urban poor segment, met a similar fate, 
according to LCR founder and former leader Ilenia Medina.237
This fluid, flat organizational structure and lack of organizational capacity ended 
up  hampering  party  adaptation  because  the  party  could  not  engage  in  multiple  tasks 
simultaneously.  Without  the  division  of  labor,  specialization  of  tasks,  or  presence  of 
professionalized staff members, one cannot possibly try to administer a national party. 
LCR founder and PRAG leader Edgar Yajure lamented that tasks were repeated at various 
organizational levels (especially for national campaigns), organizational inconsistencies 
resulted in internal contradictions, and affiliate movements made their own decisions and 
eventually  went  their  own  way  (e.g.,  PRAG,  Pro-Catia).238 Since  Maneiro  did  not 
delegate responsibilities to other party members (he was known as a micromanager), the 
party could not grow in two places at once: numerous LCR members acknowledged that 
the main reason why their efforts at organizing students, intellectuals, and popular sectors 
fell short was because the party focused so much of its time and limited resources on 
Guayana's workers.239 This phenomenon became self-fulfilling, since a professionalized 
staff  was  needed  to  delegate  tasks  if  and  when  the  party  were  to  grow  and 
professionalize. 
236 Author interview (26 October 2011).
237 Author interview (6 October 2011).
238 Author interview (26 October 2011).
239 Additionally, the fact that LCR was so inchoate meant that it did not have a national corps of party sup-
porters helping it observe elections and denounce the alleged electoral fraud of the 1993 presidential 
elections, as it had done in the 1989 municipal and gubernatorial elections in the party's home state of 
Bolívar. Because LCR had never felt the need to build up a party structure to organize activities at the 
national level, it proved incapable of mobilizing against and denouncing the alleged national-level elec-
toral fraud. 
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Fourth, LCR never felt compelled to establish vertical accountability; the party 
had no hierarchical structure. In order for a party to remain legitimate in the eyes of its 
members and followers, it needs to allow for leadership renewal over time; however, in 
order to remain dynamic and effective, a party also needs to have clearly demarcated 
lines  of  authority  in  the  first  place.  Party  leadership  is  needed  to  develop  and 
communicate  party  policy  to  the  general  public.  LCR founder  and  former  secretary-
general, Lucas Matheus, claimed that, within LCR, the position of secretary-general was 
a mere figurehead, created solely to fulfill the dictates of the CSE.240 In reality,  party 
members were all treated as equals, with leadership diffused amongst a core group of 40-
50 militants. LCR had a National Political Team (Equipo Político Nacional) of thirteen 
members (one of which being the general-secretary figurehead);  however,  the highest 
authority within the party was the National Meeting (Reunión Nacional), composed of 
103 elected delegates, plus the team of thirteen, in which the party's main decisions were 
made by consensus (LCR 2009, arts 7, 11).
This lack of formal, centralized leadership ended up hampering party adaptation 
because there was no set institutions for resolving internal conflicts. For instance, the 
protracted struggle between velasquistas and medinistas (i.e.,  supporters  of  Velásquez 
and Medina, respectively) in the mid-1990s ended up renting the party in two because the 
party  had  not  established  conflict  resolution  mechanisms. While  Velásquez  was 
campaigning for president, for example, Pablo Medina was actively advocating for extra-
constitutional means to power (explained in Chapter 5) and trying to cause an extra-
constitutional  confrontation between the  armed forces  and other  segments  of  society, 
claimed LCR leaders César Ramírez and José María “Chema” Fernández.241 Unlike the 
PT's Lula, Velásquez proved unable to overcome or outmaneuver his party's more radical, 
240 Author interview (5 December 2011).
241 Author interviews with Ramírez (22 November 2011) and Fernández (21 November 2011).
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undemocratic wing (cf. Salamanca 2004). Such a lack of structured leadership meant that 
nobody was running the party: because there were no established positions within the 
party there were various different personalities jockeying for power. 
Finally, LCR never felt compelled to establish and enforce majoritarian decision-
making mechanisms; instead, of simply putting issues to a vote, it made decisions based 
on consensus without establishing any formal method of dispute resolution. Ideally, such 
a policy enables everyone to have a say in internal decisions and ensures that a final 
policy decision has the broadest possible support  within the party; according to LCR 
national  leader  and four-time national  deputy Amérigo de Grazia  Veltri,  it  was  often 
repeated  within  the  LCR  community  that,  “in  a  debate,  we  are  all  equal.”242 
Causaerristas were  surprisingly  against  the  process  of  voting:  “the  vote  produces 
factionalism and is not necessarily the best way to reach the most just and true response” 
(López Maya 1995, p 174).  Many acknowledged the effectiveness and importance of 
voting; in discussing the difference between the old LCR and the post-1997 LCR, LCR 
founder and current leader Eleuterio “Tello” Benitez argued that the party's new, more 
majoritarian  way  of  engaging  in  decision-making  is  “more  efficacious  and  more 
democratic.”243 Nonetheless,  the  process  was  considered  undemocratic:  according  to 
LCR founder and former national leader Clemente Scotto, “elections are a trap...it's easier 
to buy someone's vote than to convince them through debate.”244
While rigorous debate among broadly like-minded individuals can lead to vastly 
superior final results, as the meeting of minds weeds out bad ideas and perfects good 
ones,  it  is  far  less  efficacious  than  majoritarian  rule  and  usually  discarded  by 
organizations as they grow and mature. LCR founder and former national leader Edgar 
242 Author interviews (31 January and 7 March 2012).
243 Author interview (20 October 2011).
244 Author interview (8 November 2011).
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Yajure  termed these consensus-seeking meetings  “seemingly interminable  debates.”245 
Interestingly enough, former LCR secretary-general Pablo Medina assured this author 
that the party never “wasted time” voting.246 However,  since LCR never suffered any 
external challenges, it was able to continue to rely upon a more discursive approach of 
intense and protracted debate until consensus was achieved.
LCR's party statute, promulgated at the behest of the CSE, actually does establish 
majoritarian decision-making mechanisms. Article 10 states that “the decisions of the RN 
will be made by approval of one-half-plus-one of the members present,” while article 12 
state that “the decisions of the EPN will be made by the vote of one-half-plus-one [i.e., 
seven] of  its  members” (LCR 2009).  However,  as  mentioned earlier,  José Lira,  LCR 
founder and de facto political head of the party, averred twice that the “statutes do not 
exist outside of the CSE.”247
This lack of majoritarian decision-making mechanisms ended up hampering party 
adaptation because LCR was unable to confront and defuse internal conflicts and, thus, 
survive institutionally.  For instance, LCR had no formal rules for internally selecting 
candidates and, since it did not believe in voting (internally, at least), it did not hold party 
primaries to select candidates for elected offices. Instead, the party relied upon internal 
debate to find consensus on suitable party candidates for offices desired by more than one 
party  member.  For  instance,  the  debate  over  whether  to  select  former  Caroní  mayor 
Clemente Scotto or Velásquez's protégé, Eliécer Calzadilla, as candidate for governor of 
Bolívar to replace Velásquez turned into a bitter, internecine war between medinistas and 
velasquistas.
245 Author interview (26 October 2011).
246 Author interview (7 October 2011). 
247 Author interview (5 December 2011 and 27 February 2012).
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Medina and many party intellectuals supported Scotto (at the time, Scotto was 
married to Pablo Medina's sister,  Pastora Medina), while Velásquez and most Bolívar 
workers supported Calzadilla. As consensus could not be reached and voting was out of 
the question, a subpar compromise was struck: both candidates would renounce their bid 
and a compromise candidate, Victor Moreno, would be put forth. This turned out to be a 
disaster,  as Moreno did not  have popular  support  and party members,  bitter  over the 
nomination fight, never fully rallied behind their party candidate. Predictably, Moreno 
ended up losing what should have been an easy LCR win, given Velásquez and the party's 
extraordinary popularity in the state; to this day, the party has yet to recover the state's 
governorship. More broadly, the consequences of this fight, which could have easily been 
determined  by  a  simple,  majoritarian  vote,  are  widely  credited  as  the  catalyst  that 
ultimately led to the party's inevitable division a few years later.248
Indeed, LCR relied upon consensus over majority rule, even if that meant political 
stalemate and interminable debates,  because it  had never felt  the need to adopt more 
efficacious  rules  to  handle  external  challenges  (Yépez  Salas  1993).  In  turn, LCR 
languished institutionally because it lacked a disciplined leadership able to make effective 
decisions in a  top-down manner:  according to LCR specialist  Margarita  López Maya 
(2005) “...the almost-exclusive use of the consensus mechanism, through which the party 
decided  not  only  what  policies  to  follow but  also  who to  nominate  for  internal  and 
popular elections, made it impossible to address the differences” that grew within LCR 
throughout the 1990s (p 189). And an internal policy change was out of the question, 
since that would require the unanimous approval of the LCR leadership. According to 
former LCR leader Gustavo Hernandez, “LCR could have been [like] the PT. It didn't, I 
248 Author interviews with LCR leaders Eliezer Calzadilla (24 November 2011), Clemente Scotto (8 No-
vember 2011), and Ilenia Medina (6 October 2011).
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say,  because LCR couldn't  simultaneously  be leftist  and pragmatic  at  the  same time. 
Why? Because you needed consensus for the party to function.”249
For LCR, internal democracy came at the cost of efficacy and functionality. The 
party's  anti-hierarchical,  fluid nature,  which had initially helped LCR attract  so much 
societal  support,  seemed  also  to  doom the  party  to  eventual  failure:  the  absence  of 
decision-making and -enforcing rules and of hierarchical leadership meant that LCR had 
no  established  mechanisms  or  protocols  with  which  to  resolve  political  impasse. 
Furthermore, the party's lack of structure or formalized rules and regulations meant that 
much-needed political reform—which could have addressed the situation by establishing 
guidelines and rules—was stymied; there was no established way of effecting internal 
party change. This ended up making it all but impossible to confront the increasingly 
serious  issues  challenging  the  party  as  it  grew  exponentially  and  as  the  external 
environment  changed  fundamentally;  as  such,  the  party  remained  weakly 
institutionalized, unable to engage in party professionalization.
CONCLUSION
In order to survive, parties need to be flexible enough to respond quickly and 
effectively  to  external  challenges  and  changes  in  their  environment.  As  institutional 
change is generally the province of disciplined and effective leadership, majoritarianism 
is  usually  considered  a  more  efficacious  way  of  making  decisions.  Parties  lacking 
249 Author interview (26 October 2011). On a trip to Mexico arranged by PRD founder Cuauhtémoc Cár-
denas, Medina met with Bishop Samuel Ruiz and asked him about the peace process between the 
EZLN and the Mexican government. Ruiz said it was difficult because Mayan culture is different from 
Western culture, especially when it comes to decision-making: “Imagine that, one has pre-accords to be 
signed and they first have to be debated within all the indigenous communities...Think about what that 
means: everyone debates everything...And so they debate and debate and debate and, just like that, sud-
denly they reach an agreement and make the decision...” Medina's response was “Wow! That's  La 
Causa Radical! That's just like us!” (Medina 1999, p 66).
158
centralized  leadership  and  effective  conflict  resolution  mechanisms  thus  have  more 
difficulty  engaging  in  party  adaptation.  That's  where  the  ill  intentions  of  outgoing 
authoritarian regimes prove so helpful: bureaucratic obstacles seeking to stifle emerging 
leftist  parties  ended up forcing them along party-building trajectories  that  centralized 
power and streamlined decision making.
Brazil's PT developed into a professional party with centralized control over party 
membership,  strategy,  and  policy;  majoritarian  decision-making  and  -enforcing 
mechanisms; and top-down leadership not because its  founders wanted to construct a 
hierarchical, bureaucratized party, per se. Rather, the PT developed in that way because 
the dictates of Brazil's  outgoing authoritarian regime encouraged the party to alter its 
course and pursue institutionalization along those lines. Since Peru's IU and Venezuela's 
LCR were never subject to such challenges, there was no pressing need to streamline the 
party organization and professionalize. The consequences of not institutionalizing were 
seen a decade later, when both parties struggled to adapt successfully to the changing 
political  and economic  environments  around them:  IU collapsed in  1990 while  LCR 
divided in 1997. Both parties were not adaptable enough to survive.
Neither  IU nor LCR were confronted by external  challenges early on in their 
history, when the nascent parties had still been in flux and change could have come about 
relatively easily. Since there was no incentive to engage in the costly process of party-
building, little took place. Later on, once institutions had settled, institutionalization had 
little chance of occurring since fragmentation already had been cemented, change ruled 
out,  and  power  brokers  refused  to  consent  to  changes  in  the  status-quo  that  would 
challenge their influence. The historical legacy of this phenomenon was the persistence of 
an ineffective and undisciplined leadership structure that made decisions on the basis of 
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consensus, not the more efficacious majoritarianism. The prospects of sweeping change 
in such a context are slim to nil.
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Chapter 5: Democratization: The Widening of Political Appeals
Given their externally mobilized nature, Latin America's leftist parties were, more 
often than not, born with an aversion to compromise and a reluctance to cooperate across 
partisan or ideological lines. Indeed, the definition of an externally mobilized party is that 
it did not emerge from within the walls of parliament (Shefter 1994, p 5). Ideological 
moderation,  however,  necessitates  a  certain  amount  of  politicking  and  collaboration, 
amongst  other  things.  For  this  reason,  many  leftist  parties  in  the  region  had  innate 
difficulties moderating; this translated into low levels of adaptability. 
Without any incentive to change, leftist parties would (and did) remain fixed in 
their  old  ways,  obstinate  about  ever  having  to  compromise  their  beliefs  for  political 
expediency. Because of this, a prerequisite for ideological moderation—and thus party 
adaptation—was an external challenge that would create the incentive to broaden and 
deepen one's political appeals, in effect forcing one to represent a more diverse swath of 
society. Parties faced with such a challenge were thus able to moderate ideologically, 
while those that were faced with no such challenge did not sway from the status quo and 
thus were unable to moderate.
Active  participation  in  the  process  of  democratization—i.e.,  fighting  against 
tottering regimes in favor of the return to democracy—was crucial to party adaptation. 
This effort induced these parties to rethink their unpopular utopian political prescriptions, 
expand their political demands, and cloak themselves with the banner of pluralism and 
progressivism,  effectively  gaining  the  moral  high  ground  (vis-à-vis  the  authoritarian 
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regime) in the process. This change became self-fulfilling, as parties then had to represent 
politically those members of the electorate whom it had won over formerly. In contexts in 
which the left  was obliged to help democratization move forward,  leftist  parties then 
found it easier to adapt down the line; in contexts in which the left was not compelled, for 
whatever reason, to fight for democracy, leftist parties had more difficulty engaging in 
adaptation when societal factors eventually rewarded parties with moderated policies.
In  this  way,  the  manner  in  which  the  power  handover  process  took  place 
conditioned  the  success  of  leftist  party  adaptation.  Foot-dragging  on  the  part  of  the 
regime induced leftist  parties  to  participate  in  broad,  pro-democratic  alliances.  Being 
obliged  by  a  regime's  intransigence  to  participate  actively  in  the  struggle  for 
democratization encouraged parties to put aside theoretical debates and collaborate with a 
broader range of society in order to succeed in forcing the military back into the barracks. 
Such collaboration had positive repercussions: the make-up of leftist parties altered in the 
process, bringing into the fold middle-class actors and activists from a wide variety of 
social groups. These new followers then needed to be welcomed into the party, including 
by ensuring that  their  political  views were represented within the party platform and 
bureaucracy. This process of opening up helped parties embrace their democratic role as 
political  entities  that  collaborate,  negotiate,  and compromise with  diverse  parties  and 
organizations. Conversely, a lack of incentive to adopt the democratic mantle precluded 
the steps necessary to prepare a leftist party for future ideological adaptation.
This chapter explains the causal mechanisms at play whereby regime obstinance, 
in the form of the military's reluctance to extricate itself from power, encouraged new 
leftist parties to widen their goals and appeals, leading to ideological moderation and thus 
enabling party adaptation. It first goes into detail on the theory, introduced in Chapter 2, 
that explains how and why regime obstinance encourages such parties to compromise and 
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engage  wholeheartedly  in  the  political  process.  Next,  it  shows  how  the  Brazilian 
authoritarian regime's initial refusal to leave power encouraged the PT to change its ways 
and  begin  to  engage  in  tactical,  and  then  policy,  moderation.  Then,  it  shows  how, 
conversely,  the absence of  such an incentive—Peru's  authoritarian regime readily left 
power and Venezuela was governed by a democratic regime—meant that IU and LCR, 
respectively, did not moderate, thus thwarting future attempts at party adaptation. The 
chapter  concludes  with  a  discussion  on  the  importance  of  experience  and  practice—
actually going through the democratic movements and defending democracy as the best 
regime type—in ensuring a party's long-term growth and survival.
DEMOCRATIZATION
Many authoritarian regimes in Latin America were hesitant to turn power over to 
civilian hands, despite an ever-increasing understanding in the 1980s that democratization 
was inevitable. In Chile, for example, Augusto Pinochet prolonged turnover until 1990, 
finally leaving only after an embarrassing referendum defeat in 1988; the PS was critical 
to the plebiscite's “No” campaign, on eight more years of Pinochet (Hite 2000; Rojas 
2008; Lanzaro 2004).250 Such foot-dragging encouraged some leftist parties to act and 
fight for a speedy transition to democracy. Where the left participated in democratization 
(i.e.,  Chile,  Brazil,  Uruguay),  that  participation channeled leftist  party discontent  into 
democratic norms, strategies, and goals; where the left remained on the sidelines (i.e., 
Venezuela, Argentina) or participated, but not necessarily for the sake of democracy (i.e., 
Peru),  it  saw little  need to engage in policy moderation.  This  complicated the future 
growth and development of such parties. 
250 Similarly, the FA was crucial in helping organize Montevideo’s 1984 general strike (Harnecker 1991; 
Yaffé 2005).
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In the former set of countries, the militaries' reluctance to leave power served as 
the catalyst for leftist parties to step in and push for an end to authoritarian rule. They did 
so by spearheading democratization efforts: mobilizing civil society, staging anti-regime 
marches,  and  petitioning  the  government.  With  such  increased  visibility  and 
responsibility, however, came these parties' need to listen to the political needs and wants 
of their newfound, pro-democratic support base (i.e., those citizens who collaborated with 
leftist  parties and ended up being won over).  This meant distancing themselves from 
earlier ideological and partisan dogmatism for the sake of the broader goal of regime 
change  and  thus  engaging  in  ideological  moderation;  furthermore,  having  assumed 
publicly the responsibility of promoter-of-democracy under military dictatorship, leftist 
parties were then hemmed into abiding by democratic norms and procedures down the 
line.  This  also  led  to  the  widening  of  appeals,  as  parties  felt  obliged  to  continue 
representing their newly diverse allies and transform them into an electoral base: thus 
arose the need to expand political  appeals beyond a narrow focus (as well  as radical 
ideologically-based prescriptions) and begin to follow public opinion instead of trying to 
lead it (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986). 
These  developments  signaled  a  fundamental  shift:  parties  began  listening  to 
supporters and the broader electorate, often at the expense of the left's sacred texts. The 
consequence, this author contends, was increased pragmatism, a greater respect for the 
will  of  the electorate,  and gradual  ideological  moderation.  It  helped stem internecine 
battles over possible political strategies and goals by rendering moot the more radical 
options and further facilitating moderation later on. After having become broad-based 
groups with diverse political interests and demands, leftist parties had to renegotiate their 
strict adherence to ideological norms and focus more on representing their supporters, a 
fundamental redefinition of the role of leftist political parties (cf. Schönwälder 2002, p 7; 
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Przeworski and Sprague 1986, p 3). In this way, these parties focused more on building 
political capital through winning and retaining supporters—by constructing alliances-of-
convenience with other parties and actors, for example—than on engineering a utopian 
society via seizure of the state apparatus (cf. Kitschelt 1989). This tactical moderation 
served  as  the  basis  for  policy  moderation  down  the  line:  such  parties  had  already 
conducted “test runs” of the broad-scale ideological moderation that external events made 
electorally preferable in the 1990s.
It is worth noting that this theory is an amendment of the existing literature on de-
radicalization which was developed to explain the moderation of radical parties during 
the third wave of  democratization in Southern Europe—namely,  Spain,  Portugal,  and 
Greece—but then stretched to explain the cases of Latin America as well (cf. Huntington 
1992). Pressure for moderation, Huntington claims, came from both the conditionality 
implicit (or explicit) with inclusion in the new democratic system, as well as the desire 
for immediate electoral success. However, neither of Huntington’s causal mechanisms 
function for Latin America.
First, leftist parties in Latin America were, by and large, not forced to moderate as 
a precondition for participation: this “participation-moderation trade-off” does not apply 
universally to the region. It was important for the case of Chile’s PS (cf. Roberts 1995a) 
and, to a far lesser extent, Uruguay’s FA.251 However, this was not the case for Brazil’s 
PT as it was not a party to the pacted transition—in fact, the PT vehemently opposed 
much of the terms of the debate. Most of Latin America’s transitions from authoritarian 
251 The FA’s moderation began in the early 1970s, long before the pacted transition began; also, the moder-
ate Blancos did not take part in the Pacto del Club Naval yet they were allowed to participate in the en-
suing democratic regime.
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rule  were  elitist  affairs  that  often  excluded  certain  sectors:  O’Donnell  and  Schmitter 
(1986) describe this regional phenomenon as “democracy by undemocratic means.”252
Second, leftist parties in Latin America were not forced to moderate immediately 
due to electoral constraints: stating that the quest for electoral success was a driver of de-
radicalization blankets over important empirical differences. For instance, the FA won 
close to 20 percent of the national vote in 1971, despite its strong support for and ties to 
the  Tupamaros  National  Liberation  Movement  (Movimiento  de  Liberación  Nacional-
Tupamaros),  Uruguay’s  urban guerrilla  movement  inspired by the  Cuban Revolution. 
Additionally,  the PT’s Lula won over  44 percent  of  the vote in  the second round of 
Brazil’s  1989 presidential  election;  at  the  time the  PT’s  platform still  advocated  for, 
amongst other things, radical land reform and the nationalization of the country’s banks 
(cf.  Hunter  2010).  Finally,  radicalized  leftist  parties did take  part  in  the  democratic 
process post democratization. Indeed, sections of Peru’s IU supported the Maoist terrorist 
group  Shining  Path  throughout  the  1980’s;  during  this  time  the  party  remained  torn 
between wanting to mobilize popular sectors within or against the established democratic 
regime. Yet, despite its support for anti-system groups, the party was granted political 
inclusion (cf. Roberts 1998).
Re-democratization did create the incentive for de-radicalization; however, it was 
neither the conditionality of inclusion nor the phenomenon of electoral competition that 
induced Latin America's leftist parties to moderate their ideological stance. Rather, it was 
the effect of being forced to collaborate with other groups in ensuring the military's return 
to the barracks that served as the necessary experience for leftist parties to be able to 
252 Furthermore, Nancy Bermeo (1997) challenges both parts to Huntington’s moderation argument by 
showing that the Peruvian left felt no need to moderate in order to be included within the new demo-
cratic system; in fact, it continued to mobilize and radicalize, even as it stood for the Constituent As-
sembly elections (pp 312-313).
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adapt, later on, to a changing political environment that rewarded policy moderation from 
political parties. 
In Peru and Venezuela there was no incentive for leftist parties to cooperate with 
non-leftist  parties  or  groups or  otherwise  expand their  electorate  to  embrace a  wider 
swath  of  society.  Given  this,  parties  were  never  compelled  to  moderate  their  policy 
prescriptions in order to represent their newly diverse support bases. In this way, such 
parties never experienced the need to compromise and, thus, had difficulty engaging in 
policy moderation down the line. 
It is the very process of serving as protagonists in democratization that sows the 
seeds for future policy moderation. Parties that fought against authoritarian rule in the 
historical struggle for democracy widened their political appeals more than those leftist 
parties  that  had  not  be  compelled  to  participate  in  democratization.  Serving  as  a 
protagonist  in democratization prepared parties for  participating democratically in the 
ensuing political regime: as parties help change politics they themselves are subject to 
change as well. The next section traces this process, whereby regime obstinance helped 
force  the  PT to  moderate  tactically,  preparing  it  for  future  policy  moderation  when 
external events rewarded moderate parties.
THE PT: PARTICIPATION IN BRAZIL'S BROAD, PRO-DEMOCRATIC CAMP
Brazil's authoritarian dictatorship lasted from 1964 to 1985. The Brazilian armed 
forces were only the second in South America to take power in the context of cold war 
polarization, a year after Ecuador's military coup of 1963 (cf. O'Donnell 1973), and were 
one  of  the  last  to  leave  power.  The  leisurely  pace  of  their  extrication  from politics 
prompted  a  call  to  action  among  leftist  (as  well  as  centrist)  parties  and  social 
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organizations. This obstinance compelled the PT to set aside its leftist sectarianism and 
collaborate across the aisle for the sake of the greater good: democratization, or a chance 
to be able to participate in the political process.
However,  the  process  of  participating  in  democratization  also  had  important 
repercussions for  the party:  it  broadened the PT's  support  base and demonstrated the 
benefits  of  political  compromise.  These  factors  encouraged  policy  moderation  in  the 
medium-run, as the party's newly expanded base had to be represented. In the long-run, 
its experience engaging in the art of compromise and collaboration facilitated efforts at 
the ideological moderation needed to keep the party in line with the changing times. The 
next three subsections detail the party's participation in the process of democratization, 
the path dependency of these actions, and the effects they had on the party platform, 
respectively.
Regime Obstinance Spurs Action
Brazil's  military  dictatorship  presided  over  a  period  of  political  stability  and 
economic growth. Especially prior to the 1973 oil crisis, Brazil experienced a golden age 
of economic development under military rule, characterized by rising incomes; a positive, 
long-term economic outlook; and rapid industrialization (Gaspari 2002b; Iglesias 1992). 
Largely given the positive perception of their handling of the economy, Brazil's military 
enjoyed a fair amount of legitimacy and a relatively robust degree of public support; 
O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) note that, historically, the most frequent event triggering 
a transition from authoritarian rule has been military defeat in an international context (pp 
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17-18). Therefore, the generals were in no rush to return to the barracks and were able to 
plan the timetable for extrication from politics themselves, free from pressure.253
The Brazilian military began its protracted extrication from politics in 1974 with 
President  Ernesto Geisel’s distensão, followed in 1979 by President  João Baptista  de 
Oliveira Figueiredo’s declaration of amnesty (Gaspari 2002a). However, the regime only 
called for presidential elections in 1985, and even those were indirect.254 Worried that the 
regime would prolong the turnover even more, the PT joined others in helping organize 
the  multi-class,  multi-organization,  and  multi-party  movement  to  convene  direct 
elections: “(eleições) diretas, já!” (Weffort 1983a). In doing so, the party did not act how 
a  cadre-based,  orthodox  leftist  party  should  have.  Rather,  it  embraced  the  non-
ideological, middle-class movement and collaborated broadly with non-Marxists for the 
“bourgeois” goal of representative democracy: “we do not want to penalize and jettison 
the 'masses' who do not have the privilege of accompanying the endless, metaphysical 
political discussions of our party nuclei” (Silva 1983).
Diretas Já! was a broad-based civil/political movement from 1983-1984 aimed at 
pressuring the regime to hold direct, democratic elections as soon as possible in order to 
hasten the end of the military regime (Cardoso 2006, pp 147-154). The primary objective 
was to do away with indirect elections: up to that point, Electoral College electors (i.e., 
senators, state and federal deputies, and city-level lawmakers) had been the final arbiters 
for executive positions. As part of the military's slow, piecemeal transition to democracy, 
253 Contrast  this  with  the  case  of  Argentina's  military  dictatorship.  Economic  mismanagement  all  but 
forced the armed forces to create a distraction, in the form of waging an un-winnable war against the 
United Kingdom over control of the territorially disputed Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas, in Spanish). 
Argentina's embarrassing military defeat exposed the ineptitude of the military government, hastening 
its demise: given its loss of legitimacy, the cost of continued political repression was too great to be 
sustainable. 
254 Given the armed services' piecemeal extrication from politics, the exact date of the end of the military 
dictatorship is debatable. While a few scholars claim that democracy was restored in 1979 (cf. Boix 
2003), the vast majority claim that the regime became democratic again in 1985 (with full democracy 
restored in 1989).
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direct  elections  were  gradually  being implemented for  an  increasing number  of  such 
positions; the 1982 election, for example, saw the return of direct elections for governors.
The direct  election movement  brought  over  five million people  to  the  streets. 
While Brazil's military dictatorship had initially enjoyed surprisingly broad support for its 
political  and  economic  project,  the  national,  regional,  and  international  contexts  had 
changed by the early 1980s. The so-called “third wave of democracy” (cf. Huntington 
1991) had spread from Southern Europe to Latin America,255 delegitimizing military rule 
throughout  the  region.  Additionally,  the  debt  crisis,  which  generated  acute  economic 
problems  and  annual  inflation  in  the  triple  digits256 and  put  an  end  to  the  Brazilian 
Miracle, helped debunk the myth surrounding the armed forces' ability to run the country 
(Sallum 2000).
Diretas Já! began not with the PT,257 but with civil society groups and, especially, 
the catch-all opposition party, PMDB, and the recently elected PMDB governor of São 
Paulo, Franco Montoro (1983-1987). The campaign began as a loosely-connected series 
of,  admittedly,  poorly  attended  demonstrations;  as  the  Congressional  decision  on  the 
constitutional  amendment approached (the Emenda Constitucional  Dante de Oliveira, 
PEC n°5 of 1983), however, attendance at the campaign's rallies and marches swelled. On 
25 January, 1984, the 300th anniversary of the city of São Paulo, over 300,000 people 
congregated on Sé Square (Praça da Sé), in São Paulo, to pressure for direct presidential 
elections. In early April of that year, the movement gathered approximately one million 
people  in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  On  16  April,  nine  days  before  the  congressional  vote  on 
255 Beginning with the Dominican Republic in 1978, this wave spread to Ecuador (1979), followed by 
Peru (1980), along with almost the entire region in the 1980s and into the 1990s.
256 The restructuring of the global economy in the 1970s caused by Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) windfalls created international liquidity and provided Latin America with an in-
flux of cheap credit with which to fund debt-led growth. With the rise in interest rates in the 1980s, 
such heavy borrowing proved to be disastrous and caused massive debt crises (Bruton 1998).
257 The PT did not initiate Diretas Já!, despite taking credit for it repeatedly (see, for example, Gushiken 
1984). The party was a late entrant to this MDB-initiated effort; however, it made up for it by helping 
fill the streets and stadiums with supporters.
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whether to make the indirect elections direct, the movement attracted over 1.5 million 
people on a march through São Paulo, making it the largest public demonstration ever to 
occur in Brazil (Coelho 2007, pp 292-296; Leonelli and de Oliveira 2004).258
Weary of continued military control, as well as aware that the public tide was 
turning in favor of direct elections, the PT embraced wholeheartedly the movement and 
adopted it as its own. Lula, already a national figure for his role in the São Paulo strikes, 
soon began heading protests alongside leaders of the PMDB and PDT. According to PT 
founder  and  former  CEN member  (1984-1990)  Wladimir  Pomar,  “The  campaign  for 
Diretas Já! was not only the first large mass mobilization that the PT put forth after its 
founding, but also the first grand alliance practiced by the party with different political 
currents—including bourgeois ones.”259 Indeed, during its formative years, the PT was 
deeply  involved in  Brazil’s  democratic  struggle,  from organizing  labor  strikes  in  the 
1970s,  to  pushing  for  amnesty  at  the  turn  of  the  decade,  to  campaigning  for  direct 
elections in 1983 and 1984 (Keck 1992, pp 40-60). The political context had persuaded 
the PT to moderate its tactics and embrace a broader spectrum of society, not only to 
distinguish itself from the prevailing regime, but also to be able to participate openly in 
the political arena.
Embracing their New, Broad Representative Role 
Organizing labor strikes, challenging non-democratic policies, and crossing the 
political aisle to collaborate with diverse groups had an indelible effect on the party's 
political strategy and appeals. Marching side by side with non-leftists challenged the PT's 
preconceived notions and political aversion to cross-party collaboration. According to PT 
258 Author interviews with PMDB founder Almino Affonso (30 November 2010) and former PT secretary-
general Luiz Dulci (4 October 2010).
259 Author interview (26 May 2011).
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founder and former mayor of Belém (1997-2004) Edmilson Rodrigues, “Engaging in all 
these alliances changed us. We came in as hard-liners and left changed.”260 Mobilizing 
the entire spectrum of the pro-democracy electorate forced them to address, target, and, 
eventually, represent a larger, more heterogeneous swath of the Brazilian electorate.
According  to  Ricardo  Berzoini,  former  PT president  (2005-2006,  2007-2010), 
Diretas Já! fundamentally reordered the party's priorities; this experience made the party 
start focusing more on “middle-class concerns,” such as establishing a minimum wage 
and advocating on behalf of the social rights of homosexuals, women, Afro-Brazilians, 
and people with disabilities.261 Participating in the struggle for democracy encouraged the 
PT to broaden and deepen its political appeals so that it could better represent its growing 
and  diversifying  support  base;  the  experience  served  as  a  “dry-run”  for  the  party  to 
witness how one represents constituents (Singer 2001, pp 52-53).
The PT's embrace of Diretas Já! helped solidify a  change taking place in the 
party's political tactics, a topic that had been hotly contested within the party by radicals 
and moderates since its founding. Building off its initial need to rebrand itself as the 
defender of democracy, the PT fully embraced its new role and sidelined those within its 
ranks that harbored ultra-narrow sentiments. In this way, a temporary decision that was 
initially taken by the party—namely, mobilizing to promote a quicker transition from 
authoritarian rule—took on a life of its own and profoundly affected the party's future 
developmental trajectory: the PT became increasingly inclusive, representative of more 
broad opinions, and more open to collaborating across the aisle.
PT founder Ricardo de Azevedo argued that the PT's collaboration with disparate 
groups during Diretas Já! is  what made possible the PT's 1988 mayoral  wins in São 
Paulo (with Luiza Erundina), Porto Alegre (with Olívio Dutra), and Vitória (with Vitor 
260 Author interview with (13 October 2010).
261 Author interview (8 November 2010).
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Buaiz).262 Indeed,  shortly  after Diretas  Já!,  during  the  PT's  V National  Meeting,  in 
Brasília, the party approved the use of alliances with leftist parties. Alone, the PT would 
have had a very difficult time winning municipal office outside of the party's core support 
base, in the greater region of São Paulo (namely, Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, 
São Caetano do Sul, and Diadema, often referred to as the “ABCD region”).
Diretas Já! failed in its effort to instate direct elections for the 1985 elections. 298 
deputies voted in favor of direct elections, with 65 against and three abstaining; however, 
since 112 deputies were absent,  the amendment was 22 votes short  of  the two-thirds 
majority  needed  to  change  the  constitution.  The  1985  elections  remained  indirect. 
Although the Diretas  Já! movement  faded  with  the  failure  to  pass  the  constitutional 
amendment,  the PT nonetheless  continued to demand that  direct  elections be held.263 
While upwards of 85 percent of the population was in favor of the amendment, the vast 
majority  of  civil  society  groups  and  political  parties  conceded  to  the  inevitable  and 
sought to plan accordingly for the upcoming indirect elections. The PMDB, in particular, 
successfully  sought  a  political  alliance  with  the  pro-democratic  dissidents  within 
ARENA's successor party, the PDS. In this way, Tancredo Neves of the PMDB stood for
—and  won—the  1985  indirect  presidential  elections,  with  José  Sarney  of  the  newly 
formed breakaway from the PDS, the Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal, 
PFL) as vice-president (Cardoso 2006, pp 152-154).264
262 Author interview (3 February 2011).
263 However, early in his term President Sarney instated direct elections for president; Brazil's first direct 
election was in 1989 (Sallum 2000, p 10).
264 Tancredo, as Neves was popularly referred to, never took office. He was hospitalized with appendicitis 
the night before his inauguration. Sarney was sworn in as vice-president and immediately became in-
terim president; once Tancredo died a little over a month later, Sarney assumed the presidency.
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The  PT,  however,  insisted  on  fighting  on.265 Partially  due  to  its  wariness  of 
becoming just  another  voice  in  the  already heavily-populated unified opposition,  and 
partially due to its real fear of continued military control (or, at least, tutorship), the PT 
refused  to  concede  and  accept  indirect  elections  with  the  PMDB's  Neves  as  the 
opposition's consensus candidate. After much deliberation, the PT opted to boycott the 
Electoral College:266 a pacted transition, its leadership argued, was no transition at all. In 
this way, the PT positioned itself as an extreme defender of democracy: the party would 
not budge from its principled defense of democracy, even if it meant not voting for the 
Democratic  Alliance's  (Aliança  Democrática)  consensus  candidate.  While  seemingly 
extremist, the PT's decision not to accept defeat was very much in line with the broader 
public  opinion  at  the  time;  it  was  the  compromising PMDB that  was  the  outlier. 
Furthermore, as the PT only held eight of 479 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, it was 
“allowed” to hold such a principled stance without fear of derailing the democratization 
process; the PMDB, which held 200 seats, was not so lucky. Such principled stances, 
explained  Brazilian  intellectual  Bolívar  Lamounier,  earned  the  PT the  name  of  “the 
contrarian party” (“partido do contra”).267
Another example of the PT's newfound democratic zeal was in its opposition to 
Brazil's Constitution of 1988: while contributing actively to the elaboration of the text, 
the PT's 16 constituent assemblypersons ultimately voted against the final charter.268 The 
constitution, they argued, did not go far enough to protect social and economic rights, or 
advance  democracy.  Lula  and  other petista assemblypersons  denounced  the  text  as 
265 What the PT saw as staying true to its principles other parties saw as sectarianism. The ideological 
moderation that this dissertation demonstrates was never perfectly linear; rather, it was a series of two-
steps-forward and one-step-back.
266 Three PT federal deputies (Aírton Soares, José Eudes, and Bete Mendes) rebelled and voted for Tan-
credo. Upon threat of expulsion, the three resigned (Keck 1992, pp 219-223).
267 Author interview (11 August 2010).
268 The PT “signed” (assinou) the Constitution, as it was a formal, legal requirement to do so. What the PT 
did not do was participate in the collective approval (homologação coletiva) of the Constitution.
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“reformist” and, in particular, “against agrarian reform.” In a formal announcement to the 
constituent body, Lula stated that “the party votes against the text,  and tomorrow, by 
decision—majoritarian  decision—of  our  directorate,  we  will  sign  the  Constitution, 
because  it  understand  that  it  is  a  formal  requirement  of  our  participation  in  this 
Constituent Assembly” (da Silva 1988). Twenty years later, Lula (2008), claimed that the 
PT
voted against the final text of the Constitution because we did not agree with the 
future regulation (regulamentação posterior) of a series of social rights that were 
being guaranteed. We believed that it would be quite difficult to implement those 
regulations that had stuck.
In short, the Constitution was reformist and did not go far enough in terms of 
protecting social and economic rights, particularly for the working class, such as a 40-
hour  work  week  (da  Silva  1998).  Secondly,  the  Constitution  did  not  do  enough  to 
institutionalize democracy. The military remained “untouchable, as if they were first class 
citizens, so that, in the name of law and order they can repeat what they did in 1964;” 
indeed,  despite  the fact  that  democracy was won by Brazilian society fighting in the 
streets, “the essence of power, of private property, and the power of the military remains 
intact”  (da Silva 1988).  The PT had internalized the wider  demands of  the Brazilian 
electorate and worked to channel them within the country's political institutions.
By being cornered into adopting democracy in opposition to the prevailing regime 
(and thus reformism, broadly defined),  leftist  radicals  who had originally  entered the 
party for purely tactical reasons, such as the Trotskyists (cf. Coelho 2007, pp 267-269), 
ended up being “absorbed and transformed in the PT. The party was transforming persons 
and organizations” (Paraná 2006, p 111). In this way, the PT's hands became tied. Its 
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earlier decision to take on the mantle of democracy created for it a new identity among 
the electorate based on its unwavering support for democracy; this replaced the party's 
earlier, far more narrow party platform. The party's initial tactical moderation created a 
virtuous  cycle  that  linked the  PT to  a  broader  and broader  segment  of  the  Brazilian 
electorate. This process had important consequences on the party's ideological outlook, as 
well; the next section details the PT's process of policy moderation.
From the Politics of Principle to the Politics of Responsibility
The PT's tactical moderation paved the way for later policy moderation, when the 
political context rewarded parties with more moderate political stances. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the PT's adoption of the democratic banner was not taken lightly by many of 
the party's more revolutionary, anti-democratic members. However, given the external 
incentives  and  constraints  to  moderate  tactically,  such  ideologues  were  at  a  definite 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their pragmatist counterparts. The defeat of these party members 
within internal party struggles made sure that the PT would be able to pursue top-down 
policy  moderation  in  the  near  future,  since  the  more  rebellious  members  were 
systematically purged form the party and the real  threat  of  expulsion silenced and/or 
moderated those radicals remaining in the party (as well as moderates who did not follow 
the party line).269 Four instances of party expulsions demonstrate this process.
First, in 1985, three of the PT's eight elected congresspeople, Airton Soares, Bete 
Mendes, and José Eudes, did not follow the party's stance of boycotting the Electoral 
College  and ended up  voting  for  Neves.  The  rationale  behind  their  actions  was  that 
anyone  was  better  than  the  regime's  candidate,  Paulo  Maluf.  Nonetheless,  the  party 
269 The PCB and PC do B, which were only able to legalize in 1985, “missed” in a sense the political 
learning and positive repercussions that came to the PT with participating in Diretas Já! Largely be-
cause of this, they remained more insular and narrowly focused than the PT, complicating future efforts 
at policy moderation.
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leadership  harshly  criticized  the  three  congresspeople  for  “disrespecting  the  internal 
democracy of the PT by disobeying the majority decision, taken by its national bodies, to 
not  appear  before  the  Electoral  College,”  and  reminded  them  tersely  that  “all  PT 
affiliates,  even  congressmen,  should  respect  and  abide  by  the  majoritarian  decisions 
democratically adopted by the party” (Commissão Executiva do PT 1985). After much 
internal strife, many denunciations, and the real threat of immediate expulsion, all three 
congresspeople resigned shortly after the incident (Keck 1992, pp 219-223). The party 
hierarchy demonstrated that it would not tolerate dissent within its ranks, no matter the 
issue. 
Second, the PT's decision to compromise gradually its tactical position of refusing 
to enter into across-the-aisle alliances drew much ire from the party's leftist ranks. The 
PT's  rejection  of  party  alliances  had  been  challenged  from  the  party's  inception  by 
electoral concerns (cf. Jornal da Tarde 1983); however, it took the experience of Diretas 
Já! for the party truly to embrace the tactic (and, even so, only with other leftist parties). 
In  particular,  the  Trotskyist  faction,  CO,  vehemently  opposed the  change and vowed 
openly to block its implementation. The PT leadership used the opportunity to set an 
example and expel the members in question, as the faction had always been a radical 
thorn in the party's side (the expelled petistas went on to form the PCO270). The PT's 
ability to engage in party alliances (coligações) is one of many reasons that help explain 
its electoral growth in the 1990s beyond the party's original strongholds. Indeed, it  is 
often argued that the PT's Lula was only able to win the presidency in 2002, after having 
lost three times before, by selecting a conservative running mate: his vice-president for 
both presidential terms was José Alencar, a conservative businessman of the center-right 
Liberal  Party  (Partido  Liberal,  PL).  The  PT  of  the  early  1980s  would  never  have 
270 Author interview with PCO president and two-time presidential candidate Rui Costa Pimenta (26 Au-
gust 2010).
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considered allying politically with a conservative politician, evidence of how much the 
party had changed in the ensuing two decades.271
Third,  in  response  to  the  PT's  institutional  pursuit  of  the  impeachment  of 
President  Fernando  Collor  de  Mello  and  the  party's  decision  not  to  challenge  the 
prevailing  regime  (by  agreeing  to  let  Collor's  vice-president,  Itamar  Franco,  assume 
power),  the CS faction rebelled against the official party platform and sought a more 
confrontational approach. CS sought to topple Collor through both institutional and extra-
institutional means, while the PT sided with Brazil's centrist parties in not rocking the 
boat. CS preferred immediate elections—public opinion polls suggested that Lula could 
win—while the PT as a whole opted to let Franco serve out Collor's term. When CS 
began  insisting  on  immediate  elections,  the  PT leadership  expelled  members  of  the 
faction (the group went on to form the PSTU272).
Finally,  and most  contentiously,  the PT was wracked by internal  turmoil  over 
President Lula's decision to implement a series of “neoliberal” reforms, particularly the 
Social Security Reform (Reforma da Previdência) of 2003. The most vocal faction in 
opposition to these reforms was APS, which was subsequently expelled in 2005 for its 
rebelliousness (the group went on to form the PSOL). Leaders of all these groups claim 
271 The PT's ability to engage in across-the-aisle alliances had its drawbacks, however: in order to placate 
the various parties within Lula's governing coalition, the PT ended up buying allied legislators' votes 
(cf. Hunter 2010; Mendes 2006). This practice was exposed and tried by the Supreme Court; amongst 
others, former PT presidents José Dirceu and José Genoino were found guilty of corruption (Estado de 
S.Paulo 2012).
272 Author interviews with PSTU leaders Valério Arcary (20 August 2010) and Mariucha Fontana (10 May 
2011). However, the party was only so willing to defend the prevailing regime. Despite helping im-
peach President Collor, the party decided not to support or help President Franco. Former São Paulo 
mayor Luiza Erundina, however, accepted a ministerial position from Franco, her rationale being that 
the PT owed it to Brazil to help ensure stability during such an unprecedented challenge to the coun-
try's nascent democracy. At the VIII National Meeting (1993), Erundina was suspended for one year 
and then subtly forced out in 1997. Author interview (4 February 2011).
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that the real reason they were expelled from the PT was because they were “holding 
back” the party from moderating.273
PT pragmatists were thus able to retain control of the party platform and political 
trajectory. In this way, the party became free to moderate its policy: the absence of radical 
members plus the threat of expulsion for those who do not follow the party line muted the 
opposition that destroyed IU and LCR, as will  be seen in the next two sections. The 
extent to which the PT engaged in policy moderation is staggering. A party that once 
supported bank take-overs, radical agrarian reform, and some ill-defined socialism has 
become the party of market reforms, implementing World Bank-endorsed targeted social 
programs (instead of  the  left's  preferred universalist  ones)  and honoring IMF macro-
economic agreements (da Silva 2002). In contrast with the failed cases of IU and LCR, 
the PT was only able to do this because of the widening of its appeals, which sidelined 
radicals, tied its hands, and opened the party up to profound policy changes down the 
line.
IU: REVOLUTIONARY AGITATORS AND TERRORISM APOLOGISTS
Peru's military dictatorship (1968-1980) did not follow the same script as that of 
the Brazilian one. Unlike their Brazilian counterparts, the Peruvian armed forces were 
eager to extricate themselves from politics for a variety of reasons.274 This absence of 
foot-dragging  meant  that  leftist  parties  had  no  need  to  reposition  themselves  as  the 
country's defenders of democracy;275 since IU had no incentive to fight for democracy, its 
273 Author interviews with 2006 PSOL presidential candidate Heloísa Helena (12 January 2011) and PSOL 
founders Babá (11 April 2011) and Luciana Genro (24 April 2011).
274 They openly laid out the timetable for the transition: the holding of constituent assembly elections in 
1978, such that the Assembly could write a new constitution, followed by parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections in 1980.
275 The left did seek  to  hasten  the  military's  extrication  from politics;  however,  as  will  be  explained 
shortly, it was not seeking a democratic alternative.
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subsequent developmental trajectory was markedly different than that of the PT. Peru's 
soft authoritarian regime did not try to prolong its extrication from power, but instead 
agreed to leave after convening a constituent assembly (Lynch 1999). This meant that 
IU's  immediate  leftist  predecessors  did  not  have  to  adopt  the  role  of  defenders  of 
democracy—with democratization assured, there was no need for them to act276—and 
thus felt no societal pressure to expand political appeals or moderate policy down the 
line. As such, sectarianism and orthodoxy remained strong within Peru's numerous small 
leftist parties, the immediate predecessors to IU. 
Moreover, instead of defending democracy, IU did the opposite and dithered in 
denouncing categorically the violent leftist terrorist group, Shining Path.277 Given this 
history, IU was unable to engage convincingly in policy moderation at the end of the 
1980s: it had never tactically moderated, but rather, spent much of the decade parsing the 
exact circumstances in which political violence is and is not legitimate. Largely because 
of this failure to adapt, the party split in two and became electorally irrelevant. The next 
three  subsections  detail  the  party's  bid  for  a  transition  to  a  non-democratic  political 
regime, its ambiguous stand and tentative support for Shining Path, and the effects of its 
support on party adaptation, respectively.
The Gran Paro's Non-Democratic Ends
Especially after 1975, Peru's armed forces did not want to remain in power. Given 
the  regime's  unstructured  corporatism and  encouragement  of  mobilization,  traditional 
patron-client  vertical  relations  had  broken  down.  As  a  result,  confrontational  and 
276 Nor was there a need to embrace political rights to safeguard their welfare, given the lack of repression 
against the left.
277 In addition to being “unable to mark the line on Shining Path and its use of violence,” throughout the 
1980s IU “never believed in the free market” and “took a while to buy into the idea of liberal democ-
racy.” Author interview with Peruvian leftist specialist Cynthia Sanborn (12 July 2011).
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combative tactics regained appeal as the military saw its hold over the mobilization and 
organization process collapse, leading to the praetorianization of society (Mauceri 1996, 
p 24).278 Social unrest came to a head with the economic crisis triggered by the steep 
increases in oil prices in 1973. Economic decline ensued, given the parallel decline in the 
price of Peruvian commodities, spiraling inflation, and the resulting balance of payments 
crisis. As a result, General Morales Bermúdez inherited a restive society and a damaged 
economy  from  General  Velasco,  whose  own  deteriorating  health  was  hampering  his 
government's ability to handle these pressing challenges and run the country. The gran 
paro, or general strike, was the straw that broke the camel's back, convincing the regime 
of its need to convene democratic elections as soon as possible: a little more than a week 
after  the general  strike,  the regime announced the convening of  constituent  assembly 
elections for the following year (Lynch 1992, pp 125-147).
Peru's left did play a role in the military's calculus to extricate itself from power. 
The left spearheaded the gran paro in 1977 (McClintock 1999); however, unlike the PT 
vis-à-vis Diretas Já!, it was not advocating democracy. According to Peruvian intellectual 
Julio Cotler, the Peruvian left had “never been a fan of democracy.” Indeed, during the 
democratic  transition,  the  left  was  “decidedly  not  in  favor  of  democracy,  but  rather 
revolution;  it  got  to  democracy  by  default.”279 It  was  advocating  a  “transition  from 
military rule,” not a “transition to democratic rule:” it was looking to implement a radical 
form of socialism. Aldo Panfichi, press secretary for Barrantes' 1983 Mayoral Campaign 
Committee, claimed that the unifying call among the left at the time was not democracy, 
278 Samuel Huntington (1968) argues that modernization must take place within the context of positive in-
stitutional outlets. Otherwise, uncontrolled modernization may cause revolution and upheaval: praetori-
anism.
279 Author interview (25 July 2011).
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but rather “more than democracy” (“más que democracia”), meaning a “more direct and 
radical but less liberal” democracy.280 
Blinded by their dogmatic beliefs, the left had interpreted the initially enormous 
level of popular support for the paralyzing strike as evidence that the country was ripe for 
popular insurrection and that the electorate was seeking a socialist revolution. According 
to former IU Senator Rolando Ames, there was, without a doubt,  a large, combative, 
disaffected, popular movement in Peru at the time, “paralyzing strikes,” “social unrest,” 
the “tell-tale signs of a revolution in the making;” however, the belief that this was a 
“revolutionary  mass  was  the  figment  of  the  left's  imagination,”  according  to  former 
Revolutionary Vanguard militant Carmen Balbi.281 Leftists were convinced that the old 
regime  was  on  its  way  out  and  that  they  were  the  people's  revolutionary  vanguard, 
uniquely positioned to lead the people to socialism (Nieto 1983). Even after the military 
had agreed to hand over power to civilian hands, the left rejected the transition plan and 
denounced the democratic elections: it was hedging its bets on a genuine revolution from 
below (Sanborn 1991, pp 115-116).282 
Peru's Marxist left participated in the elections, but only because they wanted the 
free media time and subsequent protected institutional space to denounce the military, 
divulge their anti-system beliefs, and provide national political expression to the popular 
movements  (Sanborn  1991,  pp  145-146).  For  instance,  former  guerrilla  leader  Hugo 
Blanco,  who  ended  up  receiving  the  most  votes  of  any  leftist  candidate,  used  his 
television  spots  to  denounce  democracy  and  advocate  armed  struggle  (Tuesta  1980). 
Even after getting elected, many leftist parliamentarians used their position as a soapbox 
280 Author interview (15 July 2011).
281 Author interviews with Ames (14 July 2011) and Balbi (13 July 2011).
282 There are two important (albeit minor) exceptions: two of IU's component-parties, PCP and the pro-Ve-
lasco PSR supported the elections from the beginning.
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from which to criticize the government, according to former IU leader Antonio Zapata.283 
Some even boycotted the constitutional drafting, instead choosing to continue engaging 
in popular mobilizational efforts in the streets. For instance, the former guerrilla Ricardo 
Napurí unabashedly used his position of constituent assemblyperson as a platform from 
which to overthrow the prevailing order and install a socialist regime, claimed Peruvian 
intellectual Julio Cotler.284
Subsequently,  because  Peru's  vanguard  leftists  were  not  compelled  to  defend 
democracy (they were advocating for socialism), they felt no need to reach out to diverse 
social groups or other political parties. IU did not find the need to widen its political 
appeals  later  on;  instead,  it  insulated itself  from all  but  the most  radical  elements  in 
society as it continued to radicalize. 
IU did end up administering a majority of Lima's many individual districts in the 
middle of the 1980s. However, the party remained incapable of engaging in a dialogue 
with its constituents and understanding what exactly society wanted from their elected 
officials. The lack of policy moderation led to much dissatisfaction with the party. Former 
IU militant Carmen Balbi put it succinctly: “people wanted their garbage collected, not 
the Cold War to be fought.”285 Henry Pease, vice-mayor of Lima from 1983-1986 under 
Barrantes,  claimed that  the process  of  administering the capital  may have moderated 
those directly involved; however, “it just did not have much influence on the ideology of 
the party as a whole.”286
Furthermore, the processes initiated by and mechanisms adopted as a result of 
earlier decisions became self-reinforcing, as IU found it increasingly difficult to support 
democracy after having repeated so often its mantra of socialist revolution. Indeed, when 
283 Author interview (1 August 2011).
284 Author interview (25 July 2011).
285 Author interview (13 July 2011).
286 Author interview (13 July 2011).
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armed insurrectionary  groups  arose  to  challenge  the  very  existence  of  Peru's  liberal-
democratic  state  in  the  name of  traditionally  leftist  goals,  many sectors  of  IU never 
denounced the subsequent political violence and the party as a whole took too long to 
distance itself from the groups' violent means and totalitarian ends. Instead of entering 
into a grand alliance with non-leftists groups and parties to ostracize the imminent threat 
to Peru's democratic regime, IU opted to side with its ideological brethren, no matter how 
extreme,  and  thus  close  preclude  the  chance  of  new  sectors  of  the  electorate  from 
entering the party. 
Support of Shining Path
On election day of 1980—the very election that signaled the end of Peru's 12-year 
dictatorship—the leftist Shining Path launched a Maoist-based armed insurrection aimed 
at  overthrowing  the  Peruvian  state  and  initiating  a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat 
(McClintock 1984). Shining Path traced its roots back José Carlos Mariátegui, who had 
argued back in the 1920s for the creation of a Leninist vanguard party in Peru to organize 
its Indians as the revolutionary class, as Peru lacked an industrial proletariat class at the 
time.  Helped by the political  vacuum in the countryside created by the revolutionary 
military  government’s  destruction  of  the  old  order  in  the  1970s,  Abimael  Guzmán 
revisited Mariátegui’s works with a Maoist emphasis on rural rebellion as the motor for 
revolutionary change, founded Shining Path, and initiated its popular war. The group was 
so successful because it fed off of peasant redress and addressed the profound exclusion 
of Peru’s mostly-indigenous, poor, underbelly: it promised to end poverty, inequality, and 
marginalization (del Pino 1998, p 170; Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton 1990, 1992).
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Senderistas, as the guerrillas were known, were not anomalous to the Peruvian 
context. The group's origins lay squarely within the confines of Peru's Marxist left, whose 
parties considered them their “poor, provincial cousins” (Hinojosa 1988; Rénique 2003). 
Indeed,  Shining  Path  counted  among  its  followers  many  former  members  of  IU's 
component parties, in particular Red Fatherland, Communist Party of Peru – Red Flag 
(Partido  Comunista  del  Perú  -  Bandera  Roja,  PCP-BR), VR,  and  PCP. Julio  César 
Mezzich of VR went on to become a high-ranking Shining Path figure, in charge of the 
short-lived project to turn the insurgent group into the militant wing of IU, according to 
IU party intellectual Fernando Tuesta.287 Another paradigmatic case was Lino Quintanilla, 
a former VR militant who joined Shining Path in 1980.
Also in the progressive camp was the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
(Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA). IU's connections to the MRTA were 
even deeper and more direct. The MRTA was created by a radical faction of former IU 
militants and enjoyed, at the least, tacit support from IU. This complicated IU's ability to 
distance itself from them: MRTA “wasn't a distant and despised relative, but our dear first 
cousins” (Zapata  2009).  Former IU senator  and CDN member Javier  Díez Canseco's 
comments  in  an interview with the author  demonstrates  the camaraderie  between the 
MRTA (which  was  listed  by  both  the  US  and  Peruvian  government  as  a  terrorist 
organization) and IU (here, the PUM):
We couldn't associate with them after they went clandestine, but before we were 
very close with them. They were different [from Shining Path]; they were not 
terrorists. Even though they placed bombs in buildings, used car bombs, and what 
not, they were not terrorists.288
287 Author interview (8 July 2011).  
288 Author interview (2 August 2011).
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Peruvian intellectual specialist José Luis Rénique claimed that the PUM had intended for 
the MRTA to become its military wing some day289 (see also PUM 1987, p 113).
Former VR militant Carmen Balbi related that, to many IU members, senderistas 
were merely “compañeros equivocados,” leftist peers “mistaken” in their interpretation of 
Marx and in their understanding of how to bring about a socialist revolution.290 Many 
among the legal left—and even within IU's moderate wing—appeared concerned less 
about the nihilistic violence and atrocities committed by Shining Path than about the fact 
that the group was not engaging in the “proper” form of revolution (cf. Barrantes 1985): 
Shining Path was too Maoist, it was run by country-bumpkins, its actions were not in 
coordination with other Marxist groups. 
The  affinity  between  Shining  Path  and  the  legal  left  soured  as  the  decade 
progressed: as the group began targeting more and more IU members, the party began to 
distance itself from Shining Path and denounce its tactics.291 Nonetheless, IU members—
particularly those from Red Fatherland—continued to flock to the group292 and IU still 
shared much in common with the extremist group.293 For instance, while Red Fatherland 
“postponed” the inevitable armed struggle for a later, more opportune moment and thus 
did  not  take  up  arms,  it  nonetheless  remained  quite  militaristic,  claimed  former  IU 
senator and PSR secretary general Enrique Bernales: its slogan was “power is born from 
a rifle” (“El poder nace del fusil”)294 Later on in the decade, even once virtually all of IU 
denounced and fought  against  Shining Path,  “The public  announcements  and official 
289 Author interview (1 September 2011).
290 Author interview (13 July 2011).
291 Author interview with Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler (25 July 2011). 
292 Interestingly enough, Julio Cotler admitted that “the left finally 'discovered' democracy through Shin-
ing Path and Fujimori [and his self-coup].” Author interview (25 July 2011).
293 Confusingly enough, after having finally distanced themselves from Shining Path, IU's radical wing 
blamed the group's rise and success in part on IU's moderates because “they were not able to crystalize 
an alternative government and power in the late 1970s” and were, thus, responsible for ARI's collapse 
(PUM 1987, p 85).
294 Author interview (14 July 2011).
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declarations  of  IU  and  its  [component]  parties  often  criticized  Shining  Path  for  its 
'provocative and adventuresome' terrorist actions; but they were not frontal boundaries, 
they did not treat Shining Path for what they were, that is, enemies” (Guerra García 2012, 
p 85). 
According to the final report from Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación), the one thing that unified Peru's diverse leftist 
parties  in  1980  was  their  support  for  armed  struggle  and  their  profound  under-
appreciation  for  the  forms,  rules,  and  procedures  of  democracy  (CVR 2003,  p  169). 
According to former IU Senator Edmundo Murrugarra, “almost all of the parties [of the 
Peruvian Left] had militant wings, but they let Shining Path take their place...when they 
declared war,  we did not  have a  clear  position.  Most  of  the Left  vacillated and was 
confused  and  contradictory  vis-a-vis  Shining  Path”  (quoted  in La  Republica, 11 
September 2011).
Toward  the  end  of  the  1980s,  some  moderate  IU  politicians  did  explicitly 
foreswear political violence: see, for example, IU senator and CDN member Edmundo 
Murrugarra's  (1988)  “We  Renounce  the  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat  Thesis” 
(“Renuciamos a la Tesis de la Dictadura del Proletariado”). However, the fact that a 
major,  legitimate party had to make such proclamations—in 1988—demonstrates  just 
how radical the party really was. Futhermore, Murrugarra states that neither PUM nor 
UNIR have abandoned the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
IU as a whole would not foreswear armed struggle; rather,  it  continued to see 
itself  as  a  revolutionary,  socialist  front,  which “does  not  renounce,  on principle,  any 
means of struggle or form of organization. It combines each and every [mean and form], 
be they legal or illegal, overt or covert, depending on the circumstance.…class struggle is 
complex, sharp, and, at times, violent” (IU 1984). By positioning itself close to Shining 
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Path, IU had no opportunity to bring new sectors in, meaning the party could remain an 
echo chamber since there was little internal pressure to widen its appeals. 
Given their vocal support of armed struggle and socialist revolution, it  proved 
difficult for IU to condemn Shining Path's actions, which had been made in the name of 
Marxism:  denunciation would have been contradictory  and hypocritical,  according to 
former Senator and PSR General Secretary Enrique Bernales, former guerrilla and leftist 
intellectual Héctor Béjar, and principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Ricardo Caro.295 Instead, IU's reaction to Shining Path was 
indecisive and ambiguous (Burt 1998; Rénique 1998). Barrantes and other moderate IU 
politicians did eventually denounce Shining Path;  however,  their  condemnations were 
generally tempered. During a discussion on Shining Path in 1981, Barrantes argued that 
IU's continued acceptance of political violence was legitimate not only because violence 
very well might be necessary at some future date—although Shining Path was wrong to 
use it  at  this  juncture—but also because political  violence does not necessarily mean 
terrorism.296
IU criticism of SL's actions was often premised on the fact that they would not be 
successful and would instead elicit a violent counteraction by the armed forces: “This 
coup  [against  Shining  Path],  as  is  evident,  will  have  as  its  objective  not  only  the 
liquidation  of  Shining Path,  but  also  that  of  IU” (CNM 1989,  pp  6-7).297 Instead  of 
criticizing Shining Path outright for its ultra-extremist ideology and deplorable actions, 
IU focused much of its criticism on the negative repercussions that its “popular war” 
295 Author interviews with Bernales (14 July 2011), Béjar (25 July 2011), and Caro (4 July 2011). 
296 Interview in OIGA (29 June 1981), cited in Barrantes (1985). 
297 Shining Path actually was attempting to provoke a rebellion in order to hasten the demise of the pre-
vailing democratic regime (CVR 2003, II.1.1). Some in IU welcomed this: radical members of the 
PUM—termed “Libyans” (“libios”) because many of them had allegedly traveled to Libya for training 
and had received guns from Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011)—hoped that Shining Path 
would  destroy  the  State,  facilitating  IU's  take-over  and implementation  of  a  “third  way” between 
democracy and communism. Author interview with academic specialist on Peruvian intellectuals José 
Rénique (1 September 2011); see also Rénique (2004). 
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would bring about: by destabilizing the regime, Shining Path would incite the military to 
engage  in  a  coup  d'état.  By  doing  so,  IU  effectively  deflected  its  anti-Shining  Path 
criticism by simultaneously condemning—and equating—Shining Path with the armed 
forces  (which  was  portrayed  as  a  loose  cannon,  waiting  for  any  pretense  to  reenter 
politics). When IU moderates, such as Barrantes and members of the PSR, did condemn 
Shining Path's violence, it was often done so only after being likened to the violence 
engaged by Peru's armed forces in the countryside (cf. IU 1988a, p 12). State-sanctioned 
terror  is  a  gross  violation  of  the  social  contract  between  democratic  states  and  their 
citizenry;  however,  there  is  a  qualitative  difference  between  excessive  state  violence 
during an anti-insurgency campaign and terrorism (Murrugarra 2003).
IU was never faced with the incentive to collaborate across the aisle and fight for 
democracy;  as  such,  it  never  moderated its  policies  or  outlook.  Whereas  other  leftist 
parties  began  adapting  ideologically  during  the  same  moment  in  world  history,  IU 
continued  to  defend  armed  struggle. Indeed,  “IU's  strategic  objective  was  not  the 
consolidation of the democratic regime, but rather the creation of conditions that would 
bring about a socialist society” (Lynch 1999, p 179). 
To be fair, a very significant percentage of the IU did end up denouncing Shining 
Path by the decade's end, even if it left open the possibility of its own, “genuine” armed 
struggle in the near future; the first to do so were Barrantes, the PCP, and the PSR (cf 
PUM 1987,  p  82).  Toward  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  IU's  moderate  wing  began  to 
denounce  vehemently  political  violence  and  engage  in  scathing  self-criticism  of  the 
Peruvian left's continued ambivalence toward democracy. However, some analysts claim 
that  the about-face was the result  of  SL's  increase in assassinations of  the legal  left: 
Shining Path murdered, among others, Deputy Eriberto Arroyo of Piura, and Alderman 
Benigno  Ayala  of  Cangallo  (radical  leftist  groups  often  target  more  moderate  leftist 
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groups, as the latter are their principal competition, and vice versa, spatially speaking). 
Much was the same for Shining Path. However, so long as SL kept its persecution of IU 
politicians  and  popular-sector  leaders  to  a  minimum,  the  IU could  turn  a  blind  eye. 
Carmen  Balbi,  a  former  Revolutionary  Vanguard  militant,  lamented  that  such 
assassinations  had  initially  been  accepted  by  the  IU  as  “collateral  damage”  (daños 
colaterales),  necessary  but  unavoidable  losses  in  the  broader  goal  of  achieving 
socialism.298
Never any Policy Moderation
The  Peruvian  left  was  faced  with  an  opportunity  to  prove  its  democratic 
credentials and appeal to a wider segment of society in the late 1970s; however, it failed 
to do so. Because the left never sought to enter into a broad alliance of pro-democratic 
forces, its base never diversified and the left never gained the experience of collaborating 
across the aisle. Had such actions taken place, it would have necessitated a widening of 
political appeals by the newly formed IU to represent its broad base. Instead, given the 
party's “ideological  ambivalence” regarding democracy,  and its  “ambiguity” regarding 
Shining Path (Lynch 1999, p 179), the IU, like its leftist predecessors from the 1970s, 
came  down  narrowly  in  favor  of  armed,  anti-system  insurgent  groups,  instead  of 
democracy, the prevailing political regime, and—most importantly—the diverse needs of 
298 Author interview (13 July 2011). Another, less pessimistic, view would see SL's 1983 massacre of 69 
peasants accused of collaborating with the military, in and around the Andean town of Lucanamarca 
(see CVR 2003, V.2.2), as the left's turning point. In the beginning of the 1980s, there was much misin-
formation about Shining Path, what it represented, and what exactly it was doing in the countryside. 
This massacre, well documented and widely publicized, however, should have put an end to any ambi-
guity Peruvians may have had about the means and intentions of this messianic, ultra-violent extremist 
group. A counter-argument, however, would point to the fact that the Left never denounced MRTA, 
which, while far less violent, was likewise officially categorized as a terrorist organization: “...MRTA's 
armed actions, despite their conceptual and methodological differences from Shining Path, create dis-
tortions within the field of the popular organizations, creating difficulties the work of organization and 
mobilization and impeding the proper linkages between the fight for peach with justice, for democracy, 
and for socialism (IU 1988b, p 12). The MRTA, it should be noted, never targeted Leftist or popular 
sector leaders.
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Peruvian society. IU was unable to denounce categorically Shining Path, according to 
Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler, because, denouncing the group would simultaneously 
mean supporting the police, army, and the (bourgeois) democratic regime.299
By not defending the country's nascent democracy, the IU took the wrong side of 
Peru's public opinion trends (McClintock 1989); the party's core constituency remained 
limited and unrepresentative of (and thus unaccountable to) the average Peruvian voter, 
and the party's leadership had little experience or precedence collaborating across the 
aisle  with political  adversaries.  IU thus remained only partially  wedded to  the legal-
political realm as a result. This helped prevent the party from adapting successfully to 
exogenous changes in the future: the party never moderated tactically.
Into the late 1980s, IU members did not widen their appeals to appeal to more and 
more  of  the  electoral.  Instead,  they advocated  extra-parliamentary  political  struggles: 
“Revolution is a historical necessity in Peru...The definition of IU as a revolutionary front 
of masses comes from this idea, which determines its nature, goals, tasks, and forms of 
organization and corresponding struggles” (APS 1987, p 9). They sought to undermine 
the prevailing politico-economic regime: IU deputy Fernando Sánchez Albavera (1989) 
criticized his party's ideologues by pointing out that:
What is happening is that [IU] Senator Diez Canseco believes that if the economic 
situation deteriorates even more, and if the people become more impoverished, it 
would  favor  a  supposed  pre-revolutionary  situation,  consistent  with  the 
insurrectional line adopted by the PUM in its last congress.
They refused to renounce political violence. In reaction to the push by some IU militants 
to renounce political violence,300 the PUM (1989) declared that
299 Author interview (25 July 2011).
300 One such example, by José Luis Velásquez (1988), was: “It is urgent that all socialists break with their 
militaristic (and embarrassing) position and state that violence is neither a revolutionary principle nor a 
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Renouncing  the  right  to  use  violence  and  to  rebel  against  oppressors  is  an 
unmitigated capitulation. History has taught us that those with power will not give 
up their privileges without fighting by all means at their disposal. It is not only 
naïve, but foolish and blind to think that announcing that we will not fight will 
ensure that their will not fight (p 6). 
Finally,  they took years  to  denounce categorically  the  Shining Path.  In  fact,  the  real 
turning point between Shining Path and the Peruvian state occurred when the peasants 
turned  against  the  insurgency.  Violence  against  peasants—and,  particularly,  the 
assassination of peasant leaders and members of the CCP—convinced the peasantry to 
jump ship and start collaborating with the state against the insurgency.301
This failure to engage in tactical moderation had ideological repercussions later 
on: policy moderation proved impossible, in effect assigning the party to the dustbin of 
history.  Despite controlling the party's  presidency, IU moderates were unable to push 
through policy moderation. Deepening divisions between the party's two wings led to 
IU's split,  in the build-up to the 1990 election: unable to effect the kind of top-down 
change that Lula achieved in the PT, Barrantes and his more pragmatic followers were 
forced to jump ship and start their own party.
The IU was rent  principally by internal  disagreements  over  whether  the party 
should engage in contentious politics alongside its electoral measures, and whether or not 
it should defend and accept the prevailing political regime, or try to overthrow it from the 
inside-out. For instance, former IU senator and CDN representative Javier Díez Canseco 
argued that the IU divided over fundamental disagreements over whether or not:
libertarian value.”
301 Also helpful was Fujimori's embrace and promotion of peasant rounds (rondas campesinas), autono-
mous, rural, peasant controls. Author interview with CCP president Andrés Luna Vargas (19 July 2011).
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We should seek power through elections, or should we sit out of elections? Should 
we let  Garcia  govern  out  his  term,  or  make him abdicate  early?   Should  we 
participate  and  augment  social  conflicts?  Should  the  'transition'  be  purely 
electoral, or should it be electoral coupled with social struggles [i.e., strikes, land 
occupations, etc].302
Barrantes, as well as the more moderate component parties and independents, sided with 
liberal  democracy,  while the PUM, as well  as the more radical  component parties of 
UNIR and FOCEP, were less supportive of the prevailing democratic regime. Sectarian, 
internecine  battles  became  drawn-out,  particularly  over  the  composition  of  IU's 
presidential and congressional slates. 
The  principal  concern  of  Barrantes,  as  well  as  of  the  PSR  and  PCR,  was 
supporting the democratic regime and protecting against economic collapse, a potential 
rightist military coup, and/or an escalation of hostilities by the insurrectionary Shining 
Path.  He  embraced  APRA President  Alan  García's  proposed  national  accord—which 
involved eliminating costly subsidies and bringing the IMF back in—with the left as a 
necessary  evil.  IU's  radical  wing,  however,  took  this  as  evidence  that  Barrantes  had 
become “each time more distant from the people, and each time more reactionary” (PUM 
1988b) and that he was still  an “Aprista at  heart”—Barrantes had been a member of 
APRA before  joining  IU  as  an  independent  politician,  not  tied  to  any  of  its  leftist 
component parties (Taylor 1990, pp 111-112). In fact, according to principal researcher of 
leftist  parties  for  Peru's  Truth  and  Reconciliation  Commission  Ricardo  Caro,  many 
radical IU militants and supporters actually think that Barrantes abdicated the second 
round of the 1985 presidential elections, letting García win. While Barrantes had served 
as  a  lawyer  for  many  leftists,  he  was  never  considered  a  partisan  of  any  of  IU's 
302 Author interview (2 August 2011). 
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component parties; rather,  he was embraced as an independent,  consensus figure who 
garnered respect from virtually all leftists.303
For their part, IU's radicals—PUM, UNIR, and FOCEP, along with smaller groups 
and some non-aligned individuals—were holding out  for  social  revolution,  instead of 
looking to engage in across-the-aisle alliances in defense of the beleaguered democratic 
regime.  The  three  main  parties  deemphasized  parliamentary  action  in  favor  of 
establishing  and  training  popular  organization  in  the  social  sphere  as  a  way  of 
accumulating revolutionary forces for the impending showdown. As late as 1988, the 
PUM was criticizing its IU brethren for being too focused on seeking to obtain power via 
democratic-institutional  channels  (PUM  1988b),  placing  value  upon  the  electoral 
struggle, and, most telling of all, looking to “manage the crisis and save the old system 
[i.e., the prevailing regime]” (PUM 1988c, p 77). The PUM (1988) reaffirmed—in 1988
—its priority in “the revolutionary political struggle;” it sought to:
Develop a  counter-power capable  of  developing all  the  forms of  struggle  and 
combining the most varied forms of organization to defeat the bourgeois, semi-
colonial power [of the Peruvian state]...We should reject the over-valuation of the 
electoral struggle [without abandoning or abstaining from it] (pp 76-77).
Unlike Barrantes et al., the “PUF faction” (named after the first letter of each of the three 
radical component parties) saw little point in defending what they felt was a democratic 
regime in name only, according to IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch.304 the only way to to 
bring about the fundamental socio-political and economic changes needed for Peru to 
establish a truly democratic government and society free of abject poverty was to abolish 
the old system and start anew (cf. Taylor 1990).
303 Author interview (4 July 2011).
304 Author interview (1 August 2011).
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These competing factions jockeyed fiercely for power. Beginning in early 1988, 
the Barrantes faction tried to consolidate their position and worked to expel the more 
radical factions; however, despite having more militants and nonaligned support, their 
moderate  position  was  a  minority  position  in  the  ranks  of  the  party  hierarchy.  The 
problem was that many otherwise moderate IU members were plagued by their failure to 
moderate  tactically.  For  instance,  it  was  widely  assumed that  most  members  of  IU's 
Christian Left, which were for the most part grouped under the party's “independent” 
label, would side with Barrantes, whether he succeeded in expelling the radicals or was 
himself expelled by them. Given the rigid structure of IU (see Chapter 4), party activities 
and decisions were all determined by one's component party. For this reason, nonaligned 
party militants, which made up the bulk of IU's rank-and-file (and which were, for the 
most part, moderate), had little formal power or sway within the party bureaucracy.
What ended up taking place, though, was that the formerly moderate Christian 
Left insisted on continuing to equate terrorist violence with the “violence” committed by 
the Ministry of the Economy (Lynch 1999;  Murrugarra 2003).  In part  for  ideological 
reasons, they were convinced to remain within IU once it became clear that Barrantes had 
lost the battle and would leave the party.305 Following Barrantes's departure, Henry Pease, 
the de facto leader of IU's Christian Left, became IU president and presidential candidate; 
his 1990 campaign slogan was “no to killing by hunger [caused by capitalism] nor by 
[Shining  Path's]  bullets”  (“No mata  ni  con  hambre  ni  con  balas”),  according  to  IU 
intellectual Nicolás Lynch306 (cf. Murrugarra 2003). Much the same can be said for the 
middle-of-the-road PCP, which opted to remain within IU. 
305 To be fair, many moderates also remained within IU for the sake of not splintering the party
306 Author interview (1 August 2011).  On the other hand, Barrantes's slogan was “everyone against terror-
ism.” Author  interview with former IU Senator  and CDN member Edmundo Murrugarra  (18 July 
2011).
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The IU collapsed in 1989, along with any hopes of remaining a viable national 
contender: Barrantes, the PCR, and nonaligned militants left in August of that year to 
found the AS, later renamed the IS. The split distracted the two sides from focusing on 
the municipal and presidential elections of 1989 and 1990, respectively, in which both 
parties fared poorly; many former IU supporters ended up throwing their support behind 
presidential  candidate  Alberto  Fujimori.307 Had  the  party  been  able  to  adapt  without 
splitting in two, Barrantes would most certainly have made it at least to the presidential 
run-off, given his high level of voter preference just months before (cf. Taylor 1990, p 
113).308 Given the poor electoral showings, coupled with confusion and anger on the part 
of IU's former supporters at its inability to represent them, both parties fizzled out in the 
early 1990s, with dire consequences for Peru's party system. To garner legitimacy, party 
systems need to represent the full range of policy options to the electorate; Peru's party 
system collapsed shortly after IU's demise.
The IU did not collapse because of Peru's party system collapse;309 in fact, the 
collapse of the IU is, arguably, partially to blame for Peru's party system breakdown. The 
right (Belaúnde) and center (García) had already tried their luck at running the country in 
1980 and 1985, respectively. Had the left been able to adapt successfully to the changing 
times  Barrantes  could  have  won  the  1990  election;  had  the  left  been  able  to  adapt 
307 While Fujimori is perhaps best known ideologically for his neoliberal shock program, he ran on a cen-
ter/center-left platform in which he vehemently denounced neoliberal structural adjustments (cf. Stokes 
2001;  O'Donnell 1994; Roberts 1995b; Cameron 1994).
308 In March of 1988, Barrantes enjoyed 36 percent support and was projected to win a landslide victory in 
a second round run-off. His percentage of the voter preference slipped shortly thereafter; however, he 
remained in a safe second place until two months before the 1990 election (Schmidt 1996, p 329).
309 One could claim that it was not the political context in which the IU was born that was to blame for its 
failure to adapt, but rather the collapse of Peru's party-system as a whole that was responsible. Such an 
argument is flawed, however, because the party system collapsed after the IU did. Peru's political par-
ties were doing relatively fine throughout the 1980s: parties had successfully achieved the basic parti-
san goal of political representation throughout this tempestuous decade (Tanaka 1998). Peru's party 
system deteriorated in the early 1990s, then collapsed in 1992 following Fujimori's self-coup (Dietz 
and Myers 2007; Tanaka 1998). Fujimori disparaged the country's traditional parties, withdrew state 
support from parties (Tuesta 2001), and disbanded congress (Conaghan 2005)
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successfully  it  would not  have opened up a  vacuum on the  left  side  of  the  political 
spectrum, of which the anti-system, centrist Fujimori so adeptly took advantage.
LCR: UNCHASTENED RADICALS AND THE 1992 COUPS
Similar to IU, LCR was never compelled to stand up in favor of democracy—and 
thus enter into a broad, pro-democratic alliance—because it arose within a democratic 
context: Venezuela had been governed by a democratic regime for twenty years prior to 
LCR's birth as a political party. As such, LCR never had the same need as Brazil's PT, 
Chile's PS, or Uruguay's FA had to differentiate itself from the prevailing regimes and 
become democratic  stalwarts.  This  lack of  incentive to engage in tactical  moderation 
meant that LCR was less likely to do; it  also complicated future moves to engage in 
policy  moderation,  making it  less  likely  as  well.  Like  IU,  LCR never  witnessed  the 
broadening of its support base (along with the ensuing positive repercussions that this 
would bring) that the PT did.
Similar  to  the case of  IU,  internecine battles  over  the proper  role  of  political 
parties and the legitimate realm of political action led to a party schism, which spelled the 
end to LCR's political relevance. The next three subsections detail the party's internal 
struggle between democrats and revolutionaries, its role in what became the attempted 
military coup of 4 February 1992 (as well as the one on 27 November of that same year), 
and the effects of its non-democratic support on party adaptation, respectively.
The Battle Between Democrats and Revolutionaries
 Since 1958, Venezuela had been categorized as a democratic regime. As it was 
not  possible  to  construct  a  mobilizing  cleavage  around  regime  type, causaerristas 
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initially  focused their  efforts  on  building off  of  the  struggles  of  narrow,  pre-existing 
social  movements.  Indeed,  after  years  of  mobilizing  and  organizing  in  the  state  of 
Bolívar, Velásquez and his Matanceros successfully took control of Sidor's labor unions, 
which had previously been dominated by AD, and pushed their New Unionism agenda of 
ensuring  that  workers  get  their  due  say  in  the  decisions  that  affect  their  lives  and 
livelihood  (Salamanca  1998).  Due  in  large  part  to  the  extraordinary  success  of  the 
Matanceros,  LCR  ended  up  being  seen  as  a  narrow, single-issue  and  -class  party 
(Hellinger 1996).  This myth became self-fulfilling as the party's three other segments 
(students, the urban poor, and intellectuals) were ignored in favor of the worker success 
story; their movements broke with the party or slowly petered out. 
Given  his  charisma,  electability,  and  extreme  popularity,  Velásquez  quickly 
assumed the  mantle  of  de-facto  party  leader  following  the  death  of  Maneiro,  LCR's 
founder and intellectual mastermind, in 1983. While Velásquez undoubtedly was (and 
continues to be) a democrat concerned primarily with improving the working and living 
conditions  of  Venezuela's  steelworkers  and  the  country's  middle  class  overall,  other 
members of the party were not as moderate in their tactics or political goals. Although 
Velásquez was LCR's public face and most popular politician, within the party, Pablo 
Medina, LCR's nominal secretary-general, held a significant amount of sway. And unlike 
Velásquez, Medina's ideological stance was extremist; he was uninterested in widening 
the party's appeals to capture a larger audience.
Medina, like Maneiro, was a former guerrilla who retained much of his 1960s 
radical bend. He had been sent to Bolívar in 1972 by Maneiro to infiltrate the region's 
social  movements  and look for  organic  intellectuals  and native  leaders  that  could be 
recruited into the future LCR project. Medina bided his time as the party increased its 
scope and gained new converts among social movement militants; his real goal was to 
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“deepen democracy” by inaugurating a new, radical form of democratic governance after 
having  dismantled  the  pre-existing,  “nominally  democratic”  one.  The Caracazo—the 
massive, spontaneous urban uprising that came about in 1989 in response to President 
Carlos  Andrés  Pérez's  “Gran Viraje,”310 in  which  hundreds  to  thousands  died  by  the 
hands of Venezuela's security apparatuses311—convinced Medina (and many others) that 
the time was ripe for action.312 Along with treasonous members of the armed forces, who 
had  been  converted  and  nurtured  since  the  1970s,  Medina  and  LCR's  more  radical 
members  began  plotting  a  civilian-military  insurrection;  they  had  no  interest  in 
embracing a larger portion of Venezuelan society, but rather, sought to take power by 
force.
The Coup of 4F
A series of internal and external events triggered fierce intra-party debates that 
exposed and accentuated the ideological and institutional incoherence that had existed 
within LCR ever since it stopped being a small, tight-knit group of like-minded social 
activists in Venezuela's Guayana region. The most bitter of these debates was over the 
decision  of  whether  or  not  to  participate  actively  in  the  planned  civilian-military 
insurrection of 4 February 1992 (“4F”), which turned into an attempted military coup 
310 The abrupt shift towards an open economy in full compliance with the IMF's dictates. While arguably 
unavoidable, Andrés Pérez's actions have been criticized because he did not consult with the business 
community before adopting the austerity package. Because the private sector was caught off-guard by 
the threat of the imminent dismantling of protection, manufacturers swiftly cut back production and 
businesses withheld government-regulated food to drive prices up, further exacerbating the plight of 
poor workers and consumers (Coronil and Skurski 2004, p 93).
311 The Committee of the Relatives of the Victims (El Comité de Familiares de las Víctimas, Cofavic) has 
documentation thus far of 470 deaths, almost twice the official number (276). However, a mass grave 
was uncovered in Caracas’s public cemetery in which the government had buried sixty-eight victims in 
plastic garbage bags; these unidentified bodies were never included in the official number (Coronil 
1997, p 377). Furthermore, there were approximately 2,000 disappeared persons from 27 to 28 Febru-
ary 1989. 
312 For a definitive picture of Venezuela during Carlos Andrés Pérez's second term of office (1989-1993), 
see Rivero (2010).
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headed by Hugo Chávez. Since  LCR had  never  been  presented  with  an  incentive  to 
moderate tactically, much of the party remained ambivalent towards democracy and the 
party's representative role within Venezuelan democracy, and ended up leaving LCR over 
the party's official line, insisting on parliamentary and electoral political engagement. 
Throughout the 1970s and up to his death, Maneiro had regular contact with a 
number of members of Venezuela's military. According to General Müller Rojas (1991), 
LCR's continued adherence to the idea of armed struggle as a legitimate means to power 
led its members to look to utilize the “internal contradictions of the military sector of 
society [i.e.,  the fact that some servicemen, many from lower class backgrounds, felt 
uncomfortable propping up an increasingly exclusionary democratic regime that had, in 
1989,  used  force  against  the  people]  to  achieve  their  combined  participation  in  the 
popular insurrection” that they sought to foment (p 72).
To this end, in 1983 Chávez and other military figures, who had been in regular 
contact with Maneiro and Medina, founded a clandestine, subversive, civilian-military 
organization aimed at toppling the existing political regime and taking power by force 
(cf. Zago 1998; Garrido 2000b). The MBR-200 combined the Marxist-Leninist ideals of 
Douglas Bravo with populist/nationalist ones from Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, and 
Ezequiel Zamora, three historical Venezuelan heroes (Garrido 2000a, pp 5-10). 
Original plans had called for a popular, civilian-military insurrection. Chávez—
along with Francisco Arias Cárdenas and other treasonous colonels, majors, captains, and 
lieutenants, along with the troops from the Maracay, Maracaibo, and Valencia quarters—
had been planning for 10-15 years with leftist civilian radicals an eventual overthrow of 
the existing Punto Fijo regime. According to Arias Cárdenas—4F's second-in-command 
and later LCR governor of Zulia (1996-2000)313—the idea was for Chávez and himself to 
313 The main catalyst for MBR-200's decision to embrace the electoral route was Arias Cárdenas's surprise 
win in 1995. The group did not consider its leaders—including Chávez—viable political candidates in 
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overthrow the government, disband the noxious traditional parties, transform the army 
into  “guardians  of  the  revolution,”  and  then  immediately  create  a  civilian-military, 
tutelary junta to rule for one year until elections for a constitutional assembly would be 
held; on that junta would sit Andrés Velásquez, as well as José Vicente Rangel of the 
leftist MAS (Garrido 2000a; Garrido 2000b).
Until  roughly 1996,314 MBR-200 rejected  elections  as  the  route  to  power  and 
called for abstentionism (López Maya 2005, p 175). Civilian leftists included Maneiro, 
Medina,  and especially  militants  from the  two minuscule  parties  Red Flag (Bandera 
Roja) and Revolutionary Venezuelan Party (Partido Revolucionario Venezolano, PRV). 
Similarly, many PRV militants, such as Rodríguez and Uzcátegui, flocked to LCR in the 
late 1980s (Ruiz 2001; Sonntag and Maingón 1992; Ramírez 2006). Chávez sidelined 
many of the LCR plotters at the last minute. The plot failed and the principal military 
participants were jailed; many of the insurgents were surprised that there was no popular 
insurrection following the attempted coup (Müller Rojas 1992).
By 1987, certain LCR leaders, including Secretary-General Pablo Medina and Alí 
Rodríguez,  were  clandestinely  participating  in  the  preparations  for  a  civilian-military 
insurrection (Rosas, 2009a). Instead of seeking out like-minded individuals and groups 
within the legal political realm, LCR's ideologues were plotting treason. Following the 
Caracazo, the group of causaerristas actively plotting with the MBR-200 grew to include 
Roger Capella, Freddy Gutiérrez, Rafael Uzcátegui, José Albornoz, and General Alberto 
Müller Rojas, as well. It is unclear whether or not the rest of LCR's leaders knew about 
the preparations: according to Rafael Uzcátegui, former LCR leader and national deputy, 
many claim  to  have  known  nothing  of  these  subversive  plans  until  a  few  months 
democratic elections (Sánchez Urribarri 2008).
314 MBR-200 transformed into Chávez's Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República, MVR), 
one of Chávez's many personal electoral vehicles, in 1997.
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beforehand,315 while the rank-and-file only found out about the participation of many 
LCR leaders after 4F. Venezuelan left specialist and former LCR intellectual Margarita 
López  Maya,  however,  claims  that  all  of  LCR's  leaders  were  complicit,  including 
Velásquez.  Shortly  before  4F,  she  avers,  Velásquez  had  a  change  of  heart  and  then 
subsequently  denied  any  knowledge  of  LCR's  involvement  after  the  fact  because  he 
thought it would harm his electoral prospects in the upcoming presidential election.316 
Chávez seems to concur (cf. Blanco Muñoz 2003). Former LCR national leader Gustavo 
Hernandez claimed that discussion of this insurrectional vision was openly taking place 
within the party since, at least, 1989.317
In November of 1991, in a meeting of LCR national leaders in Valencia, Pablo 
Medina divulged to the party that certain LCR leaders were helping prepare for a civilian-
military  rebellion  (Medina  1999,  pp  41-44).  While  the  majority  of  LCR's  leadership 
initially rejected any form of participation on the part of the party, unanimity was not 
achieved  and  no  action  could  therefore  be  taken,  thanks  to  internal  decision-making 
mechanisms stipulating that decision-making be done on a consensus-basis, according to 
former  LCR leader  and  national  deputy  Gustavo  Hernandez.318 Given  the  failure  to 
achieve  consensus  behind  the  party's  non-involvement,  Medina  and  Rodríguez  were, 
technically, permitted to continue their role as the civilian leaders of the rebellion and 
participated,  along with Uzcátegui,  in both 4F and the second attempted coup,  of  27 
November  1992  (Rosas  2009a,  pp  94-111).  This  phenomenon  of  unresolved  issues 
hampering the party's coherence was a recurring theme throughout LCR's history. The 
first example of this, recalled LCR founder and former national leader José Albornoz, 
was back in the early 1970s when the party was deciding whether to side with China or 
315 Author interviews (9 and 10 October, 2011). 
316 Author interview (11 October 2011).  
317 Author interview (26 October 2011).
318 Author interview (26 October 2011).
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the USSR. Given strong sentiment in both directions, a subpar alternative was chosen: to 
side with neither and both.319 
In  this  way,  amidst  LCR's  “meteoric”  rise  to  prominence  through  democratic 
channels,320 some from the party's highest leadership ranks were simultaneously looking 
to overthrow Venezuela's democratic regime. Rafael Uzcátegui was briefly detained (for 
the  fourth  time)  in  1993,  Freddy Gutiérrez  was  accused  by  the  government  of  arms 
possession, and Pablo Medina was allegedly involved in a number of shady activities, 
from stealing arms from a military barracks in the Caracas neighborhood of Bello Monte, 
to confronting physically Minister of Defense Vice-admiral Radamés Muñoz León at an 
official ceremony, to brandishing a gun at a peaceful demonstration, according to LCR 
leader José María “Chema” Fernández, LCR leader Luis Medina, and LCR leader César 
Ramírez.321 When asked—twice—about these incidents, as well as his involvement in 4F, 
Pablo Medina vehemently denied everything and changed the topic322 (see also Medina 
1999, pp 121-123).
The  “Three  Musketeers”—i.e.,  Medina,  Alí  Rodríguez,  and  Roger  Capella
—“spoke of democracy, but did not believe in democracy;” LCR national leader Luis 
Medina (no relation323) also claimed that Medina had ties with guerrillas in Colombia, 
while Rodríguez was close to Fidel Castro.324 This group's anti-democratic behavior was 
foreign to the party's history as fighting for workers' rights, according to LCR founder 
319 Author interviews (9 October 2011 and 8 March 2012).
320 Even those LCR politicians who rose to power through the electoral route were not completely com-
mitted to  parliamentary action.  In  describing the  whopping 40 LCR candidates  who won seats  in 
Venezuela's Chamber of Deputies in 1993, Venezuelan labor specialist and LCR intellectual Luis Sala-
manca called them “more activist  than anything.” “They were more about protesting and agitating 
[than legislating].” Author interview (29 September 2011).
321 Author interviews with Fernández (21 November, 2011), Medina (22 November 2011), and Ramírez 
(22 November, 2011). 
322 Author interviews (7 October 2011 and 28 February 2012).
323 N.B. Luis Medina is not related to Pablo Medina; Pastora and Ilenia Medina, however, are Pablo's sis-
ters.
324 Author interview with (22 November 2011).
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and current national leader Eleutorio “Tello” Benitez.325 Maneiro had always harbored 
insurrectional goals for the party; however, he had envisioned a democratic overthrow of 
the  only  nominally  democratic  regime  (see  Chapter  3). Medina  and  Rodríguez  (and 
Chávez, for that matter), on the other hand, seemed to interpret the idea as more of a 
military coup with the tacit approval of the masses; it was for this disconnect that many 
LCR members did not adhere to the putschist 4F idea at first.
However, according to LCR founder Edgar Yajure, who left the party early—and 
thus was never a party to the internecine struggles that arose later—the ideological debate 
was  not  over  “representative  democracy”  versus  “some  sort  of  radical,  socialist 
democracy;” rather, it was over how exactly to arrive at that radical form of democracy. 
From the party's founding, all militants were in favor of spearheading a popular, civilian-
military insurrection to overthrow Venezuela's lackluster and elitist democratic regime; 
however, until the early 1990s, few were willing to agree to a military-based overthrow 
of the prevailing regime, which is what was attempted on 4F. Such a radicalization of the 
terms of the debate was due, continued Yajure, to Medina, as well as: the Caracazo and 
the ensuing radicalization of Venezuelan society; an increasing economic crisis; and the 
influx and/or rise in importance of radical militants inside LCR, including, but not limited 
to, Rafael Uzcátegui and Alí Rodríguez.326
Chávez has insinuated that Velásquez was also compromised in the planning of 
the 4F conspiracy. With lament, he mentions that, after a conversation with Velásquez 
shortly before winning the Bolívar governorship in 1989, he came to understand that 
Velásquez started to believe in the electoral project, in the power behind elections, 
etc, that which led him to say on the afternoon of 5 February 1992 that, 'these [4F 
conspirators] are gorillas,' even though we had spoken various times and he knew 
325 Author interview (20 October 2011).
326 Author interview (26 October 2011).
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about the project. We always had contacts with LCR; however, in October of 1991 
they broke these ties and even began to distance themselves from the more radical 
wing of Pablo Medina and others (quoted in Blanco Muñoz 2003, pp 274-275).
Whatever  the  case  may  be,  Velásquez  and  the  more  moderate causaerristas most 
certainly distanced themselves from the 4F plotters after the failed coup took place. This 
effort  was  both  conscious  and  subconscious:  López  Maya  (2005),  a  former  LCR 
intellectual, argues that the moderates became so caught up with their electoral triumphs
—and  ensuing  responsibilities—that  they  became  even  further  removed  from  their 
historical role as fomenters of social agitation. This caused tension and contributed to the 
growing distance between LCR moderates and radicals (pp 174-175).
 At the time the party had a very good chance of winning power democratically, 
thanks to Velásquez's charisma and growing popularity, as well as to the party's proven 
record of good governance on the local level. LCR's uncanny ability to administer cities 
and  states  became  renowned  throughout  Venezuela  (cf.  Harnecker  1994).  Ana  Elisa 
Osorio, a former high-ranking civil servant who served under both Mayor Scotto and 
Governor Velásquez but who is now part of Chávez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela 
(Partido Socialista  Unido de Venezuela,  PSUV) and thus  a  direct  opponent  of  LCR, 
nonetheless  admitted  that  LCR  transformed  the  way  the  country  looks  at  local 
governance.327 But  internal  contradictions  confused  sympathizers  and  would-be 
followers, as well as exacerbated pre-existing differences between the more radical and 
revolutionary wing of the party, headed by Medina, and the more moderate and reformist 
wing, headed by Velásquez and supported primarily by those with ties to Bolívar State 
syndicalism.
Compared to their policy positions, the Velásquez group saw Medina's actions as 
extremist,  foreign  to  the  party's  self-proclaimed  efforts  at  deepening  democracy,  and 
327 Author interview (24 February 2012).
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dampening  the  electoral  hopes  of  the  party.  Indeed,  Velásquez's  1993  presidential 
platform was  a  paragon  of  moderate  leftism,  much  to  the  chagrin  of  LCR's  radical 
members. He proposed a “radical cultural transformation,” i.e. encouraging educational 
reform,  anti-corruption  measures,  and  decentralized  health-care,  and  a  “productive 
revolution,” namely moving beyond the rentier economy. Velásquez even clarified his use 
of the word “revolution” in the text: he did not mean “violent,” but rather, “accelerated, 
intense, and deep” (1993a).
However, given the party's inchoate nature, horizontal accountability, and need for 
consensus to make decisions, Velásquez and LCR's pragmatists could do little about the 
traitorous  plans  being developed by the  party's  secretary-general  and by many of  its 
national leaders. As seen in the PT, all leftist parties have marginal, ultra-radical elements 
within their ranks; however, such factions are sidelined when, having collaborated across 
the aisle, parties find themselves representing a broader segment of the populace and feel 
the need then to represent this base.  Many LCR leaders precluded this possibility by 
opting to side with (and, indeed, help spearhead) undemocratic agents, instead of enter 
into broad, pro-democratic alliances with other parties in order to sideline the country's 
growing threat to democracy.
The  distance  between  the  two  factions'  tactical  decisions  was  too  great  to 
overcome and LCR ideologues proved too powerful to be sidelined. LCR's Executive 
Committee had not approved of Medina's measure requesting the party's formal support 
for  the  rebellion:  upwards  of  80  percent  of  the  party's  national  leadership  had  been 
against  the  idea,  according  to  LCR  Federal  Deputy  Amérigo  de  Grazia  and  LCR 
presidential candidate Andrés Velásquez.328 However, official policy toward the rebellion 
was, technically, never defined since consensus was never achieved. Thanks to this, the 
328 Author interviews with de Grazia (7 March 2012) and Velásquez (24 November 2011).
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formal  setback  did  not  preclude  Medina  and  other  radical causaerristas from 
participating in the preparations: Medina was later accused of supplying arms for the 
attempted coup, and went on the record to document publicly his role in the affair (cf. 
Medina 1999). Furthermore, when it seemed as if LCR would win the 1993 presidential 
election,  he  attempted  to  sabotage  Velázquez's  presidential  campaign,  alleged  LCR 
militant and two-time national deputy Adón Soto.329 Many current LCR militants claim 
that Medina intentionally provoked the powers that be prior to the 1993 election because 
he  was  convinced  that  Velásquez  was  going  to  win  the  election,  legitimizing  the 
“reformist,” electoral route over his preference, a civilian-military uprising. According to 
Velásquez, “Among the factors that provoked this whole plan against my victory, in 1993, 
is the [subversive] conduct of Pablo Medina” (quoted in Giusti 1997).
As the decade progressed, however, more and more causaerristas took Medina's 
side, tilting the party's balance-of-power to the side of the ideologues. Amidst all of this 
jockeying for power, the Venezuelan public could not figure out what LCR stood for and 
so the party's base did not diversify as the PT's had following that party's entrance into a 
broad, pro-democratic alliance.
Incomplete Policy Moderation
The decision as to whether or not LCR should wholeheartedly participate in the 
upcoming political insurrection of 4F exacerbated the tension between the party's two 
main political factions. The failure to engage in tactical moderation complicated future 
attempts to effect policy moderation and thus party adaptation; because the party had 
never been forced to reckon with the democracy-authoritarian question, LCR remained 
ambiguous about its tactical approach to obtaining and exercising power. The failure to 
329 Author interview (23 November 2011).
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adopt  wholeheartedly  the  electoral  route  to  power  precluded the  need  to  broaden its 
electoral appeal beyond its core group of supporters: if the party were to come to power 
via a civilian-military insurrection, what's the need for attracting a broader support base? 
This political impasse between causaerrista democrats and revolutionaries eventually led 
to the party's division in 1997.
The profound political difference over whether or not to support or undermine the 
prevailing democratic regime polarized the party leadership, bringing other contentious 
issues to the foreground and turning seemingly innocuous issues into bitter fights. For 
instance,  many saw Velásquez as domineering and looking to control  unilaterally the 
heterodox party and the Medina camp was weary of Velásquez's political compromises 
with the economic establishment in Bolívar State. While Velásquez did provide support 
for certain “neoliberal” structural reforms in the face of the country's economic collapse 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the party had always been pragmatically oriented (cf. 
Salamanca 2004).  One of  the  principal  complaints  of  the  radical  camp,  according to 
founder and former LCR leader Pastora Medina and current LCR leader Luis Medina, 
was  that  Velásquez  had  become  too  “chummy”  with  Leopolde  Sucre  Figarella,  the 
businessmen who ran the Venezuelan Corporation of Guayana (Corporación Venezolana 
de Guayana, CVG) and who also served as AD Senator for Bolívar.330 
The Velásquez camp, in turn, started questioning Medina's figurehead role as the 
party's secretary-general for life, a role which he held since the death of Maneiro in 1983. 
As  there  existed  no  institutionalized  way  to  deal  with  internal  disagreements,  these 
conflicts grew and ended up casting into doubt the party's very survival.  The Bolívar 
segment proposed that a new secretary-general be chosen, and, as Medina could not rally 
the  leadership  behind  his  candidacy,  Lucas  Matheus  (of  the  Velásquez  camp)  was 
330 Author interviews with Pastora Medina (2 November 2011) and Luis Medina (22 November 2011).
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selected; this was the beginning of the end. Sensing a battle over the party's resources and 
acronym, Matheus and Velásquez successfully appealed to the CSE, the predecessor of 
Venezuela's National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) and thus held 
onto  the  party,  while  Medina,  Rodríguez,  Albornoz,  Uzcátegui,  Istúriz,  and  many 
others331 left to found PPT on 27 September, 1997.332
Further exacerbating the political impasse was Velásquez's refusal to take to the 
streets in protest of the alleged fraud that had snatched the 1993 presidential election out 
of LCR's grasp. Velásquez did not want to fight the results through non-judicial channels, 
whereas Medina and many others leaders were adamant about shutting the country down 
through mass protests. Velásquez acknowledged to this author that there was, most likely, 
widespread,  systematic  fraud;  however,  he  stressed  that  the  party  had  no  tangible 
evidence to prove their allegations and that the powers that be held such a tight grasp 
over the media such that LCR members could not circulate what imperfect information 
they did obtain.333 Another issue discouraging LCR from taking to the streets, according 
to LCR national leader and four-time national deputy Amérigo de Grazia Veltri, was the 
fact that a large percentage of the progressive military men whose allegiance LCR had 
spent decades cultivating had all been imprisoned for their role in participating in the 
331 It is difficult to find firm numbers as to what percentage of the party stayed and which left. What is not 
debatable, however, is that the majority of LCR elected officials, as well as a large number of national 
leaders, followed Medina to the PPT. Many supporters, as well as militants with connections to the 
Guayana region and virtually everyone with direct ties to Sidor, remained in LCR. In the 1998 parlia-
mentary and gubernatorial elections LCR won one senator and six deputies, while PPT won one sena-
tor and seven deputies. LCR won 3.71 percent of the gubernatorial vote, while PPT won 3.01 (PDBA).
332 Pepetistas, who felt that they had been expelled from the party, have claimed that they are the real LCR 
(cf. López Maya and Lander 2011). Author interviews with PPT intellectual Margarita López Maya (11 
October 2011) and PPT founder Ilenia Medina (6 October 2011). To this end, PPT's founding document 
explicitly speaks of a “rebirth,” not a “birth” (Sesto 1997). PPT went on to become an important com-
ponent of Chávez's Patriotic Pole (Polo Patriótico, PP); General Arias Cárdenas, Ana Elisa Osorio, 
Aristóbulo Istúriz, and Alí Rodríguez all held high-level positions within Chávez's government.
333 Author interview (24 November 2011).
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insurrection of 4F; over 3,000 members of the armed services were arrested for their role 
in the two attempted coups of 1992.334 
Furthermore, Velásquez, along with all of the major presidential candidates, had 
signed  a  national  accord  the  week  before  with  then  President  Ramón Velásquez  (no 
relation), committing himself to respect the official results of the 5 December election 
(Latin American Weekly Report 1993, p 555). Velásquez's decision not to engage in extra-
parliamentary action was cited by virtually every PPT party member with whom this 
author spoke—especially Pablo Medina335—as a principal factor behind the increasingly 
deep schism in the party. In Velásquez's defense, however, he protested to this author that 
he did submit formal protests to the Supreme Court  of Justice (Tribunal Supremo de 
Justicia) and the Supreme Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral).336 
Whatever the case may be,  LCR's electoral  success was short-lived:  the party 
collapsed before winning national office, having been torn apart by its inability to engage 
in policy moderation. The straw that broke the camel's back was a heated debate over the 
party's stance over the role of the IMF within Venezuelan politics (cf. Medina 1999, pp 
54-57). Internecine fighting, which had forced the party to lose its bid to hold onto the 
Bolívar governorship, escalated and led to division: in 1997, the party was hollowed-out 
by the exodus of numerous leaders and militants, who went on to found PPT and help 
Hugo Chávez win the presidency (PPT 2007; López Maya 2004).337 To this day, LCR 
334 Author interviews (31 January and 7 March 2012).
335 Author interviews (7 October 2011 and 28 February 2012). 
336 Author interview (24 November 2011).
337 Fast forwarding thirteen years, PPT, having broke off its support for Chávez, is now suffering from the 
same issue that LCR had gone through in the 1990s (which led to the founding of PPT in 1997): since 
decisions within PPT are also made by means of consensus, the party is at risk of being rent in two over 
whether or not to continue supporting Chávez's political project. In response to the alleged attempts by 
pro-Chávez pepetistas to undermine the party (and, thus, one of Chávez's opposition groups), seventeen 
regional PPT general-secretaries “rejected the use of internal debate to try to destroy the political orga-
nization” (El Universal, 2011). The PPT did try to address the failings of LCR, by making its organiza-
tion and internal decisions procedures more “explicit and formal” (López Maya 2004, pp 291-296; 
López Maya 2005, p 190), but to little avail.
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retains a limited role in local Guayana politics (as well as in a few other small pockets 
around the country)  and continues to  demonstrate  and advocate  for  transparency and 
good governance; however,  it  has lost  its  position as a national power contender and 
constantly runs the risk of electoral irrelevance. Nonetheless, it has finally taken a firm 
stance on democracy and entered into a broad, multi-party, pro-democratic front: it is an 
active member of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, 
MUD), the opposition to Chávez. In large part thanks to its participation in the MUD, 
LCR has finally been able to widen its appeals: with the former ideologues gone (having 
mostly left the party in 1997), LCR is today a broad, moderate, pro-democratic (albeit 
small) political party.
Given the prevalence of counter explanations to LCR's failure, some should be 
mentioned here. One is the political Darwinism argument, that all of Venezuela's parties 
(not only the traditional ones) were unable to adapt to external changes and collapsed. 
Indeed, this was the case for AD and COPEI, which had become top-down and overly 
disciplined,  incapable  of  supporting  internal  competition  and  stifling  of  civil  society 
(Coppedge 1997). However, LCR was a reaction to the overly orthodox and disciplined 
AD and COPEI; one would have to stretch the concept of “traditional party” to be able to 
include  LCR (cf.  Coppedge  2001,  p  189).  LCR was  to  be  a  part  of  the solution to 
Venezuela's crisis of democratic representation and legitimacy, not another victim (Crisp 
and Levine 1998). Indeed, by the rationale of party-system collapse, LCR should have 
benefited from the collapse of the old order and swept the 1998 elections; however, the 
party collapsed before the political crisis reached its high point and before Chávez's anti-
party machinations took effect. According to Salamanca (2004), “LCR was affected more 
by its internal shock than by the party system crisis. It was its own internal contradictions 
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and their  institutional  carelessness  or  negligence”  that  spelled  the  party's  demise”  (p 
222).338
Another counter explanation is the two-level framework put forward by Burgess 
and Levitsky (2003) on the adaptation of populist parties in power. Adopting their criteria 
for this project's case, LCR would score “high” on fluidity of leadership hierarchy (there 
were  no  barriers  to  entry  into  the  party  and  no  bureaucratized  hierarchy  with 
institutionalized  career  paths  and  tenure  security  in  leadership  posts)  and  “high”  on 
autonomy of elected officials from the party leadership and party-affiliated unions (office 
holding party leaders were not formally held accountable to either the LCR “leadership” 
or  the  politically  diverse  Guayana  unions).  And,  since  there  was  a  “medium”  level 
incentive to adapt, the theory would falsely predict LCR adaptation, not continuity.
CONCLUSION
Throughout Latin America, where the left participated in democratization—i.e., 
Chile,  Brazil,  Uruguay—that  participation  channeled  leftist  party  discontent  into 
democratic norms, strategies,  and goals.  Where the left  remained on the sidelines for 
whatever reason (or, where it helped extricate the military from politics, but with non-
democratic  goals  in  mind)—i.e.,  Peru,  Venezuela,  Argentina—it  remained  unable  to 
engage in policy moderation down the line. Given the continued clout of party radicals 
and diffuse power structure, efforts at policy moderation proved ineffective: a lack of 
diverse voices within the parties' support bases, as well as disagreements over the proper 
role of parties within society and the legitimate sphere of political action complicated 
efforts at party adaptation. For instance, such a debate roiled IU's component party the 
338 Salamanca (2004) and López Maya (cf. 1998, 1999, 2004), the two leading LCR scholars, have pro-
posed system-specific theories—which include numerous factors (i.e. personal rivalries, electoral ambi-
tions, etc)--that share in common the fact that LCR's lack of institutionalization led to the party's col-
lapse.
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PUM. In its main journal, radical and pragmatic PUM militants debated the pros and cons 
of  trying  to  lead  society  versus  trying  to  follow (and  appeal  to)  public  opinion.  An 
editorial in favor of the party's moderation argued that the PUM needs to “do away with 
its conception of the cadre party.” “A little army party to attack frontally power” is not 
what's needed; rather, “we need to conquer society, not the state” (El Zorro de Abajo 
1985, p 4).
Parties  that  felt  compelled  to  compromise  their  beliefs  and  tactics  ended  up 
experiencing a genuine paradigm shift, as the very act of collaborating across the aisle 
and engaging diverse groups—whether or not done in an ad hoc way, strictly for the 
purposes of  regime change—had profound,  long-term effects.  Parties  that  were faced 
with the incentive to collaborate and negotiate in such a way were encouraged to adopt 
the role of formal political party and, from there, gained the incentive to 1) broaden their 
parties' appeals to appease their newfound audience, 2) expand their policy platform to 
include more diverse interests under one party umbrella, and 3) recalibrate their goals to 
ensure that they support and defend the rules of the political system for which they have 
recently  fought.  This  “dry  run”  of  tactical  moderation  ended  up  allowing  for  policy 
moderation down the line. Grzymala-Busse (2002) finds a similar phenomenon at play in 
her analysis of adaptation of former Communist parties. The experience of engaging in 
reform and negotiation under Communism taught party elites in Poland and Hungary how 
to adapt successfully under democratic rule, while the absence of such an experience in 
the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia  meant  that  party  elites  were  unable  to  adapt  to 
democratic rule down the line.
Neither  Venezuela’s  LCR,  nor  Peru’s  IU played such a  role,  as  there  was  no 
dictatorship to create the incentives and constraints that would induce adaptation in the 
former and the type of dictatorship in the latter likewise precluded the need to adapt (cf. 
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López Maya 1999; Calderón and Valdeavellano 1991; Tanaka 1998). The PS,339 PT, and 
FA all adapted into organized, electoral-professional parties—and the later two presently 
run Brazil and Uruguay’s national governments340—while LCR and IU failed to adapt 
and have become irrelevant and a non-actor, respectively. 
339 It was only under dictatorship, for example, that Chile’s PS finally broke out of its insular, ideologically 
uniform networks  of  movement  politics  in  order  to  advocate  a  broad,  multiparty  alliance  against 
Pinochet (Roberts 1998). 
340 Chile's PS controlled the presidency from 2000 to 2010 through the Concert of Parties for Democracy 
(Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia)
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This dissertation has shown that, paradoxically, it is helpful for leftist parties to 
experience challenges during their early, formative years so that they are better prepared 
institutionally to respond to potential changes in their external environment in the future. 
Inversely, “no pain, no gain:” if parties do not experience such difficulties early on, they 
have little need to focus their time and efforts on party program and organization and, 
given status quo bias and the costs of engaging in party building, will be unable to adapt 
in the future. In this way, a party's ability to adapt is, in large part, determined by the 
external  challenges  it  faced—or  did  not  face—during  its  formative  years:  it  is  the 
founding moments  of  a  party that  help determine its  organization and developmental 
trajectory in future phases.
First, leftist parties whose predecessors were subjected to authoritarian repression 
ended up intrinsically valuing democracy, thanks not only to political learning but also to 
the  altered  make-up  and  origins  of  such  parties.  This  ideological  renovation  helped 
parties  adapt  by  curtailing  the  spectrum of  possible  future  political  stances  and  thus 
enabling ideological moderation. Second, leftist parties that had to navigate legal hurdles, 
put in place by outgoing authoritarian regimes looking to prevent the rise of the left, 
ended up institutionalizing and developing disciplined, majoritarian mechanisms to make 
and  enforce  party  decisions.  This  institutional  maturation  helped  parties  adapt  by 
lengthening  time  horizons  and  strengthening  the  pragmatic  leadership  vis-à-vis  party 
radicals and rebels, keeping parties competitive and facilitating much-needed top-down 
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changes. Finally, leftist parties that felt compelled to hasten the armed forces' extrication 
from power ended up entering into pro-democratic alliances that expanded their support 
base to broader segments of society. This tactical moderation helped parties adapt by 
opening up formerly narrow parties, necessitating a broadening of political appeals.
Leftist  parties  that  were  born  out  of  repression,  were  subject  to  bureaucratic 
hurdles, and were forced into action to ensure a timely transition ended up benefited later 
on: these diverse challenges created the incentive to take actions, build structures, and 
adopt strategies that would pay off handsomely in the long-term. Those parties that had it 
relatively “easy” were not as lucky: as there was no need to engage in these costly, albeit 
worthwhile,  party-building  endeavors  early  on,  they  never  did  so  (since  institutions 
solidified and radicals retained veto power). As such, they were not prepared to respond 
to broad exogenous changes and engage in institutional adaptation in the future. In this 
way, leftist parties confronted by authoritarian repression, harassment, and intransigence 
adapted better than those that emerged within the context of democracy or non-repressive 
authoritarianism, as the former were forced to withstand greater challenges and, by doing 
so, sowed the seeds of future party adaptation.
Brazil's PT, Peru's IU, and Venezuela's LCR were all leftist parties with deep ties 
to  Marxism and  were  born  within  two  years  of  each  other  (1980,  1980,  and  1978, 
respectively). Despite having been created in the same world historical moment—thus 
controlling for the state of international socialism—their development trajectories were 
markedly different. The PT quickly abandoned non-democratic goals, slowly diversified 
and  professionalized  its  organization,  and  eventually  moderated  its  program (Amaral 
2003;  Ribeiro  2008).  IU  failed  to  moderate  or  professionalize;  in  fact,  the  party 
radicalized  during  the  1980s  and  its  institutional  development  plateaued  (Adrianzén 
2012). Much the same happened for LCR: a significant portion of the party radicalized 
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during the 1990s,  helping effect  the party's  institutional  collapse in 1997 (Salamanca 
2004). Why do we see divergence when, given these parties' initial similarities and given 
relative similar external contexts, one would expect convergence?
This  thesis  has  used  these  cases  to  develop  a  theory  explaining  under  what 
conditions some leftist  parties in Latin American democracies transform from radical, 
weakly institutionalized parties into moderate, professional ones and, conversely, under 
what conditions others fail to adapt, remaining confined to their ideological ghettoes and 
stagnating organizationally. It has argued that a party's ability to adapt institutionally and 
ideologically  is  determined  in  large  part  by  the  external  challenges  faced  during  its 
foundation  and  formative  years.  In  other  words,  parties  emerging  under  repressive 
authoritarian rule face particular challenges and constraints that encourage them to adopt 
certain mechanisms and policies—which facilitate party adaptation down the line—that 
they would otherwise not pursue. Party adaptation does not happen spontaneously; it only 
happens, in the words of Harmel and Janda (1994), when there is an incentive present to 
help  the  party  overcome a  natural  “wall  of  resistance.”  The  wall  may be  ideational, 
institutional, or a combination of the two.
Does this argument travel to the rest of the universe of leftist  parties in Latin 
America?  What  are  the  long-term  consequences  of  party  adaptation?  What  are  the 
repercussions of the failed adaptation of a country's leftist party? Is there hope for the left 
in  countries  where  leftist  parties  failed  to  adapt?  What  can  we  learn  from  this 
phenomenon of party change in terms of our understanding of how institutions are born, 
function, and die? Is adaptation reversible and, if it is, what should we expect to see in the 
coming years? Such questions need to be addressed before the thesis's research question 
can be truly answered.
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This chapter concludes the thesis on Latin America's leftist party adaptation. First, 
it  extends  the  argument  to  other  cases  within  Latin  America,  notably  Argentina's 
FREPASO and Mexico's PRD, while also providing a theoretical categorization of the 
different party types that emerge, given different scores on the dependent variable. Then, 
it returns to the debate over how the discipline understands and categorizes institutional 
change over time, offering a revised interpretation of critical juncture theory. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a discussion on the bi-directionality of adaptation and the future 
of leftist parties in the region.
LATIN AMERICA'S LEFT PARTIES
This  theory  can  be  used  to  explain  leftist  party  adaptation  throughout  Latin 
America. To various degrees, the same phenomenon has played out in the rest of the 
region's democracies. Table 6.1 offers more nuanced categories for the different possible 
combinations of values for the dependent variable, the project's case studies having been 
chosen only from the two main quadrants.  This section demonstrates that,  while they 
often go hand-in-hand, institutional professionalization and ideological moderation do not 
necessarily  take  place  in  unison;  the  two  secondary  categories  (i.e.,  high 
professionalization  with  low  moderation,  and  low  professionalization  with  high 
moderation)  admittedly  are  imperfect  theoretical  explanations  of  the  messy empirical 
realities of Latin American politics. The descriptive typology characterizes each outcome 
based on its phenotypical resemblance to a snapshot of one of the life stages of a star: 
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Figure 6.1: Leftist Party Adaptation Typology 
In  the  upper  left-hand quadrant  are  the  “stars,”  the  ideal  celestial  type:  large, 
stable  spheres  of  plasma.  Parties  within  this  cell  should  have  high  levels  of  both 
institutional  professionalization  and  ideological  moderation:  witness  Brazil's  PT, 
Uruguay's FA, Chile's PS-PPD, and Mexico's PRD (which will be discussed later in this 
section). As explained in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, these parties are characterized as having 1) 
immediate  predecessors  who were  subjected  to  authoritarian  repression,  2)  formative 
years  spent  struggling  to  abide  by  discriminatory  legal  regulations  put  in  place  by 
outgoing dictatorships,  and 3) raisons d'être that were challenged by the authoritarian 
regime's obstinance in leaving power. 
Given their  history of having been confronted by such early challenges,  these 
parties  were  compelled  to  do  what  was  necessary  to  pave  the  path  for  future  party 
adaptation.  Since  such  parties  boast  a  professional  party  organization  and  structure, 
coupled with a moderated policy stance, they are likely to be deeply embedded within 
341 N.B. FREPASO was born in 1994; as it never held a “radical” ideological stance, the party was placed 
in the “high” ideological moderation category.
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society and highly relevant electorally. Indeed, Handlin and Collier (2011) show that the 
PT,  FA,  and  PS  each  have  striking  advantages  over  the combined parties  in  their 
respective opposition when it comes to psychological linkages between the party and the 
electorate  (i.e.,  the  incidence  of  party  identification  and  the  level  of  confidence  left 
partisans  express  in  parties  themselves).  Furthermore,  the  PT has  controlled  Brazil's 
presidency since 2003,342 FA has controlled Uruguay's since 2005,343 and the PS was in 
power from 2000 to 2010;344 the PRD won over 32 percent of the presidential vote in 
2012, over 35 percent in 2006, and would have won the 1988 election had massive fraud 
not taken place345 (PDBA). 
Next,  in  the  upper  right-hand  quadrant  are  the  “supernovae,”  fleeting  but 
extremely  luminous  phenomena.  Parties  within  this  cell  should  have  low  levels  of 
institutional  professionalization  but  high  levels  of  ideological  moderation:  witness 
Argentina's FREPASO. Given their high levels of ideological moderation,346 such parties 
are  able  to  succeed  electorally;  however,  given  their  low  levels  of  institutional 
professionalization, such success is sure to be fleeting. According to this theory of party 
adaptation, such parties should have 1) immediate predecessors who were subjected to 
authoritarian repression, should not have 2)  spent  their  formative  years  struggling  to 
abide by discriminatory legal regulations put in place by outgoing military dictatorships, 
342 Lula held the presidency from 2003-2010 and Dilma Rousseff, his former chief-of-staff, took over the 
presidency in 2011.
343 Tabaré Vázquez held the presidency from 2005-2010 and José Mujica assumed power on 2010.
344 Ricardo Lagos was president from 2000-2006 and Michelle Bachelet was in power from 2006-2010.
345 In his memoir (2004), former President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) admitted that the ruling PRI 
did engage in massive fraud to steal the election from PRD candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas; however, 
the official count placed PRI candidate Carlos Salinas with over 50 percent of the vote, to Cárdenas's 
31 percent.
346 FREPASO was never as radical as those Latin American leftist parties with more direct roots to leftist 
groups from the 1960s; its ideology was more anti-populist and anti-former president Carlos Menem 
(1989-1999) than anything else. Furthermore, given its late founding—after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1990 and following the “end of history,” or, the supposed universalization of Western liberal democ-
racy (cf. Fukuyama, 1992)—FREPASO's stance vis-à-vis democracy (as well as the threat of an author-
itarian backlash) was categorically different from that of the other parties in this study.
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and should have 3) raisons d'être that were challenged by the armed forces' obstinance in 
leaving power.
FREPASO,  the  confederation  of  parties  which  arose  in  1994,  quickly  rose  to 
national prominence thanks in large part to its lack of party roots or an ideological history 
that could tie it down. A mere three years later the party allied itself with the Radical 
Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical, UCR) to form the Alliance for Work, Justice, and 
Education (Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación, “la Alianza”), and won the 
1999 presidential election with UCR candidate Fernando de la Rúa, only to disintegrate 
two years later. The next subsection will discuss in detail the case of FREPASO (as well 
as the discrepancy between the expected and theorized outcomes).
In the lower right-hand quadrant are the “black holes,” residue from a collapsed 
star; black holes also suck in all energy around them. Parties within this cell should have 
low levels of both institutional professionalization and ideological moderation: witness 
Peru's IU, Venezuela's LCR, and Colombia's M-19. As explained in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, 
these parties are characterized as having neither 1) immediate predecessors who were 
subjected to authoritarian repression, nor 2) formative years spent struggling to abide by 
discriminatory legal regulations put in place by outgoing military dictatorships, nor 3) 
raisons d'être that were challenged by the armed forces' obstinance in leaving power. 
All three parties showed great potential, yet all three were unable to surpass a 
certain point in their developmental trajectories: given their lack of party building and 
strategic and tactical moderation, such parties were unable to capitalize on earlier gains 
and suffered fatal divisions. Furthermore, this experience complicated future efforts by 
newer leftist parties to capitalize on the open space in the left-hand side of the political 
spectrum in Peru and Venezuela,347 as well as Colombia. In the 2000's, small new leftist 
347 The state of the lefts in Peru and Venezuela will be discussed later in this chapter.
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parties  have appeared in Colombia.  In 2005,  the Independent  Democratic  Pole (Polo 
Democrático  Independiente,  PDI)—a  small  young,  leftist  party  composed  of  social 
movements,  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs),  and  minor  leftist  parties348—
joined  with  Democratic  Alternative  (Alternativa  Democrática,  AD)  to  form  the 
Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo, PDA). The party's rise was 
helped by a 2003 electoral reform, which encouraged smaller parties to unite, and the 
divisiveness of President Álvaro Uribe's (2002-2010) rightist political project.
Finally, in the lower left-hand quadrant are the “red dwarves,” small, dull stars 
with  nonetheless  exceedingly  long  life  spans.  Parties  within  this  cell  should  have 
relatively  high  levels  of  institutional  professionalization,  yet  relatively  low  levels  of 
ideological moderation: witness Ecuador's ID and Bolivia's MIR. Such parties are able to 
obtain national power, given the strength of their party structure; however, their lack of 
policy moderation limits their ability to retain electoral relevance. According the theory, 
such parties should not have 1) immediate predecessors who subjected to authoritarian 
repression, should  have 2)  spent  their  formative  years  spent  struggling  to  abide  by 
discriminatory  legal  regulations  put  in  place  by  outgoing  military  dictatorships,  and 
should not have 3) raisons d'être that were challenged by the armed forces' obstinance in 
leaving power; the empirical cases in this quadrant do not fit perfectly the theoretical 
predictions.
Ecuador's ID was born under a democratic regime in 1970, but one which had 
been (and would later be) interrupted repeatedly by the armed forces.349 A military coup 
348 In 2003 the PDI's Luis Eduardo Garzón won the mayoralty of Bogotá, the second most powerful politi-
cal position in the country. During his tenure (2004-2008), “Lucho” developed numerous social pro-
grams targeting the poor. The PDA held onto the city, with the election of Samuel Moreno Rojas in 
2007; however, Rojas was suspended, stripped of his office, and arrested in 2011 for allegedly taking 
bribes (El País 2011).
349 Months after ID's founding in 1970, President José María Velasco (1968-1972) assumed dictatorial 
powers.
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two  years  later  placed  General Guillermo  Rodríguez  Lara  in  power  (1972-1976); 
however, Rodríguez was a soft-liner and the military regime's guiding philosophy was 
similar to that of neighboring Peru. In this way, the ID's immediate predecessors were not 
repressed, nor did ID spearhead democratization. Ecuador's transition to democracy was 
an elite-led affair: the country's political and economic elites, which had had enough with 
the military's modernization efforts, collaborated with the military to reinstall democratic 
rule. Throughout  this  the  ID  grew  slowly,  albeit  hampered  bureaucratically  by  a 
distrustful military. In 1988, ID presidential candidate Rodrigo Borja won the election 
and,  against  the  wishes  of  his  party  (a  member  of  the  Socialist  International), 
implemented moderate economic policies during his tenure (1988-1992). Borja's actions 
helped moderate what should have remained a more ideologically radical party, given 
ID's history and this dissertation's theory. Nevertheless, shortly after Borja's term ended, 
the party contracted and has since become a minor force in Ecuadorean politics.
Bolivia's MIR followed a similar trajectory; however, the leftist party did suffer 
repression under the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer (1971-1978). Under Jaime Paz Zamora, 
the party assumed the presidency (1989-1993); however, power was obtained through a 
backroom deal between Paz Zamora and Banzer (since no candidate received over 50 
percent  of  the  vote,  Congress  was  given  the  task  to  decide  among  the  top  three 
contenders:  Paz  Zamora,  Banzer,  and  incumbent  Gonzalo  Sánchez  de  Lozada).  Like 
Borja, Paz Zamora steered an otherwise reluctant party into more moderate waters under 
his  presidency;  also  like  ID,  the  party  has  since  lost  a  vast  majority  of  its  political 
territory within Congress and in society,  and is  currently a minor leftist  party on the 
fringes of Bolivian politics (cf. Mayorga 2005). The cases of ID and MIR suggest that the 
forward-looking actions of pragmatist party leaders cannot compensate for an otherwise 
ideologue-dominated party.
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The  next  two  sub-sections  take  a  closer  look  at  two  leftist  parties  in  Latin 
America: Argentina's FREPASO and Mexico's PRD. The first is a case of partially failed 
adaptation:  FREPASO had  no  incentive  to  sink  roots  into  society  or  institutionalize, 
undermining its ability to become a lasting, relevant party. The second is another case of 
successful adaptation: while the PRD is the only “star” in Latin America not to have held 
national office, it is nonetheless a case of successful party adaptation. These sub-sections 
present a brief overview of these parties' early years to show how the presence of early 
challenges  forced  these  parties  along  a  party-building  and  strategic-  and  tactical- 
moderation developmental trajectories, and vice versa. 
Argentina's FREPASO: A Case of Partial Failed Adaptation
FREPASO, a “supernova,” is a less clear-cut case of party adaptation: the party 
tried to adapt so quickly that it failed to establish itself as a party.350 Given the party's 
developmental trajectory—namely, a meteoric rise to prominence, followed by a hard 
fall, with extreme ideological moderation along the way—this project's theory of party 
adaptation would classify the party's founding and formative years as characterized by 
immediate  predecessors  who  were  subjected  to  repression,  no  legal  obstacles  to 
legalization, and participation in the country's democratization process. The party's failure 
to perfectly fit the theory's parameters stems in large part from FREPASO's late arrival 
onto the world stage. The party was founded in the mid 1990s; by that time, authoritarian 
rule  had been shunned throughout  the  region and,  therefore,  state  repression was  no 
longer a possible political tool. Largely because of this, the party experienced no legal 
hurdles to overcome in legalizing or participating politically; as such, FREPASO felt little 
350 Given Argentine history between 1994 and 2001, the party never had the opportunity to take on the role 
of defender of democracy: the country has been democratic since 1983 and has not experienced any 
challenges to democratic rule.
224
incentive  to  professionalize  its  organization.  The  party  remained  little  more  than  an 
electoral front and media phenomenon.
FREPASO arose in 1994 out of the Grand Front (Frente Grande), which had been 
founded shortly before by leftist  parties and progressive members of the PJ who had 
renounced Menem’s neoliberal reforms, Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata 
Cristiano,  PDC),  the  Intransigent  Party  (Partido  Intransigente,  PI), Socialist  Unity 
(Unidad  Socialista,  which  was  composed  of  the  Popular  Socialist  Party, Partido 
Socialista Popular, PSP, and Democratic Socialist Party, Partido Socialista Democrático, 
PSD),  and  sectors  of  the  old  Argentine  Communist  Party  (Partido  Comunista  de  la 
Argentina, PCA). The party’s strength lay primarily in the urban electorate (especially in 
the  Capital  Federal,  Greater  Buenos  Aires,  and Rosario);  however,  it  had a  presence 
throughout the country and, at one time or another, had won representation in almost all 
the  important  provinces.  This  new  party  attracted  young,  educated,  left-of-center,351 
statist (i.e., government intervention both in the economy and in decreasing the country’s 
inequality.) voters; FREPASO was the alternative to Menem’s neoliberalism (Caputo and 
Godio 1996). This was especially the case since UCR had shifted right following Raúl 
Alfonsín’s presidency. By the early 1990’s both of Argentina’s traditional parties saw 
their ideological stances converge (Gibson, 1996). 
A year later, José Octavio Bordón ran for president under the FREPASO platform 
and  placed  second  with  almost  thirty  percent  of  the  valid  votes.  Two  years  later, 
FREPASO  entered  la  Alianza,  which  performed  surprisingly  well  in  the  legislative 
elections. Riding on this wave of success, FREPASO occupied the vice-presidential slot 
in la Alianza's 1999 presidential slate. The Alianza swept that year's legislative elections
351 According to Latinobarometro data from the 1990’s, the Argentine electorate was surprisingly moti-
vated to vote based on ideology. FREPASO supporters were quite ideological: left-of-center center Ar-
gentine’s were more likely to vote for FREPASO and FREPASO supporters were more likely to see 
themselves as left-of-center (Seligson 2003).
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—winning a little less than half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies—and won the 
presidency with FREPASO's Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez as vice-president on de la Rúa's 
ticket  (Novaro and Palermo, 1998).
Yet it ended up falling just as quickly as it had risen. Profound disagreements 
between the conservative de la Rúa on one hand, and Chacho Álvarez and his FREPASO 
on the other, made for difficult governing as it became increasingly clear that UCR and 
FREPASO held few opinions in common, apart from their mutual opposition to Menem 
(Schamis  2002).  Even  within  FREPASO  there  were  numerous  intra-party  policy 
disagreements,  due to  the  extreme heterogeneity  within  the  party  and the  lack of  an 
institutionalized way of making and enforcing decisions. 
FREPASO did not last. In the aftermath of de la Rúa's contentious labor reform, 
followed by the corruption scandal in the Senate and alleged corruption within de la 
Rúa's  own  administration,352 Álvarez  resigned  the  vice-presidency  (cf.  Álvarez  and 
Morales Solá 2001). La Alianza collapsed shortly after, when de la Rúa was forced out of 
office amidst Argentina's financial crisis and debilitating street riots in the capital and 
throughout the country; many militants went on to rejoin the Peronist party, which was 
then pulled to the left by Néstor Kirchner after he became president (2003-2007). Why 
was FREPASO unable to engage in party adaptation?
FREPASO  never  professionalized  institutionally  because  it  never  had  any 
incentive to engage in party-building. The party always remained a loose confederation of 
different parties, held together tenuously by a unified political platform and leadership. 
None of the party's component parts ever seemed that interested in creating the structure 
needed to adapt  to FREPASO's ever-increasing electorate;  no one wanted to lose the 
autonomy with which they had initially entered. In this way, FREPASO remained a force 
352 In 2012, De la Rúa went on trial for allegedly engaging in active bribery and misappropriation of pub-
lic funds (El País 2012).
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with  “poor  organization  and  territorial  presence”  and  a  “persistent  lack  of  internal 
institutionalism,” one whose astonishing (albeit short-lived) success was based primarily 
on the dynamic qualities and strong personal abilities of Álvarez and Graciela Fernández 
Meijide,  FREPASO senator  and two-time deputy  (Novaro and Palermo 1998,  pp 65, 
109).
FREPASO never had to grow as a party because it never suffered any early legal 
challenges to its formation; it was growing electorally merely by the fact that it was in the 
right place at the right time. Instead, FREPASOhad it too easy, in a sense, to ever have to 
professionalize  institutionally.  According  to  Novaro  and  Palermo  (1998),  the  party's 
success  was  due  principally  to  the  fact  that  economic  and  state  reforms  led  to  the 
transformation  of  traditional  parties,  which  resulted  in  the  shaking  up  of  Argentina's 
traditional two-party system and the opening up of a new political space on the left side 
of the political spectrum. In particular, following Alfonsín's alliance with Menem in the 
Olivos  Pact353 (Pacto  de  Olivos),  UCR  witnessed  a  mass  defection  of  voters  and 
militants, who saw FREPASO as the best alternative. Indeed, an analysis of Argentine 
vote choice shows that FREPASO’s victories stem directly from the party’s ability to fill a 
previously empty niche in the country’s ideological spectrum (Seligson 2003).
Such a context, however, does not bode well for long-term electoral relevance and 
societal insertion. A lack of institutional organization meant that FREPASO was little 
more than a hollow shell. A lack of formal lines of communication or agreed-upon ways 
to make decisions and resolve conflicts meant that the party could never agree on what it 
stood for. Ideological incoherence led to bitter infighting between the Front's component 
groups. For instance, when “Chacho” promised Argentine companies that he would not 
reverse privatization, some leftists, notably Fernando “Pino” Solanas, left the party in 
353 Much hated by Alfonsín's party, the UCR, this Pact granted autonomy to Buenos Aires City in ex-
change for a constitutional reform allowing for presidential re-election. 
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disgust (Novaro and Palermo 1998, p 106). Indeed, a number of media pronouncements 
by  party  leaders  deeply  upset  party  militants,  who  saw  such  policy  switches  as 
ideological  opportunism  (Novaro  and  Palermo  1998,  p  115);  for  example,  Bordón's 
invitation  to  allow Menem's  ex-Minister  of  the  Interior  Gustavo Béliz  into  the  party 
caused much consternation amongst FREPASO's leftists.
FREPASO  did  not  survive  because  it  proved  unwilling  and  unable  to 
professionalize institutionally. If parties have no incentive to engage in party-building, 
they will, more often than not, avoid doing so, given the process's high upfront costs 
(Kalyvas  1996)  Even  in  terms  of  the  party's  ideological  moderation,  FREPASO was 
deficient.  It  was  less  ideologically  moderate  than  ideologically  lacking.  While  this 
ideological incoherence and extreme policy flexibility seemed to work wonders at first—
this dynamic fluidity proved adept at conforming quickly to public opinion, it  proved 
fleeting since the party never coalesced into representing a certain ideology or worldview. 
Rather, FREPASO represented a distinct moment of popular frustration over a specific 
problem: Menem. Once this issue had been dispelled, there was no more need for the 
party among the Argentine electorate (cf. Torre 2003).
 
Mexico's PRD: Another Case of Successful Adaptation
PRD,  like  the  PT,  is  categorized  as  a  “star:”  it  is  a  case  of  successful  party 
adaptation. Despite the questionable actions of its former party president, the PRD has 
professionalized  institutionally  and moderated  ideologically.  Indeed,  the  party  1)  was 
directly repressed  by  the  PRI,  2)  experienced  significant  bureaucratic  hurdles  to 
institutionalizing,  and  3)  was  compelled  to  participate  in  Mexico's  process  of 
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democratization. The rest of this subsection deals with the PRD's birth and developmental 
trajectory.
The PRD began as the National Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nacional, 
FDN), an electoral vehicle for the 1988 elections. It  was a fusion party of pro-statist 
defectors  from  the  PRI  along  with  preexisting  social  movements  and  leftist  parties, 
particularly the Socialist Mexican Party (Partido Mexicano Socialista, PMS), which was 
an agglutination of the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (Partido Socialista Unificado 
de México, PSUM), the Mexican Workers' Party (Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores, 
PMT), the Revolutionary Patriotic Party (Partido Patriótico Revolucionario, PPR), the 
Revolutionary Movement of the People (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, MRP), 
and the Union of the Communist Left (Unión de la Izquierda Comunista, UIC). It was 
founded  in  1989  upon  the  strong  showing  of  PRI-defector  Cuauhtémoc  Cárdenas's 
presidential campaign.354
Undeterred  by  its  1988  loss,  the  party  gradually  grew  institutionally  and 
electorally throughout the 1990s, winning victories at the municipal, state, and national 
level. The PRD achieved a breakthrough in 1997, when Cárdenas won the Mexico City 
government—which the party has held onto ever since, and which has since become the 
party's principal electoral stronghold—and legislative candidates won over a quarter of 
the vote: the PRD's share of senators rose from 8 to 16 (out of 128) and its share of 
deputies rose from 71 to 125 (out  of  500),  making it  the second largest  party in the 
Chamber of Deputies (and the third largest in the Senate). The party lost the presidential 
vote in 2006 by approximately 0.5 percent or 300,000 votes, and placed a respectable 
354 As mentioned earlier, according to former President de la Madrid (2004), the 1988 election was marred 
by fraud. Early electoral returns had Cárdenas leading the race so the PRI shut off the computerized 
vote tabulation system at the Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE). Five days 
later, when the vote count was finally announced, the system showed PRI's Salinas to have won, with 
over 50 percent of the vote (Anaya 2008).
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second in the 2012 presidential election (PDBA). Organizationally and structurally, the 
party boasts a strong base (relative to most leftist parties) and has handily survived the 
defection  of  its  most  famous  and  charismatic  leader,  Andrés  Manuel  López  Obrador 
(“AMLO,” for short), former governor of Mexico City and two-time PRD presidential 
candidate.
The PRD was born a leftist party, amidst the gradual strategic moderation of the 
Mexican  left  since  1977.  This  moderation  had  been  in  partial  response  to  targeted 
repression  of  the  left  by  the  “perfect  dictatorship:”  the  Mexican  state  alternatively 
harassed, sidelined, co-opted, and repressed the left. In this manner, the political learning 
that took place with the PT's predecessors in Brazil likewise took place in Mexico, too. 
The PRD was born with  radical  leftist  views.  In  terms of  policy  ideology,  Cárdenas 
described his 1988 presidential project as a “revolutionary movement in favor of the poor 
and dispossessed” (Borjas Benavente 2003, p 215). Identifiers with the FDN, the PRD's 
immediate predecessor, were consistently in favor of state-led development, as opposed 
to market reform and trade liberalization (Greene 2007, pp 177, 216). 
However, due to earlier authoritarian repression, its members had, for the most 
part, moderated strategically and accepted the electoral route as the sole legitimate route 
to power. Indeed, the reason why the minor leftist parties opted to give up their party 
identity  and  independent  structure  was  because  they  knew  that  Cárdenas  was  a 
charismatic and well-respected candidate capable of attracting the vote of a large sector 
of the population, thus helping them obtain power (Domínguez and McCann 1995).355
Furthermore, as was the case for the Brazilian left in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the Mexican left began to realize in the 1980s that the PRI's stranglehold on power 
355 Cárdenas was also the son of Lázaro Cardenas del Río (1934-1940), one of Mexico's most well-re-
garded presidents; his familial roots—he often invoked his father and claimed that he was an extension 
of his father's legacy (Borjas Benavente 2003, p 219)--provided him with traditional authority as well 
(cf. Weber 1964).
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was loosening and democracy inevitable.  In  1977,  PRI President  José López Portillo 
(1976-1982) passed political reforms that facilitated the legalization of numerous leftist 
parties (cf.  Middlebrook 1986).  Opening up on the part  of the PRI meant that  leftist 
parties  were  more  and  more  able  to  compete  electorally.  This  knowledge  that  the 
dictatorship was on its way out helped ensure that leftists did not radicalize, as is often 
the case when opposition politicians are faced with repression and see no plausible end in 
sight.356
Despite the political opening up, repression continued and even ended up directly 
persecuting the PRD (whereas the PT was never the target of direct repression). Shortly 
after  the  PRD's  founding,  and  in  response  to  electoral  inroads  by  it  and  the  PAN, 
President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and local PRI caciques led a crusade against the 
PRD and began to target its PRD politicians and militants for repression.357 Repression 
involved  anything  from  harassment—such  as  shutting  off  access  to  urban  services, 
making threats, and prison sentences based on trumped up charges (Greene 2007, p 95)—
to assassination.  Between 1988 and 1996,  the  PRI killed an estimated 250-400 PRD 
activists,  and imprisoned many thousands more, particularly in Southern Mexico. The 
first assassinations were two high-ranking members of Cárdenas's presidential opposition 
front, Francisco Xavier Ovando and his aide Román Gil Hernández, four days before the 
1988 presidential election; Ovando had built a system to oversee the electoral results and 
guard  against  election  fraud  (Schatz  2011,  p  51).  Schatz  (2011)  provides  a  detailed 
356 Greene's (2007) argument on how repression radicalizes opposition parties states exactly this. His argu-
ment explains why Mexico's rightist PAN radicalized instead of moderated: it was born in 1939, not 
1989. Back then, electoral success was highly unlikely and repression was expected; because of this, 
panistas hunkered down and adopted a “bunker” mentality to protect themselves, only to see this de-
fense mechanism constrain them from moderating down the line. Indeed, the PAN suffered through 
decades of unfair rule at the hands of the PRI and, as such, remained radically out of step with the aver-
age Mexican voter. However, because the PRD came about under different circumstances—namely, un-
der an authoritarian regime that was opening up—it reacted differently than the PAN.
357 Panistas were targeted far less than perredistas. Panistas who were assassinated or “died under suspi-
cious circumstances” include Judith Barrio, the daughter of then PAN candidate for governor Francisco 
Barrio, and Manuel Clouthier, PAN leader and presidential candidate (Schatz 2011, p 35-37)
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analysis of the many cases of violence and assassination committed against the PRD (see 
also CHR 1994).
If this theory is correct, such repression should have forced the PRD to moderate. 
While the party was always relatively moderate strategically, state repression seemed to 
have forced the PRD to moderate tactically, as well. Indeed, the PRD challenged the 1988 
fraud through the existing, legal procedures. It took its battle to formal institutions that 
the  PRI  controlled,  namely  the  Federal  Electoral  Commission  (Comisión  Federal  de 
Electores, CFE; IFE's predecessor) and the electoral courts (Bruhn 1997, p 147). Together 
with  pressure  from  the  PAN,  PRD's  efforts  paid  off  in  helping  push  through  and 
legitimize the electoral reform of 1996, requiring non-PRI affiliated citizens to administer 
elections under the newly created, autonomous IFE, and ensuring that elections could no 
longer be thrown, as they had in the past. The PAN and PRD succeeded in restructuring 
the  IFE  such  that  its  General  Council  would  be  manned  by  nonpartisan  electoral 
councilors, making IFE free from party and government pressure. Furthermore, electoral 
law was placed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, 
STF),  with  the  Federal  Electoral  Court  (Tribunal  Electoral  del  Poder  Judicial  de  la 
Federación,  TEPJF)  restructured  and  its  magistrates  nominated  by  the  STF (Klesner 
1997; Córdova and Ugarte 2008).
Supporting this reform, which was so crucial to ensuring Mexico's move to truly 
free and fair elections, was a key example of pushing for democratization. According to a 
1996 poll,  among those respondents who knew about the electoral  reform, almost 43 
percent  believed  that  the  PRD was  the  party leading the  negotiations  (Oficina  de  la 
Presidencia  1996).  The  PRD acknowledged that,  in  agreeing  to  support  the  electoral 
reform, it would be committing itself to the electoral arena and closing off any possibility 
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of  aligning  themselves  with  the  EZLN358 and  radical,  non-democratic  social  groups 
(Magaloni 2006).
However,  the  presidential  election  defeat  of  AMLO in  2006 (and,  to  a  lesser 
extent, in 2012) called into question the party's tactical moderation. IFE determined that 
the 2006 race was too close to call until all votes were counted. Once all votes were in, 
the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón, who was ahead by one half of a percentage point, 
was  declared  the  winner.  In  response,  losing  PRD  candidate  AMLO  challenged  the 
electoral results and went on to lead massive marches and protests throughout the capital, 
particularly  at  the  Zócalo,  Mexico  City's  main  square.  In  response  to  these  extra-
parliamentary actions, the TEPJF ordered the recount of those polling stations deemed to 
have irregularities; the Court reaffirmed the results and declared Calderón the winner. 
While  nominally  antidemocratic,  such actions  say  more  about  the  PRD's  presidential 
candidate (and ex-party leader) than the party; indeed, both AMLO and Cárdenas were 
arguably more radical than their party. AMLO has since moderated tactically, however. 
Following the 2012 election, the defeated PRD candidate lodged a formal complaint to 
invalidate  the  elections  with  the  TEPJF;  the  Court  looked  into  his  request,  but  later 
rejected allegations of fraud (El Universal 2012).
Following Cárdenas's poor showing in 1994—he garnered only 16.59 percent of 
the vote—pragmatic leaders in the party positioned to sideline him and other  radical 
ideologues. Responding to polls that showed that Cárdenas was too out of step with the 
average Mexican voter, such as a 1994 poll showing that 18 percent of the electorate 
thought that Cárdenas was too “radical” or “demagogic” (Oficina de la Presidencia 1994), 
then party president, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (1993-1996), extended much of his political 
capital pushing the PRD to spearhead what became the 1996 electoral reform as a way of 
358 In 1994, the Zapatistas began their guerrilla war against the Mexican state, with the objective of top-
pling President Salinas and instituting a radical, participatory democratic regime.
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professionalizing the PRD and sidelining the party's less democratic elements (Morales 
Paulín, 1997). The PRD's Third National Congress, in 1995, witnessed a public sparring 
between Muñoz Ledo and Cárdenas, with the former winning the upper hand in terms of 
the party's future ideological and institutional outlook. This achievement manifested itself 
via public opinion surveys and electoral results as a boon for the party's credibility and 
public  image  (cf. Oficina de la Presidencia 1997; IDEMERC Louis Harris 1994). 
However, the rise to prominence of AMLO, who became Mexico City's second elected 
mayor359 in 2000, brought to the party's forefront another relatively radical leader.
In terms of party-building, while the PRD was able to legalize relatively easily,360 
especially given the political reforms of 1977, the PRI regime did erect obstacles aimed 
at hampering the PRD's growth. Even placing repression aside, the PRD did not have it 
easy. While its predecessor parties and organizations helped give the PRD a jump start in 
terms of party-building (Carr 1996, pp 308-310), they had weakly consolidated bases, 
few  activists  and  resources,  little  organizational  structure,  and  virtually  no  national 
presence (Borjas Benavente 2003, pp 187-195; Anaya 2008). To make matters worse, 
Salinas concentrated efforts to erode what little traditional bases of support the PRD had 
inherited from its  leftist  component  parties361 through targeted social  programs and a 
public  relations  campaign  that  portrayed  the  party  as  violent  and  unreliable.  Indeed, 
Dresser  (1991)  argues  that  the  National  Solidarity  Program  (Programa  Nacional  de 
Solidaridad, PRONASOL), Mexico's umbrella organization developed to improve health, 
education, and employment for those living in extreme poverty, was designed as a “social 
359 Another aspect to the 1996 electoral reform was the ability to directly elect a mayor for the Federal 
District, a position that was previously appointed by the incumbent president (Córdova and Ugarte 
2008).
360 The FDN gave up in its attempt to organize itself into a party via the official registration process (i.e., 
holding state assemblies, etc.) and decided to accept the PMS's offer of transferring its registry to create 
the new, jointly constructed PRD (Borjas Benavente 2003, p 289).
361 To be fair,  Cárdenas did have his own personal support base in the State of Michoacán, where he 
served as senator (1974-1980) and governor (1980-1986). 
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tranquilizer,” a political strategy to shore up Salinas's administration and the PRI's hold 
over power by “undermining the strength of left-wing opposition forces by establishing 
ties with and commitments to popular movements” (pp 1-2).
Immediately after legalizing, the PRD was thus forced to embark on the tedious 
process of institutionalization, similar to what happened to the PT. An organization of 
activists  was  soon  constructed,  ties  with  civil  society  (especially  with  those  popular 
movements  that  had  supported  Cárdenas  in  1988)  were  strengthened,  and  a  modern, 
bureaucratic party structure and organization was built (Bruhn 1997, p 168). This process 
continued wholeheartedly throughout the 1990s. This professionalization drive was, in 
part, a result of the party's devastating loss in the 1994 presidential election. According to 
then  PRD  president  Muñoz  Ledo,  “unless  the  PRD  became  a  stable,  electoral-
professional, and trustworthy party” it would never be able to garner significant support 
from the electorate to win national elections (quoted in Borjas Benavente 2003, p 591). 
This effort continued under AMLO's party presidency; he pushed for tactical pragmatism 
and, to a lesser extent, party professionalization.
Today, the PRD is a moderate, professional party. It holds over 14 percent of the 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as almost twenty percent of the Senate. It is a 
democratic leftist party, with a strong organizational base. According to Bruhn (2012), 
78.4 percent of all the PRD's expenditures are characterized as “ordinary, permanent,” 
which covers salaries and benefits for employees, as well as building and utilities and 
which she describes as the category that “comes closest to measuring funding for party 
organization” (p 27;  emphasis  added).  Furthermore,  in  comparison to  Mexico's  other 
three parties, the PRD “was the most bureaucratized party,” given the high percentage 
(40) of its income spent on salaries (Bruhn 2012, p 28); the 1996 electoral reform had 
also revamped the country's party financing scheme, which became essentially public and 
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established mechanisms to control and monitor the origin and destination of resources 
(Córdova and Ugarte 2008). The PRD nonetheless opted to divert much of its resources
—more than Mexico's two other major parties—to party organization and other long-term 
party building measures (Bruhn 2012). In this way, the PRD, which suffered so many 
early challenges, successfully engaged in party adaptation.
BROADER THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: CRITICAL JUNCTURE, YET GRADUAL 
CHANGE
Institutions are historical products of political conflicts and choices (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992). They provide links between unsettled moments of great transformation
—such  as  the  birth  and  formative  years  of  a  political  party—and  ordinary  times 
(Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). As such, they are sticky, remaining in place long after 
their original objective or usefulness has passed. In this way, the “weight of the past” 
often impedes one's ability to compete in a new or different system. However, this same 
“weight” can also be liberating; the results of earlier political conflicts can be retrofitted 
and  used  for  different  purposes  down the  line.  For  example,  institutions  adopted  by 
parties for the purpose of confronting early challenges may also help parties engage in the 
difficult task of ideological and institutional adaptation at some future date. In this way, 
this project has shown that early pain did indeed cause later gain.
Leftist parties that were subjected to the machinations and whims of authoritarian 
regimes were compelled to engage in certain actions and adopt certain policies for the 
sake of their own protection, future, and very survival. Unbeknownst to these parties—
and,  for  sure,  to  those  military  rulers  who  did  the  repressing,  cooked  up  the  unfair 
policies, and refused to return to the barracks—their responses to external challenges in 
turn  facilitated  ideological  moderation  and  institutional  professionalization.  This  thus 
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prepared such parties better than those that were never subjected to early challenges for 
party  adaptation  when  the  Latin  American  electorate  began  rewarded  professional, 
moderate parties in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
What  is  so  interesting  is  the delayed consequence  of  these  early  challenges: 
repression, legal obstacles, and participation in democratization prepared leftist parties 
for later adaptation by germinating the seeds for ideological moderation and institutional 
professionalization if and when the need should arise. During their formative years these 
parties adopted the mechanisms, structures, and policies necessary for future adaptation; 
however,  institutional professionalization and ideological moderation only came about 
years later, after external stimuli created the incentive for adaptation. For instance, the PT 
immediately  moderated  strategically,  but  it  took  years  to  moderate  tactically,  and  a 
decade to  moderate  its  policies;  institutional  professionalization likewise  was  a  slow, 
gradual process. Such a phenomenon, however, challenges the established wisdom in the 
discipline that understands political change as the result either of continual, incremental 
change or sudden  change  following  a  critical  juncture—namely,  the  transition  from 
military rule.
This party adaptation argument is thus one of a critical juncture that predicts a 
much-delayed, gradual effect. It synthesizes and integrates the two competing schools of 
historical institutionalism: traditional, critical juncture theory—i.e., short bursts of change 
followed by long stretches of continuity (Collier and Collier 1991; Katznelson 2003)—
and  the  more  revisionist  historical  institutionalism  that  advocates  a  gradual  change 
argument (e.g. Sewell 1996). In this way, an unorthodox critical juncture theory actually 
predicts gradual change. Incremental institutional change can thus, nonetheless, result in 
transformative  consequences  over  time  (cf.  Streeck  and  Thelen  2005);  however,  the 
catalyst for such glacial change was an earlier critical juncture. In this way, institutional 
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change  is  a  complex  phenomenon  that  does  not  conform  to  the  stark  division  of 
transformational-change-followed-by-stasis  versus  continual-incremental-change 
currently established in the literature.
Beginning with Lipset and Rokkan, many party theorists have come to see parties 
as  “frozen”  residues,  or  “crystallizations”  of  previous  conflicts,  characterized  by 
considerable  autonomy and  the  inertial  strength  to  resist  shifts  in  the  broader  socio-
political environment (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Likewise, many see a party's historical 
origins as deterministically shaping its developmental trajectory (cf. Greene 2007), an 
anchor of stability and a contributor to status-quo bias. However, this dissertation has 
demonstrated  that  a party's  historical  origins  can  also,  paradoxically,  serve  as  the 
mechanism for sweeping change down the line: institutional features adopted by leftist 
parties in the face of early challenges had unintended, albeit positive, consequences that 
prepared these parties for later ideological and organizational transformations (i.e., the 
opposite of  institutional  inertia).  In  this  way,  particular  institutional  designs can offer 
opportunities  for  unforeseen venues of  political  contestation and unpredicted political 
outcomes.
Political  challenges  during  a  party’s  formative  years  and  the  institutional 
responses they engendered help shape that party's long-term developmental trajectory. 
But the “weight” of one’s past is not necessarily burdensome; it can also be grounding 
and positive. The past does not necessarily make one resilient to change (since certain 
party structures and policies technically remained in place past their original purpose). 
Rather,  institutional  legacies,  paradoxically,  can  also  ensure  that  leftist  parties 
transformed successfully into moderate, professional parties. 
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FINAL THOUGHTS
While political parties matter, non-party entities remain important within Latin 
American  politics.  Indeed,  the  failure  of  LCR  and  IU  to  consolidate  themselves  as 
professional,  moderate leftist  parties still  reverberates in the Venezuelan and Peruvian 
political realms, respectively, to this day. In both countries, the left largely exists in non-
party form. Such developments are harrowing for the future of democratic politics in both 
countries.
Life Outside Parties?
The fact that a leftist party does not engage in party adaptation does not preclude 
the rise to power of leftist leaders. Indeed, Chávez's firebrand discourse was loaded with 
leftist  rhetoric,  and  his  political  project  of  “21st Century  Socialism”  came,  at  least 
nominally, from the leftist camp. However, as the former president became more and 
more of a one-man-government at the expense of democratic institutions, as the regime 
became  more  militaristic,  as  the  president's  cronies  became  business  magnates 
(“Boligarchs”), as crime and violence surged, and as rampant inflation has harmed the 
country's lower classes, many leftists have rethought their former allegiance and severed 
ties with the regime—especially with the recent passing of Chávez. PPT, PCV, MAS, and 
For Social Democracy (Por la Democracia Social, PODEMOS) all broke with Chávez's 
political project, and many of his staunchest critics, such as Petkoff, are historical leftist 
figures. Medina, for his part, also broke with Chávez; he ran, unsuccessfully, in the 2012 
presidential primary of the unified opposition, the MUD.
In  large  part  thanks  to  Chávez's  charisma,  electoral  strength,  and  political 
machinations,  the  Venezuelan  left  barely  exists  outside  of  Chávez  and  his  Unified 
Socialist  Party  of  Venezuela  (Partido  Socialista  Unido  de  Venezuela,  PSUV).  The 
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opposition has become more unified than ever, but the prospect of a strong leftist party 
emerging is unlikely; far more likely is the rise of a centrist or center-right party, headed 
by  2012  MUD  presidential  candidate  and  Governor  of  Miranda  Henrique  Capriles. 
Capriles will compete against Chávez's hand-picked successor, Nicolás Maduro of the 
PSUV, in presidential elections on 14 April 2013.
In  Peru,  President  Ollanta  Humala  (2011-present)  likewise  governs  from  the 
center-left; however, he is more nationalist-pragmatic than anything else. Humala walks 
the walk and talks the talk in terms of social inclusion and battling poverty through new 
social programs; furthermore, he initially brought in numerous leftists to the ranks of his 
overall-diverse  advisory  groups  and  cabinet,  including  Sinesio  López,  Carlos  Tapia, 
Nicolás  Lynch,  Alberto  Adrianzén,  and  Aida  García  Naranjo.  The  PCP  and  Red 
Fatherland both supported Humala and he also initially counted upon the support of five 
leftist congressmen, including Díez Canseco; however, they all broke with the president 
in July of 2012. Indeed, after realizing that the Humala government would be marked 
more  by  continuity362 than  by  radical  change  (cf.  Vergara  2012),  many  leftists  have 
severed political ties with the president.
Despite supporting him and playing a minor role in his government (or, perhaps, 
because they did so), the left is “without a home of its own....Today, the left in Peru is 
more  of  a  sentiment  than  a  political  option...it  is  the  sum of  individuals  and  small 
organizations that do not approach the idea of parties” (León Moya 2012). In many ways, 
Peru's left is still suffering from the failure of IU. Dargent (2012) argues that three factors 
are  greatly  diminishing  the  possible  rise  of  a  leftist  party  in  Peru:  the  existence  of 
caudillos  unwilling  to  subordinate  themselves  to  national  organizations;  a  lack  of 
362 Humala has supported orthodox economic policies and has taken a hardline stance against protesters 
looking to suspend mining projects over the ensuing environmental damage and water pollution that re-
sults (Dargent and Muñoz 2012).
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resources,  especially  given  the  weakness  of  unions  and  agrarian  federations,  and;  a 
political  program  broad  but  strong  enough  to  accommodate  environmental  issues  (a 
growing concern among Peru's left), as well as others, such that the party has enough 
support to win a presidential election. 
While  the  ambiguity  surrounding the  left's  stance on armed struggle  has  long 
since dissolved, its failure to professionalize and moderate is in part to blame for the 
small  but  growing  support  for  the  Movement  for  Amnesty  and  Fundamental  Laws 
(Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales, MOVADEF), especially among 
student groups, but also in poor neighborhoods and labor unions. Considered by some the 
political arm of Shining Path (which still operates today albeit as a fraction of its former 
self and more in the form of an illicit drug enterprise than a Maoist guerrilla insurgency), 
MOVADEF tried to create a political party in 2011 with the objective of amnestying all 
crimes committed during the war, as well as the release of its jailed members, especially 
its founder, Abimael Guzmán or “Chairman Gonzalo.”
The JNE rejected MOVADEF's request on the grounds that any group that wants 
to register itself has to demonstrate that it does not engage in seditious acts; the group's 
founding document “does not demarcate in a clear and concrete manner the terrorist and 
barbaric acts committed by Shining Path in the 1980s and 1990s” (La República 2012). 
In spite of this, however, the group is minuscule. And, despite its sensationalization in the 
media (cf. Ramírez Zapata 2013), MOVADEF most likely does not represent any threat 
to Peruvian democracy: the country has changed (cf. Gamarra 2012). What threat there is 
is  that  the  left  remains  without  a  party  and  the  electorate  remains  without  a  viable, 
democratic  option.  The result  is  a  feckless  left,  not  anchored down to any particular 
ideology or program, and characterized by personalist, go-it-alone leaders who represent 
no one given their frequent “flipflopping.”
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Leftist Parties in the 21st Century
Nonetheless, Latin America's leftist parties have come a long way from their past 
of bombing buildings and kidnapping ambassadors. Many of the region's leftist parties 
are now professional and moderate,  boasting of strong and flexible organizations and 
defined by pragmatic ideologies. Thanks not only to the actions of leftist parties in power
—i.e., bringing the military under civilian control, decentralizing government services, 
promoting  transparency,  reducing  poverty  and  inequality,  and  implementing  fiscally 
sound social programs (cf. Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010)—but also to the very 
presence of a legal, democratic option on the left, the region's democratic institutions are 
stronger and more consolidated. Latin Americans of all ideological strains and partisan 
proclivities are the beneficiaries of this.
Given the nature of party adaptation, successfully adapted leftist parties should be 
able to handle subsequent ideological shifts among the electorate. One example of this is 
the PRD's dramatic shift to the left in terms of social policy (i.e., support for abortion 
rights and gay marriage) since 2006. Indeed, policy adaptation is actually bi-directional: 
were the left's  electoral base to radicalize in the foreseeable future,  those parties that 
replaced  deterministic  ideological  stances  for  more  malleable,  pragmatic  approaches 
should be able to respond in kind and re-radicalize.363 Ideological moderation, in the end, 
has  always  been  less  about  actual  policy  moderation  than  adopting  a  more  flexible 
approach to politics, one that seeks to follow and represent public opinion rather than 
guide it and serve as society's self-appointed, vanguard delegates. In this way, we should 
363 In terms of policy moderation. A reversal of strategic and tactical moderation is highly unlikely, given 
these parties' struggles to participate in the representative democratic arena and the harrowing experi-
ence of their institutional predecessors in the hands of non-democratic regimes in the 1960s and 1970s.
242
not be surprised to see adapted leftist parties swing back to the left,  if  and when the 
electorate were to reward it.
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APS: Socialist Popular Action (Ação Popular Socialista). Brazil.
APS: Socialist Political Action (Acción Política Socialista). Peru.
ARENA: National Renewal Alliance Party (Aliança Renovadora Nacional). Brazil.
ARI: Revolutionary Alliance of the Left (Alianza Revolucionaria de Izquierda). Peru.
ARS: Socialist Revolutionary Action (Acción Revolucionaria Socialista). Peru.
AS: Socialist Accord (Acuerdo Socialista). Peru.
CC: Central Committee (Comitê Central). Brazil.
CCP: Peasant Confederation of Peru (Confederación Campesina del Perú). Peru.
CDN: National Directive Committee [of IU] (Comité Directivo Nacional). Peru.
CDMP: Provisional Municipal Executive Committee (Comissão Diretora Municipal Provisória). Brazil.
CDNP: Provisional National Executive Committee (Comissão Diretora Nacional Provisória). Brazil.
CDRP: Provisional Regional Executive Committee (Comissão Diretora Regional Provisória). Brazil.
CEN: National Executive Committee [of LCR] (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional). Venezuela.
CEN: National Executive Committee [of the PT] (Comissão Executiva Nacional). Brazil.
CFE: Federal Electoral Commission (Comisión Federal de Electores, CFE); replaced by the Federal Elec-
toral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE). Mexico.
CGTP: General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General del Trabajo del Perú). Peru.
CNE: (see also CSE) National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral). Venezuela.
CO: Worker's Cause (Causa Operária). Brazil.
COFAVIC: Committee of the Relatives of the Victims (El Comité de Familiares de las Víctimas). 
Venezuela.
COLINA: National Liberation Command (Comando de Libertação Nacional). Brazil.
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COPEI: Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee (Comité de Organización Política Elec-
toral Independiente). Venezuela.
COPRE: Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del 
Estado). Venezuela.
COSO: Socialist Convergence (Convergencia Socialista). Peru.
CS: Socialist Convergence (Convergência Socialista). Brazil.
CSE: Supreme Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral); replaced by the National Electoral Council 
(Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE). Venezuela.
CVG: Venezuelan Corporation of Guayana (Corporación Venezolana de Guayana). Venezuela.
CVR: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación). Peru.
ELN: Army of National Liberation (Ejército de Liberación Nacional). Peru.
EP: Progressive Encounter (Encuentro Progresista). Uruguay.
EU: European Union.
EZLN: Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional). Mexico.
FA: Broad Front (Frente Amplio). Uruguay.
FALN. Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional). Venezuela
FMLN: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Na-
cional). El Salvador.
FNTC: National Front of Workers and Peasants (Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos). Peru.
FOCEP: Worker, Peasant, Student, and Popular Front (Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular). 
Peru.
FREPASO: Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente por un País Solidario). Argentina.
FSLN: Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional). Nicaragua.
ID: Democratic Left (Izquierda Democrática). Ecuador.
IFE: (see also CFE) Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral). Mexico.
IMF: International Monetary Fund.
IS: Socialist Left (Izquierda Socialista). Peru.
IU: United Left (Izquierda Unida). Peru.
JCV: Communist Youth of Venezuela (Juventud Comunista de Venezuela). Venezuela.
JNE: National Panel of Elections (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones). Peru.
LCR: The Radical Cause (La Causa Radical; La Causa Я). Venezuela.
M-19: The 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril). Colombia.
MAS: Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo). Venezuela.
MBR-200: Bolivarian Republic Movement 200 (Movimiento Bolivariano Republicano 200). Venezuela.
MDB: Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro). Brazil.
MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria). Bolivia.
MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria). Peru.
MIR: Leftist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario). Venezuela.
MOVADEF: Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Laws (Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fun-
damentales). Peru.
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MR-8: Revolutionary Movement – October 8 (Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro). Brazil.
MRP: Revolutionary Movement of the People (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo). Mexico.
MRTA: Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru). Peru.
MUD: Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática). Venezuela.
MVR: Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República). Venezuela.
NGO: Non-governmental organization.
NOP: Nucleus of Public Opinion (Núcleo de Opinião Pública). Brazil.
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
PAN: National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional). Mexico.
PCA: Argentine Communist Party (Partido Comunista de la Argentina). Argentina.
PCB: Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro). Brazil.
PCBR: Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário). Brazil.
PC do B: Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil). Brazil.
PCO: Worker's Cause Party (Partido da Causa Operária). Brazil.
PCP: Peruvian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Peruano). Peru.
PCP-BR: Communist Party of Peru – Red Flag (Partido Comunista del Perú - Bandera Roja). Peru.
PCP-PR: Communist Party of Peru—Red Fatherland (Partido Comunista del Perú–Patria Roja). Peru.
PCP-SL (see also, SL): Communist Party of Peru—Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero 
Luminoso). Peru.
PCR: Revolutionary Communist Party (Partido Comunista Revolucionario). Peru.
PCV: Communist Party of Venezuela (Partido Comunista de Venezuela). Venezuela.
PDA: Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo). Colombia.
PDC: Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano). Chile.
PDC: Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano). Argentina.
PDI: Independent Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Independiente). Colombia.
PDS: Social Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Social). Brazil.
PDT: Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista). Brazil.
PED: Process of Direct Elections (Processo de Eleições Diretas). Brazil
PFL: Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal). Brazil.
PI: Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente). Argentina.
PJ: Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista). Argentina.
PL: Liberal Party (Partido Liberal). Brazil.
PMDB: Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro). 
Brazil.
PMS: Socialist Mexican Party (Partido Mexicano Socialista). Mexico.
PMT: Mexican Workers' Party (Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores). Mexico.
PODEMOS: For Social Democracy (Por la Democracia Social). Venezuela.
PP: Patriotic Pole (Polo Patriótico). Venezuela.
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PP: Popular Party (Partido Popular). Brazil.
PPR: Revolutionary Patriotic Party (Partido Patriótico Revolucionario). Mexico.
PPS: Popular Power and Socialism (Poder Popular e Socialismo). Brazil.
PPT: Fatherland for All (Patria Para Todos). Venezuela.
PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática). Mexico.
PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional). Mexico.
PRONASOL: National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad). Mexico.
PS: Socialist Party (Partido Socialista). Chile.
PSD: Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrático). Argentina.
PSDB: Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira). Brazil.
PSP: Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular). Argentina.
PSOE: Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español). Spain.
PSOL: Socialism and Freedom Party (Partido Socialismo e Liberadade). Brazil.
PSR: Revolutionary Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario). Peru.
PSUM: Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (Partido Socialista Unificado de México). Mexico.
PSUV: United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela). Venezuela.
PSTU: United Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado). Brazil.
PT: Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores). Brazil.
PTB: Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro). Brazil.
PUM: Mariateguist Unified Party (Partido Unificado Mariateguista). Peru.
Sidor: Iron and Steel Works of Orinoco (Siderúrgica de Orinoco C.A.). Venezuela.
SIN: National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional). Peru.
SINAMOS: National Support System for Social Mobilization (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movi-
lización Social). Peru.
SL (see also, PCP-SL): Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). Peru.
SNI: National Information Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações). Brazil
STF: Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal). Mexico.
SUTIS: Single Union of the Iron and Steel Works of Orinoco (Sindicato Único de la Siderúrgica del 
Orinoco). Venezuela.
TEPJF: Federal Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación). Mexico.
TSE: Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral). Brazil.
UCR: Radical Civic Union. (Unión Cívica Radical). Argentina.
UCV: Central University of Venezuela (Universidad Central de Venezuela). Venezuela.
UDP: Popular Democratic Unity (Unidad Democrático Popular). Peru.
UI: Left Unity (Unidad Izquierda). Peru.
UIC: Union of the Communist Left (Unión de la Izquierda Comunista). Mexico.
UNIR: Revolutionary Left Union (Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria). Peru.
URD: Democratic Republican Union (Unión Republicana Democrática). Venezuela.
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URNG: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca). 
Guatemala.
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
VAR Palmares. Palmares Armed Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares). 
Brazil.
VR: Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Revolucionaria). Peru.
VS: Socialist Side (Vertente Socialista). Brazil.
WTO: World Trade Organization.
259
Bibliography
Acción Política Socialista (APS). 1987. Acuerdos del V Ampliado CDN-IU. Lima: Acción 
Política Socialista.
Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2001. “A Theory of Political Transitions.” The 
American Economic Review 91 (4).
____. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Achen, Christopher and Duncan Snidal. 1989. “Rational Deterrence Theory and Compar-
ative Case Studies.” World Politics 41.
Adrianzén, Alberto, ed. 2012. Apogeo y Crisis de la Izquierda Peruana: Hablan sus Pro-
tagonistas. Lima: Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya.
Aldrich, John. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in 
America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Allison, Michael. 2012. “The Causes and Consequences of Schisms on the Electoral Per-
formances  of  Former  Rebel  Groups.”  Paper  presented  at  Party-Building  in  Latin 
American Conference at Harvard University, 16 November 2012. 
Álvarez, Ángel. 2006. “Social Cleavages, Political Polarization, and Democratic Break-
down in Venezuela.” Stockholm Review of Latin American Studies (1).
Álvarez, Chacho and Joaquín Morales Solá. 2001. Sin Excusas. Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Sudamericana.
Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. 1984. Estado e Oposição no Brasil (1964-1984). Petrópo-
lis: Vozes.
Alves, Márcio Moreira. 1986. Torturas e Torturados. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Idade Nova.
____. 1993. 68 Mudou o Mundo. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira.
Amaral, Oswaldo. 2003. A Estrela Não é Mais Vermelha: As Mudanças do Programa 
Petista nos Anos 90. São Paulo: Editora Garçoni.
____. 2010. As Transformações na Organização Interna do Partido dos Trabalhadores 
entre 1995 e 2009. Doctoral thesis, Political Science: Universidade Estadual de 
Campinas.
260
Ames, Barry. 1995. “Electoral Strategy under Open List Proportional Representation.” 
American Journal of Political Science 39(2).
Amnesty International. 2005. “Perú/Chile: Las Graves Violaciones de Derechos Humanos 
durante el Mandato de Alberto Fujimori.”
Anaya, Martha. 2008. 1988: El Año que Calló el Sistema. México D.F.: Debate.
Andersen, Martín. 1993. Dossier Secreto. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
Anderson, Charles. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Govern-
ing of Restless Nations. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company.
Angell, Alan and Benny Pollack. 1990. “The Chilean Elections of 1989 and the Politics 
of the Transition to Democracy.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 9(1).
Arditti, Rita. 1999. Searching for Life: The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the 
Disappeared Children of Argentina. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Arenas, Nelly. 2010. “La Venezuela de Hugo Chávez: Rentismo, Populismo y Democra-
cia.” Nueva Sociedad 229 (September-October).
Arnold, Jason Ross and David Samuels. 2011. “Public Opinion and Latin America’s ‘Left 
Turn.” Steven  Levitsky  and  Kenneth  Roberts,  eds., The  Resurgence  of  the  Latin 
American Left. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Arns, D. Paulo Evaristo. 1985. Brasil: Nunca Mais. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes.
Arnson, Cynthia and José-Raúl Perales, eds. 2007. The ‘New Left’ and Democratic Gov-
ernance in Latin America. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Arroyo, Ângelo. 1979. “Um Grande Acontecimento na Vida do País e do Partido.” Movi-
mento (São Paulo) 222.
Azevedo, Clovis Bueno de. 1995. A Estrela Partida Ao Meio: Ambigüidades Do Pensa-
mento Petista. São Paulo: Editora Entrelinhas.
Baker, Andy. 2003. “Why is Trade Reform so Popular in Latin America? A Consump-
tion-Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences.” World Politics 55(3).
____. 2009. The Market and the Masses in Latin America: Policy Reform and Consump-
tion in Liberalizing Economies. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Baker, Andy and Kenneth F. Greene. 2011. “The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free 
Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies.” World Politics 63(1).
Barrantes, Alfonso. 1985. Sus Propias Palabras. Lima: Mosca Azul.
261
Bartolini, Stefano. 2000. The Political Mobilization of the European Left,  1860-1980: 
The Class Cleavage. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Basombrío, Carlos. 2003. “The Militarization of Public Security in Peru.” Joseph 
Tulchin, H. Hugo Frühling and Heather Golding, eds., Crime and Violence in Latin 
America: Citizen Security, Democracy, and the State. Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press.
Bayardo Sardi, Luis. 2001. Cambio en Democracia. Caracas: Instituto Municipal de Pub-
licaciones.
Bennett, Andrew. 2008. “Process Tracing: A Bayesian Approach.” Janet M. Box-Stef-
fensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political 
Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bennett, Andrew and Colin Elman. 2006. “Qualitative Research: Recent Developments 
in Case Study Methods.” Annual Review of Political Science 9(1).
Bernales, Enrique Bernales. 1980. Crisis Política: Solución Electoral? Lima: Desco – 
Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo.
Bermeo, Nancy. 1992. “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship.” Comparative Poli-
tics 24(3).
____. 1997. “Myth of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transi-
tions.” Comparative Politics 29(3).
Blanco Muñoz, Agustín. 1980. La Lucha Armada: Hablan 5 Jefes. Caracas: Universidad 
Central de Venezuela.
____. 2003. Venezuela del 04F-92 al 06D-98: Habla el Comandante Hugo Chávez Frías. 
Caracas: Fundación Cátedra Pío Tamayo.
Boix,  Carles.  2003. Democracy  and  Redistribution.  Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press.
Borjas Benavente, Adriana. 2003. Partido de la Revolución Democrática: Estructura,  
Oganización Interna y Desempeño Público 1989-2003. México D.F.: Gernika.
Brady, Henry E. and David Collier, eds. 2004. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, 
Shared Standards. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Bruhn, Kathleen. 1997. Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the  
Struggle for Democracy in Mexico. University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press.
Bruhn, Kathleen. 2012. “Money for Nothing? Public Financing and Party Building in 
Latin America.” Paper presented at Party-Building in Latin Conference at Harvard 
University, 16-17 November 2012.
262
Bruton, Henry. 1998. "A Reconsideration of Import Substitution." Journal of Economic 
Literature. 36.2.
Buonicore, Augusto. Unpublished. “A História do PC do B entre 1979 e 1985.”
Burgess, Katrina and Steven Levitsky. 2003. “Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in 
Latin America: Environmental and Organizational Determinants of Party Change in 
Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.” Comparative Political Studies 36(8).
Burt, Jo-Marie. 1998. “Shining Path and the 'Decisive Battle' in Lima's Barriadas: The 
Case of Villa El Salvador.” Steve Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Soci-
ety in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press.
Buxton, Julia. 2003. “The Economics of Chavismo.” Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, 
eds., Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict. Boul-
der: Lynne Rienner.
Calderón, Julio and Rocio Valdeavellano. 1991. Izquierda y Democracia: Entre la Utopia 
y la Realidad. Lima: Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano.
Calloni, Stella. 1999. Los Años del Lobo: Operación Cóndor. Buenos Aires: Ediciones 
Continente.
Cameron, Maxwell. 1994. Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru: Political Coalitions 
and Social Change. London: Macmillian.
Caputo, Dante and Julio Godio. 1996. Frepaso: Alternancia o Alternativa. Buenos Aires: 
Corregidor.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 2006. The Accidental President of Brazil: A Memoir. New 
York: Publicaffairs.
Caro Cárdenas, Ricardo. 1998. Vanguardia Revolucionaria: Una introducción a los Orí-
genes y Desarrollo de la Nueva Izquierda Peruana (1965-1972). Unpublished Bache-
lor's thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
Carr, Barry. 1996. La Izquierda Mexicana a través del Siglo XX. México D.F.: Era.
Carrigan, Ana. 2009. El Palacio de Justicia: Una tragedia colombiana. Bogotá: Icono 
Editorial.
Cason, Jeffrey. 2000. “Electoral Reform and Stability in Uruguay.” Journal of Democ-
racy 11(2).
____. 2002. “Electoral Reform, Institutional Change, and Party Adaptation in Uruguay.” 
Latin American Politics and Society 44(3).
Castañeda, Jorge. 1993. Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
263
____. 2006. “Latin America's Left Turn.” Foreign Affairs. 85:3 (May-June); 28-43.
Castañeda, Jorge and Marco Morales, eds. 2008. Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American 
Left. New York: Routledge.
Castañeda, Jorge and Patricio Navia. 2007. “Latin America’s Election Year: The Lessons 
Learned.” Current History. February.
Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico (CIUP) y Fundación Friedrich 
Ebert. 1980. Peru 1980: Elecciones y Planes de Gobierno.  Lima: Universidad del 
Pacífico.
Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico (CIUP) y Fundación Friedrich 
Ebert. 1985. Decidamos Nuestro Futuro: Guía del Elector; Peru 85; Vote Sabiendo. 
Lima: Universidad del Pacífico.
Chernick, Marc. 2007. "The Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Peru." Marianne Heiberg, 
Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman, eds., Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending 
Protracted Conflicts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Cleary, Matthew. 2006. “A ‘Left Turn’ in Latin America? Explaining the Left’s Resur-
gence.” Journal of Democracy 17(4).
Coelho, Maria Francisca Pinheiro. 2007. José Genoino: Escolhas Políticas. São Paulo: 
Centauro Editora.
Collier,  David  and James  Mahon.  1993.  “Conceptual  'Stretching'  Revisited:  Adapting 
Categories in Comparative Analysis.” American Political Science Review 87(4) pp. 
845-855.
Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junc-
tures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press.
Comisión de Derechos Humanos (CHR). 1994. Un Sexenio de Violencia Política. Mexico 
City: Comisión de Derechos Humanos, Grupo Parlamentario del PRD.
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR). 2003. Final Report. Available  at 
www.cverdad.org.pe.
Comisión Valech. 2011. “Informe de la Comisión Presidencial Asesora para la Califi-
cación de Detenidos Desaparecidos, Ejecutados Políticos y Víctimas de Prisión 
Política y Tortura.” Available at www.comisionvalech.gov.cl.
Comissão Diretora Nacional Provisória (CDNP) do PT. 1980. “O PT Pela Organização 
dos Trabalhadores.” Resolution presented at meeting of CDNP with representatives of 
the CDRPs. 16 August.
Comissão Executiva do PT. 1985. “IV. Proposta de Resolução da Comissão Executiva 
Nacional ao Diretório Nacional do Partido dos Trabalhadores” (3 February).
264
Conaghan, Catherine. 2005. Fujimori's Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh.
da Conceição, Manoel. 1980. “Uma Contribuição ao Debate.” Paper for Pro-PT Move-
ment meeting in Recife. (20 March).
Coordinadora Nacional Mariateguista (CNM). 1989. La Crisis Exige: Cambio y Nuevo 
Orden. Lima: CNM.
Coppedge, Michael. 1994. Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and  
Factionalism in Venezuela. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press
____. 1997. “A Classification of Latin American Political Parties.” Working Paper Series 
244. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame 
____.  1999.  "Venezuela:  Conservative  Representation  without  Conservative  Parties,” 
Working Paper Series 268. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame.
____. 2001. “Political Darwinism in Latin America’s Lost Decade.” Larry Diamond and 
Richard Gunther, eds., Political Parties and Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.
Córdova Vianello, Lorenzo and Pedro Salazar Ugarte, eds. 2008. Estudios Sobre la Re-
forma Electoral 2007: Hacia un Nuevo Modelo. Mexico D.F.: Tribunal Electoral del 
Poder Judicial de la Federación.
Coronil,  Fernando.  1997. The  Magical  State:  Nature,  Money,  and  Modernity  in  
Venezuela. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Coronil,  Fenrnando and Skuski,  Julie.  2004.  “The Semantics  of  Political  Violence in 
Venezuela.” Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri’s Politics in the Andes: Identity, Con-
flict, and Reform. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
Corrales, Javier. 2006. “Hugo Boss.” Foreign Policy. 152: Jan-Feb. 32-40.
Corrales, Javier and Michael Penfold. 2011. Dragon in the Tropics. Hugo Chavez and the  
Poltiical Economy of Revolution in Venezuela. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion.
Correio Braziliense. 1984. “Ackel Censura, no Diário Oficial, o Programa do PCB.” 31 
May.
Cotler, Julio. 1995. “Political Parties and the Problems of Democratic Consolidation in 
Peru.” Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully’s, eds., Building Democratic Institu-
tions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cox, Gary. 1997. Making Votes Count. New York: Cambridge University Press.
265
Cox, Gary and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government 
in the House. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Crisp, Brian, and Daniel Levine. 1998. “Democratizing the Democracy? Crisis and Re-
form in Venezuela.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 40(2). 
Cuoto, Cláudio Gonçalvez. 1995. O Desafio de Ser Governo: O PT na Prefeitura de São 
Paulo (1989-1992). São Paulo: Paz e Terra.
Dalton, Russell and Martin Wattenberg, eds. 2000. Parties without Partisans: Political 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dargent, Eduardo. 2012. “Izquierda.” Diario 16. 10 June.
Dargent, Eduardo and Paula Muñoz. 2012. “Perú 2011: Continuidades y Cambios en la 
Política sin Partidos.” Revista de Ciencia Política 32(1). 
Debs, Alexandre and Gretchen Helmke. 2008. "Inequality under Democracy: Explaining 
"The Left Decade" in Latin America." Paper presented at APSA 2008 Annual Meet-
ing, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008
Degregori, Carlos Ivan. 2003. “The Vanishing of a Regime and the Challenge of Demo-
cratic Rebuilding.” Jorge Dominguez and Michael Shifter, eds., Constructing Demo-
cratic Governance in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Della Porta, Donatella, ed. 2009. Democracy in Social Movements. Houndsmill, United 
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
Departamento de Ordem Política e Social. 1967. “Analise da Situação do PC no Brasil.” 
Informe 47/67 SCI/RS. 15 September.
Dias, Giocondo. 1985. Uma Alternativa Democrática para a Crise Brasileira. Belo Hori-
zonte: Editora Novos Rumos.
Díaz  Rangel,  Eleazar.  1971. Como  se  Dividió  el  PCV.  Caracas:  Editorial  Domingo 
Fuentes.
Dietz, Henry. 1980. Poverty and Problem-Solving under Military Rule. Austin: Univer-
sity of Texas Press.
Dietz, Henry and David Myers. 2007. “From Thaw to Deluge: Party System Collapse in 
Venezuela and Peru.” Latin American Politics & Society 49(2).
Dirceu, José. 1985. “Articulação.” 10 April.
Domínguez, Jorge and James McCann. 1995. “Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: The 
Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections.” Ameri-
can Political Science Review 89(1).
266
Dreser, Denise. 1991. Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National 
Solidarity Program. San Diego: University of California San Diego Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies.
Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Mod-
ern State. London: Methuen.
Eckstein, Susan, ed. 2001. Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Move-
ments. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Economist, The. 2006. “The return of populism: A much-touted move to the left masks 
something more complex: the rebirth of an influential Latin American political tradi-
tion.” April 12.
El País. 2011. “A la cárcel Samuel Moreno Rojas por carrusel de contratación.” (23 Sep-
tember).
____.  2012.  “El  Expresidente  Argentino  De  la  Rúa  Afronta  un  Juicio  por  Presuntos 
Sobornos.” 14 August.
El Universal. 2012. “Celebran Priístas Resolución del TEPJF.” El Universal. 30 August.
Elkins, David and R. Simeon 1979 “A Cause in Search of Effect, or What Does Political 
Culture Explain.” Comparative Politics 11:2 (January).
Ellner, Steve. 1986. “The MAS Party in Venezuela.” Latin American Perspectives 13(2).
____. 1993. "The Deepening of Democracy in a Crisis Setting: Political Reform and the 
Electoral Process in Venezuela." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 
35:4 (Winter).
____.  1996.  “Democracia,  Tendencias  Internas  Y  Partidos  Políticos  en  Venezuela.” 
Nueva Sociedad 145(Sept-Oct).
____. 2010. “La Primera Década del Gobierno de Hugo Chávez: Logros y Desaciertos.” 
Cuadernos del CENDES 74 (May-August).
____. 2011. “Venezuela's Social-Based Democratic Model: Innovations and Limitations.” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 43.
Ellner, Steve and Daniel Hellinger. 2004. Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class,  
Polarization, and Conflict. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
El Zorro de Abajo. 1985. “Izquierda: Una Revolución Copernica.” (3). November/De-
cember.
Engel, Eduardo and Patricio Navia. 2006. Que Gane el Más Mejor. Mérito y competencia 
en el Chile de hoy. Santiago, Chile: Random House.
267
Estado de S.Paulo. 2007. “Dilma Será Indenizada por Sofrer Tortura durante Ditadura.” 6 
February.
____. 2012. “O Placar do Mensalão.” 9 October.
Falcão, Rui. 1984. “Proposta 1 – Manter-se Fiel às Origens ou Diluir-se.” PT Circular 23 
November.
____. 1994. “Gatos Com Luvas Não Caçam Ratos.” Folha de S.Paulo (22 March).
Farias, Wanderly. 1980. Legalizar o PT, já. São Paulo: Partido dos Trabalhadores.
Fearon, James. 1991. “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing.” World Politics 43(2).
Folha de S.Paulo. 1980. “Giocondo Dias é o novo secretário-geral do PCB.” 21 May.
____. 1983. “Deputados Vão Tentar Isolar Radicais do PT.” 10 May.
____. 1984. “Imprensa Nacional Nega-se a Publica Estatuto do PCB.” 30 May.
____. 2010. “30 Anos do PT.” Audio interview with José Eduardo Dutra, then presi-
dent-elect of the PT.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Gabeira, Fernando. 1979. O Quê é Isso, Companheiro? Rio de Janeiro: Condecri.
Gamarra,  Jefrey.  2012.  “Movadef:  Radicalismo  Político  y  Relaciones  Intergenera-
cionales.” Argumentos 6(5).
Garreton Merino, Manuel Antonio. 2000 “Chile’s Elections: Change and Continuity.” 
Journal of Democracy 11(2).
Garrido, Alberto. 2000a. La Historia Secreta de la Revolución Bolivariana. Mérida: Edi-
torial Venezolana.
____. 2000b. La Revolución Bolivariana: de la Guerrilla al Militarismo. Revelaciones 
del Comandante Arias Cárdenas. Mérida: Ediciones del Autor.
____. 2005. Revolución Bolivariana 2005 – Notas. Mérida: Ediciones del Autor.
Gaspari, Elio. 2002a. As Ilusões Armadas: a Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Editora 
Schwarcz.
____.  2002b. As  Ilusões  Armadas:  a  Ditadura  Escancarada.  São  Paulo:  Editora 
Schwarcz.
____. 2003. As Ilusões Armadas: a Ditadura Derrotada. São Paulo: Companhia das Le-
tras.
268
____. 2004. As Ilusões Armadas: a Ditadura Encurralada. São Paulo: Companhia das 
Letras.
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selec-
tion Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2(1).
____. 1995. “Uses and Limitations of Rational Choice.” Peter Smith, ed. Latin America 
in Comparative Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press.
George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Gerring, John. 2007. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Giusti, Roberto. 1997. “Andrés Velásquez Propone una Ruptura Civilizada de la Causa 
R.” El Universal. 23 February.
Goertz, Gary. 2006. Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
González, Oscar Alfredo. 1980. Testimonio sobre los Campos Secretos de Detención en 
Argentina. London: Amnesty International Press.
González, Osmar. 1999. Señales sin Respuesta: Los Zorros y el Pensamiento Socialista 
en el Perú, 1968-1989. Lima: Ediciones Preal.
Gorriti, Gustavo. 2008. Sendero: Historia de la Guerra Milenaria en el Perú. Lima: Plan-
eta.
Grandin, Greg. 2004. The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Greene, Kenneth. 2007. Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Com-
parative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Greif,  Avner and David Laitin.  2004.  “A theory of  endogenous institutional  change.” 
American Political Science Review (98)4.
Grindle, Merilee Serrill. 2000. Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democ-
racy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Grzymala-Busse,  Anna.  2002. Redeeming  the  Communist  Past:  the  Regeneration  of  
Communist Parties in East Central Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Guerra, Cláudio, Marcelo Netto, and Rogério Medeiros. 2012. Memórias de uma Guerra 
Suja. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.
269
Guerra García, Francisco. 2012. “Notas Preliminares sobre la Experiencia de la Izquierda 
Unida.” Alberto Adrianzén, ed., Apogeo y Crisis de la Izquierda Peruana: Hablan sus 
Protagonistas. Lima: Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya.
Guimarães, Ulysses. 1980. “Nota à Imprensa do Deputado Ulysses Guimarães Respeito a 
Greve no Porto Santos.” 18 March.
Gushiken, Luiz. 1984. “Companheiros.” Speech delivered in August to Labor Secretary 
of the PT's Regional Directorate.
____. 1990. “Brasil: A Experiência do PT e da FBP [Frente Brasil Popular]”. Paper pre-
sented to the Meeting of Leftist Parties and Organizations in Caribe, São Paulo, 2-4 
July.
Hagopian, Frances. 1990. “’Democracy by Undemocratic Means’? Elites, Political Pacts, 
and Regime Transition in Brazil.” Comparative Political Studies 23:2 (July). 
____. 1998. “Democracy and Political Representation in Latin America in the 1990’s.” 
Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark, eds., Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition 
Latin America.
Handlin, Samuel and Ruth Berins Collier. 2011. “Party Change and the Left in South 
America: Linkages through Partisanship, Direct Contact, and Social Organizations.” 
Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, eds., The Resurgence of the Latin American 
Left. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Harmel,  Robert and Kenneth Janda. 1994. “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and 
Party Change.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(3).
Harmel, Robert and Alexander Tan. 2003. “Party Actors and Party Change: Does Fac-
tional Dominance Matter?” European Journal of Political Research 42(3).
Harnecker, Marta. 1991. Frente Amplio: Los Desafíos de una Izquierda Legal. Montev-
ideo: La República.
____. 1994. Gobernar: Tarea De Todos. Venezuela: Alcaldía de Caroní.
Hellinger, Daniel. 1996. “The Causa R and the Nuevo Sindicalismo in Venezuela.” Latin 
American Perspectives 23(3).
____. 2004. “Political Overview: The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chav-
ismo.” Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, eds, Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: 
Class, Polarization, and Conflict. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Hellman, Olli. 2011. Political Parties and Electoral Strategy: The Development of Party 
Organization in East Asia. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Hinojosa, Iván. 1988. “On Poor Relations and the Nouveau Riche: Shining Path and the 
Radical Peruvian Left.” Steve Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society 
in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press.
270
Hite, Katherine. 2000. When the Romance Ended: Leaders of the Chilean Left, 1968-
1998. New York: Columbia University Press.
Howard, Marc Morjé and Philip G. Roessler. 2006. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50(2).
Huber Stephens, Evelyne. 1983. “The Peruvian Military Government, Labor Mobiliza-
tion, and the Political Strength of the Left.” Latin American Research Review 18(2): 
57–93.
Hunter, Wendy. 2003. “Brazil’s New Direction.” Journal of Democracy 14 (April).
____. 2007. “The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers’ Party in Brazil.” World 
Politics 59 (April).
____. 2010. The Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, 1989–2009. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Huntington, Samuel 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
____. 1970. “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems.” Samuel Hunting-
ton and Clement Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynam-
ics of Established One-Party Systems. New York: Basic Books
____. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press.
IDEMERC Louis Harris. 1994. “Elecciones 94: Pre-Electoral Nacional.” http://www.bi-
iacs.cide.edu/.
Iglesias,  Enrique.  1992. Reflections on Economic Development:  Toward A New Latin 
American Consensus. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank.
Izquierda  Unida  (IU).  1984. Lineamientos  Estratégicos  Generales  y  Tácticos. Lima: 
Izquierda Unida.
____. 1985. Plan de Gobierno de Izquierda Unida: Peru 1985–1990. Lima: Comisión de 
Plan de Gobierno de Izquierda Unida.
____. 1988a. Estatutos, Reglamento y Normas Electorales / Izquierda Unida - I Con-
greso Nacional. Lima: Izquierda Unida.
____.  1988b. Programa para el I Congreso de Izquierda Unida: Lineamientos Pro-
gramáticos. Lima: Comisión Nacional de Formación Política de IU.
Jornal Causa Operária. 1981. “Sobre o Regimento Interno do PT.” Militantes do PT do 
Jornal Causa Operária (August).
271
Jornal da Tarde. 1983. “PT: Nada de Acordos ou Fusões.” 7 February.
Jornal do Brasil. 1979. “MDB Lutará contra sua Extinção.” 16 May.
____. 1983. “Gallup Diz que PT Atingiu o 3° Lugar em Preferência.” 23 September.
Kalyvas, Stathis. 1996. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Katz, Richard and Peter Mair. 1995. “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party 
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party.” Party Politics (1)1.
Katznelson, Ira. 2003. “Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in 
Comparative Historical Social Science.” James Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer, eds., 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Katznelson, Ira and Barry Weingast, eds. 2005. Preferences and Situations: Points of In-
tersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism. New York: Rus-
sell Sage.
Keck, Margaret. 1991. PT: A Lógica da Diferença: o Partido dos Trabalhadores na Con-
strução da Democracia Brasileira. São Paulo: Ática.
____. 1992. The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Sci-
entific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium 
and West Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
____. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Klesner, Joseph. 1997. “Democratic Transition? The 1997 Mexican Elections.” PS: Polit-
ical Science and Politics 30(4).
Kornblith, Miriam and Levine, Daniel. 1995 “Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party 
System.” Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully’s Building Democratic Institutions: 
Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kruijt, Dirk. 1989. La Revolución por Decreto: Peru durante el Gobierno Militar. San 
Jose, Costa Rica: FLACSO/Mosca Azul.
____. 1996. “Peru: The State under Siege.” Richard Millett and Michael Gold-Biss, eds., 
Beyond Praetorianism. Miami: North-South Center Press.
272
La Causa Radical (LCR). 2009. “Estatutos de la Causa R.” 29 March.
La República. 2012. “JNE: Movadef no Podrá Inscribirse como Partido Político aunque 
Cambie de Nombre.” 12 October.
Lagonell, Eloísa. 1987. “La Causa R: Alianza Social.” Elite. 25 August.
Lagos, Marta. 1997. “Latin America’s Smiling Mask,” in Journal of Democracy 8(3).
Lamonier, Bolívar. 1990. “Brazil: Inequality Against Democracy.” Larry Diamond, Juan 
Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries: Com-
paring Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Lander, Edgardo. 2005. “Venezuelan Social Conflict in a Global Context.” Latin Ameri-
can Perspectives 32(2).
Lanzaro, Jorge. 2004. La Izquierda Uruguaya entre la Oposición y el Gobierno. Montev-
ideo: Fin de Siglo.
____. 2011. “Uruguay: Un Gobierno Socialdemócrata en América Latina.” Steven Levit-
sky and Kenneth Roberts,  eds., The Resurgence of  the Latin American Left.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR). 2 December 1993.
León Moya, Carlos. 2012. “Una Izquierda sin Casa Propia.” La República. 1 January.
Leonelli, Domingos and Dante de Oliveira. 2004. Diretas Já: 15 Meses que Abalaram a 
Ditadura. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record.
Lenin, Vladimir. 1902 (1987). Essential Works of Lenin: “What is to be Done?” and 
Other Writings. New York: Dover Publication.
Letts, Ricardo. 1981. La Izquierda Peruana: Organizaciones y Tendencias. Peru: Mosca 
Azul Editores.
Levine,  Daniel.  1978. "Venezuela  Since  1958:  The  Consolidation  of  Democratic 
Politics." Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes 
Part III Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine 
Peronism in Comparative Perspective. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Levitsky, Steven and Max Cameron. 2003. “Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties 
and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru.” Latin American Politics and Society 45 (Au-
tumn).
Levitsky, Steven and Kenneth Roberts, eds. 2011a. The Resurgence of the Latin Ameri-
can Left. New York: Cambridge University Press.
273
____. 2011b. “Latin America's “Left Turn”: A Framework for Analysis.” Levitsky and 
Roberts, eds. The Resurgence of the Latin American Left. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2002. “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of 
Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13(2).
____. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Lichbach, Mark. 2003. Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science? Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1971. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” American 
Political Science Review.
Linz, Juan. 1976. “The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of 
an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil.” Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian 
Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996a. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolida-
tion: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
____. 1996b. “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 7(2). 
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: 
Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press.
Locke, Richard and Kathleen Thelen. 1995. “Apples and Oranges Revisited: Contextual-
ized Comparisons and the Study of Comparative Labor Politics.” Comparative Politi-
cal Studies 23.
López Maya, Margarita. 1994. “The Rise of Causa R.” NACLA XXVII(5).
____. 1995. “El Ascenso en Venezuela de la Causa R.” Revista Venezolana de Economía 
y Ciencias Sociales 2-3.
____. 1998. New Avenues for Popular Representation in Venezuela: La Causa-R and the 
Movimiento  Bolivariano  200.  Damarys  Canache  and  Michael  R.  Kulisheck,  eds., 
Reinventing Legitimacy: Democracy and Political Change in Venezuela.  Westport: 
Greenwood Publishing Group.
____. 1999. "Alcaldías de Izquierda en Venezuela: Las Gestiones Locales de LCR entre 
1989 y 1996." Beatriz Stolowicz, ed., Gobiernos de Izquierda en América Latina. 
Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés Editores.
____. 2004. Patria Para Todos (PPT): Un Partido Popular en Tiempos de Globalización. 
José Enrique Molina Vega and Angel Eduardo Álvarez Díaz, eds., Los partidos políti-
cos Venezolanos en el siglo XXI. Caracas: Vadell Hermanos.
274
____. 2005. Del Viernes Negro al Referendo Revocatorio. Caracas: Alfadil Ediciones. 
López Maya, Margarita and Luis Lander. 2011. Carta al PPT: Ideas para Contribuir con 
el Debate Sobre su Porvenir. Internal memo to the PPT.
Lowenthal, Abraham, ed. 1975. The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change Under  
Military Rule. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Luna, Juan Pablo. 2007. “Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alterna-
tive in Uruguay.” Latin American Politics and Society 49(4).
Lynch, Nicolás. 1990. Los Jóvenes Rojos de San Marcos: El Radicalismo Universitario  
de los Años Setenta. Lima: El Zorro de Abajo.
____. 1992. La Transición Conservadora: Movimiento Social y Democracia en el Perú 
1975-1978. Lima: El Zorro de Abajo.
____. 1999. Una Tragedia Sin Héroes: La Derrota de los Partidos y el Origen de los In-
dependientes. Perú, 1980-1992. Lima: UNMSM.
Madrid, Raúl. 2010. “The Origins of the Two Lefts in Latin America.” Political Science 
Quarterly 125(4), 587-609.
de la Madrid, Miguel. 2004. Cambio de Rumbo. Testimonios de una Presidencia, 1982-
1988. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Magaloni,  Beatriz.  2006. Voting  for  Autocracy:  Hegemonic  Party  Survival  and  its 
Demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mahoney, James. 2003. “Comparative Historical Analysis.” James Mahoney and Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz. 2004. “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative 
Cases in Comparative Research.” American Political Science Review 98(4).
Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2009. “A Theory of Gradual Institutional 
Change.” Mahoney and Thelen, eds., Explaining Institutional Change Ambiguity, 
Agency, and Power. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott. 2006. “The Crisis of Representation in the Andes.” Journal of 
Democracy 17(3).
Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. Building Democratic Institutions: Party 
Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
____. 2008. “Latin America: Eight Lessons for Governance.” Journal of Democracy 
19(3).
275
Mainwaring, Scott and Edurne Zoco. 2007. “Political Sequences and the Stabilization of 
Interparty  Competition:  Electoral  Volatility  in  Old  and New Democracies.” Party 
Politics 13(2).
Mainwaring Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2001. “Classifying Political 
Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999.” Studies in Comparative International Devel-
opment 36(1).
Maneiro, Alfredo. 1982. “Carta Pública a Jorge Olavarría.” Resumen. Vol XXXV: 440 (11 
April).
____. 1986. Notas Políticas. Caracas: Ediciones del Agua Mansa.
____ (Edited by Marta Harnecker). 2007. Ideas Políticas para el Debate Actual. Caracas: 
Fundación Editorial el perro y la rana.
Márquez, Pompeio. 1968. Una Polémica Necesaria: Fidel Castro, PCV. Caracas:  Edi-
ciones Documentos Políticos.
____. 1981. Socialismo: Nuevas Situaciones Reclaman Nuevas Elaboraciones. Caracas: 
Versión Taquigráfica.
Mauceri,  Philip.  1996. State  Under  Siege:  Development  and Policy  Making in  Peru. 
Boulder: Westview Press.
Mayorga, Rene. 2005. "Bolivia's Democracy at the Crossroads." Frances Hagopian and 
Scott Mainwarig, eds., The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Ad-
vances and Setbacks. New York: Cambridge University Press.
McClintock, Cynthia. 1983. “Velasco, Officers, and Citizens: The Politics of Stealth.” 
McClintock and Abraham Lowenthal, eds. The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
____. 1984. “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso.” World Poli-
tics 37(1): 48–84.
____. 1989. “The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a ‘Least Likely’ Case: 
Peru.” Comparative Politics. 21(2): 1–23.
____. 1999. "Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic." Larry Diamond, 
Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Devel-
oping Countries: Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
McClintock, Cynthia and Abraham Lowenthal, eds. 1983. The Peruvian Experiment Re-
considered. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McCoy,  Jennifer.  2000.  “De-mystifying  Venezuela’s  Hugo  Chávez.” Current  History 
February.
276
____. 2004. “From Representative to Participatory Democracy? Regime Transformation 
in  Venezuela.”  McCoy and David Myers,  eds., The Unraveling of  Representative 
Democracy in Venezuela. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
McSherry, J. Patrice. 2005. Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in latin 
America. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Medina, Pablo. 1999. Rebeliones: una Larga Conversación con María Cristina Iglesias y  
Farruco Sesto. Caracas: Santiago de León.
Mendes, Candido. 2006. Lula Apesar de Lula. Rio de Janeiro: Educam.
Mendonça,  Ricardo,  and  Wálter  Nunes.  2004.  “Uma Empresa  Chamada  PT.” Época 
Edição 328(Set).
Meneguello, Rachel. 1989. PT: a Formação de um Partido 1979 – 1982. São Paulo: Paz 
e Terra.
Mesquita  Neto,  Paulo  de. 2006.  “Public-Private  Partnerships  for  Police  Reform  in 
Brazil.” John Bailey and Lucía Dammert, eds., Public Security and Police Reform in 
the Americas. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Middlebrook,  Kevin.  1986.  “Political  Liberalization  in  an  Authoritarian  Regime:  The 
Case of Mexico.” Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, 
eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.
Morales Paulín, Carlos Alberto. 1997. Reforma al Sistema Electoral Mexicano. México, 
D.F.: Plaza y Valdés.
Moore, Barrington. 1966. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and 
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
Movimento revolucionário - Oito de Outubro (MR-8). Undated. “Sobre a Morte de Car-
los Lamarca.”
Movimiento de Afirmación Socialista de Izquierda Unida (MAS-IU). 1989. Transformar 
IU Transformar el Perú: Selección de Textos y Pronunciamientos. Lima: La 
República.
Müller, Wolfgang and Kaare Strøm, eds. 1999. Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political 
Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Müller Rojas, Alberto. 1991. Época De Revolución en Venezuela.  Caracas: Solar Edi-
ciones.
____. 1992. Relaciones Peligrosas: Militares, Política y Estado. Caracas: Fondo Editorial 
APUCV/IPP.
277
Murillo, Maria Victoria, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav. 2009. “Electoral Revolu-
tion or Democratic Alternation?” Paper prepared for 2009 Latin American Studies 
Association Conference.
Murrugarra Florián, Edmundo. 1988. “Renunciamos a la Tesis de la Dictadura del Prole-
tariado.” Expreso (24 April).
____. 2003. “Nuestra Verdad para la Reconciliación.” Nos+@tros. August, No 2.
____. 2011. Interview in La República by Flor Huilca (11 September).
Myers, David. 2004. “The Normalization of Punto Fijo Democracy.” Jennifer McCoy and 
Myers’s The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Naím, Moisés. 2004. “From Normalcy to Lunacy: New Latin American Activists Em-
brace the Politics of Rage, Race, and Revenge.” Foreign Policy. March 1.
Nieto, Jorge. 1983. Izquierda y Democracia en el Perú 1975-1980. Lima: Centro de Estu-
dios y Promoción del Desarrollo.
Novaro, Marcos, and Vicente Palermo. 1995. Los Caminos De La Centroizquierda: Dile-
mas Y Desafíos Del Frepaso Y De La Alianza. Buenos Aires: Losada.
Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997. ¿Adios al Mas? Caracas: Domingo Fuentes Editor.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies 
in South American Politics. Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley.
____. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5(1) January.
O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press.
Oficina  de  la  Presidencia.  1994.  “Debate,  Previo  Aspirantes  para  Presidente.” 
http://www.biiacs.cide.edu/.
____. 1996. “Diálogo para la Reforma Política.” http://www.biiacs.cide.edu/.
____. 1997. “Evaluación de la Situación Nacional (Previa electoral).” http://www.biiacs.-
cide.edu/.
Packenham,  Robert.  1986.  “The Changing Political  Discourse  in  Brazil,  1964-1985.” 
Wayne Selcher, ed., Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Fu-
ture Prospects. Boulder: Westview Press.
Pandolfi, Dulce Chaves. 1995. Camaradas e Companheiros: Memória e Históriado PCB. 
Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Relume-Dumará.
278
Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. Political Parties: Organization and Power. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
D'Paola, Víctor Hugo. 2011. El Gran Sepulturero de la Izquierda: Cómo Chávez Fue De-
struyendo la Izquierda. Caracas: Fundación Espacio Abierto.
Paraná, Denise. 2006. Entre o Sonho e o Poder: A Trajetória da Esquerda Brasileira 
através das Memória de José Genoino. São Paulo: Geração Editorial.
Partido  Comunista  Brasileira  (PCB),  Comissão  Executiva  do  Comitê  Central.  1978. 
“Nota Eleitoral Executiva do PCB.” May.
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), Comissão Nacional Provisória. 1979. Carta de Princí-
pios.
____. 1980. Manual de Construção dos Diretórios. São Paulo: Partido dos Trabalhadores.
____. 1982. “Subsídios para a Analise do Desempenho do PT em São Paulo.”
____. 1985. Plano Nacional de Organização. Secretaria Nacional de Organização.
Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM). 1985. Los Resultados del 14 de Abril y el Rea-
juste de la Táctica: II Sesión Plenaria del Comité Central del PUM. Lima: PUM.
____. 1987. Estrategia del Poder Popular. Unidad de Todas las Sangres en el Autogob-
ierno del Pueblo: Documento en Minoría Presentado al VI Pleno del Comité Central. 
Lima: PUM.
____. 1988a. Documentos Fundamentales de Izquierda Unida. Lima: PUM.
____. 1988b. El PUM ante la Situación Política. Lima: PUM.
____. 1988c. Informe Político: Crear, Forjar y Conquistar Poder Popular. Lima: PUM
Pásara, Luis. 1990. “El Doble Sendero de la Izquierda Legal Peruana.” Nueva Sociedad: 
Mar-Apr.
Passoni, Irma. 1981. “Circular No 20/81 da Comissão Executiva aos D.M. – D.D. e N.B.”
Patria Para Todos (PPT). 2007. El Libro Azul del PPT: Ahora mas que nunca con la Rev-
olución y el Socialismo - 1997-2007. Caracas: Patria Para Todos
Pease García, Henry. 1979. Los Caminos Del Poder: Tres Anos De Crisis En La Escena 
Política. Lima: Centro De Estudios y Promocion Del Desarrollo.
Pedráglio, Santiago. 2011. “Todavía no hay que Ponerle Etiquetas al Gobierno.” Inter-
view by Patricia Wiesse and Gerardo Saravia. Revista Ideele 214.
279
Peregial, Francisco. 2012. “Argentina Condena a 50 Años de Cárcel al Dictador Videla 
por el Robo de Bebés.” El País (11 July).
Petkoff, Teodoro. 1969. Checoslovaquia; el Socialismo como Problema. Caracas: Edito-
rial D. Fuentes.
____. 1976. Proceso a la Izquierda: o de la Falsa Conducta Revolucionaria. Barcelona: 
Editorial Planeta.
____. 2005. Las dos izquierdas. Nueva Sociedad (197).
____. 2010. El Chavismo como Problema. Caracas: Editorial Libros Marcados.
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” 
American Political Science Review 94:2 (June).
____. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Political Analysis. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
del Pino, Ponciano. 1998. “Family, Culture, and ‘Revolution’: Everyday Life with 
Sendero Luminso.” Steve Stern’s, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in 
Peru 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press.
Piuma, Daniel Rey. 1988. Un Marino Acusa: Juicio y Castigo a los Culpables: Informe 
Sobre la Violación de Derechos Humanos por la Marina Uruguaya. Montevideo: Tu-
pac Amarú Editores.
Political Database of the Americas (PDBA). pdba.georgetown.edu
Pomar, Pedro. 1979. “Carta sobre a Guerrilha do Araguaia.” Movimento (São Paulo) 199.
Pomar, Wladimir. 1980. Araguaia: o Partido e a Guerrilha. São Paulo: Brasil Debates.
Portes, Alejandro and Kelly Hoffman (2003). “Latin American Class Structures: Their 
Composition and Change during the Neoliberal Era.” Latin American Research Re-
view 38(1).
Prestes, Luiz Carlos. 1980. Carta aos Comunistas. São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega.
Przeworski, Adam. 1985. Capitalism and Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
____. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Eu-
rope and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Social-
ism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. 
New York: Wiley.
280
Ragin, Charles. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quan-
titative Strategies. University of California Press.
Ramírez Rojas, Kléber. 2006. Historia Documental del 4 de Febrero. Caracas: El perro y 
la rana.
Ramírez Zapata, Iván. 2013. “¿De qué Hablamos en San Marcos cuando nos Referimos 
al MOVADEF?” Revista Ideele (227).
Rangel, Carlos. 1983. “Entrevista con Alfredo Maneiro.” Buenos Días: Venevision. 14 
October.
Reis,  Fábio  Wanderley,  org.  1978. Os  Partidos  e  o  Regime:  A Lógica  do  Processo 
Eleitoral Brasileiro. São Paulo: Ed. Símbolo.
Reid, Michael. 1985. Peru: Paths to Poverty. London: Latin America Bureau/Third 
World Publications.
Rénique, José Luis. 1998. “Apogee and Crisis of a 'Third Path': Mariateguismo, 'People's 
War,' and Counterinsurgency in Puno, 1987-1994.” Steve Stern, ed., Shining and 
Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press.
____. 2003. La Voluntad Encarcelada: Las ‘Luminosas Trincheras de Combate’ de 
Sendero Luminoso del Perú. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
____. 2004. La Batalla por Puno: Conflicto Agrario y Nación en los Andes Peruanos, 
1866-1995. Lima: IEP Ediciones.
Ribeiro, Darcy. Undated. “Um Típico Filho do Povo.” Available at www.pdt.org.br.
Ribeiro, Pedro. 2008. Dos Sindicatos ao Governo: a Organização Nacional do PT de 
1980 a 2005. Doctoral Thesis, Political Science: Universidade Federal de São Carlos.
Rivero, Mirtha. 2010. La Rebelión de los Náufragos. Caracas: Alfa.
Roberts, Kenneth. 1995a. "From the Barricades to the Ballot Box: Re-Democratization 
and Political Realignment in the Chilean Left." Politics and Society 23 (December).
____. 1995b. “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The 
Peruvian Case.” World Politics 48(October): 82–116.
____. 1996. “Economic Crisis and the Demise of the Legal Left in Peru.” Comparative 
Politics 29(1).
____. 1998. Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile 
and Peru. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
____. 2002. “Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal 
Era.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (4).
281
____. forthcoming. Political Parties in Latin America’s Neoliberal Era.
Rodrigues, Leôncio Martins. 1991. “O Futuro do PT.” Folha de S.Paulo. 12 May.
Rojas, Eduardo. 2008. Los Murmullos y Silencios de la Calle: los Socialistas Chilenos y 
Michelle Bachelet. Buenos Aires: UNSAM Edita.
Rosas, Alexis. 2009a. 50 Años de Lucha Revolucionaria: la Vida de Rafael Uzcátegui. 
Caracas: Editorial Texto.
____. 2009b. Patria Para Todos: Un Partido Indoblegable. Caracas: Editorial Texto.
Rubio Marcial. 1982. “La Crisis de la Izquierda en el Perú.” Nueva Sociedad (Jul-Aug).
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and John D. Stephens. 1997. “Comparing Historical Sequences – 
a Powerful Tool for Causal Analysis." Comparative Social Research 16.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capital-
ist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ruiz, Carlos Eduardo. 2001. “Ejército Rebelde.” Analytica.com. 1 February.
Rustow, Dankwart.  1968. “Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Re-
search and Theory.” Comparative Politics, 1 (October).
Sabato, Ernesto. 1984. Nunca más: Informe. Buenos Aires: Comisión Nacional sobre la 
Desaparición de Personas.
Salamanca, Luis. 1998. Obreros, Movimiento Social y Democracia en Venezuela. Cara-
cas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.
____. 2004. “La Causa Radical Auge y Caída.” José Molina Vega and Ángel Álvarez 
Díaz, eds., Los Partidos Políticos Venezolanos en el Siglo XXI. Caracas: Vadell Her-
manos Editores.
Sallum Jr, Brasílio. 2000. “A Transição Política Brasileira do Final do Século XX.” São 
Paulo: Centro de Estudos de Cultura Contemporânea (CEDEC).
Samanez, Alvaro Rojas. 1982. Partidos Políticos en el Peru: Manual y Registro. Lima: 
Centro de Documentación e Información Andina.
Samuels, David. 2004. “From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party Organization and 
the Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil.” Comparative Political Studies 37 
(November). 
Sanborn, Cynthia. 1991. The Democratic Left and the Persistence of Populism in Peru: 
1975-1990. Unpublished PhD dissertation from Harvard University.
282
Sánchez Albavera, Fernando. 1989. “Propuestas Económicas de Diez Canseco son Ab-
surdas.” La República (17 January).
Sánchez Urribarri, Raúl. 2008. “Venezuela, Turning Further Left?” Jorge Castañeda and 
Marco Morales, eds., Leftovers: tales of the Latin American Left. New York: Rout-
ledge.
Schamis, Hector. 2002. “Argentina: Crisis and Democratic Consolidation.” Journal of 
Democracy 13(2) April.
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1942. Party Government. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston.
Schatz, Sara. 2011. Murder and Politics in Mexico: Political Killings in the Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática and its Consequences. New York: Springer.
Schmidt, Gregory. 1996. “Fujimori's 1990 Upset Victor in Peru: Electoral Rules, Contin-
gencies, and Adaptive Strategies.” Comparative Politics 38(3): 321-354.
Schmitter,  Phillipe.  1997 “Civil  Society East  and West.”  Larry Diamond,  et  al.,  eds., 
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives.
Schönwälder, Gerd. 2002. Linking Civil Society and the State: Urban Popular Move-
ments, the Left, and Local Government in Peru, 1980-1992. University Park: Pennsyl-
vania State University Press.
Seawright,  Jason.  2012. Party-System  Collapse:  The  Roots  of  Crisis  in  Peru  and  
Venezuela. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Secretaria de Segurança Publica do Rio Grande do Sul. 1968. “Ação Popular.” 16 August.
Seligson, Amber. 2003. “Disentangling the Roles of Ideology and Issue Positions in the 
Rise of Third Parties: The Case of Argentina.” Political Research Quarterly 56(4). 
Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. “The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of 
the Ecological Fallacy?” Comparative Politics (April).
___. 2007. “The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America.” Journal of Democracy 
18(3).
Selznick, Philip. 1952. The Organizational Weapon: The Organizational Weapon: A 
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Sesto,  Farruco.  1987. Andrés  Velásquez  en  Entrevista.  Caracas:  Ediciones  del  Agua 
Mansa.
____. 1992a (1988). Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas: Ediciones del Agua Mansa.
____. 1992b (1987). Tres Entrevistas con Andrés Velásquez. Caracas: Ediciones del Agua 
Mansa.
283
____. 1997. “Intervención en el Acto de Presentación Pública del PPT.” 27 September. 
Caracas.
Sewell, William. 1996. “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology.” Terence 
McDonald, ed., The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press.
Share, Donald. 1999. “From Policy-Seeking to Office-Seeking: The Metamorphosis of 
the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.” Wolfgang C Müller and Kaare Strøm, eds., 
Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Deci-
sions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shefter, Martin. 1993. Political Parties and the State. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1989. “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice 
Approach.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (April).
Shugart, Matthew and John D. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional 
Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
da Silva, Antonio Ozai da. 1987. Historia Das Tendências no Brasil. São Paulo: Proposta 
Editorial.
da Silva, Luis Inácio “Lula.” 1988. "É por isso que o PT Vota Contra o Texto [da Consti-
tuição].” Discourse to the Constituent Assembly session of 22 September 1988 (cited 
in the Blog do Noblat, O Globo, 11 June 2008).
____. 2002. “Letra ao Povo Brasileiro.” Available at http://www.pt.org.br.
____. 2008. “Seria mais Difícil Governar se PT Tivesse Feito Carta, diz Lula.” Interview 
of Lula by Fernanda Odilla. Folha de S.Paulo (5 October).
de Silva, Benedita Souza. 1983. “Eleições Diretas, Que Que É Isso Companheiro?” 15 
April.
Singer, Paul. 1980. “A Fundação.” Folha de S.Paulo. 14 February.
____. 2001. O PT. São Paulo: Publifolha.
Skromov, Paulo Matos. 1980. “A Militância, a Democracia Interna e o Estatuto do Par-
tido dos tTrabalhadores.” Prepared for the PT's 1980 National Meeting
Skromov, Paulo Matos et al. 1983. “PT – 83: o Partido na Direção da Luta contra o Arro-
cho e a Ditadura.”
Smith, Benjamin. 2005. “Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Per-
sistence under Single-Party Rule.” World Politics 57 (April).
284
Sonntag, Heinz and Thaís Maingón. 1992. Venezuela: 4F 1992: Un análisis sociopolítico. 
Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad.
de Souza, Djalma et al. 1983. “Manifesto da Articulação dos 113.” 2 June 1983.
Stallings, Barbara. 1992. "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabiliza-
tion, and Structural Reform." Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Poli-
tics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Politics, and the 
State. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stepan. Alfred. 1973. “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role 
Expansion.” Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
____. 1978a. "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil." Juan Linz and 
Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
____. 1978b. The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press.
Stern, Steve, ed. 1998. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Stokes, Susan. 1995. Cultures in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
____. 1999. "Political Parties and Democracy." Annual Review of Political Science 2.
____ 2001. Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
____. 2008. “Globalization and the Rise of the Left in Latin America.” Manuscript, De-
partment of Political Science, Yale University, August 27.
Streeck, Wolfgang and Kathleen Thelen. 2005. “Introduction: Institutional Change in Ad-
vanced Political Economies.” Streeck and Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institu-
tional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strøm,  Kaare,  and  Wolfgang  C  Müller.  1999.  “Political  Parties  and  Hard  Choices.” 
Müller and Strøm, eds., Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western 
Europe Make Hard Decisions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Studart, Hugo. 2006. A Lei da Selva: Estratégias, Imaginário e Discurso dos Militares 
sobre a Guerrilha do Araguaia. São Paulo: Geração Editorial.
Tanaka, Martin. 1998. Los Espejismos de la Democracia: el Colapso del Sistema de Par-
tidos en el Perú, 1980-1995, en Perspectiva Comparada. Lima: Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos
285
____. 2005. “Peru 1980-2000: Chronicle of a Death Foretold? Determinism, Political De-
cisions,  and Open Outcomes.”  Fran Hagopian and Scott  Mainwaring,  eds., Third 
Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
____. 2008. “The left in Peru: Plenty of wagons and no locomotion.” Jorge Castañeda 
and Marco Morales, eds., Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left.
____. 2009. La Condena a Fujimori. La Republica. 14 April.
Taylor, Lewis. 1990. “One step forward, two steps back: The Peruvian Izquierda Unida.” 
Journal of Communist Studies 6(3): 108–119.
Thelen,  Kathleen.  2003.  “How  institutions  evolve.”  James  Mahoney  and  Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences.  Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thelen, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo. 1992. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics.” Steinmo, Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds. Structuring Politics: Histori-
cal Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Torre, Juan Carlos. 2003. “Los Huérfanos de la Política de Partidos Sobre los Alcances y 
la  Naturaleza  de  la  Crisis  de  Representación  Partidaria.” Desarrollo  Económico 
42(168).
Truskier, Andy. 1969. “Entrevista a Quatro Revolucionários Brasileiros (Ladislaw Dobor, 
Carlos Eduardo Fluery, Fernando Gabeira, Ângelo Pezzutti).” Paris.
Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Turner, Frederick. 1995. “Reassessing Political Culture.” Peter Smith, ed. Latin America 
in Comparative Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press
Tuesta Soldevilla, Fernando. 1980. La Izquierda y las Elecciones de 1978. Unpublished 
Bachelor's thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
____. 2001. Perú Político en Cifras, 1821-2001. Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert.
Unidad Democrático Popular-Izquierda Unida (UDP-IU). 1983. Acuerdos del Comité Di-
rectivo Nacional de Izquierda Unida. Lima: Unidad Democrático Popular-Izquierda 
Unida.
El Universal. 2011. “PPT: Quieren Colocar al Partido al Servicio de Chávez.” 15 Decem-
ber.
Valenzuela, Arturo. 1990. "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Demo-
cratic Regime." Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Poli-
tics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner.
286
Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Timothy R. Scully. 1997. “Electoral Choices and the Party 
System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy.” Compar-
ative Politics 29(4).
Velásquez, Andrés. 1993a. Proyecto Político para una Nueva Venezuela. Caracas: Presi-
dente Andrés Velásquez.
____. 1993b. “Venezuela 1994-1998: Respuestas al Rato.” Economía Hoy. 3 November.
Velásquez, José Luis. 1988. “La Vía Democrática Al Socialismo.” La República. 22 May.
Vergara, Alberto. 2012. “Alternancia sin Alternativa: Un Año de Humala o Veinte Años 
de un Sistema?” Argumentos (3).
Villanueva, Víctor. 1969. ¿Nueva Mentalidad Militar en el Perú?. Lima: Editorial Re-
planteo.
____. 1972. El CAEM y la Revolución de la Fuerza Armada.  Lima: IEP Ediciones y 
Campodónico.
Wanderely, Farias. 1980. Legalizar o PT, Já! São Paulo: Partido dos Trabalhadores.
Ware, Alan. 1996. Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weber, Max. 1964. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free 
Press.
Weffort,  Francisco.  1983a.  “Debate  do Partido dos Trabalhadores  sobre a  Conjuntura 
Política Nacional” (21 October).
____. 1983b. “Informa sobre Reunião da Comissão Executiva Nacional.” Circular No. 
22/83 (19 November).
____. 1984a. “O PT na Encruzilhada.” Folha de S.Paulo. 14 December.
____. 1984b. Por Que Democracia? São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense.
Weyland, Kurt. 2002. “Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of 
Latin American Politics.” Studies in Comparative International Development 37(1).
Weyland, Kurt, Raúl Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds. 2010. Leftist Governments in Latin 
America: Successes and Shortcomings. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 2004. “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Leraning in the 
Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party.” Comparative Politics 36(2).
Woy-Hazleton, Sandra. 1979. “The Infrastructure of Participation in Peru: SINAMOS.” 
John Booth and Mitchell Seligson, eds., Politics and the Poor: Political Participation 
in Latin America, Vol. II. New York: Holmes and Meir Publishers.
287
Woy-Hazleton, Sandra, and William Hazleton. 1990. “Sendero Luminoso and the future 
of Peruvian Democracy.” Third World Quarterly 12(2): 21–35.
____. 1992. “Sendero Luminoso: A communist party crosses a river of Blood.” Terrorism 
and Political Violence. Vol 4, Issue 2.
Yaffé, Jaime. 2005. Al Centro y Adentro: la Renovación de la Izquierda y el Triunfo del 
Frente Amplio en Uruguay. Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso.
Yépez Salas, Guillermo. 1993. La Causa R: Origen y Poder. Caracas: Editorial Tropy-
kos.
Zago, Angela. 1998. La Rebelión de los Ángeles. Caracas: Warp Ediciones, S.A.
Zapata, Antonio. 2009. “Izquierda Unida: 20 Años atrás.” La República. 4 November.
288
Vita
Daniel Nogueira-Budny was born in New York, New York on 8 June 1982 to 
Nadia Nogueira and Robert Budny. He received his Bachelor's, magna cum laude,  in 
Political  Science,  Honors,  from  Columbia  University  in  2004.  He  then  received  a 
Master's  in  Latin  American Studies  from Georgetown University's  School  of  Foreign 
Service. While in Washington, DC, Daniel also served as program assistant to the Latin 
American Program and Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars. Since entering the doctoral program at the University of Texas at Austin, Daniel 
has won a number of grants and fellowships, including: numerous grants and fellowships 
from the Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies, the Department of 
Government, and the Graduate School of the University of Texas; a Clogg Scholarship 
from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (2008); a Boren 
Fellowship  (2010)  and  a  Fulbright  Fellowship  (2011),  both  from  the  Institute  of 
International Education; residency at the Summer Doctoral Institute (2012) of the George 
Washington University's CIBER, and a Graduate School Continuing Fellowship from the 
University of Texas (2012).
Permanent address: 120 E 81st St Apt 2E – New York, NY 10028
This dissertation was typed by the author.
289
